Interview
Julius Nyerere Former President, the United Republic of Tanzania
This interview was conducted jointly by Margaret A. Novicki, editor of Africa Report, and Bob Boorstin, reporter for The New York Times, during President Nyerere's visit to New York in late September 1985 to address the United Nations General Assembly.
Africa Report, November – December 1985
A month before handing over power to his successor, Julius Nyerere reflected on the disappointments and triumphs of his 24 years as president of Tanzania. In a candid discussion with Africa Report, Mwalimu reveals his unwavering commitment to socialism and to a free and united Africa as he prepares to play a new role in his country's future.
"I am a permanent actor until I die on the question of the freedom of my continent."
"We announced socialism in the Arusha Declaration. If I was asked to rewrite it, I would change some commas, but nothing else."
Africa Report: During the period shortly after independence, many people looked very hopefully at Tanzania's efforts to implement African socialism. But in recent years, many have held up Tanzania as the example of the "failure of African socialism."
Nyerere: As the "unique failure!"
Africa Report: In light of your recent comments on privatizing the sisal estates, some have even gone so far as to suggest that perhaps you are abandoning some of your socialist economic principles. Given your experiences over the last 24 years, how appropriate has socialism been as a philosophy for Tanzania's economic development, and in hindsight what might you have done differently?
Nyerere: That's a very small question! It can be answered, or at least an attempt can be made to answer it. As far as socialism is concerned, there is nothing that we would not do in the same way. We announced socialism in the Arusha Declaration. If I was asked to rewrite it, I would change some commas, but nothing else. If possible, I would simply strengthen our re-commitment to socialism.
But in the course of building socialism—and especially in a poor, underdeveloped country—naturally you are groping in the dark. You make some decisions that are right and others that are not. So there are certain decisions in the actual attempt to implement our programs of socialism which I think I could have looked at differently if I was starting over again; for instance, the example I gave when I was talking about privatization. I think we rightly decided to put the sisal industry, which was the biggest industry in Tanzania, in the public hands. Actually, I think we had no choice, because the private owners of the estates were not investing at all because the price had gone down.
In spite of our ideology, we had no choice but to take over. But we did not have the management capacity—how could Tanzania have had the management capacity in 1967? We didn't have much industry in Tanzania. Whenever we established an industry, or even in terms of the little ones which we nationalized, we were aware of our own lack of management capacity.
Sometimes we asked the capitalist owner of the industry we had nationalized to go into partnership with us, or we signed a management agreement with them.
It takes money from us, but what can you do if you are going to establish an industry that you can't manage? You buy management. We are so import-dependent that we import even the management ability. In the case of sisal, somehow we assumed that we could just manage, because it was farming. We went wrong, and we haven't done very well. If I were to do it again, we would pay more attention to management. And we may have had actually to hire management from outside. We did not do it.
But we are committed to socialism. I don't believe myself that the answer is to privatize. Some of those farms that are not doing well may have to be privatized. But what we really ought to do is to pay attention to the problem of management, because that is a skill we have not developed. We now have first-class doctors, first-class teachers, first-class engineers, and so forth, but we didn't think that management was a skill we lacked. If I was starting again in the actual implementation, I'd be looking at various areas and asking, do we have the management capacity there?
We're better organized now than we were in 1967. So the problem is not socialism. The problem is the process of implementing socialism. Socialism lias served us very well. In a poor country like Tanzania, if we had not opted for socialism, we would have had some chaos. Even our critics cannot avoid saying, "That country has the highest rate of literacy in Africa." It wasn't the highest when we took over—it was one of the lowest. Eighty-five percent of our people are literate. When we started, 85 percent were illiterate. We have universal primary education. When we took over, we had 400,000 children in primary schools and primary school education was four years. We now have 5.5 million children in primary schools. Every child can go to school and primary education is seven years. This is a tremendous achievement.
Our health service is one of the best on the continent. We are poor and sometimes our health dispensaries don't have all the drugs that are needed because we don't make the drugs, we import them. Even for some of the drugs which we make locally, we must import some of the raw materials. So it's a problem. If you don't have the foreign exchange, you don't get the raw materials. But even our critics always refer to this, even if they end up by saying that we are a total failure. But how they explain our success in the social services if socialism has failed in Tanzania, I don't know.
