The mutiny, Kambona and the 1969 coup attempt
The army mutinies started in Tanganyika on 20 January 1964 and spread to Kenya and Uganda within two days. The mutineers demanded higher salaries and expulsion of British army officers whom they said should be replaced by African officers. But there was also potential for a military coup in each of those mutinies.
In Tanganyika, the involvement of union labour leaders Christopher Kasanga Tumbo and Victor Mkello who had close ties to the mutineers created strong suspicion that the mutiny was an attempt to overthrow the government....
Officials in the Johnson Administration were convinced that communists had played an active role in the Zanzibar revolution on 12 January 1964, according to released documents contained in the 850-page volume of
Foreign Relations of the United States 1964 – 1968. As one US State Department background paper, 7 February 1964, asserted: “There was obvious communist involvement in Zanzibar.”
Yet, the same officials admitted that disturbances in other parts of East Africa – the army mutinies in Tanganyika, Kenya, and Uganda in January 1964 – around the same time did not appear to be communist-inspired.
In fact, President Nyerere himself resolutely maintained:
“(There was) no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the mutinies in Tanganyika were inspired by outside forces – either Communist or imperialist.” – (Julius Nyerere, quoted in the East African Standard, Nairobi, Kenya, 13 February 1964; cited by Ali Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana, op. cit., p. 153).
There was also a common logic that linked the mutinies to the Zanzibar revolution. The revolution was an African uprising against Arab domination and had a distinct racial component (it was also a class conflict between dispossessed blacks and the merchants and landowners who were mostly Arab and Indian), as was clearly demonstrated during the revolution in which many Arabs and Indians, as well as some Comorians, but mostly Arabs, were massacred.
The highest figures of those who were killed – 13,000 to 20,000 – mostly come from the supporters of the old Arab regime who, even today, are still opposed to the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.
The army mutinies in Tanganyika and in the other two East African countries (Kenya and Uganda), partly inspired by the uprising in Zanzibar, also had a racial dimension. In addition to demanding an increase in salaries, the mutineers also demanded the replacement of British army officers with African ones to Africanise the armed forces all the way to the highest level in a true spirit of independence by eradicating the last vestiges of colonialism.
The mutiny in Tanganyika was not only the first one among the three in East Africa; it was also the most successful in terms of “usurpation” of power as the only mutiny that almost ended up in a military coup, according to the evidence gathered from an analysis of records and documents contained in the archives of the East Africana Collection at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. As Professor Ronald Aminzade states in “The Politics of Race and Nation: Citizenship and Africanization in Tanganyika”:
“(The) abortive military mutiny on January 20, 1964, (was) motivated by demands for higher pay and the replacement of British officers by Africans.
The six-day mutiny, which began at Colito Barracks (renamed Lugalo Barracks) in Dar es Salaam and spread to troops stationed at Tabora (and Nachingwea), appears to have been well-planned. After arresting their British officers, soldiers built roadblocks at strategic points throughout the city, seized the State House (the president’s official residence, although Nyerere did not live there but in a simple house on the outskirts of the city in Msasani, and used the State House, popularly known as Ikulu, only for official functions), police stations, airport, radio station, and railway station, and placed guards at critical postal, telegraph, and bank buildings.
The Tanganyikan mutiny sparked similar uprisings in the Ugandan and Kenyan armies as well as the looting and pillaging of Asian shops in Dar es Salaam.
Hundreds of people were arrested during the looting in the commercial areas of the capital. Local forces of order were weakened by the government’s earlier decision to send the Dar es Salaam Field Police (known by the acronym FFU - Field Force Units), a contingent of 300 men, to Zanzibar to help restore order on the troubled island.
The fear that racial violence might escalate was linked to the revolution in Zanzibar, which took place in the preceding week and was accompanied by race riots, the murder of hundreds of Arab and Asian shopkeepers, and the mass exodus of Asians to the mainland.
Field Marshal John Okello, who had seized power in Zanzibar, declared: ‘We are friends of all Europeans and other foreigners. It is only the Ismailis and certain other Indian groups and people of Arab descent we do not like.’ (Tanganyika Standard, January 17, 1964).
