Mapokezi ya Nyerere huko Uingereza

The Remarkable Rise of Swahili in Africa.

Swahili is a Bantu language, which stands out from the rest in Africa and is the most spoken and widely studied indigenous African language. Swahili's rise, development and spread also makes it the only African language in African union and has over 150 million speakers, it is the national and official language of Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda and more recently Rwanda.

With global corporations starting to pay attention to Swahili’s rise as a lingua franca in most of east and parts of central Africa, the language of Swahili may soon become the first African language spoken across the continent.

The latest sign of Swahili’s rise is recently, 16 southern African countries agreed to adopt Swahili as a formal language in their region, providing impetus for wider spread of one of the few shared African languages, that is not colonial.

President Julius Nyerere speaks about the security of Tanganyika – interview excerpt – April 1964.

The abortive coup attempt against Nyerere which Kambona masterminded in collaboration with the white minority regimes in southern Africa and with other forces including some elements in the United Kingdom and in the United States sealed his fate; a luminary who once was, who also inspired the youth and became an embodiment of youthful exuberance, now shunted into oblivion, yet not as a mere footnote in the annals of the independence struggle in Tanganyika and in the consummation of the union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar.

Also, inextricably linked with Kambona's fate was the 1964 army mutiny which he was suspected of instigating or, at the very least, taking advantage of. He was a radical proponent of Africanisation together with Zuberi Mtemvu, Bhoke Munanka, Lawi Nangwanda Sijaona and Chief Abdallah Said Fundikira among others although Fundikira was not as radical as they were in pursuit of Africanisation and was a moderating influence on them.

Besides an increase in salaries, soldiers of the Tanganyika Rifles demanded Africanisation of the army leadership, hence expulsion of British officers, a demand which reflected the Africanisation policy advocated by Kambona and his colleagues.

Strikes organised and masterminded by prominent leaders of the labour unions, not just by those in the lower echelons of the labour hierarchy, coincided with the mutiny and were even in some cases inspired by what amounted to an insurrection against the government by the soldiers.

What has not been publicly let alone fully acknowledged by government leaders since then is that there was a concerted effort, at least a serious attempt, by labour union leaders together with some leaders in the government including a number of civil servants, in collaboration with the soldiers, to overthrow the government. Very little has been said publicly by Tanzanian leaders besides oblique references to the attempted coup made by Nyerere himself, Kawawa, and less so by Job Lusinde and Paul Bomani.

Yet there is ample and compelling evidence – discovered by the Tanganyikan intelligence service under Emilio Mzena – showing that there was a plot to oust Nyerere and even assassinate him and other leaders. The driving force behind the coup attempt were labour union leaders Kasanga Tumbo, Victor Mkello and their colleagues. As Professor Paul Bjerk states in his book, probably one of the best on post-colonial Tanganyika, Building a Peaceful Nation: Julius Nyerere and The Establishment of Sovereignty in Tanzania, 1960 – 1964:

“The mutiny was initially little more than a labor strike to protest the continued presence of British officers in the army. But the turning point that led to the invitation of British intervention was the Tanganyikan discovery of evidence of a plot to assassinate top politicians and overthrow Nyerere’s government....

Intense labor activity and the politics of Mtemvu and Tumbo had an effect on enlisted men. Free housing seemed like a joke compared to the facilities given to British officers, who treated the enlisted men with scorn. Frustration in the ranks was less about pay than respect.

Kambona’s Africanization of the police command in 1962 (when he was minister of home affairs) heightened soldiers’ expectations for similar progress for the military, and Kambona made the army a priority for 1964....

Rumors spread that dockworkers intended to strike and that the police might ally themselves with the mutineers. The lack of central authority created an impulse toward agitation as leaders sought advantageous positions in expectation of a realignment of power in the country. Indeed, such a realignment may have been underway. The mutiny had begun as a localized labor action within the army, but that description was not nearly so benign as Nyerere and his ministers made it appear. As one former labor stalwart recalled, 'Some of our leaders had a desire to rule.'

Using the mutiny as a springboard, labor leaders gave speeches at the barracks, trying to redirect the mutineers’ grievances into a full-scale rebellion.

Presidential security chief Wynn Jones Mbwambo understood the radical labor plan for a coup d’état to have entailed four steps:

The first was to instigate a similar mutiny in the police force that had hitherto been an effective counterweight to the mutineers. With the police on their side, the mutineers could then retake control over Dar es Salaam. They hoped for sympathetic strikes by the dock and railway workers, and civil servants if possible, leading to a general government shutdown. Then the mutinous police and army personnel could arrest and assassinate Nyerere and his cabinet ministers.