We are a very united country, one of the stablest countries on the continent, or even in the Third World. How have we achieved that?
We are a poor country. Poverty is destabilizing. How is it that poverty has failed to destabilize Tanzania? And there was not a lack of efforts—people did try to exploit poverty to destabilize Tanzania. How did they fail? Because socialism has given hope to our people.
Africa Report: A lot of commentators are saying that socialism is on the decline in many African nations and that they are turning toward more mixed economies. Do you agree?
Nyerere: Most economies in the world are mixed. It depends upon the emphasis. The British economy is a mixed economy and even the American economy has some public sector. The question is where you put the emphasis, on the private sector or the public sector? Our economy is a mixed economy, but our emphasis is on the public sector.
There may be some Afncan countries which went for socialism and didn't think there was any place for private enterprise in their system, but they're discovering that that was a mistake. There is a place, especially during the transition, and perhaps not only during the transition, as Eastern European countries are finding now.
There are key areas which ought to be public, but there are some areas which don't have to be public and to try and make them public is to make socialism very difficult because the scale of activities sometimes can be too small. Agriculture is one of them.
So it is possible that a number of African countries which, in the rhetoric about socialism, had neglected the important role that can be played by private enterprise, are now paying attention to that transition. But when those who are basically opposed to socialism in Africa or the Third World see that, they say that Africa is abandoning socialism. That is not true. Certainly we have not abandoned socialism.
Africa Report: Your running battle with the IMF is well-known. Nevertheless, over the last year or so you have adopted some of the IMF's prescriptives such as devaluation, higher producer prices, and a reduction in the number of parastatals. Are these moves in your view consistent with your vision of socialism? To what extent has the IMF been successful in imposing what you've been resisting all along?
Nyerere: Had they actually imposed what we had been resisting, by now we would have an agreement with them! We have no agreement with them. Naturally, life is tough for our people. We can't fool our people that somehow life is going to be easy. Life is going to be very tough. We are bound to go through a very difficult period, but what is the purpose of the sacrifice? Is the purpose of the sacrifice to establish some kind of capitalist system? Abandon our goals? Or to buy us time in order to continue with our objectives?
We oppose devaluation—but not on some socialist grounds. At present there are 18 Tanzanian shillings to the dollar. When we started the debate with the IMF some six years ago, it was 8 shillings to the dollar, but now they want 35. There is no socialist value of the Tanzanian shilling in relation to the dollar. It could be 100 shillings to the dollar, it does not matter. The problem is that I want to see the effect of devaluation at that time on our people, what it will mean. With the IMF, it is not simply devaluation; they will say: "Devalue, remove subsidies, and don't increase wages."
We devalued last year. At one time, we removed subsidies. But it was our own program and we put up the minimum wage. If it was an IMF program, we would not have been able to put up the minimum wage.
When I have discussed with the IMF over these years, I have said I'm very pleased that the IMF has discovered the African peasant, because there was a time when we used to talk about the African peasant and these fellows didn't know what we were talking about. Today, the IMF comes and tells me: "You must pay a good price to peasants." I feel with that we've made some wonderful converts!
There is never an argument between ourselves and the IMF about paying the peasants a good price. No problem. I want to pay the peasants a good price. What is the debate we had recently with the IMF? They come to us and say: "Give the peasant a very good price." We say: "What is a good price in your estimation?" They say: "Give them a 40 percent increase in real terms." Well, I'm not an economist, so I have to find out from the economists what this means. And they explain to me. And I said that cannot be done. It simply cannot be done. It's ridiculous. How can we?
Our country is a peasant country. Most of our people are peasants. When you say give the peasants an increase of 40 percent in real terms, that means a transfer of resources from one sector of Tanzania to the other. It's real wealth you are transferring. Agriculture is the major sector of the country. I love that sector. I've been working for that sector all the time. But how do you transfer this? It's really nonsensical. It cannot be done at all. And we discover what they're really doing—their eye is not on the peasant farmer, their eye is on the Tanzanian shilling. If you agree to increase the price paid to the farmer at this fantastic rate of 40 percent in real terms—and our inflation is very high, about 30-35 percent—that means increasing the prices by 70 or 75 percent. If you do that, where do you get the money? How do you do it? You devalue the shilling! Massive devaluation! But a massive devaluation in Tanzania raises costs and inflation.
