Special Thread: Yanayojiri Mgogoro wa Ukraine na Urusi. Nini chanzo na hatma ya mzozo?

Ngongo said:

We are fighting today not only for the freedom of Russia, but for the freedom of the entire world,” Putin said. “Our country is now at the forefront of creating a more equitable world order. And I want to emphasize: without a sovereign, strong Russia, no lasting, stable world order is possible.”

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lee Vladimir cleef said:

A hard truth about the Russia-Ukraine conflict is finally dawning on the West​

American observers are finally snapping out of “magical thinking” about Moscow’s defeat

By Tarik Cyril Amar, a historian from Germany working at Koç University, Istanbul, on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, the history of World War II, the cultural Cold War,

On November 16, the Wall Street Journal, one of the most prestigious and influential American media outlets, published an essay under the title “It’s Time to End Magical Thinking About Russia’s Defeat.”

The authors, Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss, are influential representatives of America’s national security and international relathment. After a career in government service, Rumer now directs the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Weiss is Carnegie’s vice president for studies. This is an important text, and both its message and the timing of its publication matter.

The message is simple: “Putin” (by which they mean Russia) has “withstood the West’s best efforts” to roll back the military operation against Ukraine; Moscow’s political system has proven resilient and even become stronger; and “America and its allies” must now switch to a strategy of “containment.”

The failure of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive, by now acknowledged even in gung-ho outlets such as the British Daily Telegraph.