The racial antagonisms behind the army mutiny were evident in the behavior of the mutinous soldiers stationed in the town of Tabora, who beat up all Europeans and Asians who crossed their path. (Listowel, 1965: p. 433). During the looting of Asian shops in Dar es Salaam, 17 people were killed and 23 seriously injured. (Tanganyika Standard, January 22, 1964). Rumors spread throughout the capital that Nyerere had fled the country and a general strike was imminent. Nyerere, while still hiding, broadcast a radio message on the second day of the rebellion, to reassure the country that he was still in power.
Had they moved quickly, the mutineers could probably have seized control of the government, but the rebellious army units had no plans to launch a coup d’etat. Rebellious soldiers negotiated with Minister of Defence Oscar Kambona and agreed to release the 30 captured European (British) officers, who were quickly flown out of the country.
Kambona had offered to replace all European officers with Africans and discuss wages, provided the troops release the officers and return to their barracks.
Nyerere’s first public act, after he emerged from hiding on January 22, was to tour the city on foot, visiting the areas of looted Asian shops to express his condolences to Asian shopkeepers who had been targets of violence. (Tanganyika Standard, January 23, 1964).
Only after the mutineers began to negotiate with militant leaders of the trade union movement did the government reluctantly ask the British to intervene (the British were soon replaced by Nigerian troops at Nyerere’s request at an urgent OAU meeting he called in Dar es Salaam to deal with the crisis). Trade union leaders hoped to take advantage of the situation and turn the mutiny into a coup d’etat.
The two most prominent proponents of Africanization, trade union leaders Christopher (Kasanga) Tumbo, who had returned from Kenya, and Victor Mkello, met in Morogoro to plan a new government. (Listowel, 1965: pp. 437 - 38). On January 25, British troops quickly took control of the barracks and disarmed the rebels, killing five African soldiers in the confrontation.
The army mutiny proved to be a great embarrassment for the government, which was forced to call on troops of the former colonial power to restore public order. Yet the uprising also provided the occasion to move decisively against those who had continued to press for Africanization.
After the abortive mutiny, the government arrested 50 policemen implicated in the uprising, reorganized the military (while Nigerian troops sent to Tanganyika by the Nigerian Federal Government provided defence for the country), and replaced British officers to defuse the issue of Africanization.
It used Preventive Detention Law, rarely invoked since its passage in 1962, to order the arrest of more than 200 trade union leaders, many of whom were released after questioning.
Fifteen soldiers were sentenced to prison for their role in the mutiny. The trade union movement was brought firmly under the control of the government by the dissolution of the Tanganyika Federation of Labour (TFL) and establishment in its place of the TANU-controlled National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA).
Several days after the suppression of the mutiny, on January 28, 1964, Nyerere announced the appointment of a presidential commission to pursue the plans that had been announced earlier to create a single-party state, subsequently instituted in the constitution of 1965.” – (Ronald R. Aminzade, “The Politics of Race and Nation: Citizenship and Africanization in Tanganyika,” in Diane E. Davis, ed., Political Power and Social Theory, Vol. 14, Amsterdam: Elsevier Science, 2001, pp. 53 – 90; Ronald Aminzade, “The Africanization Debate, The Failed Army Mutiny, and a Restructured State,” in Ronald Aminzade, Race, Nation, and Citizenship in Post-Colonial Africa: The Case of Tanzania, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013, 79 – 89).
Professor Aminzade of the sociology department at the University of Minnesota conducted his research in Tanzania which was published on 2 December 1998.
Reports on the mutiny in Tanganyika were also published in the Tanganyika Standard, Dar es Salaam, 22 – 23 January 1964.
In spite of all the speculations about the spectre of communism looming over East Africa, especially Tanganyika and Zanzibar, we see that from all available evidence, it is clear that communism – or any form of external involvement or manipulation – was not a factor in the army mutiny in Tanganyika or those in Kenya and Uganda; three inter-related incidents in a chain reaction that almost plunged the three countries into chaos during those fateful days in January 1964.
Probably more than anything else, even more than salary demands, the mutinies were inspired by black nationalism and were a military expression of indigenous political aspirations; so was the Zanzibar revolution, although it transcended race and included some Arabs and people of Persian origin in the vanguard in the quest for racial justice.
But since the oppressive regime that was overthrown was Arab, oppressing and exploiting black people more than anybody else, the revolution assumed a racial dimension as an indigenous expression of the political and economic aspirations of the black majority – who did not need communism to wake them up to reality and show them that they were being oppressed and exploited by the Arabs because they were weak and black. Experience is the best teacher.
