Mapokezi ya Nyerere huko Uingereza
Mapokezi ya Nyerere huko Uingereza
- Thread starter Nyani Ngabu
- Start date
Hawezi.
Nakumbuka mwanajamii mmoja, chama, alisema hatutapata tena raisi au kiongozi mwingine kama Mwalimu Nyerere.
Hata viongozi wengine katika nchi mbalimbali pamoja na Amerika na Uingereza walisema Nyerere hakuwa kiongozi wa Tanzania au wa bara la Afrika tu, alikuwa ni kiongozi wa dunia nzima.
Sema hivyo kuhusu Mwinyi, Mkapa, Kikwete na Magufuli kwamba walikuwa viongozi wa dunia nzima. Walikuwa viongozi duniani lakini siyo viongozi wa dunia. Hata Nkrumah hakupewa sifa hiyo except as a Third World leader kama Nehru.
Walinganishe na Mwalimu viongozi wetu hao - Mwinyi, Mkapa, Kikwete na Magufuli - ingawa kuna ambao wanasema Magufuli alikuwa ni "Nyerere."
Mwalimu Nyerere alikuwa na akili sana.
Mwandishi wa habari Jenerali Ulimwengu aliyemjua Mwalimu kwa miaka mingi alisema Nyerere “alikuwa na uwezo mkubwa sana wa kufikiri” (“Uadilifu wa Mwalimu Nyerere,” Jenerali Online).
Professor Ali Mazrui, msomi mkubwa ambaye alikuwa anaheshimiwa sana katika bara letu na katika nchi za Magharibi na zingine nyingi, na ambaye hakukubaliana na Mwalimu katika mambo kadhaa, alisema Nyerere alikuwa na akili sana kuliko viongozi wote wa Afrika (akifuatwa na Leopold Sedar Senghor) na kwamba alimheshimu, intellectually, kuliko karibu wanasiasa wote dunia nzima.
Alitofautiana na Nyerere kuhusu Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar (1964), demokrasia ya chama kimoja (1965), Ujamaa – Arusha Declaration (1967), Uamuzi wa Tanzania kuitambua Biafra (1968) ingawa alikubaliana na sababu zilizomfanya Mwalimu aitambue Biafra.
Mazrui alisema Nyerere aliitambua Biafra siyo kwa sababu Wanigeria wa Kaskazini, Wahausa na Wafulani (ambako Waibo wengi sana waliuawa) walikuwa ni Waislamu na Waibo kutoka Nigeria Mashariki walikuwa ni Wakatoliki kama yeye; aliitambua Biafra “for moral reasons.” Maisha ya Winigeria wa Mashariki yalikuwa hatarini katika sehemu zote katika Shirikisho la Nigeria except nyumbani kwao jimbo la mashariki ambako iliwalazimu warudi baada ya kuanza kuuawa na wananchi wenzao, hasa kaskazini.
Ingawa ni kweli Waibo walidhulumiwa, hasa Nigeria Kaskazini, Mazrui alisema wajaribu kutatua matatizo yao kama Winigeria, within the context of Nigeria, badala ya kujitenga na kuvunja shirikisho.
Mazrui alisisitiza kwamba Nyerere hakuwa mdini hata kidogo na kwamba alimjua kwa miaka mingi sana, karibu ya miaka arobaini, kuliko viongozi wote wa Afrika, na alikutana na alizungumza naye mara nyingi miaka yote hiyo; mara ya mwisho muda mfupi karibu na mwisho wa maisha ya Mwalimu walipokuwa pamoja wakati wa breakfast, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. Alimpa Nyerere copy ya lecture yake ambayo alitaka Mwalimu aisome na ampe critique ya lecture hiyo. Alisema Nyerere alimwahidi atafanya hivyo mara tu atakaporudi Dar na atamtumia critique yake ya lecture hiyo lakini hakuweza kufanya hivyo kwa sababu ya ugonjwa wake na akafariki baada ya hapo. Mazrui alisema walipokuwa pamoja Philadelphia, Nyerere hakuwa na dalili yoyote iliyo onyesha ni mgonjwa. Alikuwa "mzima" kabisa, Mazrui alivyomuona, na alishtuka kusikia amefariki muda mfupi baada ya hapo.
Pia kuna wakati Nyerere na Mazrui walialikwa pamoja Nigeria, alivyoeleza Mazrui. Mazrui alisema aliona ilikuwa ni heshima sana kwake kualikwa pamoja na Mwalimu Nyerere. Pia alisema walipokuwa Nigeria, "We gossiped in Kiswahili." Mazrui pia aliandika yafwatayo:
“'The two top Swahili-speaking intellectuals of the second half of the 20th Century are Julius Nyerere and Ali Mazrui.' That is how I was introduced to an Africanist audience in 1986 when I was on a lecture-tour of the United States to promote my television series: The Africans: A Triple Heritage (BBC-PBS.)
I regarded the tribute as one of the best compliments I had ever been paid. In reality, Mwalimu Nyerere was much more eloquent as a Swahili orator than I although Kiswahili was my mother tongue and not his.
In the month of Nyerere's death (October 1999), the comparison between the Mwalimu and I took a sadder form. A number of organisations in South Africa had united to celebrate Africa's Human Rights Day on October 22. Long before he was admitted to hospital, they had invited him to be their high-profile banquet speaker.
When Nyerere was incapacitated with illness, and seemed to be terminally ill, the South Africans turned to Ali Mazrui as his replacement. I was again flattered to have been regarded as Nyerere's replacement. However, the notice was too short, and I was not able to accept the South African invitation.” - (Ali A. Mazrui, “Nyerere and I,” op. cit.).
Mazrui pia alieleza pia kwamba Tanzania ilikwenda vitani na Uganda si kwa sababu Nyerere alitaka kumwondoa Mwislamu, Idi Amin, madarakani, na kwa sababu yeye alikuwa Mkristo; ilikuwa ni kwa sababu Amin alivamia Tanzania na ilimbidi Nyerere afanye alichofanya to curb Amin's “territorial appetite,” as Mazrui put it.