We are an import-dependent country. We import everything. Devaluation in Tanzania does not help us to export. It simply makes imports very expensive. We don't import luxuries. We don't! We have cut down our imports and we import only what is absolutely necessary. And then you make it as expensive as possible, by decree. So we have taken some very tough measures. But our own tough measures are unsatisfactory to the IMF and therefore we have no agreement with the IMF.
Africa Report: Do you think there's a hope for an agreement?
Nyerere: No. I do want an agreement with the IMF. I'll tell you why I want an agreement with the IMF. There are two very good reasons. Government revenues are very bad. Reagan has a deficit. We have a deficit, too. The IMF is worried about our deficit, although our deficit doesn't cause anybody any trouble except us in Tanzania. They're not really worried about Reagan's deficit. Because we don't have the foreign exchange to buy the spare parts and the raw materials for our factories, our factories are running at 30, 40, 50 percent of capacity. We get a lot of revenue from sales taxes, from what is produced by the factories. If I can get the money to import the things we need for the factories so that they can run at 60, 70, 80 percent, the government deficit will be wiped out in no time at all. Well, I want to do that. I would like to get that deficit wiped out. That's one reason—any government would want to do that.
The second reason is obvious. We argue about the prices of the commodities which the peasants produce. And we think there's no debate; we want to put up the price. But having put up the price, what does the peasant do with that money if there zr -•) goods in the shops? The real incentive is not the paper money, but goods in the shops. If I had an agreement with the IMF and I was able to get the resources that enable us to import the things we need, there'd be goods in the shops and a tremendous incentive for the peasant.
Those are two of the objectives I would like to achieve. The trouble is the price I would have to pay for them. The price I would pay for them if I sign an agreement with the IMF would be riots in the streets of Dar es Salaam!
Africa Report: How long do you give the white regime in South Africa? How many more years do think it will last? And do you think that it's inevitable that liberation in South Africa will lead to a socialist government there?
Nyerere: I don't know how long it's going to take before we see the end of apartheid. The apartheid authorities there have all the machineries of oppression. From the surface they look very strong—they have the police, they have the army, and basically they have the economy which can keep them in power for a long, long time. They appear determined to stay in power. So if you look at it purely from the outside, you see that these people can stay for a long time. The African opposition inside can organize the masses, but they have no fire power. The government has the monopoly on fire power. These young men and women who defy the state have nothing except their courage and when you see that kind of confrontation you say, how can they do anything? These people can go on for a long time.
I don't know how long it's going to take. But I say again, you cannot be sure when you look at the structures. Do you have termites in the United States? Sometimes you look at a structure from the outside and it looks solid. But internally, the termites have been eating. And you don't need [hurricane] Gloria to get rid of the building! Some determined push will bring the structure down.
The people are now putting that structure to the test. For decades, we haven't seen this kind of pressure mounting from the inside and from the outside. Even Reagan eventually had to yield to popular pressures here that he must do something—not this constructive engagement business, but really some pressure to see if we can end apartheid with less violence.
I've watched some of these people on television defending the system, and I must admit, I've not seen it defended with conviction. I can see Bishop Tutu speaking with absolute conviction. Seeing Botha on television, he puts on a brave face, but I can't see that it's coming from his inside. I've seen some of the real right-wingers who speak with tremendous conviction. But these people in power now, I don't know whether they believe in what they are doing. It's possible at one time they did. There are lots of whites in South Africa— most of them English-speaking—who have accepted the system because it was producing the goods. It was protecting their wealth, their standard of living, and so forth. That's why they supported it, not because they believed in it as a philosophy. Some of them are ashamed of it as a philosophy. But it protects their high standard of living. When it ceases to be a protector of their high standard of living, it's beginning to be a threat. How long can it go on? I don't know. I cannot really answer your question.
