Nairobi, Kenya and The Hague, Netherlands
19 January 2015
A redacted brief by ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has accused senior politicians and officials in President Mwai Kibaki's government of using security agents and the Mungiki to cause violence during the 2007/2008 post-election violence.
The report names Mr Uhuru Kenyatta, who was then supporting President Kibaki's re-election, of having funded Mungiki and pro-PNU youths to attack perceived ODM supporters in Naivasha and Nakuru.
It alleges that Mr Kenyatta gave the youths the green light to do their worst, which the youths interpreted to mean they could kill and rape. Bensouda: Uhuru gave cash to arm Mungiki - Politics - nation.co.ke
The full text of Bensouda's evidence is available below
IN THE CASE OF
THE PROSECUTOR V. UHURU MUIGAI KENYATTA
I. Introduction
1. This case concerns the post-election violence that followed Kenya's 2007
presidential and parliamentary elections. Uhuru Kenyatta (also "Mr Kenyatta" or
the "Accused") was a leading politician, a member of the Party of National Unity
("PNU"),1 the son of Kenya's first President, and one of Kenya's wealthiest and
most influential political figures. He, along with other prominent PNU
supporters, deliberately entered into an alliance with a widely known and feared
criminal organisation, the Mungiki, paying them in cash and promises of
protection, in order to keep the PNU in power through every means necessary
and to carry out retaliatory attacks against perceived ODM supporters and to
avenge prior attacks against the Kikuyu and perceived PNU supporters.
2. When President Kibaki, the PNU candidate, was declared the winner of the 2007
presidential election, the opposition Orange Democratic Movement ("ODM")
denounced the results as fraudulent.2 Violence erupted, pitting PNU supporters
against those perceived to be ODM supporters, and ODM supporters against
those perceived to support the PNU.3 The violence was one of the most brutal
episodes in Kenya's post-independence history. The Prosecution alleges that the
Accused and others formulated a plan to attack perceived ODM supporters to
force them to abandon their attempts to overturn the announced election results.
This case focuses on Nakuru and Naivasha, the locations of two attacks in the
Rift Valley, the epicenter of the violence. To carry out the attacks, the Accused
paid, armed, instructed and transported Mungiki members and other pro-PNU
youths to the attack sites. The attackers committed scores of crimes over a five-
1 ICC-01/09-02/11-T-11-CONF-ENG, pages 13-16.
2 ICC-01/09-02/11-479-AnxA, agreed fact 23.
3 ICC-01/09-02/11-479-AnxA, agreed facts 10, 24; [REDACTED].
ICC-01/09-02/11-796-AnxA-Red 19-01-2015 5/73 EK T
ICC-01/09-02/11 2/ 69 19 January 2015
day period, many of which – such as forcible circumcision, rape and hacking
victims with pangas – were chosen for their barbarity and capacity to instil fear.
The attacks left hundreds dead and wounded, thousands displaced, and
countless victims with severe physical and mental injuries.
II. The Principal Actors
a. Uhuru Kenyatta
3. Mr Kenyatta is a career politician.4 He entered the 2007 election campaign
needing to prove his loyalty to the Kikuyu political elite, having run
(unsuccessfully) against President Kibaki in the 2002 election on the Kenya
African National Union ("KANU") ticket,5 and having opposed President Kibaki
in the 2005 constitutional referendum.6 Within the Kikuyu community, Mr
Kenyatta's previous opposition to President Kibaki was seen as an attempt to
divide the Kikuyu vote.7 In the 2007 election, Mr Kenyatta supported the PNU
and the incumbent, President Kibaki.8 Mr Kenyatta has been associated with the
Mungiki since at least 2000.9 The Mungiki supported his candidacy in the 2002
presidential election,10 campaigned for him, and provided security on the
campaign trail.11 As explained below, Mr Kenyatta's ties to the Mungiki enabled
him to engage the organisation's members to carry out the attacks in Nakuru and
Naivasha (together, "Rift Valley attacks") in January 2008.
4 KEN-OTP-0046-0103.
5 ICC-01/09-02/11-T-11-CONF-ENG, pages 5-8.
6 ICC-01/09-02/11-T-11-CONF-ENG, pages 11-12.
7 ICC-01/09-02/11-T-11-CONF-ENG, pages 6-7.
8 ICC-01/09-02/11-T-11-CONF-ENG, pages 13-16.
9 [REDACTED].
