Konseli Mkuu Andrew
JF-Expert Member
- May 10, 2013
- 749
- 875
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE BEFORE THE 20TH CENTURY
War and infectious diseases have always been closely linked. Even without a precise understanding of how diseases were spread, it was understood early on that dead animals or humans could cause disease. There are some accounts of biological warfare as early as Greek and Roman times, but these are difficult to confirm and analyze. For an overview and further example of biological warfare prior to the 20th century, please see the paper in this issue entitled ‘Biological weapons and bioterrorism preparedness: importance of public-health awareness and international cooperation’.
MODERN BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
During World War I, Germany used biological warfare (BW) agents for sabotage. Horses being shipped to the Allies were infected with anthrax or glanders. This kind of sabotage was carried out in the USA, Romania, France and Spain, and later in Argentina and Norway. These actions did not have military consequences. France also seems to have had similar interests prior to World War II, but never got beyond research. Germany also undertook some limited activity prior to World War II, but most of the documentation was destroyed when Germany was invaded [1,2].
During World War II, many countries tried to acquire a BW capability. Among them were the USA, Russia, the UK, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, and Hungary [2]. The UK and Canadian BW programs were started in the 1930s. Both programs focused on agents harmful to crops and animals. In 1941, the UK had developed anthrax as an agent against cattle. Canada did extensive work on rinderpest. The USA-UK-Canadian BW program was focused on anthrax as an antipersonnel weapon. It was abandoned before being finished [2]. The UK BW program was aimed at retaliation-in-kind, using agents against cattle, in the form of cattle-cakes containing anthrax organisms. The UK produced 5 million cattle-cakes containing anthrax organisms, but these were never used. Testing of bombs was carried out on the island of Gruinard off the Scottish coast during 1942. Plans between the UK, Canada and the USA for a joint BW cluster bomb never reached the production stage during the war. Some studies were carried out on botulin, and a small amount of work was done on plague and Salmonella [1]. Field tests were carried out on BW munitions. Research focused on anthrax, botulin, and vectors to spread disease.
In reality, German activity was limited, as no offensive work was permitted [3]. Contacts between the Axis powers with regard to BW agents were very limited. By contrast, the Japanese BW program, which had been initiated in the middle of the 1930s, became quite advanced during World War II, and production capabilities (hundreds of kilograms) were developed for plague, anthrax, typhoid, cholera and dysentery. Several different types of bombs and devices to disseminate agents were developed, as well as methods for sabotage. Agents were tested on prisoners of war and, on a fairly large scale, against Chinese populations. Not all information concerning the Japanese BW program and activities has yet been made public [1].
THE US BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM
The US BW program was initiated as a response to suspicions during World War II that Germany and Japan were developing such warfare capabilities. George W. Merck was a key member of the panel advising President Franklin Roosevelt and was also responsible for initiating the program. The Army Chemical Warfare Service was given the responsibility for the program. The BW research was initiated in 1941 under stringent security, and the public was given no information until after the war, in 1946. Secretary of War H. Stimson had referred to the fact that Germany had used glanders against Rumanian cavalry, and that German saboteurs had infected horses being shipped to Europe, in World War I. Merck soon realized that the initial phase of work, using universities and private research institutes, was inadequate, and that a large-scale effort was required to develop weapons and means of protection.
In 1943, work on BW agents started at Fort Detrick, Maryland. The US BW program was given high priority. Germany is said to have had a mortal fear of the US BW capability, and decided against the BW option, a fact that the Allies were not aware of [4]. The important technological achievement in the US program during World War II was the development of small-particle-size aerosol dissemination of wet or dry preparations of pathogens. The US dropped charges of war crimes against the leading members of the Japanese BW program in exchange for data on experiments on human subjects [2]. In preparation for the Korean War, wheat rust was made available in 1950 as an agent to be used against the Soviet Union. The first production facility for bacterial agents was opened in the Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, and production of Brucella suis began in 1954, eventually reaching an output of 650 tons/month [2]. During the 1950s and 1960s, the program was further expanded, and more facilities were involved. At its peak, the program involved about 3400 people and a number of agents: Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Brucella suis, Coxiella burnetti, Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus, yellow fever, botulin, staphylococcal enterotoxin, and the anti-crop agents Pyricularia oryzae and Puccinia graminis [2].