It's not inevitable [that a change of government will bring socialism] and, let's remember, they are not working for socialism. The ANC is working for the end of apartheid. South Africa has one of the oldest communist parties—it's one of the few African countries with a communist party. They have a small communist party, which works with the ANC because they are opposed to apartheid and they have ideas that when the country eventually becomes independent, certainly they will want to work for socialism or for communism. But the ANC and the masses of the people basically are working against apartheid.
And quite frankly, whatever the rhetoric, I don't believe that post-apartheid is going to be a socialist South Africa. It's not going to be that way. How socialist is Zimbabwe? It serves Botha to say, "We are protecting this country against socialism, communism and so forth, and when the country becomes independent, it is going to go socialist." Actually, I don't believe it. For instance, in the case of Mozambique, what went socialist, what they nationalized, was what had been abandoned by the Portuguese settlers. They abandoned factories, farms, buildings, and those—the abandoned ones—were nationalized. They never nationalized anything which had not been abandoned. What has Mugabe nationalized? He has bought off some farmers—he's actually paid them against his principles in order to make land available to the people. What have they nationalized? I think the ANC will nationalize what will be abandoned. I can't see them nationalizing something viable, on-going. They will find it extremely difficult to interfere with that. South Africa will become Africa's first welfare state, not a socialist state.
Africa Report: What would you say to those who maintain that mandatory economic sanctions against South Africa will cause the neighboring states to suffer first and therefore they shouldn't be imposed?
Nyerere: Sanctions will hurt. They are bound to hurt. They are intended to hurt. Your people are resisting sanctions because correctly they see that they will hurt—they will hurt some businesspeople here. The British are resisting sanctions because they are the biggest investors in South Africa, because they realize sanctions will hurt. They will hurt British interests. And that's why Mrs. Thatcher is resisting, because it will hurt. So if sanctions are likely to hurt businesspeople here and in Britain, sanctions are bound to hurt businesspeople in South Africa. They will also hurt the African states. Sanctions will hurt the frontline states. We had a meeting in Arusha and we discussed this.
We had sanctions against Rhodesia, and while the Portuguese were still occupying Mozambique, they helped Rhodesia to break the sanctions until Frelimo won and Frelimo applied sanctions. They hurt Mozambique very much. They were almost sanctions against Mozambique. But Mozambique is better off now with independent Zimbabwe than if it had not helped and had allowed Rhodesia to continue.
So we have discussed sanctions, they will have an impact, they will hurt some of these countries. A few days ago before I came here, we had another meeting of the frontline states and we discussed sanctions and there was again unanimous agreement of all of us that sanctions will hurt, but sanctions must be applied because sanctions will end apartheid much quicker. And if people are concerned about the hurt that sanctions might cause to the frontline states, they should consider what to do to reduce the impact of sanctions on the frontline states.
Africa Report: The Reagan administration continues to uphold its policy of constructive engagement although it appears that it has failed in its objective to reduce regional tensions. What steps would you like to see the Reagan administration take at this point in time and how do you perceive their policy?
Nyerere: The Reagan administration was very polite when it came into power. It sent Dr. Crocker to our part of the world to explain this new policy of constructive engagement. I'm sure they believed in it, that you can bring about change to the South Africans if you are nice to them. We said, "They will use you if you are nice to them." These people want to cling to power, it is a racist country, these are racist policies, they will cling to power. And if you simply verbally say to them, "We don't' like your policies, please change," they will be very happy that a superpower is condemning them verbally, but otherwise they are accepting it. It won't hurt them at all, they will just stay. But they thought differently.
Dr. Crocker was here this morning, and I said, 'You did four years, lost, what have you? Four years of constructive engagement, nothing! You are in the second year of the second term, nothing! Nothing to show for constructive engagement!1 But the threat of sanctions is very different. Over the last few months, the threat of sanctions is at least producing promises. The South Africans are producing promises of virtually ending the bantustan idea, giving citizenship to those from whom they should never have taken it away, and so forth. The threat of sanctions. . .now these people call it active constructive engagement! We did warn, "The South Africans are very tough, they will use you, they will not want to get out of Namibia, they will not want to change apartheid. The international community will have to work with the internal forces against apartheid to put tremendous pressure on South Africa to change." They said, "No, be nice."