Nyerere angekuwa mdini, kusingekuwa na Waislamu wanaomsifu na wanaomuenzi; miongoni mwao Waislamu wasomi wakubwa – Ali Mazrui, Haroub Othman, Saida Yahya-Othman, Issa Shivji, Jenerali Ulimwengu, Ahmed Mohiddin – na wengineo. Pia marafiki zake wa karibu sana wasingekuwa Waislamu – Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Sekou Toure na wengine. Katika kitabu chake, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (see chapter notes), Professor Mazrui alieleza kwamba raisi wa kwanza wa Niger, Hamani Diori ambaye alikuwa ni Mwislamu, alikuwa ni rafiki wa Nyerere.
Siad Barre pia, Mwislamu, raisi wa Somalia, alikuwa rafiki yake.
Pia Nyerere alikuwa na uhusiano mzuri sana, na wa karibu sana, na Raisi Ahmed Bella, na baadaye Houari Boumédiène, wa Algeria, pia na Raisi Numeiry wa Sudan, wote Waislamu.
Nchini Tanzania, miongoni mwa marafiki zake wa karibu sana waliokuwa Waislamu ni Amir H. Jamal. Mtoto wake wa kisiasa aliyemlea ambaye alitaka pia awe raisi wa Tanzania, Salim Ahmed Salim, ni Mwislamu na Mwaarabu. Waliompinga, waliombagua na kumzuia Salim kuwa raisi wa Tanzania walikuwa ni Wazanzibari wenzake, Waafrika weusi, kwa sababu alikuwa ni Mwaarabu.
Jirani yetu, Mobutu Sese Seko, raisi wa Zaire, Mkristo na Mkatoliki kama Nyerere, hakuwa rafiki yake hata kidogo.
Jirani yetu mwingine, Kamuzu Banda, raisi wa Malawi, alikuwa Mkristo kama Nyerere lakini hawakuwa marafiki. Banda alikuwa adui wa Tanzania. Nyerere alisema Waarabu katika nchi za Kiarabu Afrika Kaskazini ni Waafrika kama sisi. Banda alisema siyo Waafrika, ni walowezi na mabeberu kama Makaburu:
“'There is no difference whatsoever between the Whites in South Africa and the Arabs in the Sudan. Both are settlers – foreigners and imperialists'....In his speech to the (ruling) Malawi Congress Party in September 1968, Dr. Banda complained that only a lack of funds prevented him from raising a national army to fight alongside Africans against Arabs in the Sudan because he thought that Africans in Southern Sudan were being murdered by the Arabs, yet African leaders did not lift a finger in protest....Dr. Banda declined to attend the OAU Summit conference in September on the grounds of its being held in (an Arab capital), Algiers, Algeria...." - (Hastings Kamuzu Banda, quoted in Colin Legum and John Drysdale, eds., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1968 – 1969, London: Africa Research Limited, 1969, p. 179).
Kuna wakati mwingine Banda alisema Makaburu na Waarabu were “mere guests” in Africa.
Nyerere alisema Makaburu, kama Waarabu katika bara letu, ni Waafrika, na wana haki kuishi Afrika kama Waafrika wengine, ingawa wanawabagua Waafrika weusi.
Hakuna udini wala ubaguzi wa aina yoyote upande wa Nyerere.
Mazrui alisema pamoja na Nkrumah, Nyerere aliwakubali na aliwatambua Waarabu katika nchi za Afrika Kaskazini kama Waafrika wenzao, na Waafrika halisi, bila tofauti na Waafrika wengine. Alisema pia Mwalimu Nyerere hakuwa mbaguzi hata kidogo na kwamba alipinga sana ubaguzi wa aina yoyote.
Wanaojaribu kupotosha aliyosema au aliyoandika Professor Mazrui kuhusu Nyerere, kwa sababu zao, wasome vizuri, na kwa umakini, vitabu vyake na maandishi yake mengine, badala ya kuchukua sentensi moja hapa na pale na kuziunganisha, out of context, kumpinga na kumshambulia Nyerere bila sababu za msingi.
Ingawa alikuwa msomi mkubwa sana, Professor Mazrui alisema Mwalimu Nyerere alikuwa ni mwalimu wake pia na alijifunza mengie sana kutoka kwake: “Julius Nyerere was my Mwalimu too. It was a privilege to learn so much from so great a man.”
Trevor Grundy, mwandishi wa habari gazeti la Standard, baadaye Daily News - he was a sub-editor and features writer - ambaye ni Mwingereza na hakukubaliana na sera za Mwalimu za ujamaa na chama kimoja, alisema, kwa kifupi, Nyerere alikuwa “Africa's number one brain box.”
Pamoja na busara zake:
Mwandishi wa habari Jenerali Ulimwengu aliyemjua Mwalimu kwa miaka mingi alisema Nyerere “alikuwa na uwezo mkubwa sana wa kufikiri” (“Uadilifu wa Mwalimu Nyerere,” Jenerali Online).
Professor Ali Mazrui, msomi mkubwa ambaye alikuwa anaheshimiwa sana katika bara letu na katika nchi za Magharibi na zingine nyingi, na ambaye hakukubaliana na Mwalimu katika mambo kadhaa, alisema Nyerere alikuwa na akili sana kuliko viongozi wote wa Afrika (akifuatwa na Leopold Sedar Senghor) na kwamba alimheshimu, intellectually, kuliko karibu wanasiasa wote dunia nzima.
Alitofautiana na Nyerere kuhusu Muungano wa Tanganyika na Zanzibar (1964), demokrasia ya chama kimoja (1965), Ujamaa – Arusha Declaration (1967), Uamuzi wa Tanzania kuitambua Biafra (1968) ingawa alikubaliana na sababu zilizomfanya Mwalimu aitambue Biafra.