Although all three governments – under Nyerere in Tanganyika, Jomo Kenyatta in Kenya, and Milton Obote in Uganda – survived and remained in power, there is no doubt that the mutinies had a profound impact across the continent and helped change the course of African history during the post-colonial era.
The mutinies not only demonstrated the power of the armed forces to extract concessions from national leaders and governments; they also showed, probably more than anything else, that soldiers in any African country had the power to overthrow governments without fear of retribution or any kind of punishment against them. Governments were too weak to stop or punish them, except in cases of abortive coup attempts.
Within a few years, military coups became a continental phenomenon, although not all of them could be attributed to the mutinies in East Africa. The coup in Togo is a good example. It took place in January 1963, almost exactly one year before the army mutinies in East Africa.
But like their counterparts in the three East African countries who mutinied in January 1964, soldiers in other parts of Africa knew on their own that they could storm out of the barracks, force national leaders to bow to their demands, and even overthrow them at will.
They knew the military was the strongest institution in Africa. Civilian governments were at their mercy and remained in power because soldiers allowed them to. The people were powerless to stop such intervention even if some of the governments which were being overthrown were popular and had been democratically elected.
The army mutinies in the three East African countries not only helped inspire military coups on the continent when soldiers in other countries saw how they could use guns to extract concessions from civilian governments and even overthrow them if they wanted to; they were also some of the earliest manifestations of the intrusive power of the military in African politics as a continental phenomenon, and of what was yet to come in an even more violent way: coups and assassinations spanning four decades.
The events in Tanganyika and Zanzibar in January 1964 – the Zanzibar revolution and the army mutiny on the mainland – were soon followed by another major development unprecedented anywhere else in Africa: formation of a political union of two independent states, Tanganyika and Zanzibar, to create Tanzania on April 26th in the same year....
In the treason trial which began in June 1970, it was alleged that Kambona was the mastermind behind the coup attempt....The conspirators wanted not only to overthrow the government but also to assassinate President Nyerere....
It was alleged by the prosecution team that the conspirators intended to launch a military coup between October 10 and 15, 1969. During that time, President Nyerere and a large number of high-ranking government officials including cabinet members, as well as the head of the Tanzania People's Defence Forces (TPDF), Major-General Mrisho Sarakikya, were out of the country. The plotters felt that this was the perfect time for a coup. Some people in Zanzibar were also implicated in the coup plot.
Geoffrey Sawaya, the director of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), told the high court that Oscar Kambona sent large sums of money to the people in Tanzania who were to take part in the coup; and that all the conspirators used aliases.
One key figure in uncovering the plot was a South African freedom fighter living in exile in Tanzania, Potlako Leballo, the leader of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), a black nationalist group which was formed in 1959 by members who left the African National Congress (ANC) over policy differences. The first leader of the PAC was Robert Mangaliso Sobukwe, a professor at Witwatersrand University and compatriot of Nelson Mandela. Mandela remained in the African National Congress and later became president of the organization which spearheaded the struggle against apartheid.
Leballo became head of the PAC after Sobukwe was sent to prison by the apartheid regime. And his testimony in Tanzania's first treason trial proved to be critical.
The coup plotters approached Leballo and enlisted his help in carrying out the coup, possibly with the help of his guerrilla fighters based in Tanzania, and he went along with the plan to gather intelligence for the government. Leballo met with the conspirators on a number of occasions. He had already informed the government and the conspirators were now under surveillance, with all their meetings being monitored by Tanzania's intelligence officers. Leballo became the government's key witness who unlocked all the secrets of the coup plotters. He also testified in court that Kambona had been given a lot of money to finance the coup. According to Africa Contemporary Record:
'The central prosecution witness was Potlako K. Leballo, a founder of the Pan-African Congress (Pan-Africanist Congress) of South Africa (PAC), which had its exile headquarters in Dar es Salaam.
The state maintained that seven defendants attempted to enlist Leballo in the plot but that he informed government officials and only appeared to go along with the plot in order to assist in capturing the conspirators.
Leballo testified that he frequently met with Kambona in London and that Kambona had shown him a cache of $500,000 and told him that he could 'get more where that came from' by contacting a U.S. Information Service 'friend' in London (New York Times, 19 July 1970, 12).
Leballo further testified that Kambona had an agreement with the South African foreign minister, Hilgard Muller, that South Africa would support the coup.