In 1969, President Nixon took a historic decision to stop further offensive BW development, and to use the facilities for peaceful purposes or for bio-defense work only. There were several reasons for this, one being that the USA did not want to further develop the technology for BW, as there was a risk that other countries would also acquire it. Officially, it was stated that BW agents were of limited use. Another important reason was to make progress in negotiations to establish a convention banning biological and toxin weapons. In the aftermath, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation actively spread disinformation to the Soviet Union to the effect that a covert offensive BW program was continuing in the USA [2].
It has recently been shown that the allegations during the Korean War by China, North Korea and the Soviet Union that the USA had used BW agents were based on fabricated and false evidence. At the time, this claim was taken most seriously and generated much international attention [2].
Another case of allegations that could never be proven was when Cuba accused the USA on several occasions of using BW agents. The latest was in 1997, when Cuba accused the USA of spreading Trips palmi, which led to consultations in Geneva under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention [2].
THE SOVIET/RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM
In September 1981, the US Secretary of State accused the Soviet Union of supplying mycotoxins to its Vietnamese and Laotian communist allies for military use against resistance forces in Laos and Cambodia, and of using the same agents in combat operations in Afghanistan [5]. If true, this was the first time that toxins were used in warfare. The USA also implied that the Soviet Union was then violating the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. This allegation and the presented evidence led to much discussion. A group of researchers gave an alternative explanation for the so-called ‘yellow rain’. They argued that mycotoxins are common in this region and that the colored rain that refugees had spoken of could well be harmless showers of yellow feces released by swarming honeybees [6]. To date, the USA has not retracted its claim that the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in toxin warfare in South East Asia from 1975 to 1984 [5]. This is also one reason why the USA still insists on including trichothecene mycotoxins on all lists of possible BW agents. The example of the ‘yellow rain’ confirms the importance in this type of situation of employing scientifically trained teams that can respond promptly to allegations, gain access immediately and employ rigorous forensic methods to preserve evidence, at the site of alleged use.
The Soviet BW program was initiated in the mid-1920s. During 1930-40, research was carried out at the Red Army Bacteriology Institute in Vlasikha, 40 km from Moscow, on gas gangrene, tetanus, botulism and plague, and on methods for warfare, including aircraft and artillery shells. Not much is known of this early development, and some of it was carried out by imprisoned scientists [7]. The Stalinist purges of microbiologists involved in the program limited the progress made. During World War II, typhus was developed as a BW agent, and an aircraft dispenser for plague bacteria was invented. The capture of Japanese members of the BW program provided data and plans for building BW facilities that were used in the Soviet Union in 1946. The technology and equipment for fermentation were captured in Germany and brought back to the Soviet Union [2]. During the 1950s, a series of new BW research and production facilities was constructed. At the time of the Korean War, there was a belief that BW agents might be used on a massive scale against the Soviet Union by the USA. A system of antiplague institutes scattered over the country was created; local laboratories and field epidemiologic teams were connected to these, so that they could rapidly investigate any outbreaks. Although the Soviet Union signed and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which entered into force in 1975, it took a high-level decision to massively enlarge the BW program; the disinformation program on the part of the USA might well have been an important factor in this. To take advantage of the rapid progress in microbiology and biotechnology, a special secret organization, Biopreparat, was created to develop BW technology and agents. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture, KGB and the Academy of Sciences were also involved. Biopreparat was officially an organization to develop new technologies in biotechnology for commercial applications. At this time, a decision was taken to establish eight large ‘mobilization capacity’ BW production facilities; these were tested for large-scale BW production at short notice, but officially were declared to be civilian biotechnology production plants. Open-air field testing of BW agents was carried out on the island of Vozrozhdeniye in the Aral sea. At its height, the BW program as a whole involved about 60 000 people in 40-50 facilities. The program was surrounded by very high security, and the West had very limited information until several high-ranking members of the program defected at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. The Soviet Union produced BW agents on a massive scale, and maintained a large stockpile. Among the agents were tons of plague, anthrax and smallpox organisms to be used in intercontinental missiles. The Soviet BW program included Tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, plague, glanders, Marburg virus, smallpox virus, and VEE virus. In total, about 50 agents were available for study, including aspects of genetic modification of them.