Mazrui alisema Nyerere aliitambua Biafra siyo kwa sababu Wanigeria wa Kaskazini, Wahausa na Wafulani (ambako Waibo wengi sana waliuawa) walikuwa ni Waislamu na Waibo kutoka Nigeria Mashariki walikuwa ni Wakatoliki kama yeye; aliitambua Biafra “for moral reasons.” Maisha ya Winigeria wa Mashariki yalikuwa hatarini katika sehemu zote katika Shirikisho la Nigeria except nyumbani kwao jimbo la mashariki ambako iliwalazimu warudi baada ya kuanza kuuawa na wananchi wenzao, hasa kaskazini.
Ingawa ni kweli Waibo walidhulumiwa, hasa Nigeria Kaskazini, Mazrui alisema wajaribu kutatua matatizo yao kama Winigeria, within the context of Nigeria, badala ya kujitenga na kuvunja shirikisho.
Mazrui alisisitiza kwamba Nyerere hakuwa mdini hata kidogo na kwamba alimjua kwa miaka mingi sana, karibu ya miaka arobaini, kuliko viongozi wote wa Afrika, na alikutana na alizungumza naye mara nyingi miaka yote hiyo; mara ya mwisho muda mfupi karibu na mwisho wa maisha ya Mwalimu walipokuwa pamoja wakati wa breakfast, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA. Alimpa Nyerere copy ya lecture yake ambayo alitaka Mwalimu aisome na ampe critique ya lecture hiyo. Alisema Nyerere alimwahidi atafanya hivyo mara tu atakaporudi Dar na atamtumia critique yake ya lecture hiyo lakini hakuweza kufanya hivyo kwa sababu ya ugonjwa wake na akafariki baada ya hapo. Mazrui alisema walipokuwa pamoja Philadelphia, Nyerere hakuwa na dalili yoyote iliyo onyesha ni mgonjwa. Alikuwa "mzima" kabisa, Mazrui alivyomuona, na alishtuka kusikia amefariki muda mfupi baada ya hapo.
Pia kuna wakati Nyerere na Mazrui walialikwa pamoja Nigeria, alivyoeleza Mazrui. Mazrui alisema aliona ilikuwa ni heshima sana kwake kualikwa pamoja na Mwalimu Nyerere. Pia alisema walipokuwa Nigeria, "We gossiped in Kiswahili." Mazrui pia aliandika yafwatayo:
“'The two top Swahili-speaking intellectuals of the second half of the 20th Century are Julius Nyerere and Ali Mazrui.' That is how I was introduced to an Africanist audience in 1986 when I was on a lecture-tour of the United States to promote my television series: The Africans: A Triple Heritage (BBC-PBS.)
I regarded the tribute as one of the best compliments I had ever been paid. In reality, Mwalimu Nyerere was much more eloquent as a Swahili orator than I although Kiswahili was my mother tongue and not his.
In the month of Nyerere's death (October 1999), the comparison between the Mwalimu and I took a sadder form. A number of organisations in South Africa had united to celebrate Africa's Human Rights Day on October 22. Long before he was admitted to hospital, they had invited him to be their high-profile banquet speaker.
When Nyerere was incapacitated with illness, and seemed to be terminally ill, the South Africans turned to Ali Mazrui as his replacement. I was again flattered to have been regarded as Nyerere's replacement. However, the notice was too short, and I was not able to accept the South African invitation.” - (Ali A. Mazrui, “Nyerere and I,” op. cit.).
Mazrui pia alieleza pia kwamba Tanzania ilikwenda vitani na Uganda si kwa sababu Nyerere alitaka kumwondoa Mwislamu, Idi Amin, madarakani, na kwa sababu yeye alikuwa Mkristo; ilikuwa ni kwa sababu Amin alivamia Tanzania na ilimbidi Nyerere afanye alichofanya to curb Amin's “territorial appetite,” as Mazrui put it.
Nyerere angekuwa mdini, kusingekuwa na Waislamu wanaomsifu na wanaomuenzi; miongoni mwao Waislamu wasomi wakubwa – Ali Mazrui, Haroub Othman, Saida Yahya-Othman, Issa Shivji, Jenerali Ulimwengu, Ahmed Mohiddin – na wengineo. Pia marafiki zake wa karibu sana wasingekuwa Waislamu – Gamal Abdel Nasser, Ahmed Sekou Toure na wengine. Katika kitabu chake, Towards a Pax Africana: A Study of Ideology and Ambition (see chapter notes), Professor Mazrui alieleza kwamba raisi wa kwanza wa Niger, Hamani Diori ambaye alikuwa ni Mwislamu, alikuwa ni rafiki wa Nyerere.
Siad Barre pia, Mwislamu, raisi wa Somalia, alikuwa rafiki yake.
Pia Nyerere alikuwa na uhusiano mzuri sana, na wa karibu sana, na Raisi Ahmed Bella, na baadaye Houari Boumédiène, wa Algeria, pia na Raisi Numeiry wa Sudan, wote Waislamu.
Nchini Tanzania, miongoni mwa marafiki zake wa karibu sana waliokuwa Waislamu ni Amir H. Jamal. Mtoto wake wa kisiasa aliyemlea ambaye alitaka pia awe raisi wa Tanzania, Salim Ahmed Salim, ni Mwislamu na Mwaarabu. Waliompinga, waliombagua na kumzuia Salim kuwa raisi wa Tanzania walikuwa ni Wazanzibari wenzake, Waafrika weusi, kwa sababu alikuwa ni Mwaarabu.
Jirani yetu, Mobutu Sese Seko, raisi wa Zaire, Mkristo na Mkatoliki kama Nyerere, hakuwa rafiki yake hata kidogo.
Jirani yetu mwingine, Kamuzu Banda, raisi wa Malawi, alikuwa Mkristo kama Nyerere lakini hawakuwa marafiki. Banda alikuwa adui wa Tanzania. Nyerere alisema Waarabu katika nchi za Kiarabu Afrika Kaskazini ni Waafrika kama sisi. Banda alisema siyo Waafrika, ni walowezi na mabeberu kama Makaburu:
“'There is no difference whatsoever between the Whites in South Africa and the Arabs in the Sudan. Both are settlers – foreigners and imperialists'....In his speech to the (ruling) Malawi Congress Party in September 1968, Dr. Banda complained that only a lack of funds prevented him from raising a national army to fight alongside Africans against Arabs in the Sudan because he thought that Africans in Southern Sudan were being murdered by the Arabs, yet African leaders did not lift a finger in protest....Dr. Banda declined to attend the OAU Summit conference in September on the grounds of its being held in (an Arab capital), Algiers, Algeria...." - (Hastings Kamuzu Banda, quoted in Colin Legum and John Drysdale, eds., Africa Contemporary Record: Annual Survey and Documents 1968 – 1969, London: Africa Research Limited, 1969, p. 179).