The defence charged that Leballo had a grudge against the Nyerere regime, which had cut off the funds it had given PAC, and that he would have been appointed a Bantustan leader in South Africa had the coup been successful.
Leballo denied that he was a South African spy, and the defendants called Leballo's evidence a fabrication. Some defendants (such as Bibi Titi Mohammed) denied any involvement in the plot, while others maintained that their opposition was by constitutional, not violent, means.
Chief Justice (Phillip) Telfer Georges and four others found six of the seven guilty. Milinga was acquitted. Mattaka, the Chipaka brothers, and Bibi Titi were found guilty of treason and sentenced to life imprisonment; Kamaliza and Chacha were convicted of misprison (misprision) of treason and sentenced to prison terms.' – (Colin Legum and John Drysdale, eds., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1970 – 1971, London: Africa Research Ltd., 1971, pp. 170 – 171. See also Ronald Christenson, ed., Political Trials in History: From Antiquity to the Present:, Transaction Publishers, 1991, Piscataway, New Jersey, USA, pp. 235; and Oscar Kambona in Jacqueline Audrey Kalley, Elna Schoeman, Lydia Eve Andor, Southern African Political history: a Chronology of Key Political Events from Independence to mid-1997, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1999, p. 594).
When Tanzania's Attorney-General Mark Bomani asked the Director of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Geoffrey Sawaya, how he knew for sure that Leballo met the conspirators, Sawaya said whenever he knew in advance that there would be a meeting, he would assign his intelligence officers to monitor the proceedings in a clandestine operation the coup plotters never knew about. He also testified before the court that Leballo told him, in advance, about a trip to Nairobi, Kenya, on March 25, 1969; and that Leballo did go on that trip and returned to Dar es Salaam on April 1st .
Leballo told the director of criminal investigation the purpose of the trip was to meet with Gray Likungu Mataka, who then lived in Nairobi which was one of the operational bases for the coup plotters, to get confirmation of the coup plot as Mataka had explained to him earlier.
Sawaya went on to say that he already knew that Leballo and Colonel Chacha had a meeting and that Leballo had been introduced to Prisca (one of the code names used by one of the conspirators) and Bibi Titi Mohammed. Chacha and Leballo met at Twiga Hotel in Dar es Salaam. Leballo also met with Bibi Titi Mohammed at an Islamic Centre at Chang'ombe in Dar es Salaam and discussed how President Nyerere and other senior government officials including some cabinet members would be assassinated.
Sawaya further testified that on March 24, 1969, Leballo went to him and told him about the meeting he (Leballo) had with Chacha at Twiga Hotel. When Attorney-General Mark Bomani asked him how he knew the meeting had taken place, Sawaya said he sent his intelligence officers to Twiga Hotel on a surveillance mission after he was told about the meeting in advance. And they observed the meeting taking place.
On the following day, March 25, Leballo left for Nairobi, the criminal investigation director said, and was 'escorted' by some intelligence officers who had been assigned by the director to accompany him.
Sawaya went on to tell the court that in April 1969, he went on a trip overseas. He said he met again with Leballo on May 2, 1969, and that Leballo told him that the plan for the coup as explained by Gray Mataka in Nairobi was very well received by Colonel Chacha, Michael Kamaliza and Bibi Titi Mohammed in a jovial mood. He also said Mataka had promised to ask for some money from Kambona to facilitate the operation. The CID chief further stated that Leballo produced a letter written to Prisca by Mataka, and that Mataka himself copied the letter in his own handwriting and gave the copy to Leballo,
Mark Bomani: Can you recognize the copy of this letter if you see it?
Sawaya: Yes, I can.
Bomani: How can you recognize this letter?
Sawaya: I can recognize it by the name of Chaima.
Leballo: He (the criminal investigation director) told me that after I met with Mataka for the first time, the accused changed his name and gave himself the code name of Chaima.
Chief Justice: Was the letter translated?
Sawaya: Soon after the copy of the letter was made, it was translated so that I could understand what it said.
Bomani: Did you know the letter was delivered?
Sawaya: I was informed that it was being delivered.
Sawaya went on to say that according to the information he got from Leballo, Chipaka, Titi, Kamaliza, Leballo and Prisca were going to have a meeting to discuss what they would be doing when they were waiting for some money from Kambona.