Against this background, this Wall Street Journal article clearly serves as an authoritative call for retrenchment. The object of this signal to retreat is the proxy war in Ukraine, that is, the single most aggressive, most risky, and most defeated US foreign policy strategy in the past two years (if we count from the moment Washington recklessly decided to stonewall Moscow’s clear warning as well as its urgent offer to find a grand bargain-style off-ramp in late 2021).
So far, so telling. But not surprising. For two reasons: the turn away from Ukraine is already fairly old non-news. Even mainstream media spotted the onset of a severe, probably terminal, bout of Ukraine fatigue well before the eruption of the fresh war in the Middle East. Secondly, the skeptical insights now given prominence in the Wall Street Journal as reasons to wrap up its proxy war investment in Ukraine are very old hat indeed. As a matter of fact, the most interesting question the essay – inadvertently – raises is what took you so long?
We learn, for instance, that the West’s attempts to isolate Russia have failed. Yet how hard was it to foresee that the Global South has no reason to follow the West except fear, and that fear is abating? And was it impossible to know in advance that China would answer “No, thank you very much,” when the US and the EU did two things at the same time: urge it to abandon Russia, which would have meant giving up Beijing’s single most important partnership, and signal that China would be next to be cut down to size? China, in essence, initially gestured a little in the direction of distancing itself from Russia, but the strategic fundamentals of the situation determined its real behavior and have become explicit by now. This outcome was predicted, not by every expert but by enough of them to matter.
We are also reminded that this is a war of attrition, i.e. one favoring Russia by its very nature. Even on CNN, we heard that much as early as April 2022, and the militantly Atlanticist Economist magazine admitted it in a backhanded way (using the euphemism “war of endurance”) in September.
Every war is a matter of competitive military performance. But in a war of attrition, three fundamental things matter the most: the size, productive and technological capacity, and resilience of the economy; the stability of the political system, including its real-life popularity and the elites’ legitimacy; and, of course, demography. The Wall Street Journal observes that Russia’s economy has “been buffeted but is not in tatters” (really understating its success, but let’s not quibble) and that its political system draws on “solid” popular support and elites that have neither rebelled nor deserted.
In the West at least, this was harder to predict. Not because of Russia being so difficult to decipher, but due to Western bias and groupthink, or, bluntly put, wishful thinking. Even before the post-February 2022 Ukraine war, Western politics, media, think tanks, and even academia have rewarded unrealistically pessimistic assessments of both Russia’s economy and political stability. Consider, as a pars pro toto, Western reactions to the Wagner rebellion in June. Quite a few of them predicted the imminent collapse of Russia into anarchy and civil war or, at least, a great and lasting domestic and international weakening of Russia. Yet none of this has come to pass.
The importance of this comprehensive, almost total failure of analysis and prediction lies in how typical it was, reflecting a dominant culture of politicized sloppiness vitiating Western thinking about Russia. A sloppiness that is all the more astonishing as precisely Moscow’s opponents cannot afford it without serious self-harm.
For self-harm is the main result. It is true that Russia has to bear some of the cost of Western shortsightedness. Obviously, Moscow as well would be better off if it could work with reasonable, if competitive, partners instead of irrationally hostile opponents who constantly underestimate Russia and overestimate themselves. Yet the West is suffering even more from its pattern of repetitive mistakes.
The costs of the proxy war in Ukraine demonstrate this fact, and not only in terms of arms and money, but of political prestige as well. Regarding the quantifiable costs, the US Congress, for instance, has approved $113 billion worth of aid for Ukraine since February 2022. Currently, a request for even more is turning into a major domestic headache for the Biden administration, and most likely, a defeat. The EU has shelled out almost €85 billion.
Of course, not all of these funds have really been appropriated, and much of them have really been fueling corruption in Ukraine or served the donors and especially their arms industries, as US politicians have repeatedly pointed out with proud cynicism. Yet the overall picture remains one of severe fiscal overstretch spent on a losing gamble. Add the self-inflicted losses that the EU’s economies in particular have incurred from their misconceived sanctions policy and the picture is grim. Add, moreover, how much the West will have to spend if it really wishes to finance the rebuilding of Ukraine, and the prospect turns catastrophic. Good luck, EU, with those membership
In addition, intangibles matter as well. Clearly, “losing” Ukraine (which the West should not have tried to “own” in the first place) will reveal the bloc's weakness more sharply than the failures in, for instance, Iraq, Libya, Syria, or Afghanistan. For two reasons. First, unlike these countries, Russia is a great power; that means it is in a position to exploit the Western setback. Moscow, put differently, is big enough to geopolitically counterattack.
Whether or when exactly it will do so, and what shape such a new “snapping back” of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s metaphorical “rubber band” will take this time, remains to be seen. What is clear is that such payback is a realistic possibility. Secondly, the West is committed as never before, substantially and rhetorically, when trying to use Ukraine to reduce Russia. Hence, failing to do so exposes Western limits as never before. Rumer and Weiss are not naïve. They cannot say it – and maybe they can’t even quite think it – but in their heart of hearts they know that packaging this defeat as a mere change of strategy to “containment” will not fool anyone who does not want to be fooled.
It is good to finally see some hard facts appear prominently in mainstream Western debates. But it is not enough. For one thing, the West has to ask itself painful questions why it has stayed so obsessively one-sided for so long. Otherwise, the same pattern will be repeated in starting and waging the next war, for instance, against China or Iran. Secondly, a shift to “containment” will not repair the damage but merely stretch it out. What the West really needs is a complete rethinking of not merely its methods but its aims.
A hard truth about the Russia-Ukraine conflict is finally dawning on the West
American observers are finally snapping out of “magical thinking” about Moscow’s defeat
Tarik Cyril Amar
By Tarik Cyril Amar, a historian from Germany working at Koç University, Istanbul, on Russia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe, the history of World War II, the cultural Cold War, and the politics of memory



@tarikcyrilamar
tarikcyrilamar.substack.com
tarikcyrilamar.com
A hard truth about the Russia-Ukraine conflict is finally dawning on the West

On November 16, the Wall Street Journal, one of the most prestigious and influential American media outlets, published an essay under the title “It’s Time to End Magical Thinking About Russia’s Defeat.”

The authors, Eugene Rumer and Andrew S. Weiss, are influential representatives of America’s national security and international relations establishment. After a career in government service, Rumer now directs the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace; Weiss is Carnegie’s vice president for studies. This is an important text, and both its message and the timing of its publication matter.