And this blessed idea that the South Africans are the defenders of Western civilization there! Really, how can the U. S. accept the idea that racist South Africa is a defender of Western civilization? What kind of civilization? And the nonsense that they are fighting against communism! Where are these communists in Africa? We have 51 African states, how many of them are communist? This blessed idea that this huge country wants to protect Africa against communism! These African countries cannot protect themselves against communism? Where are these communists in Africa?
They mention Angola. . . they just refuse to admit how the Cubans got into Angola in the first place and why now they must remain there—because Reagan will not accept the implementation of resolution 435. These people came determined to get the Cubans out of Angola and their policies are such as to make it absolutely certain that the Cubans will not leave Angola. How can a big nation behave like that? If they don't want Cubans in Angola, fine, that's their policy, it's their own business. But why then don't they follow policies which will help the Cubans to leave Angola? Because these it looks to me like a policy which had either been actually announced or was supposed to have been announced by Kissinger; "Let's turn Angola into Cuba's Vietnam. Let them stay."
These policies to me are not policies which will help Cubans to leave Angola, but stay there. Well, if that is the policy, it's working. But if these policies are intended to get the Cubans out of Angola, no! The Cubans went there in 1975 because South Africa invaded Angola, because the U.S. panicked, they thought the little communist party of Portugal was taking over Portugal, they linked that communist party with the MPLA, they thought they'd jump in quickly and prevent communism from taking over Angola, and they joined the South Africans. And that's how the Cubans got there.
Africa Report: Do you think the U. S. is doing anything right in its Africa policy?
Nyerere: They did a tremendous job in helping us with the famine. They have been extremely generous with Africa. They have not bothered about ideology. There are some phrases that this government cannot help the communists in Africa, but overall, they have done extremely well in helping famine-stricken Africa. But they went wrong the moment they began to refuse to see African struggle as a struggle for self-determination, when they began to see it purely in terms of the East-West conflict. The whole thing went wrong there. And they don't want us to say it. And I say, look why do you want to be fooled by Africa? I don't help your great country if I fool them.
They should know what we think. We want our continent to be free. We don't want to sell our country to the Soviet Union. How much influence does the Soviet Union have in Africa? Where? And where they are, the United States is keeping them there. So I say these things, and when I say them, it's as if I create them. But I don't create them. I say to them, we want to be free. We really believed in the United States, a democratic country, a powerful country which fears nothing from Africa. I believe the United States really should be the ally of Africa. It is not, because they think somehow we want to embrace the Soviet Union! What do we want to embrace the Soviet Union for?
These are superpowers, they want to divide the world among themselves. Africa is in the sphere of influence of the West. My problem is the Western world. We are not in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. This powerful country, instead of seeing our problem of apartheid as a problem of apartheid— that African people cannot love apartheid—they want us to see apartheid through Moscow. How can we see apartheid through Moscow? If the Soviets give arms to the ANC, is it expected that I would denounce them? Supposing your country arms apartheid, and the Soviet Union arms the ANC, I am expected to denounce the Soviet Union? Why? And intelligent people here say, "Why don't you denounce the Soviet Union?" On what? I can denounce them on Afghanistan, we do. But on Namibia? How can I denounce the Soviet Union on Namibia? Or on apartheid? And I am expected to do that. If I do that, I am a dishonest fool!
Where we feel the Soviet Union is acting wrongly with regard to the interests of the Third World, we don't fear, we say so. We are not under the influence of the Soviet Union. We are never afraid to speak freely. But our problems in Africa at present come from the Western world which is led by your country. We shouldn't say so?
Africa Report: With all these problems, why are you stepping down now when so much remains to be done?
Nyerere: I leave it to the young. I'm not saying enough is enough, but I am simply stepping out. I am a permanent actor until I die on the question of the freedom of my continent. It is my life, but I can change the stages. I don't have to remain at the same stage.
Africa Report: What do you plan on doing in your retirement?