Kuna wakati mwingine Banda alisema Makaburu na Waarabu were “mere guests” in Africa.
Nyerere alisema Makaburu, kama Waarabu katika bara letu, ni Waafrika, na wana haki kuishi Afrika kama Waafrika wengine, ingawa wanawabagua Waafrika weusi.
Hakuna udini wala ubaguzi wa aina yoyote upande wa Nyerere.
Mazrui alisema pamoja na Nkrumah, Nyerere aliwakubali na aliwatambua Waarabu katika nchi za Afrika Kaskazini kama Waafrika wenzao, na Waafrika halisi, bila tofauti na Waafrika wengine. Alisema pia Mwalimu Nyerere hakuwa mbaguzi hata kidogo na kwamba alipinga sana ubaguzi wa aina yoyote.
Wanaojaribu kupotosha aliyosema au aliyoandika Professor Mazrui kuhusu Nyerere, kwa sababu zao, wasome vizuri, na kwa umakini, vitabu vyake na maandishi yake mengine, badala ya kuchukua sentensi moja hapa na pale na kuziunganisha, out of context, kumpinga na kumshambulia Nyerere bila sababu za msingi.
Ingawa alikuwa msomi mkubwa sana, Professor Mazrui alisema Mwalimu Nyerere alikuwa ni mwalimu wake pia na alijifunza mengie sana kutoka kwake: “Julius Nyerere was my Mwalimu too. It was a privilege to learn so much from so great a man.”
Trevor Grundy, mwandishi wa habari gazeti la Standard, baadaye Daily News - he was a sub-editor and features writer - ambaye ni Mwingereza na hakukubaliana na sera za Mwalimu za ujamaa na chama kimoja, alisema, kwa kifupi, Nyerere alikuwa “Africa's number one brain box.”
Pamoja na busara zake:
Dismantling and Transcending Colonialism’s Legacy - The Elephant
Nkrumah, Nyerere and Senghor were acutely aware of the need to displace the epistemic conditions of colonization in order to transcend it.
www.theelephant.info
The Nyerere Doctrine and the Tanzania-Malawi Lake Dispute
How relevant is the Nyerere Doctrine of state succession – and treaty repudiation – to resolving the Tanzania-Malawi dispute over Lake Nyasa?
The doctrine, which became one of the theoretical tools of analysis and a subject of study and spirited debate in international relations and international law, enhanced Nyerere's reputation not only as a superb intellectual but also as a highly intellectual leader – a quality rare among leaders many of whom are not academically-oriented – who made major contributions to political thought as one of the world's leading political thinkers and won accolades as a scholar and as a philosopher.
His doctrine has been discussed and debated by academics, students, diplomats and politicians of all ideological stripes among others. One Ethiopian scholar, Yilma Makonnen, even wrote a book about it entitled The Nyerere Doctrine of State Succession and the New State of East Africa.
The Nyerere Doctrine challenges the fundamental premise on which Malawi's case is based in the dispute with Tanzania on who owns Lake Nyasa – in its entirety or as a divided lake.
The doctrine has been used in a number cases in Africa including the dispute between Egypt as well as Sudan and the other riparian countries – especially where the Nile River originates – on the use of the Nile waters. The 1929 Agreement between Britain and Egypt gave Egypt virtual control of the Nile at the expense of the other countries. Nyerere was the first leader to refuse to accept that and repudiated the agreement which Britain signed on behalf of the countries she ruled, including Tanganyika.
When Tanganyika became independent, Nyerere contended that the new state was not under any obligation to honour pre-independence agreements which violated her sovereign rights, signed on her behalf by the colonial powers (Germany and Britain) that had now been replaced by the new state.
In July 1962, Nyerere wrote Britain, Egypt and Sudan to inform them that Tanganyika was not bound by the pre-independence agreement of 1929, stating:
“The Government of Tanganyika has reached the conclusion that the provisions of the 1929 Agreement purporting to apply to the countries under British Administration are not binding on Tanganyika.”
The repudiation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty was preceded by Tanganyika's repudiation – in 1961 – of the Anglo-German Agreement (Heligoland Treaty) of 1890 when Nyerere wrote the UN Secretary General to inform him that Tanganyika would not, after independence, be bound by bilateral and multilateral agreements signed by the colonial powers which ruled the country if those treaties did not conform to customary international law and violated her sovereign rights.
The case involving the Nile is one of the areas in which the Nyerere Doctrine of state succession and treaty repudiation has been most influential. According to Law Insider, “The Nyerere Doctrine and Treaty Repudiation”:
“The 'Nyerere Doctrine of Treaty Succession' has been highly influential in the Nile debate, originally asserted by the first President of Tanganyika [Tanzania], Julius Nyerere, in 1961. According to this approach, Tanzania refused to be bound by colonial-era agreements 'unless required by international law.'
In a note to the Egyptian Government in 1962, the government of Tanzania explained that, following from the Nyerere Doctrine, 'an agreement purporting to bind [upstream riparians] in perpetuity to secure Egyptian consent before undertaking its own development programs based on its own resources was considered to be incompatible with Tanganyika’s status as a sovereign state.' The justification for this approach was that the Agreements could not bind an independent state because 'the new states never took part in the negotiations creating the obligations under the treaty'.... The Nyerere Doctrine has been in place for [more than] half a century.”
Nyerere's position on pre-colonial agreements and treaties, and his repudiation of those treaties emphasising the sovereign rights of new independent states to sign new international agreements, amounted to what came to be known as the Nyerere Doctrine in international law and international relations.