The message is simple: “Putin” (by which they mean Russia) has “withstood the West’s best efforts” to roll back the military operation against Ukraine; Moscow’s political system has proven resilient and even become stronger; and “America and its allies” must now switch to a strategy of “containment.”

The timing is more complex. Clearly, the current Israeli war on Gaza – referred to as “tumult in the Middle East” – is one of three key factors. The other two are the approaching presidential elections in the US, and, of course, the failure of Ukraine’s summer counteroffensive, by now acknowledged even in gung-ho outlets such as the British Daily Telegraph.

In addition, America's hold over the non-Western majority of humanity is continuing to decline. China, in particular, is successfully resisting Washington’s pressure. Domestically, President Joe Biden's government faces tough headwinds from both the official Republican opposition and a growing movement in the American street, where widespread and deep dissatisfaction with politics and the economy is now combining with an unprecedented groundswell of protest against US complicity in Israel’s genocidal war on the Palestinians.

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American polls are unambiguous. In September, even before the Middle East crisis, the Pew Research Center found that “Americans’ views of politics and elected officials” are now unusually and “unrelentingly negative, with little hope of improvement on the horizon.” By now, a majority of Americans also contradict the Biden administration – and the rest of almost the whole bipartisan political establishment – by wanting a cease fire in Gaza, while the number of those supporting Israel is decreasing quickly and significantly

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We are also reminded that this is a war of attrition, i.e. one favoring Russia by its very nature. Even on CNN, we heard that much as early as April 2022, and the militantly Atlanticist Economist magazine admitted it in a backhanded way (using the euphemism “war of endurance”) in September.

Every war is a matter of competitive military performance. But in a war of attrition, three fundamental things matter the most: the size, productive and technological capacity, and resilience of the economy; the stability of the political system, including its real-life popularity and the elites’ legitimacy; and, of course, demography. The Wall Street Journal observes that Russia’s economy has “been buffeted but is not in tatters” (really understating its success, but let’s not quibble) and that its political system draws on “solid” popular support and elites that have neither rebelled nor deserted.

In the West at least, this was harder to predict. Not because of Russia being so difficult to decipher, but due to Western bias and groupthink, or, bluntly put, wishful thinking. Even before the post-February 2022 Ukraine war, Western politics, media, think tanks, and even academia have rewarded unrealistically pessimistic assessments of both Russia’s economy and political stability. Consider, as a pars pro toto, Western reactions to the Wagner rebellion in June. Quite a few of them predicted the imminent collapse of Russia into anarchy and civil war or, at least, a great and lasting domestic and international weakening of Russia. Yet none of this has come to pass.

The importance of this comprehensive, almost total failure of analysis and prediction lies in how typical it was, reflecting a dominant culture of politicized sloppiness vitiating Western thinking about Russia. A sloppiness that is all the more astonishing as precisely Moscow’s opponents cannot afford it without serious self-harm.

For self-harm is the main result. It is true that Russia has to bear some of the cost of Western shortsightedness. Obviously, Moscow as well would be better off if it could work with reasonable, if competitive, partners instead of irrationally hostile opponents who constantly underestimate Russia and overestimate themselves. Yet the West is suffering even more from its pattern of repetitive mistakes.

The costs of the proxy war in Ukraine demonstrate this fact, and not only in terms of arms and money, but of political prestige as well. Regarding the quantifiable costs, the US Congress, for instance, has approved $113 billion worth of aid for Ukraine since February 2022. Currently, a request for even more is turning into a major domestic headache for the Biden administration, and most likely, a defeat. The EU has shelled out almost €85 billion.

Of course, not all of these funds have really been appropriated, and much of them have really been fueling corruption in Ukraine or served the donors and especially their arms industries, as US politicians have repeatedly pointed out with proud cynicism. Yet the overall picture remains one of severe fiscal overstretch spent on a losing gamble. Add the self-inflicted losses that the EU’s economies in particular have incurred from their misconceived sanctions policy and the picture is grim. Add, moreover, how much the West will have to spend if it really wishes to finance the rebuilding of Ukraine, and the prospect turns catastrophic. Good luck, EU, with those membership plans.