10 [REDACTED]; KEN-OTP-0046-0056.
11 [REDACTED].
ICC-01/09-02/11-796-AnxA-Red 19-01-2015 6/73 EK T
ICC-01/09-02/11 3/ 69 19 January 2015
b. The Mungiki
4. The Mungiki's violent reputation, ability to mobilise fighting age men, and
history of selling its services made it an ideal tool for the Accused to use for the
Rift Valley attacks. The "Mungiki", which means "many" or "multitude" in the
Kikuyu language,12 was an organisation primarily comprised of Kenyans from
the "GEMA" community (ethnic Gikuyu/Kikuyu,13 Embu, and Meru),14 the
majority of whom were Kikuyu.15 Formed by Maina Njenga and others as a selfdefence
and tribal militia following land-related ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley
in the late 1980s,16 it quickly grew in size, expanded outside the Rift Valley, and
developed a national presence.17 It became increasingly involved in extortion and
violent crime, including armed confrontations with the police and other ethnic
militias.18 It was declared a proscribed organisation by the Government of Kenya
("GoK") in 2002.19 Notwithstanding its criminal practices, politicians and
community leaders traded money and political patronage for the Mungiki's
backing.20
5. After the Mungiki opposed the Kibaki government in the 2005 constitutional
referendum,21 the government launched a campaign of extra-judicial killings,
enforced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests of Mungiki members.22 The
12 [REDACTED].
13 "Gikuyu" and "Kikuyu" are used interchangeably and both refer to Kenya's largest ethnic group.
14 [REDACTED].
15 KEN-OTP-0001-0364, at 0568.
16 [REDACTED]; KEN-OTP-0008-0029, at 0038- 0039; KEN-OTP-0033-0297, at 0301-0302; KEN-OTP-
0033-0514, at 0517; KEN-OTP-0033-0437, at 0441; KEN-OTP-0046-0277, at 0305-0306.
17 KEN-OTP-0008-0029, at 0037; KEN-OTP-0033-0297, at 0303-04.
18 [REDACTED].
19 KEN-OTP-0033-0297, at 0301.
20 [REDACTED].
21 [REDACTED].
22 [REDACTED].
ICC-01/09-02/11-796-AnxA-Red 19-01-2015 7/73 EK T
ICC-01/09-02/11 4/ 69 19 January 2015
crackdown lasted into 2007.23 As explained below, the PNU suspended the
crackdown in late 2007 to secure the Mungiki's support in the 2007 election.24
i. Size and structure
6. While estimates of the Mungiki's membership vary, in January 2008 it was a large
organisation, capable of mobilising thousands quickly when required.25 The
Mungiki had a hierarchical structure with a functioning chain of command,26
illustrated in general terms in the chart attached at the end of this document.
7. At the top of the hierarchy was Maina Njenga, the organisation's founder,
spiritual leader and Chairman.27 He had ultimate decision-making authority, and
decisions with national import required his approval.28 From June 2007 until
April 2009, Maina Njenga was in custody for alleged firearm and drug
possession.29 Although incarcerated during the period covered by the charges,
Maina Njenga received a constant stream of information about the organisation's
activities, made decisions on important matters, and retained a veto power.30
Throughout the PEV, Charles Ndungu Wagacha was the Acting Chairman who
supervised day-to-day operations31 and, along with other senior leaders,
communicated with Maina Njenga and visited him in prison.32
8. Below Maina Njenga and Charles Ndungu Wagacha, the next level within the
Mungiki hierarchy was the Council of Elders, approximately 50-100 senior
23 [REDACTED].
24 See, infra, paras 19-21.
25 [REDACTED]; KEN-OTP-0033-0317, at 0329; KEN-OTP-0033-0297, at 0303-0304.
26 [REDACTED].
27 [REDACTED].
28 [REDACTED].
29 KEN-OTP-0072-0371, at 0372; KEN-OTP-0053-0243; He was released following widespread protests by
Mungiki members who alleged that the PNU had promised to release him in exchange for support during the
2007 election campaign and the subsequent violence: see [REDACTED]; KEN-OTP-0053-0243
READ THE FULL TEXT OF BENSOUDA'S EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE : http://www.jfjustice.net/wp-content...6-August-2013-ICC-0109-0211-796-Conf-AnxA.pdf
19 January 2015
A redacted brief by ICC prosecutor Fatou Bensouda has accused senior politicians and officials in President Mwai Kibaki's government of using security agents and the Mungiki to cause violence during the 2007/2008 post-election violence.