At that meeting, Kamaliza asked Leballo to go to London and ask Kambona to send more money. Kamaliza also asked Chipaka to write Kambona a letter and send him a 10-shilling note for Kambona to sign it. With Kambona's signature on the 10-shilling note, Kamaliza said the note would be passed around to convince some cabinet members and members of parliament to support Kambona in overthrowing the government.
It was also expected that the note would be used to raise more funds for the coup and get support from TANU leaders and workers and from the leaders and members of the country's labour union, the National Union of Tanganyika Workers (NUTA), to oppose the government; thus encouraging others to overthrow it.
Kamaliza told Leballo there was no doubt that the workers of Tanzania would support the coup because the president had removed him (Kamaliza) from the leadership of NUTA against the wishes of the workers.
Geoffrey Sawaya went on to say that Leballo met Titi (Bibi Titi Mohammed) at her house on June 23, 1969. She told him that she had been to Nairobi where she stayed for four days and made a telephone call to Kambona asking him to send one million shillings for overthrowing the government within two weeks.
Titi gave Leballo 400 shillings and said she had received 2,000 shillings, $1,000 for Colonel Chacha, for incidental expenses. Titi told Leballo she would give him 600 shillings in a few days, and did so on June 26. The money was presented in court as evidence.
On June 28, Colonel Chacha made arrangements to meet with Leballo on June 30 in order to introduce him to Major Herman. Chacha and Lieutenant-Colonel Marwa went to Leballo's residence at 3 a.m. on June 30. Chacha and Leballo went into the bedroom, leaving Marwa in the sitting room. There in the bedroom, Chacha told Leballo that he was ready to overthrow the government if he was paid 20 million shillings, and wanted Leballo to tell Kambona to send the money right away.
On July 3, Chacha and Leballo met again at the army headquarters at Chacha's request. Chacha told Leballo he was disappointed because the money was being delayed. And he wanted Leballo to go to the officers' mess at Lugalo Barracks where Captain Elia Dunstan Lifa Chipaka would introduce him to Major Herman.
Leballo went there and found Captain Chipaka waiting for him. Captain Chipaka told Leballo that he did not trust Major Herman as someone who would be involved in overthrowing the government because he was a half-caste from Iringa (in the Southern Highlands of southwestern Tanzania); and that he would give him a list of army officers which would include the name of one officer from Zanzibar. From that list would be chosen a person who would lead the coup.
Afterwards, Captain Chipaka introduced Leballo to Major Herman.
After this meeting, Leballo met with John Chipaka and Michael Kamaliza in the main office of NUTA in Dar es Salaam. They had a discussion and agreed that Leballo should go to London and ask Kambona to send more money.
Around 4.15 p.m. on the same day, Leballo was again asked to go to the same office. He went and found Kamaliza alone in the office. Kamaliza told Leballo that he had sent someone to Kambona to get and bring the money. He also told Leballo that he personally would like Major Herman, and not Colonel Chacha, to lead the coup.
There were conspirators in Zanzibar but, because the former island nation was an autonomous entity with its own legal system even after uniting with Tanganyika to form Tanzania, the authorities in the isles dispensed swift justice against them. So, it was only the ones on the mainland who had to appear before the Tanzania High Court in Dar es Salaam presided over by the Trinidadian jurist Philip Telfer Georges.
The criminal investigation director (CID), Geoffrey Sawaya, told the court that the coup did not take place because some of the conspirators were arrested and detained before the scheduled date for the takeover. He said some of them made statements after their arrest admitting most of the allegations about their involvement in the abortive coup attempt. And he produced evidence showing instructions on how strategic locations would be taken over. He also presented to the court lists of prominent people who were to be detained by the coup makers.
There were moonlight trips by dhow between Dar es Salaam and Zanzibar, made by the conspirators and their couriers. Secret meetings were held in expensive hotels in Nairobi, Kenya, in London, and in Dar es Salaam. Nightclubs were another hot spot where the coup plotters met to discuss their nefarious scheme which included a plot to assassinate President Nyerere. There was even a plan, for whatever reason they deemed appropriate, to bomb the University of Dar es Salaam; probably to cause panic while they executed the coup, or simply to wreak havoc and cause mayhem.