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In addition, intangibles matter as well. Clearly, “losing” Ukraine (which the West should not have tried to “own” in the first place) will reveal the bloc's weakness more sharply than the failures in, for instance, Iraq, Libya, Syria, or Afghanistan. For two reasons. First, unlike these countries, Russia is a great power; that means it is in a position to exploit the Western setback. Moscow, put differently, is big enough to geopolitically counterattack.

Whether or when exactly it will do so, and what shape such a new “snapping back” of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s metaphorical “rubber band” will take this time, remains to be seen. What is clear is that such payback is a realistic possibility. Secondly, the West is committed as never before, substantially and rhetorically, when trying to use Ukraine to reduce Russia. Hence, failing to do so exposes Western limits as never before. Rumer and Weiss are not naïve. They cannot say it – and maybe they can’t even quite think it – but in their heart of hearts they know that packaging this defeat as a mere change of strategy to “containment” will not fool anyone who does not want to be fooled.

It is good to finally see some hard facts appear prominently in mainstream Western debates. But it is not enough. For one thing, the West has to ask itself painful questions why it has stayed so obsessively one-sided for so long. Otherwise, the same pattern will be repeated in starting and waging the next war, for instance, against China or Iran. Secondly, a shift to “containment” will not repair the damage but merely stretch it out. What the West really needs is a complete rethinking of not merely its methods but its aims.

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Jasmoni Tegga said:

Ukweli mgumu kuhusu mzozo wa Urusi na Ukreni hatimaye unawazukia nchi za Magharibi

Wachunguzi Wamarekani hatimaye wanazinduka kwenye ^fikra ya kimazingara^ kuhusu kushindwa kwa Mosko.

Na Tarik Cyril Amar, mwanahistoria kutoka Ujerumani afanyaye kazi katika Chuo Kikuu cha Koç, Istanbul, akijihusisha na Urusi, Ukreni, na Ulaya Mashariki, historia ya Vita II vya Dunia, Vita Baridi vya kitamaduni, na siasa za kumbukumbu.

Mnamo Novemba 16, Jarida la Wall Street, moja ya vyombo vya habari vyenye hadhi na ushawishi mkubwa zaidi Marekani, lilichapisha makala chini ya kichwa cha habari ^Ni Wakati wa Kukomesha Mawazo ya Kimazingara Kuhusu Kuishindwa kwa Urusi.^

Waandishi husika, Eugene Rumer na Andrew S. Weiss, ni wawakilishi wenye ushawishi wa usalama wa taifa la Marekani na ikama ya mahusiano ya kimataifa.

Baada ya ajira katika utumishi wa serikali, Rumer sasa anaongoza programu ya Urusi na Eurasia katika Asasi ya Carnegie kwa ajili ya Amani ya Kimataifa; Weiss ni makamu rais wa Carnegie kwa ajili ya tafiti mbalimbali. Haya ni maandishi muhimu, na ujumbe na muda wake wa kuchapishwa vina maana.

Ujumbe husika ni rahisi: ^Putin^ (ambapo wanamaanisha Urusi) ^amehimili juhudi bora za Magharibi^ kurudisha nyuma operesheni ya kijeshi dhidi ya Ukreni; mfumo wa kisiasa wa Mosko umethibitika kuwa madhubuti na hata kuwa na imara zaidi; na ^Marekani pamoja na washirika wake^ lazima sasa wageukie mkakati wa ^uzingaji.^

Muda ambapo tukio husika linatokea ni changamani zaidi. Ni wazi, vita vya sasa vya Israeli dhidi ya Gaza—vijulikanavyo kama ^msukosuko katika Mashariki ya Kati^—ni moja ya mambo matatu muhimu.

Mengine mawili ni uchaguzi wa urais unaokaribia nchini Marekani, na kwa kweli, kushindwa kwa mashambulizi-pinzani ya Ukreni katika msimu wa hari, ambayo kwa sasa yamekiriwa hata katika vinahabari kindaki kama vile British Daily Telegraph.