It is a doctrine that may also be invoked in the context of treaty repudiation with regard to the dispute between Tanzania and Malawi in which Malawi's position is based on the legitimacy of the Heligoland Treaty of 1890.
As Nyerere stated on 30 November 1961 in a letter to the Acting Secretary General of the United Nations, which was a treaty repudiation and what amounted to what came to be known as the “Nyerere Doctrine” of state succession:
“As regards bilateral treaties validly concluded by the Government of the United Kingdom on behalf of the territory of Tanganyika, or validly applied or extended by the former to the territory of the latter, the Government of Tanganyika is willing to continue to apply within its territory on a basis of reciprocity, the terms of all such treaties for a period of two years from the date of independence (i.e. until 8 December 1963), unless abrogated or modified by earlier mutual consent. At the expiry of that period, the Government of Tanganyika will regard such of these treaties which could not by application of the rules of customary international law be regarded as otherwise surviving, as having terminated.”
In response to that, Malawi used identical language. The Malawian government copied Tanganyika's statement to the UN Secretary General, verbatim, and also sent it to the UN. The only difference between the two statements – of Tanganyika and Malawi – was on how long Malawi would, after independence, continue to honour international treaties which did not comply with customary international law. She said she would honour them for six months while Nyerere said Tanganyika would honour them for two years after independence.
In January 1967, the government of Tanzania notified Malawi that the boundary between the two countries was in the middle of the lake. In May the same year, President Nyerere wrote President Kamuzu Banda of Malawi to notify him that Tanzania did not accept the eastern shoreline as the boundary between Malawi and Tanzania.
The main reason Tanzania did not accept the boundary was not that there was no border at all between the two countries; it was because the demarcation was unfair to her. As Professor Tiyanjana Maluwa, a Malawian who teaches international law and international relations at Pennsylvania State University, stated in his article, “Oil Under Troubled Waters?: Some Legal Aspects of the Boundary Dispute Between Malawi and Tanzania Over Lake Nyasa,” in the Michigan Journal of International Law:
“Tanzania has never claimed that the 1890 Anglo-German Treaty is not a treaty determining its boundaries with Malawi and its other neighbors. Rather, its contention was that the treaty wrongly or unfairly placed the boundary on the shoreline when it should have been located along the median line of the lake, which in Tanzania's view would be more equitable and in accordance with the normal practice in international law....
This view was first clearly expressed by President Nyerere on May 31, 1967 when he addressed high school pupils at Iringa, a town in the central highlands of Tanzania, and declared that Tanzania could no longer accept the shoreline as the boundary, but instead recognized the median line, which was more equitable and fair.” – (Tiyanjana Maluwa, “Oil Under Troubled Waters?: Some Legal Aspects of the Boundary Dispute Between Malawi and Tanzania Over Lake Nyasa,” in the Michigan Journal of International Law, Volume 37, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 395 – 396).
Malawi disputes that and always has. She wants the case to be adjudicated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) where she will probably win because of the court's previous decisions on territorial disputes in Africa, such as Burkina Faso v. Mali, Botswana v. Namibia, and Cameroon v. Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula which Nigeria agreed to hand over to Cameroon although the transfer was rejected by the Nigerian Senate in 2007. The peninsula was finally transferred to Cameroon in 2008.
The ICJ invoked the Anglo-German Agreement of 1913 to rule in favour of Cameroon, an indication how the court could also rule in favour of Malawi in Malawi v. Tanzania if the case were to end up before the court, with Malawi contending the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 did establish the boundary between the two countries; a treaty that has been repudiated by Tanzania according to the Nyerere Doctrine of state succession and treaty repudiation.
The same Heligoland Treaty of 1890 was invoked in resolving the dispute between Botswana and Namibia over Kasikili/Sedudu Island in Chobe River. The ICJ upheld the legitimacy of the Treaty in resolving the dispute.
There is no reason why it wouldn't do the same with regard to Malawi v. Tanzania even though the court is not bound by its own precedents. But it has always upheld the legitimacy of colonial treaties on territorial boundaries to settle disputes even if those boundaries are imprecise, not definitive and have other shortcomings. The focus is on the legitimacy of those agreements, according to the court. And that is what Malawi counts on to win the case. She does not want the case to be mediated by the members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) of which both she and Tanzania are members. Tanzania wants the case to be resolved through mediation. As Professor Mulawa states:
“SADC has already experienced...setbacks...[because of] the wavering commitment to the process and apparent lack of trust displayed by one party [Malawi]....The failure of SADC mediation would not bode well for Tanzania, which prefers mediation to international judicial settlement. On the other hand, adjudication by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which Malawi evidently favors, would likely validate Malawi's position.” – (Ibid., p. 356).
The Heligoland Treaty – also known as the Anglo-German Agreement – has sometimes been described by some scholars as an agreement on spheres of influence, not a treaty delineating the territorial boundary between German East Africa (renamed Tanganyika, then Tanzania) and the British Central Africa Protectorate (renamed Nyasaland, now Malawi). The Nyerere Doctrine of state succession and treaty repudiation may be invoked in this case because the Anglo-German Agreement did not conform to customary international law which stipulates that the median line is the boundary on the lake.
But it is not going to be upheld by the International Court of Justice because of the court's insistence on the legitimacy of colonial treaties on territorial boundaries, however ambiguous, that they do constitute evidence of demarcation or existence of borders; even though Nyerere repudiated the Heligoland Treaty when he wrote the UN Secretary General in 1961 to notify him that as a successor state replacing the colonial state, Tanganyika would no longer be bound by international treaties signed by the colonial power or powers – before independence – and had the right, as a sovereign state, to negotiate with other states and sign new treaties which did not violate her rights and were in accordance with international law.
According to the Heligoland Treaty, Lake Nyasa was placed firmly within the boundaries of what is now Malawi. The International Court of Justice has never questioned the legitimacy of the Treaty when it has been applied to resolve other disputes; which puts Tanzania in a precarious position if she were to agree with Malawi that the case should be adjudicated by the court.