In the aggressive investigations that followed the mutiny, Emil Mzena’s Special Branch reported the discovery of two lists in the house of a labor leader. One list was of a 'government to be established following a coup planned for January 25 or 26,' with the names of potential new cabinet members—including PDP chairman Christopher Tumbo, TFL president Victor Mkello, and Chief Abdallah Fundikira, who had just announced his resignation from his post as minister of justice in a forceful speech in Tabora, in which he expressed disapproval for Nyerere’s autocratic policies. The other list was of 'leaders scheduled for assassination.'” – (Paul Bjerk, Building a Peaceful Nation: Julius Nyerere and The Establishment of Sovereignty in Tanzania, 1960 – 1964, Rochester, New York: University of Rochester Press, 2015, pp. 131, 133, 145 – 146).

Bjerk goes on to state:

“Despite the gravity of the reports, Nyerere was anxious that this evidence not be used to cast suspicion on Chief Fundikira or intimate any alliance between racial extremists and the widely respected elder statesman.

Fundikira had been a fervent and loyal nationalist throughout the independence period, despite his personal ambitions and religious sympathies. His recent break with TANU resulted from his growing distaste for Nyerere’s harassment of political opponents and proposals for a one-party state. But Fundikira himself had always been a moderate who had never allied with the younger TANU radicals or the racialists of Mtemvu’s ANC and Tumbo’s PDP. With the mutiny, Fundikira cast his considerable authority back with Nyerere and TANU until the crisis settled down.

In order to retain control of the discursive implications of the disturbances, Nyerere and his associates carefully presented the whole sequence of events as a simple labor action within the army for Africanization and better pay, and not a strike at the state.

None of the evidence of the coup plot was made public.

During the week of the mutiny, Mzena had told (American) Ambassador Leonhart only of 'disloyal civil servants' in the government.

The following week, Security Chief Mbwambo acknowledged privately to Leonhart that by January 24, 'it [was] clear [that] a full-fl edged revolutionary plot against the government [was] in progress.'

Beneath a nonchalant public face, Nyerere’s government downplayed political motivations, despite the harboring of intense doubts about the deeper crisis at stake.

Publicly Nyerere pursued a nonconfrontational policy, aiming 'to educate [the] average soldier about [his] loyalties and responsibilities to [the] state.' But privately, recognizing the looming threat of a labor-initiated coup d’état, he cast another stone. He requested a British force to disarm the mutineers.

The formal request for British assistance came from Vice President Kawawa, as chairman of the Military Council, and was delivered by Minister of External Affairs Oscar Kambona in the company of Paul Bomani, minister of the treasury. Kambona requested that only British forces be used, and that the operation be mounted immediately. He was agreeable to the British request that Nyerere make a public statement the morning immediately after the action to ward off accusations of neocolonialism.

Mirisho Sarakikya flew in briefly from Tabora for consultations, accompanied by Nyerere’s childhood friend David Msuguri, a veteran sergeant who had also been promoted by the mutineers to lieutenant. They were scheduled to return early the next morning to maintain security at the upcountry barracks. Sergeant Ilogi (leader of the mutineers) was instructed to drive them to the airport at 4:30 a.m., keeping them out of harm’s way and Ilogi out of touch with his troops.

Job Lusinde and Paul Bomani were charged with working out new wage levels in accord with civilian pay scales that were to be announced at a celebration scheduled for that evening, where free liquor would leave the troops inebriated and hungover the following morning.

Kambona then met with (British) High Commissioner Miles, Brigadier Douglas, and Major Brian Marciandi; he reconfirmed Douglas as commander of Tanganyika Forces, creating an immediate chain of command upon successful completion of the action. They decided to move immediately, before dawn on Saturday, January 25.

Upon approval from London, Douglas and Marciandi boarded a launch sent from the HMS Centaur, which picked them up at the president’s pier. Mobilizing the strike force aboard the Centaur that night, they prepared a plan to take control of Colito Barracks and the city.

Having approved the intervention, in a remarkable feat of mental discipline and political dissimulation, Nyerere kept his appointment to deliver a scheduled address at the Dag Hammarskjöld Foundation dinner. Delivering a scholarly speech with his characteristic ease, he outlined a Lockean theory of sovereignty for Africa, focusing on contract rather than conflict, under the title 'The Courage of Reconciliation.' 'He was given a standing ovation by an audience of all races,' noted one observer. Another reported, 'This caused the President to smile for the first time.'

At dawn, the British ship lobbed artillery fire at Colito Barracks, while a commando unit landed and promptly took control of the base. The Tanganyika Rifles troops were hungover, their weapons locked down according to normal procedure, and their leader occupied as a chauffeur for Sarakikya. The disoriented Tanganyikan soldiers offered little resistance and within an hour were sitting on the soccer field with their hands above their heads.

Upon returning from the airport and witnessing the scene at the barracks, Sergeant Ilogi made his way to the telegraph office and sent a message to the United Nations requesting help because 'the Army of Tanganyika has been attacked by an unknown force'....