Pamoja na hilo, ushawishi wa Marekani juu ya idadi kubwa ya watu wasio wa Magharibi unaenelea kupungua. China, hususan, inafanikiwa kupinga shinikizo la Washington.

Ndani ya nchi, serikali ya Rais Joe Biden inakabiliwa na pepo mbisho na kali kutoka kwenye upinzani rasmi wa Republican na vuguvugu linalokua katika mitaa ya Marekani, ambapo hali ya kina na pana ya kutoridhika na siasa na uchumi sasa inachanganyika na mfutuko usio kifani wa maandamano dhidi ya ushiriki wa Marekani katika vita vya mauaji ya kimbari ya Israeli kwa Wapalestina.

Kura za maoni Marekani hazina utata. Mnano Septemba, hata kabla ya mzozo wa Mashariki ya Kati, Kituo cha Utafiti cha Pew kilibaini kwamba ^mitazamo ya Wamarekani kuhusu siasa na maafisa waliochaguliwa,^ kwa namna isiyo ya kawaida na ^isiyopungua, sasa ni hasi, ikiwa na tumaini dogo la kuboreka mbeleni.^

Kufikia sasa, Wamarekani wengi pia wanapingana na utawala wa Joe Biden—na karibu taasisi zote za kisiasa za pande mbili—kwa kutaka kusitishwe mapigano huko Gaza, wakati idadi ya wale wanaounga mkono Israeli inapungua haraka na kwa kiasi kikubwa.

Kutokana na hali hii, makala haya ya Jarida la Wall Street hutumika bayana kama wito madhubuti wa kubana matumizi.

Lengo la ishara hii ya kurudi nyuma ni vita vya uwakala nchini Ukraine, yaani, mkakati mmoja mkali zaidi, hatari zaidi, na ulioshindwa zaidi wa sera ya kigeni ya Marekani katika miaka miwili iliyopita (ikiwa tutahesabu kuanzia wakati Washington ilipoamua kizembe kuzorotesha onyo la wazi la Mosko na awani yake ya haraka ya kutafuta mbinu ya majadiliano kwenye njia-panda mwishoni mwa 2021).

Hadi hapa, tukio zima hujieleza hasa. Lakini haishangazi. Kwa sababu mbili: kugeuka kutoka Ukreni tayari ni suala la zamani ambalo kimsingi si habari tena.

Hata vyombo vikuu vya habari viliona kuibuka kwa hali mbaya, pengine ya hatima, ya uchovu wa Ukreni kabla ya kuzuka kwa vita mpya katika Mashariki ya Kati.

Pili, mawazo yenye mashaka ambayo sasa yamepewa kipaumbele katika Jarida la Wall Street Journal kama sababu za kusitisha uwekezaji wake wa vita vya uwakala nchini Ukreni hakika ni ile kofia ya zamani. Kwa kweli, swali la kuvutia zaidi ambalo makala haya—bila kukusudia—huibua ni nini kilichofanya mchukue muda mrefu hivyo?

Itakuwa suala la kuchosha kuainisha kila hoja iliyoibuliwa sasa katika Jarida la Wall Street. Lakini kwa vile zote zina utangamani kwamba zilikuwa zimetabiriwa au zilikuwa zikitabirika kabisa, dondoo chache zitatosha.

Tunagundua, kwa mfano, kwamba majaribio ya Magharibi kuitenga Urusi yameshindwa. Hata hivyo ni kwa namna gani hilo lilikuwa gumu tanabihi kwamba Ulimwengu wa Kusini hauna sababu ya kuifuata Magharibi isipokuwa hofu, na hofu hiyo inapungua?

Na hivi haikuwezekana kujua mapema kwamba China ingejibu ^Hapana, asante sana,^ pale Marekani na EU zilipofanya mambo mawili kwa wakati mmoja: zilipoihimiza kuachana na Urusi, ambapo ingemaanisha kuachana na ubia muhimu sana wa Beijing, na kuashiria kwamba China nayo ingefuatia kukatwa vipande-vipande?