The report names Mr Uhuru Kenyatta, who was then supporting President Kibaki's re-election, of having funded Mungiki and pro-PNU youths to attack perceived ODM supporters in Naivasha and Nakuru.
It alleges that Mr Kenyatta gave the youths the green light to do their worst, which the youths interpreted to mean they could kill and rape. Bensouda: Uhuru gave cash to arm Mungiki - Politics - nation.co.ke
The full text of Bensouda's evidence is available below
IN THE CASE OF
THE PROSECUTOR V. UHURU MUIGAI KENYATTA
I. Introduction
1. This case concerns the post-election violence that followed Kenya's 2007
presidential and parliamentary elections. Uhuru Kenyatta (also "Mr Kenyatta" or
the "Accused") was a leading politician, a member of the Party of National Unity
("PNU"),1 the son of Kenya's first President, and one of Kenya's wealthiest and
most influential political figures. He, along with other prominent PNU
supporters, deliberately entered into an alliance with a widely known and feared
criminal organisation, the Mungiki, paying them in cash and promises of
protection, in order to keep the PNU in power through every means necessary
and to carry out retaliatory attacks against perceived ODM supporters and to
avenge prior attacks against the Kikuyu and perceived PNU supporters.
2. When President Kibaki, the PNU candidate, was declared the winner of the 2007
presidential election, the opposition Orange Democratic Movement ("ODM")
denounced the results as fraudulent.2 Violence erupted, pitting PNU supporters
against those perceived to be ODM supporters, and ODM supporters against
those perceived to support the PNU.3 The violence was one of the most brutal
episodes in Kenya's post-independence history. The Prosecution alleges that the
Accused and others formulated a plan to attack perceived ODM supporters to
force them to abandon their attempts to overturn the announced election results.
This case focuses on Nakuru and Naivasha, the locations of two attacks in the
Rift Valley, the epicenter of the violence. To carry out the attacks, the Accused
paid, armed, instructed and transported Mungiki members and other pro-PNU
youths to the attack sites. The attackers committed scores of crimes over a five-
1 ICC-01/09-02/11-T-11-CONF-ENG, pages 13-16.
2 ICC-01/09-02/11-479-AnxA, agreed fact 23.
3 ICC-01/09-02/11-479-AnxA, agreed facts 10, 24; [REDACTED].
ICC-01/09-02/11-796-AnxA-Red 19-01-2015 5/73 EK T
ICC-01/09-02/11 2/ 69 19 January 2015
day period, many of which – such as forcible circumcision, rape and hacking
victims with pangas – were chosen for their barbarity and capacity to instil fear.
The attacks left hundreds dead and wounded, thousands displaced, and
countless victims with severe physical and mental injuries.
II. The Principal Actors
a. Uhuru Kenyatta
3. Mr Kenyatta is a career politician.4 He entered the 2007 election campaign
needing to prove his loyalty to the Kikuyu political elite, having run
(unsuccessfully) against President Kibaki in the 2002 election on the Kenya
African National Union ("KANU") ticket,5 and having opposed President Kibaki
in the 2005 constitutional referendum.6 Within the Kikuyu community, Mr
Kenyatta's previous opposition to President Kibaki was seen as an attempt to
divide the Kikuyu vote.7 In the 2007 election, Mr Kenyatta supported the PNU
and the incumbent, President Kibaki.8 Mr Kenyatta has been associated with the
Mungiki since at least 2000.9 The Mungiki supported his candidacy in the 2002
presidential election,10 campaigned for him, and provided security on the
campaign trail.11 As explained below, Mr Kenyatta's ties to the Mungiki enabled
him to engage the organisation's members to carry out the attacks in Nakuru and
Naivasha (together, "Rift Valley attacks") in January 2008.
4 KEN-OTP-0046-0103.
5 ICC-01/09-02/11-T-11-CONF-ENG, pages 5-8.
6 ICC-01/09-02/11-T-11-CONF-ENG, pages 11-12.
7 ICC-01/09-02/11-T-11-CONF-ENG, pages 6-7.
8 ICC-01/09-02/11-T-11-CONF-ENG, pages 13-16.
9 [REDACTED].