On Sunday afternoon, two hundred British soldiers took control of the Tabora barracks and armory and arrested twenty-four mutineers. Leonhart opined that the 'main and most encouraging development of the day was rapidity with which Nyerere moving to reassert control.'

On Monday morning, another British commando unit, with support by air from HMS Centaur fighters, disarmed the remaining mutineers in Nachingwea.

On Thursday Captain Sarakikya was promoted to brigadier and made commander of the Tanganyikan army. The mutineers’ choice, Major Kavana, was named second in command, and Brigadier Douglas was asked to stay on as a military adviser....

British troops were tasked with tracking down several dozen mutineers who had fled Dar es Salaam....

Two weeks later Nyerere asked Nigeria, Algeria, and Ethiopia to send troops to train a new officer corps for the Tanganyikan army, and a few days later he made a similar request of Britain.

Douglas commanded the Tanganyikan force for exactly six days after the mutiny, and the ongoing British presence was carefully structured to be nothing more than the sort of training mission requested by other African countries, and later by China.

The government remained very cautious about disclosing the evidence of the coup plot. The day after the British intervention that ended the mutiny, Nyerere privately confirmed reports that 'some trade union officials and other persons have been detained by police . . . to enable them to be questioned on certain activities and events which are causing concern to the Government.'

Under the authority of the Preventive Detention Act, the Special Branch arrested more than five hundred trade union members, police, and civil servants of all ranks in an effort to uncover the reality and extent of the plot to overthrow the government. 'This step was taken,' Kawawa explained, 'after discovering a number of people who were starting to use the language of terrorism with seditious intent, so we decided to detain them.'

Announcing Sarakikya’s promotion, Nyerere made the only public admission that the mutiny was something more than a labor strike, hinting at 'some mischievous people here and there.' He added: 'There are some of these amongst the number of people who have been arrested and placed in detention, because after last Monday they have been conspiring with ringleaders of the armed revolt in the hope that a further revolt would bring the downfall of our country. These people include some Trade Union leaders and one Area Commissioner.'” – (Ibid., p. 146 – 148, 150 – 151).

The closest the government came close to acknowledging there was a coup plot was when Kawawa talked about it while the plotters were still in detention:

“Four months later, 190 people remained in prison, including Tumbo. At the time, Kawawa privately betrayed a sense of how close the government had come to collapse and hinted at a steely new attitude toward potential subversion. 'It could have been much worse,' he said in his typically understated manner. 'We have learned a lesson. We intend to see that this sort of thing doesn’t happen again.'” – (Ibid., p. 151).

Still, not an explicit admission.

Nyerere himself said “a further revolt would bring the downfall of our country” without explicitly saying there was a plot to overthrow the government.

Unlike some of his successors, Nyerere refused to take arbitrary measures against his critics and opponents including the mutineers and the labour union leaders and others even though they plotted to overthrow and even assassinate him. He said any punishment meted out against them should be in conformity with the law. He was highly critical of those who overstepped the bounds of the law, exercising or attempting to exercise extrajudicial authority.

The focus was on the leaders of the labour movement and the opposition parties who posed a threat to the government. As Bjerk further states in his book:

“The focus of government concern was the labor movement and remnants of the opposition parties. The mutineers by contrast were largely ignored. Most soldiers were sent back to their home areas and told to report to the government once a week, and a few of the leaders were put on trial before a special judicial panel created by a law hastily pushed through the Parliament in February.

In response to those who called for him to issue harsher penalties, Nyerere responded, 'I don’t punish the person, it is the law that punishes the person.'

Seeking to avoid publicizing the labor plan to overthrow the government, the panel called on neither Kambona nor Mzena to testify. Since the mutiny’s leaders had not actually killed anyone, they were let off with light sentences of ten to fifteen years, and most were released early. Hingo Ilogi was one of the few who actually served his full sentence.

Christopher Tumbo languished in prison without trial for two years. He was released in April 1966 along with eight remaining detainees from the mutiny when Nyerere declared an amnesty for some ten thousand prisoners.

Tumbo was then sent into internal exile and kept under police surveillance until the time of Nyerere’s retirement in 1985. Upon release he continued to advocate for multiparty democracy....

Intelligence—never publicly disclosed—pointed to a more elaborate plan underway to violently oust the legally established government.” – (pp. 151 – 152, 153).

Had the plot to overthrow the government and assassinate President Nyerere and some of his colleagues succeeded, it is highly probable that Kambona or Fundikira would have become president, given their prominence as national leaders and their strong support for Africanisation. Also, Fundikira's status as an elder statesman, and his startling candour when he publicly criticised Nyerere in his speech in Tabora after resigning as minister of justice, enhanced his position as Nyerere's potential successor.

Christopher Kasanga Tumbo, only in his mid-twenties (he was 25 during the mutiny), would probably not have been chosen to be president, given his youth and impetuousness despite his immense popularity among the workers in different parts of the country.