Nyerere: I remain the chairman of my party. That's how I started. When I started the freedom of my country, 1 was not head of state, so I don't really have to continue the fight as head of state. That job can be done by others. I've done it for 24 years. It is plenty. They say, "Mr. President, but you are still young. . ." I say yes, if I were starting today, I'd be elected this year at the age of 63 and at the end of 10 years, I'd be younger than Reagan! But it is not a problem of my age.
I've been there for 24 years and the priority really for this young country is establishing a system, which I think we've done reasonably well. We are a reasonably stable country, united, with clarity of what we want. But it is a young country and we want to establish a system that can work, and I want to participate in establishing the system that can work. We are changing the top leadership. It's a change that needs to be made and we are making it. In our case, we are a single party. It is an important change in this country from one head of state who has been leading the country for the last 24 years to another. It is perceived as being important. And it is important because that change must be made, but not in policies, because we are a single party. Our policies are determined by the party and carried out by the government.
Africa Report: Is there room for another party in Tanzania?
Nyerere: No, not yet. It will come when we have achieved what the United States has achieved, when you have two major parties and both of them are conservative! That's a kind of single-party system, so the basic capitalist system is not being challenged at all! It's a pleasure, I wish I had that kind of system. We'll get there.
Africa Report: So you expect your successor to follow in the same path as your policies?
Nyerere: He will not come with his own policies. I didn't have my own policies. I have helped in the definition of those policies. He will carry out party policies. But he is the head of state, he is going to be the leader of the government. And a government is a government—its style of doing things, its appointments, its emphases are not likely to be my kind of emphases. People matter even if they are all socialists, because they determine the emphases. So style might change, emphases might change, but the policy will remain the same. Even the rhetoric might change!
Africa Report: Your country has been very involved in Uganda's political affairs for some time, but the country still seems to be very unstable. What are the prospects for stability in Uganda?
Nyerere: I don't know. We had hoped that a new era of stability had been established. I don't know what is going to happen, because at present, as we understand it, the new government very correctly asked all Ugandan citizens who were exiles to come back. That is correct because it is a method of building stability. As long as you have large numbers of refugees outside the country opposed to the system, that does not help. So they decided correctly to say to all refugees to please come back and forget the past.
But to say that is one thing. To get ex-Amin soldiers back into the army and in positions of responsibility, that's a very different thing. That is not going to help stability. That I understand is happening and that is a worry. That is a worry to the people of Uganda and to its neighbors. That is not an element of stability, it is an element of almost permanent instability and as I understand it, President Moi is working very hard to reconcile the government and the main guerrilla group there led by Mr. Museveni to get everybody to look at this new problem of instability that can come if Amin's former soldiers are allowed in the army, because their record is well-known. I think that is one of the problems that President Moi is asking both the government and the opposition to address themselves to. I hope he succeeds.
Africa Report: What would you like to have remembered as the greatest achievement of your presidency and what was your biggest disappointment?
Nyerere: My greatest success is also my greatest disappointment. We have established a nation—Tanzania—that is some achievement. Stable, united, proud, with immense clarity of what it wants to do, committed to the liberation of our continent. It has played an immense role—poor as it is—in the liberation of our continent and it will continue playing it. So that is what I think is our greatest achievement. But it is also our failure.
I never wanted a Tanzania. I really did not believe that these African colonies should establish different sovereignties. They are artificial creations, all of them. And I thought Africa should use the opportunity of decolonization to build more viable units. One of the most viable units we had was the East African area which had been under the same administration under the British. And the infrastructure was there, the system of administration was there, the language was there, both English and Swahili, and we could have established a more viable single state there.
If you are going to give yourself to building a new nation, you could just as well give yourself to building that nation than building a smaller one. In that I failed, and in the whole movement of African unity, in spite of the fact that we have the Organization of African Unity, unique in the world, which gives us some voice. Without the OAU, I don't know what voice the African countries would have. It helps us, it keeps the vision of possible unity and cooperation. But that's not really what we are working for.
What we really wanted is a united Africa. We haven't achieved it. But perhaps it would have been ridiculous to think that we could achieve it in these 20 years. The agenda is long and some items of that agenda must be taken up by the young generation in Africa. There is tremendous awareness in Africa of the weaknesses and the potential, and the young generation must take over.