From 1989, there was a concerted effort by the USA and UK to end the Soviet/Russian BW program. A trilateral process with mutual inspections was initiated. This stopped in 1994, and has not been revived since then. In 1992, President Yeltsin issued a decree to the effect that there had been a delay in implementing the BTWC and that further offensive work would now be banned [1,2,8]. Since then, there has been limited progress in promoting Russian transparency concerning its ongoing bio-defense work, and the West suspects that the offensive part of the program is ongoing in some form [9]. The method that has now been adopted by the West is to support Russia through financial aid. The aim is to encourage scientists with BW knowledge in Russia and CIS countries to redirect their research toward peaceful purposes, and discourage them from accepting proposals to work for rogue states [10].
An incident of great importance was the Sverdlovsk outbreak of anthrax in 1979, in which 69 people died. At the time, the USA claimed that the outbreak was the result of a release from a BW production facility. This was also the first major evidence that the Soviet Union was violating the BTWC. The Soviet Union claimed that the outbreak was a result of contaminated meat sold on the black market and that no international investigation was needed. This incident resulted in a long-standing period of distrust concerning BW between the USA and the Soviet Union. In 1992, President Yeltsin acknowledged that there had been an aerosol release from a military facility, but he did not indicate what type of work was being carried out. Recently, official representatives of the military have returned to the old explanation of contaminated meat. This shows the need for a mechanism for international investigation of this kind of incident [8].
THE IRAQI BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM
The Iraqi BW program was, as far as is known, initiated in 1974 at Al Hazen. The agents studied were Clostridium botulinum, spores of Bacillus, and influenza virus. This program did not progress very far, and those responsible were imprisoned, for reasons that are not clear today. According to the Iraqi information supplied to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the program was restarted in 1979 under the leadership of Dr Taha, who had a PhD in microbiology from the UK. There is speculation, however, that she was only presented to UNSCOM as a figurehead, and that the real head of the program is still unknown. The research at AL Muthanna was expanded in 1986, to include aflatoxin, trichothecene mycotoxins, and ricin. In 1990, the program was further expanded to include viruses and the genetic engineering of agents. It is estimated that around 30 agents were in some way studied for possible use. According to Iraqi information, aflatoxin, botulin and anthrax organisms were placed in missiles and air-delivered bombs in preparation for the Gulf War, but were not used. After 10 years of surveillance, which was in 1998, there are still many unanswered questions concerning the BW program and the possibility of ongoing activity.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
South Africa also had a BW program, which was initiated in 1980 and terminated around 1993. This was a limited covert program, in which Bacillus anthracis, Vibrio cholerae and Clostridium species were studied. Only small quantities of agents were produced, and no large-scale weaponry. Anthrax was used for individual assassinations, and cholerae for contaminating water supplies during attacks against freedom fighters in Namibia and, perhaps, other areas [2].
There are indications that 10-12 states are presently trying to acquire BW capability; this estimation is based on intelligence information, mainly from the USA. The countries named are Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Libya. This claim has remained unchanged for many years, but, so far, there is little evidence to support it.
DISCUSSION
BW or bioterrorism may have similar aims, but the magnitude of the effects might be different. From a historical point of view, it can be noted that the early military BW programs were aimed at sabotage, which is very similar to terrorism. During the Cold War, BW agents were developed as large-scale strategic weapons, making use of intercontinental missiles. Since the end of the Cold War, views on how BW agents might be used have changed. Missile attacks remain possible as more states acquire long-range and cruise missiles. However, now the whole spectrum from small, directed, covert operations and bioterrorism to larger-scale attacks has to be considered when planning preparedness.
This paper has focused mainly on military BW programs, and has not considered the history of bioterrorism as such. Only since the end of the Cold War has bioterrorism come into focus. Therefore, its history is short. It is important to remember that warfare and bioterrorism using BW agents can be the same thing.
History has shown that developments in biotechnology will be used for military purposes. As this development is very rapid and the technology is very powerful, the necessity for a multilateral control mechanism cannot be ignored, nor can the strong influence that scientists have had on the development of BW agents and their role influencing the military.
Negotiations to establish the BTWC have gone hand-in-hand with the development of BW agents, and the process of strengthening the convention has been very slow.