Excerpts from Godfrey Mwakikagile, Nyerere and Africa: End of an Era, pp. 682 – 688, and 8:

"Dear Godfrey,

I will end here. I asked (name withheld) to contact you. I think you will be hearing from him in the next few days.

Andrew."

The chapter on coup attempts against Nyerere prompted Andrew to seek comments on my work from one of the coup plotters mentioned in his letter above.

His father was one of the first people killed by Idi Amin's forces on the Ugandan-Tanzanian border in 1972 when they made repeated incursions into our country. The pictures of some of these victims were published in our newspaper, the Daily News, to demonstrate the diabolical nature of Amin's blood-soaked regime; incursions into our country and the bombing and killing of innocent Tanzanians by his forces being only the tip of the iceberg.

Earlier, Andrew had written this to me about (name withheld), whom he said he met when they underwent basic military training together at the Tanzania Military Academy (TMA), Mgulani, in Dar es Salaam, and about his attempts to get in touch with him in case he had any comments to make on my work....

I also knew about his father back in 1972, as I explain in Appendix VI, long before Andrew introduced me to the son years later in 2003 when I was working on this expanded edition. And, besides the information about the coup plot in which he was involved, he also gave me some information on other coup plots against President Julius Nyerere....

"Dear Godfrey,

I would like to make a few comments about the interview (with the army officer who was one of the coup plotters). But I will do it tomorrow.

There are many things which are not well-known. For example, that Nkrumah financed the Zanzibar Revolution, the one which overthrew the Arabs. I heard it on a tape of a speech by Sheikh Thabit Kombo....

As you look at the history of Mwalimu Nyerere and his contemporaries, you see that they were like a team who were born at the same time for the purpose of liberating the country from British imperialism. So we do well to find out the truth about what these men did. We see, for example, that there is evidence that Kwame Nkrumah financed the Zanzibar Revolution. In a speech to the Party, Sheikh Thabit Kombo gives an account of it. He explains how during the election in Zanzibar, there had been great carnage and many Arabs were killed. And Nkrumah had financed this. He says it was not the fault of the Arabs that the disturbances started. They had masterminded it, and started the trouble. But it is just modesty to say that the Arabs made no mistakes because this was a government which was based on slave trading.

So, during this election, there was a lot of trouble and many Arabs were killed, and Thabit Kombo and Mr. Karume fled to Dar es Salaam. They decided that they should go to Nyerere to discuss this with him, to find out what was his opinion. And when they met Nyerere, they discussed this and he told them to go back, and said, 'I will send you money, I will send you guns.' They went back and there was a trial.

A white judge came from London. And Karume was asked by the prosecutor, 'Do you know, Mr. Karume, when you started that fracas, 75 Arabs died?' And Mr. Karume made a very memorable statement. He spoke out in exasperation. He asked, 'Who did you want to die?' This is a statement which all the oppressed people of the world should remember. It is all on tape. I made copies of it and sent it to quite a few people....

(Name withheld) was one of the coup plotters. He is the son of (name withheld) you mentioned. I will try one more time to find him, to see if he is willing to write anything.

Andrew."

That is how the coup plotter came into the picture. I asked him to describe the sequence of events which led to their arrest and conviction and he sent me the following statement in response to my questions:

“It was Friday the 7th January 1983 at around 1500hrs local time. We were to assemble at a house in Kinondoni then proceed to another place for the final briefing as the coup was to take place the following night.

By this day we had already postponed the strike twice at the request of the mastermind Pius Lugangira or known at that time as Father Tom or Uncle Tom. Apparently, his reason was that he was expecting some ships with essential commodities in big shortage at that time.

We had planned for the previous Monday but put it forward to Wednesday; then, again, he said he wasn't ready.

We did warn him of the dangers of putting it forward as the number of people in the conspiracy always increases towards the culmination and the chances of leaks increase. So, on that Friday we had decided to go ahead whether he was ready or not.

I was close to the RV (the assembling place) when I saw Tamim running while being chased by three people. Shortly after that, I heard shots and Tamim fell from the pickup that he had jumped into in his attempt to get away. He was taken to MMC (Muhimbili) in a car that was waiting for them.

I followed them up to MMC to see what would be next. I saw the body being taken to the mortuary and after a few minutes the pursuers who happened to be from the state security came out looking quite excited about something.

I went to the attendant and gave him some money and requested to see the body, which I did, and satisfied myself that Tamim was already dead. From the wounds, I knew that he couldn't have said anything as death must have been immediate.

But what the attendant revealed to me scared me. He said those guys had taken a piece of paper from Tamim's pocket that had a list of names with military ranks.

I tried to look for my colleagues at their homes but couldn't find any. I knew it would be futile to as the plan was no one was to return home that day but go somewhere until H-hour (the hour that the actual action starts).