One of the most damaging pieces of evidence against the coup plotters presented in court was the 'wedding guest list' found at the residence of Captain Elia Dunstan Lifa Chipaka. All 37 "guests" named on the list were army officers. Captain Chipaka told the court that the names were part of a list of the names of guests he was going to invite to his wedding. But, as Chief Justice Philip Telfer Georges said at the end of the trial, the list contained comments which an average person would consider to be totally irrelevant to preparation for a wedding. For example, against the name of one colonel was this comment: 'Dissatisfied, but his stand is not known.'
Other evidence included letters from Oscar Kambona written to the conspirators.
What the coup plotters did not know was that Potlako Leballo, the South African political exile and president of the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) was already working for the Tanzania intelligence service but gained their confidence. The outlandish claim by them that Leballo had manufactured the whole thing and was really a spy for the South African apartheid regime was dismissed as nonsense by the court.
In delivering the verdicts, the chief justice denied pleas for clemency made by the defence lawyers and made it clear that overthrowing governments was not an acceptable way to change leadership, emphasizing that the young African nations needed peace and stability to consolidate their independence and serve their people.
The trial lasted 127 days, the longest in the country's history. Chief Justice Philip Telfer Georges did not sentence the conspirators to death...but nonetheless gave them stiff sentences as follows:
Bibi Titi Mohammed: life imprisonment for treason.
Gray Likungu Mataka: life imprisonment for treason.
Elia Dunstan Lifa Chipaka: life imprisonment for treason.
Michael Kamaliza: ten years' imprisonment for misprision of treason.
William Makori Chacha: ten years' imprisonment for misprision of treason.
Alfred Philip Milinga was acquitted of all charges, but after spending 16 months in detention under the Preventive Detention Act during the investigation and trial of the treason case.
The act was passed by parliament to allow the government to detain people if they posed a threat to national security but was criticized by the chief justice during the treason trial for detaining people for too long before they were brought to court.
The ringleader and mastermind of the treasonous coterie, former foreign affairs minister Oscar Kambona, was not tried even in absentia. Only three years earlier, President Nyerere had said of his cabinet colleague and close political aide:
'Oscar is extremely loyal – to the party, to me, and to the people.'
Kambona...was never arrested. No extradition proceedings took place and he remained in Britain until he willingly returned to Tanzania in April 1992 after the country adopted the multiparty system which enabled him to form a political party and challenge the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (Revolutionary Party) which had been in power since independence, first as TANU....
Twelve years after the treason trial, Oscar Kambona gave an interview in April 1982 in which he explained why he was highly critical of Nyerere, and by implication tried to justify his attempt to overthrow the government, although nothing he said could justify that. As he stated in the interview with Drum:
'Nyerere and I go back a long way - we founded TANU. Nyerere was the chairman and I was the secretary-general.
Problems between us began in 1964 during the army mutiny. Nyerere and Kawawa hid themselves in a grass hut while I was left to face the music (Kambona was then minister of defence).
I negotiated with the army and managed to settle the uprising. When Nyerere returned, the army wanted to mutiny again - that was when we asked for military assistance from the British.
After the mutiny, some friends told him that he was losing his grip on the country and I think he believed them.
When Nyerere visited China, he was very impressed with the glorification of Mao Tse-Tung. I think the seeds of a single, all-powerful individual, an autocrat, were sown in him on this trip. And when he came back, he wanted a one-party state.
I sat on the commission that looked at the question of a one-party state and produced a minority report in which I wanted to know what mechanism we had of changing government peacefully.
Nyerere persuaded me not to present my report and said that I should go along with the majority report which was in favour of a one-party state and that at the end of five years, we would review the situation and if we found any weaknesses we could put them right. I agreed, but I refused to sign as a member of the committee.
I think that Ujamaa was badly implemented and that is why it has been a failure. The government should have had pilot schemes which were successful so that people could go to see them.
The farmers in Tanzania are very conservative. They want to know what they get from their labour. If a man has a farm and earns 200 British pounds from it, and is then asked to go into an Ujamaa village and gets 20 pounds for the same work, he begins to ask: 'How is Ujamaa good for me?'
The system in Tanzania is such that Nyerere will continue to remain in power. The president chooses all the candidates for elections. Whichever way you vote, you still vote for his man.
In the presidential elections, there are only two boxes – one for Nyerere and the other against him. When you go into the polling booth, there is a soldier standing there. He tells you, 'If you want Nyerere, vote there, and if you are an enemy of the people, then vote in the 'no' box.'