China, kimsingi, awali ilionesha dalili ndogo katika uelekeo wa kujitenga na Urusi, lakini misingi ya kimkakati ya hali hiyo iliamua mwenendo wake halisi na umekuwa wazi kwa sasa. Matokeo haya yalitabiriwa, siyo na kila mtaalamu lakini na wa kutosha miongoni mwao kiasi cha kulipa umuhimu jambo hili.

Pia tunakumbushwa kwamba hivi ni vita vya msuguano, yaani ambavyo kwa asili yake vinaipendelea Urusi. Hata kwenye CNN, tulisikia hivyo mapema Aprili 2022, na jarida la kivita la Atlanticist Economist lilikiri hilo kiutata (likitumia tafsida ya ^vita vya uhimilivu^) mnamo Septemba.

Kila vita ni suala la utendaji shindani wa kijeshi. Lakini katika vita vya msuguano, mambo matatu ya msingi ni muhimu zaidi: ukubwa, uwezo wa uzalishaji na wa kiteknolojia, na uhimali wa uchumi; uthabiti wa mfumo wa kisiasa, pamoja na umaarufu wake halisani na uhalali wa maahari wake; na, bila shaka, demografia.

Jarida la Wall Street Journal linabaini kwamba uchumi wa Urusi ^umekumbwa na pigo kali lakini haujaparaganyika^ (likitweza hasa mafanikio yake, lakini hebu tusibishanie mambo duni) na kwamba mfumo wake wa kisiasa unategemea uungwaji mkono ^imara^ na maahari ambao hawajawahi kamwe kuasi wala kutoroka.

Katika nchi za Magharibi angalau, hii ilikuwa ngumu kutabiri. Siyo sababu ya Urusi kuwa ngumu sana kuing’amua, bali kwa sababu ya ubaguzi wa Magharibi na fikra muwala, au, kwa kusema wazi, matarajio potofu.

Hata kabla ya vita vya Ukreni Februari 2022, siasa za Magharibi, vyombo vya habari, magalacha, na hata wanataaluma wametunuku tathmini hafifu zisizo halisi za uchumi wa Urusi na uthabiti wa kisiasa.

Fikiria, kama sampuli mojawapo, mitilifiko ya Magharibi kufuatia uasi wa Wagner mnamo Juni. Wachache miongoni mwao walitabiri anguko la karibuni la Urusi na kutokea machafuko na vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe au, angalau, tukio kubwa na la kudumu la kudhoofika kwa ndani na kimataifa kwa Urusi. Hata hivyo hakuna hata mojawapo ambalo limetimia.

Umuhimu wa uchanganuzi na utabiri huu wa kina, takriban wenye uelekeo wa kushindwa kabisa hutokana na jinsi ulivyokuwa wa aina yake, ukiakisi utamaduni tawala wa uzembe wa kisiasa udhoofishao fikra za Magharibi kuhusu Urusi. Uzembe unaoshangaza zaidi ambao hasa wapinzani wa Mosko hawawezi kuutenda bila kujiumiza vibaya.

Kwa vile kujidhuru wenyewe ndio matokeo yake makuu. Ni kweli kwamba Urusi haina budi kubeba baadhi ya gharama za maradhi ya Magharibi ya kutoona mbali.

Ni wazi, Mosko pia ingekuwa heri zaidi iwapo ingeweza kufanya kazi na washirika wenye busara, kama ni wenye ushindani, badala ya wapinzani wenye uhasama wa akili ambao daima huitweza Urusi na kujikweza wenyewe.

Licha ya hayo, nchi za Magharibi zinateseka hata zaidi kutokana na mtindo wake wa makosa ya kujirudia.

Gharama za vita vya uwakala nchini Ukreni huonyesha ukweli huu, na siyo tu katika mantiki ya silaha na pesa, bali kuhusu hadhi ya kisiasa pia.

Kuhusu gharama zinazoweza kukadirika, Bunge la Marekani, kwa mfano, limeidhinisha msaada wenye thamani ya dola bilioni 113 kwa ajili ya Ukreni tangu Februari 2022.