I went back to that house in Kinondoni only to find it surrounded by both uniformed and plain-clothed police. I could recognise some of them and, to my utter dismay, I saw some of my colleagues already under arrest. I knew then that the whole thing was abortive as three of those arrested were from the tank unit whose success in the mission was of paramount importance.

I spotted a few of us hovering around the perimeter of that house. So, I went to them and informed them of what had taken place. It was already 2000hrs and there was nothing that we could do to salvage the situation and it was everyone for himself.

Some decided to flee to Kenya where they were given refuge; only to be returned at a later date in exchange for Ochuka and Okumu who had fled from Kenya to Tanzania after their attempt to overthrow Moi failed in August 1982.

I was married and had a one-year old daughter, not knowing what would happen to them. I decided to remain and ride out the storm.

I was arrested the same night around 0300hrs and taken straight to the Central Police Station where I found my brother (name withheld), who was a captain and pilot, already arrested; two captains in the company of a good number of armed soldiers.

They said to me that they were arresting me on the orders of the Chief of Defence Forces, but they did not say on what charge although I did ask them.

What I found out later was that my name was also on that list of paper but appeared as Captain (name withheld). And since in the army we are addressed by our surnames, there were two of us by that name. So, they arrested my brother first, as he was staying in the air-wing barracks, and they didn't know where I was staying in town until they asked my brother.

On my arrest, the whole of my family was taken out and the house was locked. The following morning my house was searched in my presence by the police, the military and the state security, but nothing of significance was found. We then went to my office. And, again, nothing was found.

I was not tortured physically, although there were a lot of threats to do just that or bring harm to my family. In my opinion, we were not tortured due to an issue that had occurred in the previous year.

What happened then was that there were interrogations that were conducted by the state security guys among prisoners who were under the care of the police and the prisons department. Something went wrong and some of those prisoners died. One of them was connected to a person in power.

So, an inquiry was initiated which culminated in the resignation of the then minister of home affairs, Mwinyi, who later on became president, and of Siyovelwa who was the minister in the president's office dealing with security.

As for the operatives, the Regional Police Commander and his counterpart in Prisons and some police officers were charged and received prison terms of between 3 and 8 years. But the guys from the state security were left scot-free.

It is this background that made the police protect us from any kind of torture.

I vividly remember the 5th day of my arrest when a security guy came to take me for interrogation but was refused permission by Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Mwamakusa under whom I was placed for investigation.

The security guy angrily went away and came back later with other top officials from the State House. But the SSP stood his ground. There were no interrogations for the following two days after this episode.

We later found out that a meeting was held by all the security organs and it was agreed that all questions were to be asked in the presence of police officers and they should follow regulations. We were to remain under police custody. And that we did, until we were taken to court and thereafter to the prisons department.

We weren't allowed to get visits from relatives until a strong rumour started circulating that some of us were dead. To prove that we were still alive, they had no option but to allow relatives to visit us and bring us some food.

Identification parades were held and, three weeks after our arrest, we were formally charged and taken to prison remand.

Thirty people were initially charged and all the military people were remanded at Ukonga while the civilian elements were put at Keko.

Every two weeks we were taken to court, and another mention would be requested and, of course, granted. By the seventh mention, Father Tom and Mcghee, who were the first and the second accused respectively, escaped from Keko and fled to Kenya.

The case was withdrawn and we were all put in detention.

There was no harsh treatment while in remand but, as soon as we were detained, conditions changed and we were mostly held incommunicado and dispersed to different prisons.

I was always segregated from the others and and was always in leg shackles apparently for being accused of being the mastermind of the Keko escape.

Almost a year later, Kenya and Tanzania settled their differences and exchanged fugitives. Mcghee and a few others who had escaped during the first arrests were brought back, while Tanzania sent back Ochuka and his friend. These two were later hanged by Moi.

After a long trial, almost a year, nine of us were sentenced to life imprisonment and the others were set free.

Altogether this time, 18 were brought back to court while the others remained in detention until four months after we were sentenced when they were released. And that included my brother whose only mistake was to have a similar (the same last) name. He spent a total of three and a half years.

As a prisoner, conditions changed again but this time slightly for the better as we were treated as political prisoners. Food was better; we were given beds, mattresses, mosquito nets, radio and newspapers. We were also allowed visits from relatives and friends.

It is standard procedure for any person in detention, or sentenced to life, to write a letter for clemency to the head of state. And I believe all of us did. I was again put alone and changed prisons from time to time. I stayed at Ukonga, Maweni, Tanga, Mtwara, Lindi, Mwanza, and again Ukonga where I was released on presidential pardon in 1995 in the wake of the first multiparty elections. In total, I spent 13 years in prison.

In the beginning, a lot of people used to avoid me. But gradually, as the freedom of speech increased in the country and the people became more bold, things began to change until now where I am leading a normal life. My wife waited for 10 years, then despaired and divorced me....”