Nyerere has been in power for 21 years now. And nowadays he is always saying that he is going to resign. Then the parliamentarians stamp their feet and shout that he is their leader and Nyerere says: 'Well, what can I do? A captain cannot abandon his ship and let it sink.'
But why is it that during all this time he hasn't been able to find anyone who can rule the country besides himself?
I feel very sorry for the person who will take over because the country is bankrupt. If I took over I would change the economic policies and do away with detention for longer than ten days.'
But even after multiparty politics was introduced, Kambona was still not able to get significant support among the people after he returned to Tanzania in April 1992 from 25 years of exile in Britain.” – (Godfrey Mwakikagile,
Africa 1960 – 1970: Chronicle and Analysis, op. cit., pp. 242 – 248, 490, 495 – 496 – 503, 505, 506 – 507).
The plot to overthrow the government and assassinate President Nyerere was real. The accused were not convicted on trumped-up charges. John Lifa Chipaka did not even deny they were going to eliminate the president. He didn't deny that. He just put a spin on the word “eliminate” and said “eliminate him politically not physically.”
Central to the plot was not just ouster but also assassination of the president. And the mastermind of all that was Oscar Kambona from his sanctuary in London.
I was at Saba Saba fair grounds in July 1972 when Portuguese planes flew over and dropped leaflets denouncing Nyerere. Most of the people did not get the leaflets but word spread quickly that Kambona was behind all that. And he was, in collusion with the Portuguese authorities and the apartheid regime.
When Kambona was plotting to overthrow Nyerere, he was in touch with Nkrumah who was then living in exile in Guinea. Nkrumah wrote Kambona supporting the coup plot. Some people in Tanzania said they saw and read the letter Nkrumah wrote Kambona agreeing with him that Nyerere should be overthrown.
Nkrumah was worried Nyerere would eclipse him as a leader of continental stature because of Mwalimu's enormous influence across Africa and beyond. Therefore, it is not inconceivable or surprising that he wanted him removed from office. And he found a comfortable ally in Kambona who also wanted Nyerere out of power; a leader who also humiliated Nkrumah at the OAU summit in Cairo in July 1964 with his brilliant and scathing response to attacks on him by the Osagyefo. Delegates to the conference saw Nyerere rewriting his speech as the Osagyefo spoke. Nyerere responded accordingly, and Nkrumah was still reeling from that even years later. He underestimated Nyerere. He never expected such a furious and brilliant response from Mwalimu.
Eight months after the OAU summit in Cairo, Nkrumah tried in March 1965 to work with two Tanzanian leaders who were close to Nyerere in an attempt to undermine him. Probably both were cabinet members, and one of them was probably Oscar Kambona who was already close to Nkrumah as the other leader also probably was; it was probably Kassim Hanga since he was a very close friend of Kambona and was also close to Nkrumah.
Bediako Poku, head and secretary-general of Ghana's ruling Convention People's Party (CPP) who knew Nkrumah very well for many years said Nkrumah was jealous of Nyerere; Kojo Botsio, Ghana's minister of foreign affairs under Nkrumah who was a friend of Nyerere, probably intimated as much.
Therefore, when Kambona came up with a plan to oust Nyerere, Nkrumah had no reason to oppose it and instead supported the plot to remove from office, his nemesis, Mwalimu Nyerere, and help ensure his legacy as Africa's preeminent leader; an evaluation on which the continent awaits the verdict of history.
Kambona also had his own merits and demerits. He will always be remembered as a leader of national stature and as a luminary in the struggle for Tanganyika's independence. But he will also be remembered as someone who tarnished his image and legacy when he tried to gain power by unconstitutional means and in collaboration with some of Africa's arch-enemies, the white minority rulers of southern Africa who, among others, were strongly denounced by his friend Nkrumah in his letter to Moise Tshombe, dated 12 August 1960, when the Congolese secessionist leader enlisted their help to dismember Congo, an admonition also applicable to Kambona who sought help from the same enemies of Africa in his attempt to overthrow Nyerere. As Nkrumah stated in his letter to Tshombe:
“You have assembled in your support the foremost advocates of imperialism and colonialism in Africa and the most determined opponents of African freedom. How can you, as an African, do this?"
Substitute “Kambona” for “Tshombe” in the letter. The gravity and magnitude of what he attempted to do is as clear as Tshombe's.