Hivi sasa, ombi la kutaka hata zaidi linageuka kuwa maumivu makubwa ya ndani kwa utawala wa Biden, na huenda kabisa, kushindwa kwake. EU imemwaga takriban €85 bilioni.

Kwa kweli, siyo kwamba fedha hizi zote zimetwaliwa, na kiasi chake kikubwa kimekuwa hasa kikichochea ufisadi nchini Ukreni au kuwahudumia wafadhili na hususan viwanda vyao vya kutengeneza silaha, kama ambavyo wanasiasa Wamarekani wameeleza mara kwa mara kwa dhihaka za majivuno.

Lakini picha nzima inasalia kuwa ile ya matumizi makubwa ya fedha kwenye kamari iliyopotea. Ongeza hasara ya kujitakia ambayo uchumi wa Umoja wa Ulaya hususan umepata kutokana na sera yao ya vikwazo dufu, ndipo picha hiyo huonekana kuwa mbaya zaidi.

Ongeza, zaidi ya hayo, kiasi ambacho Magharibi italazimika kutumia iwapo inataka kweli kufadhili ujenzi mpya wa Ukreni, na ndipo matarajio hugeuka kuwa janga kuu. Kila la heri, EU, na hiyo mipango ya uanachama.

Aidha, vitu visivyoonekana ni muhimu pia. Ni wazi, ^kuipoteza^ Ukreni (ambayo Magharibi haingepaswa kujaribu ^kuimiliki^ hapo awali) kutafichua mno udhaifu wa kambi hiyo kuliko kushindwa katika, kwa mfano, Iraki, Libya, Siria, au Afghanistani. Kwa sababu mbili. Kwanza, tofauti na nchi hizi, Urusi ni himaya kubwa; hilo humaanisha iko katika nafasi ya kujinufaisha na mtanziko wa Magharibi.

Mosko, kwa kuiweka kwa namna tofauti, ni kubwa vya kutosha kukabiliana kijiografia.

Iwapo au lini hasa itafanya hivyo, na ni sura gani ambayo ^mfyatuko^ mpya wa sitiari ya ^ukanda wa raba^ ya Rais Vladimir Putin wa Urusi utachukua wakati huu, ingali ikitizamiwa. Jambo dhahiri ni kwamba malipo kama hayo ni uwezekano halisi.

Pili, nchi za Magharibi zimeazimu kuliko wakati wowote uliopita, kwa rasilimali na maneno, inapojaribu kutumia Ukreni kuipunguza Urusi. Hivyo, kushindwa kufanya hilo hufichua ukomo wa Magharibi kuliko wakati wowote uliopita.

Rumer na Weiss si malimbukeni. Hawawezi kusema hilo—na labda hawawezi hata kulifikiria kabisa—lakini ndani kabisa ya mioyo yao wanajua kwamba kufungasha hali hii ya kushindwa na kuifanya ionekane ni badiliko tu la kimkakati kuwa ^uzingaji^ haitampumbaza yeyote asiyetaka kudanganywa.

Ni vyema hatimaye kuona baadhi ya habari ngumu za kweli zikionekana wazi katika mijadala mikuu ya Magharibi. Lakini haitoshi.

Kwa ajili ya jambo moja, nchi za Magharibi zinapaswa kujiuliza maswali machungu kwa nini zimedumu kushupalia upande mmoja muda mrefu kiasi hicho.

Vinginevyo, mtindo uleule utarudiwa katika kuanzisha na kuendesha vita vinavyofuata, kwa mfano, dhidi ya China au Irani.

Pili, kuhamia zoezi la ^uzingaji^ hakutarekebisha uharibifu bali kutaongeza tu.

Kile ambacho nchi za Magharibi zinahitaji hasa ni kufikiria upya kabisa, siyo tu kuhusu mbinu zake bali malengo yake.