Rather complex, and it would take a lot of time to explain the sequence of events. But in short, I can say bad luck on our side and good luck on them.

What really happened is that one of the plotters, Captain Tamim, was wanted for having had defected to Kenya when Ugandan interim president, Yusuf Lule, was ousted and had fallen out of favour with Nyerere. Tamim was then heading Lule's security unit. So he joined him in Kenya.

It is said, though, that Tamim was sent there by General Msuguri who was the Task Force Commander in Uganda. General Msuguri later on denied that, as this would have put him in trouble for having exceeded his authority.

Be it as it may, Tamim could not return as he would have faced a court martial although two of his colleagues were arrested, tried, and acquitted, thus giving credence to Msuguri's complicity.

So, (just) a day before the coup was to take place, the security guys decided to pick him up for questioning but in the process, Tamim resisted and fought back. This culminated in gunning Tamim to death.

Unfortunately, he had a list of (some) army officers' names on a slip of paper found in his pocket. And these officers were arrested the same day. Some of them confessed and this led to more arrests. This is how it failed.”

In the first five years of independence, TANU was able to present a united and harmonious face to the nation. There had been no acrimonious fights or bitter outbursts from within the government. "I've been one of the luckiest presidents in Africa. My colleagues are very loyal to me," President Nyerere ventured to say late in 1966.

Within two years, the tide had turned: several former cabinet ministers were in detention, one of Nyerere's closest confidants was in exile, and Tanzania's first-ever treason trial was about to open.

In June 1967, the insecure and inarticulate Oscar Kambona, a founding member of TANU and one of the most senior cabinet ministers, abruptly resigned from all his official posts. A month later, Kambona fled his homeland and began a bitter life of exile in London.

Once safely ensconced in England, Kambona made a series of sweeping allegations against the Tanzanian government, culminating in the charge that Nyerere was "making himself a dictator".

In October 1969, the almost legendary Bibi Titi Mohamed and the former Labour Minister Michael Kamaliza were arrested, along with four army officers. The next day, the former editor of the TANU newspaper, The Nationalist, was arrested in Kenya; he was said to have been acting as an emissary for Kambona.

In 1970, they were charged with plotting to overthrow the government.


THE SETTING was the timbered and whitewashed courthouse built on Dar- es-Salaam's picturesque harbour front by the German colonists shortly before the start of the First World War.

The cast was seven Tanzanians ranging in age from 27 to 46, with just one woman. And as the plot unfolded, an audience of hundreds of thousands of Tanzanians scrutinised their newspapers and kept their ears glued to the radio for every detail.

What was attracting their attention was the start of what was likely to become Tanzania's most sensational trial ever. Eight people are charged with treason following the attempt in October 1969 to overthrow the government of President Julius Nyerere.

One of the accused and the man claimed to be the ringleader, is Oscar Kambona, the former Foreign Minister.

It was from his London hideaway that he allegedly drew up plans to oust his country's leader and formerly one of his closest friends. He is the first accused.

The others accused are:

* Grey Mataka, formerly news editor of the Tanu newspaper, The
Nationalist;

* Michael Kamaliza, a polio cripple, one time Minister for Labour
and head of NUTA, Tanzania's trade union movement;

* Bibi Titi Mohamed, a former close friend of the president and
one of the founder members of Tanu. She headed the women's wing of the
ruling party and was at one time a Junior Minister;

* William Chacha, a former colonel in the TPDF, until recently
military attaché in the Tanzanian embassy in Peking;

* Elia Chipaka, a former captain in the TPDF, and

* Alfred Milinga, a lieutenant in the TPDF.

It is Tanzania's first-ever treason trial. All face the death sentence. It is believed that the government may institute extradition proceedings against Oscar Kambona.

The court was told that the bid to overthrow the government was planned for between October 10 and 15, 1969. At the time, the President and a large group of government officials, as well as the Chief of the Tanzania People's Defence Forces, Major General Sam Sarakyika, were on an overseas tour.

Evidence to be presented at the High Court trial will link the mainland plotters with conspirators in Zanzibar, who have already been dealt with.

Tanzania's CID director, Mr Geoffrey Sawaya, told the court that Kambona, who used seven aliases, sent large sums of money to some of the accused to pay people who were to help with the coup.

Mr Sawaya said that almost all the accused used code-names in most of their correspondence except for Kambona.

He alleged that the attempted coup was foiled because some of the accused were arrested and detained before the date set for the takeover.

Some of the accused made statements after their arrest admitting most of the allegations. These, he said, would be produced at the trial.

There was more evidence, said Mr Sawaya, showing instructions which had been made on how key points should be taken, and lists of important people who were to be detained.

Moonlight trips by dhow between Dar-es-Salaam and Zanzibar, secret meetings in posh hotels in Nairobi and London and night-clubs in Dar- es-Salaam, and coded messages signed with secret names: these were just a few aspects of the stranger-than-fiction story of the plot to overthrow and kill the President. The final chapter of this incredible story was written in the Dar-es-Salaam High Court.