Compounding the problem is the official position of the British government on the matter when Britain ruled both Tanganyika and Nyasaland. In 1959, as Tanganyika was approaching independence, and before internal self-government in September 1960 when Nyerere became chief minister, the British government officially notified the leaders of Tanganyika, including Nyerere, that no part of Lake Nyasa fell within the boundaries of Tanganyika, a position Nyerere also acknowledged, thus giving legitimacy to the Heligoland Treaty – which he repudiated later in 1961 – since it was, for all practical purposes, however controversial, a boundary treaty. As Nyerere himself stated in the Legislative Council (LEGCO) on 12 October 1960 when he was chief minister:
“I must emphasize again...there is now no doubt at all about this boundary. We know that not a drop of the water of Lake Nyasa belongs to Tanganyika under the terms of the agreement, so that in actual fact we would be asking a neighbouring Government [to] change the boundary in favour of Tanganyika.”
He repudiated the agreement – the Heligoland Treaty – not long after that in his statement to the UN Secretary General; a critical move which enabled Tanganyika, later Tanzania, to take a different approach in trying to resolve her dispute with Malawi over Lake Nyasa insisting that she was entitled to half of the northern part of the lake.
Then came the OAU summit in Cairo, Egypt, in July 1964, when the Organisation of African Unity adopted one of its cardinal principles, a bedrock for stability of the countries on the continent. Nyerere again made history after first repudiating pre-independence agreements including the Heligoland Treaty.
At the Cairo summit, it was Nyerere who proposed and introduced a resolution that African countries should maintain the boundaries inherited at independence to avoid territorial disputes and conflicts between neighbours, arising from claims by some countries that a part or parts of the territory across the border belong to them. As he stated years later in 1997 in an informal speech at the University of Dar es Salaam not long before he died:
In January 1967, the government of Tanzania notified Malawi that the boundary between the two countries was in the middle of the lake. In May the same year, President Nyerere wrote President Kamuzu Banda of Malawi to notify him that Tanzania did not accept the eastern shoreline as the boundary between Malawi and Tanzania.
The main reason Tanzania did not accept the boundary was not that there was no border at all between the two countries; it was because the demarcation was unfair to her. As Professor Tiyanjana Maluwa, a Malawian who teaches international law and international relations at Pennsylvania State University, stated in his article, “Oil Under Troubled Waters?: Some Legal Aspects of the Boundary Dispute Between Malawi and Tanzania Over Lake Nyasa,” in the Michigan Journal of International Law:
“Tanzania has never claimed that the 1890 Anglo-German Treaty is not a treaty determining its boundaries with Malawi and its other neighbors. Rather, its contention was that the treaty wrongly or unfairly placed the boundary on the shoreline when it should have been located along the median line of the lake, which in Tanzania's view would be more equitable and in accordance with the normal practice in international law....
This view was first clearly expressed by President Nyerere on May 31, 1967 when he addressed high school pupils at Iringa, a town in the central highlands of Tanzania, and declared that Tanzania could no longer accept the shoreline as the boundary, but instead recognized the median line, which was more equitable and fair.” – (Tiyanjana Maluwa, “Oil Under Troubled Waters?: Some Legal Aspects of the Boundary Dispute Between Malawi and Tanzania Over Lake Nyasa,” in the Michigan Journal of International Law, Volume 37, Issue 3, 2016, pp. 395 – 396).
Malawi disputes that and always has. She wants the case to be adjudicated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) where she will probably win because of the court's previous decisions on territorial disputes in Africa, such as Burkina Faso v. Mali, Botswana v. Namibia, and Cameroon v. Nigeria over the Bakassi Peninsula which Nigeria agreed to hand over to Cameroon although the transfer was rejected by the Nigerian Senate in 2007. The peninsula was finally transferred to Cameroon in 2008.
The ICJ invoked the Anglo-German Agreement of 1913 to rule in favour of Cameroon, an indication how the court could also rule in favour of Malawi in Malawi v. Tanzania if the case were to end up before the court, with Malawi contending the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890 did establish the boundary between the two countries; a treaty that has been repudiated by Tanzania according to the Nyerere Doctrine of state succession and treaty repudiation.
The same Heligoland Treaty of 1890 was invoked in resolving the dispute between Botswana and Namibia over Kasikili/Sedudu Island in Chobe River. The ICJ upheld the legitimacy of the Treaty in resolving the dispute.
There is no reason why it wouldn't do the same with regard to Malawi v. Tanzania even though the court is not bound by its own precedents. But it has always upheld the legitimacy of colonial treaties on territorial boundaries to settle disputes even if those boundaries are imprecise, not definitive and have other shortcomings. The focus is on the legitimacy of those agreements, according to the court. And that is what Malawi counts on to win the case. She does not want the case to be mediated by the members of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) of which both she and Tanzania are members. Tanzania wants the case to be resolved through mediation. As Professor Mulawa states:
“SADC has already experienced...setbacks...[because of] the wavering commitment to the process and apparent lack of trust displayed by one party [Malawi]....The failure of SADC mediation would not bode well for Tanzania, which prefers mediation to international judicial settlement. On the other hand, adjudication by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which Malawi evidently favors, would likely validate Malawi's position.” – (Ibid., p. 356).
The Heligoland Treaty – also known as the Anglo-German Agreement – has sometimes been described by some scholars as an agreement on spheres of influence, not a treaty delineating the territorial boundary between German East Africa (renamed Tanganyika, then Tanzania) and the British Central Africa Protectorate (renamed Nyasaland, now Malawi). The Nyerere Doctrine of state succession and treaty repudiation may be invoked in this case because the Anglo-German Agreement did not conform to customary international law which stipulates that the median line is the boundary on the lake.
But it is not going to be upheld by the International Court of Justice because of the court's insistence on the legitimacy of colonial treaties on territorial boundaries, however ambiguous, that they do constitute evidence of demarcation or existence of borders; even though Nyerere repudiated the Heligoland Treaty when he wrote the UN Secretary General in 1961 to notify him that as a successor state replacing the colonial state, Tanganyika would no longer be bound by international treaties signed by the colonial power or powers – before independence – and had the right, as a sovereign state, to negotiate with other states and sign new treaties which did not violate her rights and were in accordance with international law.