The BTWC was agreed only after deleting all references to a verification and control regime, as the Soviet Union would not accept this. Attempts to promote transparency through information exchange and confidence-building measures have been of limited value, as many countries view them as voluntary. The development of a comprehensive control regime for the BTWC, including mandatory declarations, visits to confirm accuracy in declarations, and the possibility of carrying out challenge inspections (field or facility investigations), has been taking place since 1995. A proposed final version of the control regime was finalized in March 2001, but it was not acceptable to the USA. Therefore, no final document was produced at the BTWC Fifth Review Conference in November 2001. The conference will be continued in November 2002.
It is now important to find a way forward. It is probable that the proliferation of BW agents will continue unless the BTWC is successful in establishing an enforceable control regime. The scientific community and the biotechnological industry are influential players who must also share responsibility in these matters.
REFERENCES
1
Geissler E, van Courtland Moon JE
Biological and toxin weapons research. Development and use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1999)
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies No. 18
2
Leitenberg MBiological weapons in the twentieth century: a review and analysis
Crit Rev Microbiol, 27 (2001), pp. 267-320
3
Geissler E
Biologische waffen-nicht in Hitlers arsenalen, LIT-Verlag, Munster (1998)
4
Covert NM. Cutting edge, a history of Fort Detrick, 4th edn. http://www.medcom.amedd.army.mil/detrick/.
5
Tucker JBThe ‘yellow rain’ controversy: lessons for arms control compliance
Nonproliferation Rev, 8 (2001), pp. 25-39
6
Ember LRYellow rain
Chem Eng News, 9 (1984), pp. 8-34
7
Domaradskij IV, Orent WThe memoirs of an inconvenient man: revelations about biological weapons research in the Soviet Union
Crit Rev Microbiol, 27 (2001), pp. 239-266
8
Alibek K, Handelman S
Biohazard. The chilling true story of the largest covert biological weapons program in the world, Random House, New York (1999)
9
Lilja P, Roffey R, Westerdahl KS
Disarmament or retention: is the Soviet biological weapons programme continuing in Russia?, Swedish Defense Research Agency, Umeå (1999)
Swedish Defense Research Agency FOI report 99-01366-865-SE, November
10
Roffey R, Westerdahl KS
Conversion of former biological weapons facilities in Kazakhstan: a visit to Stepnogorsk, Swedish Defense Research Agency, Umeå (2001)
Swedish Defense Research Agency FOI report R-0082-SE, May
Copyright © 2002 European Society of Clinical Infectious Diseases. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
War and infectious diseases have always been closely linked. Even without a precise understanding of how diseases were spread, it was understood early on that dead animals or humans could cause disease. There are some accounts of biological warfare as early as Greek and Roman times, but these are difficult to confirm and analyze. For an overview and further example of biological warfare prior to the 20th century, please see the paper in this issue entitled ‘Biological weapons and bioterrorism preparedness: importance of public-health awareness and international cooperation’.
MODERN BIOLOGICAL WARFARE
During World War I, Germany used biological warfare (BW) agents for sabotage. Horses being shipped to the Allies were infected with anthrax or glanders. This kind of sabotage was carried out in the USA, Romania, France and Spain, and later in Argentina and Norway. These actions did not have military consequences. France also seems to have had similar interests prior to World War II, but never got beyond research. Germany also undertook some limited activity prior to World War II, but most of the documentation was destroyed when Germany was invaded [1,2].
During World War II, many countries tried to acquire a BW capability. Among them were the USA, Russia, the UK, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, Japan, and Hungary [2]. The UK and Canadian BW programs were started in the 1930s. Both programs focused on agents harmful to crops and animals. In 1941, the UK had developed anthrax as an agent against cattle. Canada did extensive work on rinderpest. The USA-UK-Canadian BW program was focused on anthrax as an antipersonnel weapon. It was abandoned before being finished [2]. The UK BW program was aimed at retaliation-in-kind, using agents against cattle, in the form of cattle-cakes containing anthrax organisms. The UK produced 5 million cattle-cakes containing anthrax organisms, but these were never used. Testing of bombs was carried out on the island of Gruinard off the Scottish coast during 1942. Plans between the UK, Canada and the USA for a joint BW cluster bomb never reached the production stage during the war. Some studies were carried out on botulin, and a small amount of work was done on plague and Salmonella [1]. Field tests were carried out on BW munitions. Research focused on anthrax, botulin, and vectors to spread disease.