One of the most damning pieces of evidence in the trial was the "wedding guest list" found at the flat of Elia Lifa Chipaka. All 37 names on the list were those of army officers.

At the trial, Lifa claimed that it was a list of guests he was preparing for his wedding. But, as the Chief Justice pointed out in his summing-up of the case, the list contained comments which the average person might consider quite irrelevant when considering wedding guests.

Against the name of one colonel, for example, was the comment: "Dissatisfied, but his stand is not known".

As the trial groaned on and on, evidence against the plotters built up word by word. This included letters said to have been received from Oscar Kambona.

Chief witness at the trial was Mr Potlako Leballo, Acting President of the Pan African Congress of South Africa, which is based in Dar-es-Salaam.

According to the prosecution, Leballo had been working for Tanzania's special branch at the time of the planning of the coup and had infiltrated the group working against the government and gained their confidence.

The defence claimed Leballo was a liar who had dreamed the whole thing up and they implied that Leballo was in the pay of the South African government.

As he delivered the verdicts, Mr Philip Georges, Tanzania's Chief Justice, ignored pleas from the defence for leniency and said that independent African states badly needed stability. At the same time, the Chief Justice warned that he was not happy with preventive detention in Tanzania, saying that he hoped the trial heralded a new era in which suspected criminals would be brought before the courts of law rather than be held indefinitely in prison without trial.

At the end of this summation of the 127-day trial, Chief Justice Georges passed the following sentences:

* Bibi Titi Mohamed - Life imprisonment for treason;

* Gray Mataka - Life imprisonment for treason;

* Elia Chipaka - Life imprisonment for treason;

* Michael Kamaliza - Ten years' imprisonment for misprision of
treason;

* William Chacha - Ten years' imprisonment for misprision of
treason.

Former army lieutenant Alfred Milinga was found not guilty, and after 16 months in detention, he was carried shoulder-high from the courtroom by his joyous relatives.

In the end, Oscar Kambona was tried in absentia. A brief three years earlier, Nyerere had said of his cabinet colleague: "Oscar is extremely loyal - to the party, to me, to the people".

Two years later, in April 1972, Bibi Titi Mohamed received an unprecedented presidential pardon.

BIBI TITI Mohamed, former strongwoman of Tanzania, stepped down from the train at the crowded Dar-es-Salaam station and said: "Whoever thought I would see Dar-es-Salaam again. Incredible!" She was then thronged by exuberant relatives, friends and admirers.

She had written to the President for pardon, but she had never been given any reason for hope. She was set free from Dodoma Prison in central Tanzania, under a special Presidential decree. Freed along with here were Ottini Kambona and Mattiya Kambona, younger brothers of self-exiled Oscar.

Mwalimu's reason for releasing Bibi Titi and the former TANU Youth League secretary general, Eli Anangisye, as well as the two Kambonas, is a mystery. Bib Titi had appeared to be so inextricably involved in the treason charges.

Bibi Titi has been given an unheralded pardon. Rumours had been rife in and around the capital that she had died while in prison. In fact, a woman who heard the news of her release from prison in a radio broadcast remarked: "Hear those people! They will never get tired oftelling us lies. How can they say Bibi Titi has been freed when everybody knows she died months ago?"

Bibi Titi spent about half an hour at the railway station before she was whisked away to her mother's home in Temeke, a southern city suburb.

She went to stay in the old house she built for her mother in her heyday. Her mother, now 92 years of age, is almost as vibrant as her 47-year-old daughter Bibi Titi. But on this day she literally fell unconscious at the sight of her long-absent daughter.


The treason trials and the saga of Kambona's exile had an odd sequel a decade later:

THE HIJACKING of the Air Tanzania Boeing 737 on Friday, February 27, 1982, sent shock waves around Africa and the world. Less than three days later, the crisis ended at Stansted Airport, London, when two ten- year-old Tanzanian children, one carrying a pistol and the other a package labelled "explosives", led the hostages to safety. The four hijackers surrendered and are now in Chelmsford Prison, Britain.

This is the timetable of the domestic flight that turned into a chilling hijack drama. On Friday, February 26, at 12:35 pm, the Air Tanzania Boeing 737 took off from Mwanza, Lake Victoria, on a flight to Dar-es-Salaam. Seven and a half hours later, the jet carrying about 100 passengers touched down at Nairobi, Kenya, hijacked.

The hijackers radioed that there were explosives on board. Despite the tough talk, three women, two children and an elderly man were released unharmed. At midnight, the Boeing, call sign 5-HATC, took off on the 2,400-kilometre journey north to Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.