According to the Heligoland Treaty, Lake Nyasa was placed firmly within the boundaries of what is now Malawi. The International Court of Justice has never questioned the legitimacy of the Treaty when it has been applied to resolve other disputes; which puts Tanzania in a precarious position if she were to agree with Malawi that the case should be adjudicated by the court.
Compounding the problem is the official position of the British government on the matter when Britain ruled both Tanganyika and Nyasaland. In 1959, as Tanganyika was approaching independence, and before internal self-government in September 1960 when Nyerere became chief minister, the British government officially notified the leaders of Tanganyika, including Nyerere, that no part of Lake Nyasa fell within the boundaries of Tanganyika, a position Nyerere also acknowledged, thus giving legitimacy to the Heligoland Treaty – which he repudiated later in 1961 – since it was, for all practical purposes, however controversial, a boundary treaty. As Nyerere himself stated in the Legislative Council (LEGCO) on 12 October 1960 when he was chief minister:
“I must emphasize again...there is now no doubt at all about this boundary. We know that not a drop of the water of Lake Nyasa belongs to Tanganyika under the terms of the agreement, so that in actual fact we would be asking a neighbouring Government [to] change the boundary in favour of Tanganyika.”
He repudiated the agreement – the Heligoland Treaty – not long after that in his statement to the UN Secretary General; a critical move which enabled Tanganyika, later Tanzania, to take a different approach in trying to resolve her dispute with Malawi over Lake Nyasa insisting that she was entitled to half of the northern part of the lake.
Then came the OAU summit in Cairo, Egypt, in July 1964, when the Organisation of African Unity adopted one of its cardinal principles, a bedrock for stability of the countries on the continent. Nyerere again made history after first repudiating pre-independence agreements including the Heligoland Treaty.
At the Cairo summit, it was Nyerere who proposed and introduced a resolution that African countries should maintain the boundaries inherited at independence to avoid territorial disputes and conflicts between neighbours, arising from claims by some countries that a part or parts of the territory across the border belong to them. As he stated years later in 1997 in an informal speech at the University of Dar es Salaam not long before he died:
“The OAU was founded in 1963. In 1964 we went to Cairo to hold, in a sense, our first summit after the inaugural summit. I was responsible for moving that resolution that Africa must accept the borders, which we inherited from colonialism; accept them as they are. That resolution was passed by the organisation (OAU) with two reservations: one from Morocco, another from Somalia. Let me say why I moved that resolution.
In 1960, just before this country became independent, I think I was then chief minister; I received a delegation of Masai elders from Kenya, led by an American missionary. And they came to persuade me to let the Masai invoke something called the Anglo-Masai Agreement so that that section of the Masai in Kenya should become part of Tanganyika; so that when Tanganyika becomes independent, it includes part of Masai, from Kenya. I suspected the American missionary was responsible for that idea. I don’t remember that I was particularly polite to him. Kenyatta was then in detention, and here somebody comes to me, that we should break up Kenya and make part of Kenya part of Tanganyika. But why shouldn’t Kenyatta demand that the Masai part of Tanganyika should become Masai of Kenya? It’s the same logic. That was in 1960.
In 1961 we became independent. In 1962, early 1962, I resigned as prime minister and then a few weeks later I received Dr. Banda. Mungu amuweke mahali pema (May God rest his soul in peace). I received Dr. Banda. We had just, FRELIMO had just been established here and we were now in the process of starting the armed struggle.
So Banda comes to me with a big old book, with lots and lots of maps in it, and tells me, 'Mwalimu, what is this, what is Mozambique? There is no such thing as Mozambique.' I said, 'What do you mean there is no such thing as Mozambique?' So he showed me this map, and he said: 'That part is part of Nyasaland (it was still Nyasaland, not Malawi, at that time). That part is part of Southern Rhodesia, that part is Swaziland, and this part, which is the northern part, Makonde part, that is your part.'
So Banda disposed of Mozambique just like that. I ridiculed the idea, and Banda never liked anybody to ridicule his ideas. So he left and went to Lisbon to talk to Salazar about this wonderful idea. I don’t know what Salazar told him. That was ‘62.
In ‘63 we go to Addis Ababa for the inauguration of the OAU, and Ethiopia and Somalia are at war over the Ogaden. We had to send a special delegation to bring the president of Somalia to attend that inaugural summit, because the two countries were at war. Why? Because Somalia wanted the Ogaden, a whole province of Ethiopia, saying, 'That is part of Somalia.' And Ethiopia was quietly, the Emperor quietly saying to us that 'the whole of Somalia is part of Ethiopia.'
So those three, the delegation of the Masai, led by the American missionary; Banda’s old book of maps; and the Ogaden, caused me to move that resolution, in Cairo 1964. And I say, the resolution was accepted, two countries with reservations, and one was Somalia because Somalia wanted the Ogaden; Somalia wanted northern Kenya; Somalia wanted Djibouti.” – (Julius K. Nyerere, at an international conference at the University of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, 15 December 1997, in Godfrey Mwakikagile, Nyerere and Africa: End of an Era, Pretoria, South Africa: New Africa Press, Fifth Edition, 2010, pp. 556 – 557).
Malawi has invoked this resolution, proposed and introduced by Nyerere and adopted by the OAU, to justify her claim on the entire lake and has even reminded Tanzania that it was your own president who proposed and introduced the resolution; a resolution that, by the way, infuriated Kwame Nkrumah who wanted all the borders abolished immediately in order for African countries to unite under one government right away.
The resolution is also a principle that will be upheld by the International Court of Justice which will remind Tanzania – if she were to go – that it was Tanzania's president, Mwalimu Nyerere, who first proposed and presented the resolution before his colleagues at the OAU summit in Cairo in July 1964 and they accepted it. Only two countries refused to accept it: Morocco and Somalia, as Nyerere said.