In reality, German activity was limited, as no offensive work was permitted [3]. Contacts between the Axis powers with regard to BW agents were very limited. By contrast, the Japanese BW program, which had been initiated in the middle of the 1930s, became quite advanced during World War II, and production capabilities (hundreds of kilograms) were developed for plague, anthrax, typhoid, cholera and dysentery. Several different types of bombs and devices to disseminate agents were developed, as well as methods for sabotage. Agents were tested on prisoners of war and, on a fairly large scale, against Chinese populations. Not all information concerning the Japanese BW program and activities has yet been made public [1].
THE US BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM
The US BW program was initiated as a response to suspicions during World War II that Germany and Japan were developing such warfare capabilities. George W. Merck was a key member of the panel advising President Franklin Roosevelt and was also responsible for initiating the program. The Army Chemical Warfare Service was given the responsibility for the program. The BW research was initiated in 1941 under stringent security, and the public was given no information until after the war, in 1946. Secretary of War H. Stimson had referred to the fact that Germany had used glanders against Rumanian cavalry, and that German saboteurs had infected horses being shipped to Europe, in World War I. Merck soon realized that the initial phase of work, using universities and private research institutes, was inadequate, and that a large-scale effort was required to develop weapons and means of protection.
In 1943, work on BW agents started at Fort Detrick, Maryland. The US BW program was given high priority. Germany is said to have had a mortal fear of the US BW capability, and decided against the BW option, a fact that the Allies were not aware of [4]. The important technological achievement in the US program during World War II was the development of small-particle-size aerosol dissemination of wet or dry preparations of pathogens. The US dropped charges of war crimes against the leading members of the Japanese BW program in exchange for data on experiments on human subjects [2]. In preparation for the Korean War, wheat rust was made available in 1950 as an agent to be used against the Soviet Union. The first production facility for bacterial agents was opened in the Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, and production of Brucella suis began in 1954, eventually reaching an output of 650 tons/month [2]. During the 1950s and 1960s, the program was further expanded, and more facilities were involved. At its peak, the program involved about 3400 people and a number of agents: Bacillus anthracis, Francisella tularensis, Brucella suis, Coxiella burnetti, Venezuelan equine encephalitis (VEE) virus, yellow fever, botulin, staphylococcal enterotoxin, and the anti-crop agents Pyricularia oryzae and Puccinia graminis [2].
In 1969, President Nixon took a historic decision to stop further offensive BW development, and to use the facilities for peaceful purposes or for bio-defense work only. There were several reasons for this, one being that the USA did not want to further develop the technology for BW, as there was a risk that other countries would also acquire it. Officially, it was stated that BW agents were of limited use. Another important reason was to make progress in negotiations to establish a convention banning biological and toxin weapons. In the aftermath, the US Federal Bureau of Investigation actively spread disinformation to the Soviet Union to the effect that a covert offensive BW program was continuing in the USA [2].
It has recently been shown that the allegations during the Korean War by China, North Korea and the Soviet Union that the USA had used BW agents were based on fabricated and false evidence. At the time, this claim was taken most seriously and generated much international attention [2].
Another case of allegations that could never be proven was when Cuba accused the USA on several occasions of using BW agents. The latest was in 1997, when Cuba accused the USA of spreading Trips palmi, which led to consultations in Geneva under the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention [2].
THE SOVIET/RUSSIAN BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM
In September 1981, the US Secretary of State accused the Soviet Union of supplying mycotoxins to its Vietnamese and Laotian communist allies for military use against resistance forces in Laos and Cambodia, and of using the same agents in combat operations in Afghanistan [5]. If true, this was the first time that toxins were used in warfare. The USA also implied that the Soviet Union was then violating the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. This allegation and the presented evidence led to much discussion. A group of researchers gave an alternative explanation for the so-called ‘yellow rain’. They argued that mycotoxins are common in this region and that the colored rain that refugees had spoken of could well be harmless showers of yellow feces released by swarming honeybees [6]. To date, the USA has not retracted its claim that the Soviet Union and its allies engaged in toxin warfare in South East Asia from 1975 to 1984 [5]. This is also one reason why the USA still insists on including trichothecene mycotoxins on all lists of possible BW agents. The example of the ‘yellow rain’ confirms the importance in this type of situation of employing scientifically trained teams that can respond promptly to allegations, gain access immediately and employ rigorous forensic methods to preserve evidence, at the site of alleged use.