The jet landed at Jeddah on Saturday at 3:00 am but took off again a few hours later. At ten o'clock, the plane landed at Athens. A Belgian missionary and a Somali truck driver were allowed off. Then the plane took off again, heading west. At 2:20 pm, radio links were established between the pilot and the United Kingdom. The pilot was directed to Stansted Airport, Essex.

At 2:31 pm, the Boeing touched down at Stansted. The hijackers demanded the resignation of their premier, Julius Nyerere, and talks with his opponent, Mr Oscar Kambona, exiled in Britain since 1967. The hijackers freed a pregnant woman and her five-year-old son. At 5:27 pm, the pilot asked for permission to move the plane closer to the terminal building. "His friends" were nervous with the jet in the darkness. The plane then taxied to within 150 yards of the terminal, forcing police and fire vehicles to scatter.

At 7:32 pm, one of the hijackers screamed, "Bring 100 coffins" and threatened to blow up the jet and everyone in it. But an hour later, the situation was still calm. Michael, a softly spoken police negotiator, radioed an offer of vegetables and water. Power was provided for air-conditioning and lights on board the 737, but fuel for takeoff was refused. From 11:30 am on Sunday morning, hostages were released in dribs and drabs until 4:22 pm, when the hijackers and their families, who had been on board throughout, left the jet.

Oscar Kambona claimed to have no prior knowledge of the hijack plot. However, he said it was easy for him, Tanzania's most prominent exile, to understand the hijackers' motivations. He gave this interview to Drum, printed in its April 1982 issue:

“The British Foreign Ministry asked me to help find a solution. When I went to Stansted Airport, the hijackers asked to see me so they could be sure it was indeed me who was speaking. When they were satisfied, the negotiations took a different turn and soon they surrendered. I was only interested in saving lives. I didn't regard myself as a hero.

I didn't know the hijackers - they were all between 24 and 25 years old. So, when I left Tanzania, they must have been only ten years old.

Their act was an act of desperation. Some of their friends had disappeared. When the hijackers heard that the security police werelooking for them, they felt they had to get out of the country and the only way out was to hijack a plane. Now their families have been sent back to Tanzania and they are desperately worried about them - that is the reason for their hunger strike at Chelmsford Prison where they are being held.

They are worried that they will be detained in Tanzania - the courts of Tanzania have no right of habeas corpus. People are detained indefinitely at the pleasure of the government, but no reasons for detention are given. A detained person has no form of legal redress. Tanzania has become a police state.

I think the British should take an humanitarian angle in their case. The crime is serious, but these youths were not pirates. They were not after money. They were forced into this desperate act because of the conditions at home.

Nyerere and I go back a long way - we founded Tanu. Nyerere was the chairman and I was the secretary general. Problems between us began in 1964 during the army mutiny. Nyerere and Kawawa hid themselves in a grass hut while I was left to face the music. I negotiated with the army and managed to settle the uprising. When Nyerere returned, the army wanted to mutiny again - that was when we asked for military assistance from the British. After the mutiny, some friends told him that he was losing his grip on the country and I think he believed them.

When Nyerere visited China, he was very impressed with the glorification of Mao Tse-Tung. I think the seeds of a single, all- powerful individual, an autocrat, were sown in him on this trip. And when he came back, he wanted a one-party state.

I sat on the commission that looked at the question of a one-party state and produced a minority report in which I wanted to know what mechanism we had of changing government peacefully.

Nyerere persuaded me not to present my report and said that I should go along with the majority report which was in favour of a one-party state and that at the end of five years, we would review the situation and if we found any weaknesses we could put them right. I agreed, but I refused to sign as a member of the committee.

I think that Ujamaa was badly implemented and that is why it has been a failure. The government should have had pilot schemes which were successful so that people could go to see them. The farmers in Tanzania are very conservative. They want to know what they get from their labour. If a man has a farm and earns £200 from it, and is then asked to go into an Ujamaa village and gets £20 for the same work, he begins to ask: "How is Ujamaa good for me?"

The system in Tanzania is such that Nyerere will continue to remain in power. The President chooses all the candidates for elections. Whichever way you vote, you still vote for his man. In the Presidential elections, there are only two boxes - one for Nyerere and the other against him. When you go into the polling booth, there is a soldier standing there. He tells you, "If you want Nyerere, vote there and if you are an enemy of the people, then vote in the 'no' box".

Nyerere has been in power for 21 years now. And nowadays he is always saying that he is going to resign. Then the parliamentarians stamp their feet and shout that he is their leader and Nyerere says: "Well, what can I do? A captain cannot abandon his ship and let it sink."

But why is it that during all this time he hasn't been able to find anyone who can rule the country besides himself?

I feel very sorry for the person who will take over because the country is bankrupt. If I took over I would change the economic policies and do away with detention for longer than ten days."

Reproduced from Tanzania: The Story of Julius Nyerere, @JRA Bailey,
Mkuki wa Nyota Publishers, Dar-es-Salaam; Fountain Publishers,
Kampala.