Therefore, going to the ICJ will only help Malawi win the case. Malawi contends that is the best place for the case to be adjudicated. It is obvious why she says so. She is going to win. Tanzania would be falling into her trap if she were to go along with her and say, “Yes, let's take the case to the ICJ.”
One ICJ judge has already supported the legitimacy of the Heligoland Treaty of 1890 as the final authority on the legality of the boundary between Malawi and Tanzania and has gone even further stating:
“While the boundary between Malawi and Tanzania is Lake Nyasa [Malawi and] is a complicated issue, and not without its difficulties, I feel that the legal claims of Malawi to all of Lake Nyasa, and the submerged lands there under, is considerably the better claim.” – (Judge Rosalyn Higgins, in Chris Mahony et al., “Where Politics Borders Law: The Malawi-Tanzania Boundary Dispute,” New Zealand Centre for Human Rights Law, Policy and Practice – Working Paper 21, February 2014, p. 15).
That's enough right there for Tanzania to say she is not going to The Hague to contest Malawi's claim. The other judges are probably going to take the same position Judge Higgins has on the case.
The argument that the Heligoland Treaty established only spheres of influence, not boundaries, has been rejected by the court in the past. ICJ judges have maintained that spheres of influence were themselves territorial boundaries legalised by the Treaty as demarcation lines.
The best option for Tanzania is mediation – nothing else. Malawi is reluctant to participate in the mediation process because she knows the mediators will recommend sharing the lake on terms she will not accept; sharing the lake probably on an equitable basis and therefore give Tanzania a share of this body of water.
Malawi will not be satisfied with the outcome of the negotiations and mediation under SADC which will make both countries winners.
Malawi also claims that mediators from the countries of southern Africa – Mozambique, South Africa and Botswana – favour Tanzania because of the role she played in supporting the liberation movements and even served as their headquarters when Malawi did not and instead had cordial relations with the white minority rulers in the region.
Tanzania should invoke the Nyerere Doctrine and insist on applying customary international law – which was ignored by the Heligoland Treaty – to get a share of the lake and refuse to go to The Hague where Malawi is going to win. She should also insist on renegotiating the Treaty which clearly states that it can be re-negotiated, according to Article VI of the Treaty:
“Any correction of the demarcation lines described in Articles I to IV that becomes necessary due to local requirements may be undertaken by agreement between the two powers. It is understood, in particular, that commissioners will meet as soon as possible to undertake such a correction with regard to the borders described in Article IV.”
The treaty was never corrected.
The two colonial powers, Britain and Germany, are no longer in power in Malawi and Tanzania. The independent states – successor states – which succeeded them are the parties which can now renegotiate the terms of the Treaty to satisfy both.
It is not enough for Malawi to say the entire lake belongs to her permanently when the terms of the Heligoland Treaty are not permanent and clearly state that the treaty could be renegotiated in the future. Since it is a legally binding treaty, Malawi is also bound by the terms of the treaty to renegotiate the agreement with the other party to the agreement. She has never questioned or disputed the legitimacy of the treaty and has, instead, always used it to justify her claim to ownership of the entire lake. Therefore, she is equally bound by the terms of the treaty to sign a new border agreement that is acceptable to Tanzania.
If Malawi refuses to renegotiate the Heligoland Treaty, Tanzania should reciprocate and refuse to recognise the boundary and go ahead and establish full control over the part of the lake, up to the median line, she contends belongs to her. In fact, that is what Nyerere did, nine days before Tanganyika's independence, in his repudiation of the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890.
Tanzania can negotiate with Malawi from a position of strength but only if she can extract concessions from her. She is militarily stronger than her. If, out of shortsightedness and desperation, Malawi were to opt for a military solution to the crisis, Tanzania could seize northern parts of Malawi such as Karonga District – even after stiff resistance by Malawian forces – to facilitate effective control of the entire northern part of the lake by the Tanzanian army and patrol boats and extract concessions from Lilongwe before withdrawing her forces. Even Malawi's air force and long range artillery can't stop that. But a military solution is not the best option for either one; it is not even an option for Malawi despite threats by some Malawian leaders to use military force to take full control of the lake. As Maluwa stated:
“Despite isolated...pronouncements by some political leaders on both sides proclaiming their readiness to fight in defense of their sovereignty, nobody seriously thinks that either party wishes to seek a military solution to this dispute.
President Joyce Banda's reported decision to commission patrol boats for the lake in mid-2013 was, in my view, more an empty gesture of saber-rattling aimed at impressing a domestic audience than preparation for a real military confrontation. For one thing, according to a recent assessment by a leading external intelligence agency (the CIA), Malawi's military capabilities appear to be no match for Tanzania's. The agency estimated Malawi's military expenditure for 2012 at only 13.8 percent that of Tanzania, which in military terms makes Malawi undoubtedly the quantitatively weaker of the two parties....
Tanzania's and Malawi's military spending for 2012 was USD $950 million and USD $131 million, respectively." - (Maluwa, op. cit., pp. 413 - 414).
If Malawi insists that the case must be adjudicated by the ICJ, does not want to participate in mediation and refuses to make meaningful concessions, Tanzania should simply do one thing: Maintain the status quo. Continue using the lake, indefinitely, without even attempting to resolve the dispute. It is an approach, and a solution, that has worked for the past 54 years since the dispute started in 1967. As one Malawian said, “Let sleeping dogs lie.”
It may be the only solution to the dispute – as long as Tanzania can't be intimidated into submission by Malawi. Remain strong and continue using the lake up to the median line, a version of gunboat diplomacy in our region even if it's denounced as a hostile and an aggressive policy by Tanzania in pursuit of her imperial ambitions in a regional context. Tanzania may be forced to do that in order to pursue her national interests beyond the border because the boundary separating the two countries was established where it should not have been and violates customary international law.
Professor Maluwa has provided some illuminating and probing insights into the case in his article below:
Some Legal Aspects of the Boundary Dispute Between Malawi and Tanzania Over Lake Malawi:
https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1193&context=mjil
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