The Soviet BW program was initiated in the mid-1920s. During 1930-40, research was carried out at the Red Army Bacteriology Institute in Vlasikha, 40 km from Moscow, on gas gangrene, tetanus, botulism and plague, and on methods for warfare, including aircraft and artillery shells. Not much is known of this early development, and some of it was carried out by imprisoned scientists [7]. The Stalinist purges of microbiologists involved in the program limited the progress made. During World War II, typhus was developed as a BW agent, and an aircraft dispenser for plague bacteria was invented. The capture of Japanese members of the BW program provided data and plans for building BW facilities that were used in the Soviet Union in 1946. The technology and equipment for fermentation were captured in Germany and brought back to the Soviet Union [2]. During the 1950s, a series of new BW research and production facilities was constructed. At the time of the Korean War, there was a belief that BW agents might be used on a massive scale against the Soviet Union by the USA. A system of antiplague institutes scattered over the country was created; local laboratories and field epidemiologic teams were connected to these, so that they could rapidly investigate any outbreaks. Although the Soviet Union signed and ratified the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC), which entered into force in 1975, it took a high-level decision to massively enlarge the BW program; the disinformation program on the part of the USA might well have been an important factor in this. To take advantage of the rapid progress in microbiology and biotechnology, a special secret organization, Biopreparat, was created to develop BW technology and agents. The Ministries of Health and Agriculture, KGB and the Academy of Sciences were also involved. Biopreparat was officially an organization to develop new technologies in biotechnology for commercial applications. At this time, a decision was taken to establish eight large ‘mobilization capacity’ BW production facilities; these were tested for large-scale BW production at short notice, but officially were declared to be civilian biotechnology production plants. Open-air field testing of BW agents was carried out on the island of Vozrozhdeniye in the Aral sea. At its height, the BW program as a whole involved about 60 000 people in 40-50 facilities. The program was surrounded by very high security, and the West had very limited information until several high-ranking members of the program defected at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. The Soviet Union produced BW agents on a massive scale, and maintained a large stockpile. Among the agents were tons of plague, anthrax and smallpox organisms to be used in intercontinental missiles. The Soviet BW program included Tularemia, anthrax, brucellosis, plague, glanders, Marburg virus, smallpox virus, and VEE virus. In total, about 50 agents were available for study, including aspects of genetic modification of them.
From 1989, there was a concerted effort by the USA and UK to end the Soviet/Russian BW program. A trilateral process with mutual inspections was initiated. This stopped in 1994, and has not been revived since then. In 1992, President Yeltsin issued a decree to the effect that there had been a delay in implementing the BTWC and that further offensive work would now be banned [1,2,8]. Since then, there has been limited progress in promoting Russian transparency concerning its ongoing bio-defense work, and the West suspects that the offensive part of the program is ongoing in some form [9]. The method that has now been adopted by the West is to support Russia through financial aid. The aim is to encourage scientists with BW knowledge in Russia and CIS countries to redirect their research toward peaceful purposes, and discourage them from accepting proposals to work for rogue states [10].
An incident of great importance was the Sverdlovsk outbreak of anthrax in 1979, in which 69 people died. At the time, the USA claimed that the outbreak was the result of a release from a BW production facility. This was also the first major evidence that the Soviet Union was violating the BTWC. The Soviet Union claimed that the outbreak was a result of contaminated meat sold on the black market and that no international investigation was needed. This incident resulted in a long-standing period of distrust concerning BW between the USA and the Soviet Union. In 1992, President Yeltsin acknowledged that there had been an aerosol release from a military facility, but he did not indicate what type of work was being carried out. Recently, official representatives of the military have returned to the old explanation of contaminated meat. This shows the need for a mechanism for international investigation of this kind of incident [8].
THE IRAQI BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAM
The Iraqi BW program was, as far as is known, initiated in 1974 at Al Hazen. The agents studied were Clostridium botulinum, spores of Bacillus, and influenza virus. This program did not progress very far, and those responsible were imprisoned, for reasons that are not clear today. According to the Iraqi information supplied to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), the program was restarted in 1979 under the leadership of Dr Taha, who had a PhD in microbiology from the UK. There is speculation, however, that she was only presented to UNSCOM as a figurehead, and that the real head of the program is still unknown. The research at AL Muthanna was expanded in 1986, to include aflatoxin, trichothecene mycotoxins, and ricin. In 1990, the program was further expanded to include viruses and the genetic engineering of agents. It is estimated that around 30 agents were in some way studied for possible use. According to Iraqi information, aflatoxin, botulin and anthrax organisms were placed in missiles and air-delivered bombs in preparation for the Gulf War, but were not used. After 10 years of surveillance, which was in 1998, there are still many unanswered questions concerning the BW program and the possibility of ongoing activity.