10 [REDACTED]; KEN-OTP-0046-0056.
11 [REDACTED].
ICC-01/09-02/11-796-AnxA-Red 19-01-2015 6/73 EK T
ICC-01/09-02/11 3/ 69 19 January 2015
b. The Mungiki
4. The Mungiki's violent reputation, ability to mobilise fighting age men, and
history of selling its services made it an ideal tool for the Accused to use for the
Rift Valley attacks. The "Mungiki", which means "many" or "multitude" in the
Kikuyu language,12 was an organisation primarily comprised of Kenyans from
the "GEMA" community (ethnic Gikuyu/Kikuyu,13 Embu, and Meru),14 the
majority of whom were Kikuyu.15 Formed by Maina Njenga and others as a selfdefence
and tribal militia following land-related ethnic clashes in the Rift Valley
in the late 1980s,16 it quickly grew in size, expanded outside the Rift Valley, and
developed a national presence.17 It became increasingly involved in extortion and
violent crime, including armed confrontations with the police and other ethnic
militias.18 It was declared a proscribed organisation by the Government of Kenya
("GoK") in 2002.19 Notwithstanding its criminal practices, politicians and
community leaders traded money and political patronage for the Mungiki's
backing.20
5. After the Mungiki opposed the Kibaki government in the 2005 constitutional
referendum,21 the government launched a campaign of extra-judicial killings,
enforced disappearances, and arbitrary arrests of Mungiki members.22 The
12 [REDACTED].
13 "Gikuyu" and "Kikuyu" are used interchangeably and both refer to Kenya's largest ethnic group.
14 [REDACTED].
15 KEN-OTP-0001-0364, at 0568.
16 [REDACTED]; KEN-OTP-0008-0029, at 0038- 0039; KEN-OTP-0033-0297, at 0301-0302; KEN-OTP-
0033-0514, at 0517; KEN-OTP-0033-0437, at 0441; KEN-OTP-0046-0277, at 0305-0306.
17 KEN-OTP-0008-0029, at 0037; KEN-OTP-0033-0297, at 0303-04.
18 [REDACTED].
19 KEN-OTP-0033-0297, at 0301.
20 [REDACTED].
21 [REDACTED].
22 [REDACTED].
ICC-01/09-02/11-796-AnxA-Red 19-01-2015 7/73 EK T
ICC-01/09-02/11 4/ 69 19 January 2015
crackdown lasted into 2007.23 As explained below, the PNU suspended the
crackdown in late 2007 to secure the Mungiki's support in the 2007 election.24
i. Size and structure
6. While estimates of the Mungiki's membership vary, in January 2008 it was a large
organisation, capable of mobilising thousands quickly when required.25 The
Mungiki had a hierarchical structure with a functioning chain of command,26
illustrated in general terms in the chart attached at the end of this document.
7. At the top of the hierarchy was Maina Njenga, the organisation's founder,
spiritual leader and Chairman.27 He had ultimate decision-making authority, and
decisions with national import required his approval.28 From June 2007 until
April 2009, Maina Njenga was in custody for alleged firearm and drug
possession.29 Although incarcerated during the period covered by the charges,
Maina Njenga received a constant stream of information about the organisation's
activities, made decisions on important matters, and retained a veto power.30
Throughout the PEV, Charles Ndungu Wagacha was the Acting Chairman who
supervised day-to-day operations31 and, along with other senior leaders,
communicated with Maina Njenga and visited him in prison.32
8. Below Maina Njenga and Charles Ndungu Wagacha, the next level within the
Mungiki hierarchy was the Council of Elders, approximately 50-100 senior
23 [REDACTED].
24 See, infra, paras 19-21.
25 [REDACTED]; KEN-OTP-0033-0317, at 0329; KEN-OTP-0033-0297, at 0303-0304.
26 [REDACTED].
27 [REDACTED].
28 [REDACTED].
29 KEN-OTP-0072-0371, at 0372; KEN-OTP-0053-0243; He was released following widespread protests by
Mungiki members who alleged that the PNU had promised to release him in exchange for support during the
2007 election campaign and the subsequent violence: see [REDACTED]; KEN-OTP-0053-0243
READ THE FULL TEXT OF BENSOUDA'S EVIDENCE IS AVAILABLE : http://www.jfjustice.net/wp-content...6-August-2013-ICC-0109-0211-796-Conf-AnxA.pdf