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kp kipanya44 said:

Hii ni Jana tu, zaidi ya elf Moja na miamoja walichinjwa 🥱🥱🥱🥱🥱View attachment 2828434

Sent from my Infinix X660B using JamiiForums mobile app

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MOTOCHINI said:

View attachment 2826589

Russia is now mass producing helicopter drones. These mini helicopters can fire rockets and drop bombs
How have they done this with limited scrap washing machines and few gardening tools?

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kp kipanya44 said:

Hii ni Jana tu, zaidi ya elf Moja na miamoja walichinjwa 🥱🥱🥱🥱🥱View attachment 2828434

Sent from my Infinix X660B using JamiiForums mobile app

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Nyonzo bin mvule said:

Kwani kuna ulazima ucoment hujioni umebaki peke

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Ukraine’s army abandons about 200 dead soldiers in hasty retreat near Donetsk, says DPR​

Labani og said:

Kwenye Vita ikiwa mnaubonda mwingi...... automatically mnakuwa na morali ( motivated) kupigana Kwa nguvu .......but vice versa is true ikiwa mmezidiwa basi hakuna atakyetaka kwenda front

Nadhani that's real happening ni kiev right now....watu hawana hamu na red army

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Medvedev sees Russian frigate’s trip as `New Year gift' to NATO​

Hungary will never send weapons to Ukraine, top diplomat says​

lee Vladimir cleef said:

Hungary will never send weapons to Ukraine, top diplomat says​

Budapest will never send weapons to Ukraine because weapons supplies only prolong the conflict, Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto said.
"What we have never done and will never do is weapons deliveries because we do believe that instead of weapons, peace should be brought to this region. The more weapons are delivered the longer the war will take; the longer the war takes, the more people will die," he pointed out in an interview with CNBC.

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Nyonzo bin mvule said:

Kwani kuna ulazima ucoment hujioni umebaki peke

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lee Vladimir cleef said:

Dah,unajua Urusi ni wababe wa NATO?
Ama Kwa hakika Dunia imejua yaliyokua yamejificha.
Ama Dunia imesimuliwa the untold stories.
Medvedev kwa dharau kubwa anwaambia safari ya meli ya vita itakayoanza Jan 5 itakua ambayo itazungukia maeneo ya NATO ni zawadi ya krismass Kwa NATO,na katoa vitisho kibao kwa wababe wa wanyonge (NATO).

Medvedev sees Russian frigate’s trip as `New Year gift' to NATO​

He said the frigate carrying Tsirkon hypersonic missiles which began its trip to NATO’s shores yesterday was "a major New Year gift

The Russian frigate Admiral Gorshkov’s entering combat duty on Wednesday should bring anyone who will dare pose a direct threat to Russia to their senses, the Deputy Chairman of Russia’s Security Council, Dmitry Medvedev, warned on Thursday.
Medvedev said the frigate carrying Tsirkon hypersonic missiles which began its trip to NATO’s shores yesterday was "a major New Year gift." "Rejoice! [It] will bring anyone posing a direct threat to Russia or our allies to their senses," the politician wrote on Telegram on Thursday.
"We will use force against you, since you refuse to understand what we have been saying," Medvedev warned, adding that Russia will produce more cutting-edge weapons.

Kudadadeki

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SirChief said:

Aivamie Ukraine akose mradi wa gas wa Nord Stream 2?..NATO walishamwambia Putin very clear,hawezi pata vyote,achague kimoja,aivamie Ukraine akose Nord Stream 2 au aachane na Ukraine inversion abakize Nord stream 2.

Unafikiri Putin ni mjinga hivyo akose mradi utaofaidisha genereations sababu ya vita Ukraine.

Kila kitu ni leverage boss sio ubabe wa kijinga mnaoupigania huku usio na kichwa wala miguu.

Leo Sergei Lavrov amesema baadhi ya wanajeshi waliokuwa mpakani Ukraine wameanza safari ya kurudi kambini,Hata satellites za Marekani wame confirm movements za wanajeshi ku withdraw.

Vita sio lelemama aisee

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Jasmoni Tegga said:

The most sensible comment ever. These are the kind of leaders such as should receive our unwavering support.

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