BIOLOGICAL WARFARE PROGRAMS THROUGHOUT THE WORLD
South Africa also had a BW program, which was initiated in 1980 and terminated around 1993. This was a limited covert program, in which Bacillus anthracis, Vibrio cholerae and Clostridium species were studied. Only small quantities of agents were produced, and no large-scale weaponry. Anthrax was used for individual assassinations, and cholerae for contaminating water supplies during attacks against freedom fighters in Namibia and, perhaps, other areas [2].
There are indications that 10-12 states are presently trying to acquire BW capability; this estimation is based on intelligence information, mainly from the USA. The countries named are Iraq, North Korea, Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Libya. This claim has remained unchanged for many years, but, so far, there is little evidence to support it.
DISCUSSION
BW or bioterrorism may have similar aims, but the magnitude of the effects might be different. From a historical point of view, it can be noted that the early military BW programs were aimed at sabotage, which is very similar to terrorism. During the Cold War, BW agents were developed as large-scale strategic weapons, making use of intercontinental missiles. Since the end of the Cold War, views on how BW agents might be used have changed. Missile attacks remain possible as more states acquire long-range and cruise missiles. However, now the whole spectrum from small, directed, covert operations and bioterrorism to larger-scale attacks has to be considered when planning preparedness.
This paper has focused mainly on military BW programs, and has not considered the history of bioterrorism as such. Only since the end of the Cold War has bioterrorism come into focus. Therefore, its history is short. It is important to remember that warfare and bioterrorism using BW agents can be the same thing.
History has shown that developments in biotechnology will be used for military purposes. As this development is very rapid and the technology is very powerful, the necessity for a multilateral control mechanism cannot be ignored, nor can the strong influence that scientists have had on the development of BW agents and their role influencing the military.
Negotiations to establish the BTWC have gone hand-in-hand with the development of BW agents, and the process of strengthening the convention has been very slow.
The BTWC was agreed only after deleting all references to a verification and control regime, as the Soviet Union would not accept this. Attempts to promote transparency through information exchange and confidence-building measures have been of limited value, as many countries view them as voluntary. The development of a comprehensive control regime for the BTWC, including mandatory declarations, visits to confirm accuracy in declarations, and the possibility of carrying out challenge inspections (field or facility investigations), has been taking place since 1995. A proposed final version of the control regime was finalized in March 2001, but it was not acceptable to the USA. Therefore, no final document was produced at the BTWC Fifth Review Conference in November 2001. The conference will be continued in November 2002.
It is now important to find a way forward. It is probable that the proliferation of BW agents will continue unless the BTWC is successful in establishing an enforceable control regime. The scientific community and the biotechnological industry are influential players who must also share responsibility in these matters.
REFERENCES
1
Geissler E, van Courtland Moon JE
Biological and toxin weapons research. Development and use from the Middle Ages to 1945, Oxford University Press, Oxford (1999)
SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute) Chemical and Biological Warfare Studies No. 18
2
Leitenberg MBiological weapons in the twentieth century: a review and analysis
Crit Rev Microbiol, 27 (2001), pp. 267-320
3
Geissler E
Biologische waffen-nicht in Hitlers arsenalen, LIT-Verlag, Munster (1998)
4
Covert NM. Cutting edge, a history of Fort Detrick, 4th edn. http://www.medcom.amedd.army.mil/detrick/.
5
Tucker JBThe ‘yellow rain’ controversy: lessons for arms control compliance
Nonproliferation Rev, 8 (2001), pp. 25-39
6
Ember LRYellow rain
Chem Eng News, 9 (1984), pp. 8-34
7
Domaradskij IV, Orent WThe memoirs of an inconvenient man: revelations about biological weapons research in the Soviet Union
Crit Rev Microbiol, 27 (2001), pp. 239-266
8
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