zitto junior
JF-Expert Member
- Oct 7, 2013
- 24,661
- 40,890
* Mafuta ghafi ya Urusi na Iran yanachanganywa katika usafirishaji wa mafuta wa CPC wa Kazakhstan, na kuruhusu mapipa yaliyowekewa vikwazo kufika Ulaya chini ya nyaraka za Kazakhstan.
* Urusi na Iran zinaripotiwa kuandaa kutumia bomba jingine la mafuta la Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) kuanzia 2027, na huenda yakapitisha bpd 600,000–750,000 kupitia ukanda ili kuepuka vikwazo vya Magharibi.
* Kiasi cha mafuta ghafi (ambayo yanadaiwa kuwa yanatoka Kazakhstan pekee) kinachopitishwa kila mwaka kimeongezeka kutoka tani metriki milioni 52 — sawa na mapipa milioni 1.04 kwa siku — hadi kufikia kiwango cha rekodi cha tani metriki milioni 72; ongezeko kubwa la asilimia 38.5. Hata hivyo, katika kipindi hicho, uzalishaji halisi wa mafuta ndani ya Kazakhstan umeongezeka kwa chini ya asilimia 2 pekee.
* Kulingana na chanzo cha ngazi ya juu sana ndani ya kitengo cha usalama wa nishati cha Umoja wa Ulaya (EU) kilichozungumza na OilPrice.com wiki iliyopita; tofauti kubwa kati ya ongezeko la kiasi cha mafuta ghafi katika mfumo wa CPC na kiasi halisi cha uzalishaji wa mafuta wa Kazakhstan katika kipindi hicho, inaashiria kuwepo kwa kile kinachoitwa "kiasi kivuli" (ghost volume).
* Katika mchakato huu, mchanganyiko wa mafuta ghafi ya Urusi kutoka Iran huchanganywa kwa siri na kusafirishwa moja kwa moja hadi maeneo barani Ulaya, huku yakikwepa kabisa mfumo wa "meli kivuli" (shadow fleet) za Urusi zinazofuatiliwa na kundi la nchi za G7.
Ramani ikionyesha Caspian Sea, kaskazini mwa Iran na Kazakhstan ambako ndio lango la mafuta hayo kuingia ulaya kupitia Russia.
==========
As has been proven time and time again in multiple scenarios: ‘Where there’s a will, there’s a way around any sanctions’ and, despite looming deadlines to end all Russian oil and gas imports -- with promises to keep reducing them before that -- the European Union (EU) appears to be continuing to play a sanctions-skirting game with Moscow.
Under the strict terms of Regulation (EU) 2026/261, a hard legal cliff drops on 1 January 2027, completely banning all long-term Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, followed by a total phase-out of remaining piped gas and crude exemptions by the end of that same year. On paper, the West’s regulatory chokehold on the Kremlin’s war machine in Ukraine is reaching its absolute zenith. In reality, however, a massive, highly sophisticated infrastructure back door has been swung wide open for Russia and Iran to exploit, but which keeps European grids alive through a toxic, sanctions-busting military-energy swap between Moscow and Tehran.
In terms of Russian crude oil exports continuing to be transported specifically via pipeline to Europe -- which the EU has committed to completely phase out by 31 December 2027 -- the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) is the primary, active corridor through which the EU effectively evades its own sanctions framework, and that of the U.S., as managed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
While the EU has officially banned seaborne imports of Russian crude, the ‘CPC Blend’ crude oil stream -- which terminates at and ships from the Russian port of Novorossiysk -- was granted a specific legal exemption by Brussels on 3 June 2022. This carve-out was justified on the grounds that the underlying volumes originate in Kazakhstan. Since that date, annual throughput of this supposedly Kazakh-only crude oil has surged from 52 million metric tonnes -- around 1.04 million barrels per day (bpd) -- to a record-breaking 72 million metric tonnes: a massive 38.5% increase.
However, over that period, Kazakhstan’s actual domestic oil production has grown less than 2%, with its true crude oil output this year having fallen significantly due to operational disruptions and strict OPEC+ quota limits. According to a very senior EU source in its energy security complex exclusively spoken to by OilPrice.com last week, the huge discrepancy between the crude oil volume rise in the CPC over the period and Kazakhstan’s own oil output volume over the period represents the active ‘ghost volume’ where a heavily discounted cocktail of Russian crude -- mixed with Iranian oil -- is being quietly blended and laundered straight to European destinations completely outside the G7-monitored Russian shadow fleet.
This is not merely an energy laundering operation -- it is a direct, infrastructure-backed financing mechanism for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its terrorist proxies around the world. Deeply embedded in the trade is Khatam al-Anbiya, the engineering and industrial wing of the IRGC, alongside the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).
Because Tehran cannot easily conduct transactions via Western financial networks, for reasons fully analysed in my latest book on the new global oil market order, it is allocating massive tranches of crude directly to the IRGC and its proxies to cover expenses and to pay Moscow for advanced Russian military hardware and software.
This includes specialised air-to-air missiles, ‘Verba’ man-portable air-defence systems and real-time Russian orbital surveillance and satellite data that directly aids the IRGC in tracking Western and regional military installations, among many others. According to the EU source, this Iranian crude is transferred to Russia at a staggering discount of 35% to 42%, and then seamlessly integrated into Russia’s domestic pipeline matrix via a rapidly expanding fleet of non-aligned tankers in the secure, unmonitored waters of the Caspian Sea. It is then pushed into the CPC network under forged Kazakh certificates.
As devastating as this active CPC loophole is for Western policy credibility, things are set to become much worse. With Russia (and therefore Iran) facing an imminent capacity crunch as the EU’s statutory 31 December 2027 phase-out date approaches, the EU source highlights that Moscow and Tehran are organising a clandestine operational pivot to integrate the highly strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline into this exact Russian-Iranian-Kazakh mix. To lay the groundwork for this upcoming shift, Moscow, Tehran, and Astana are already utilising the public corporate media to build a plausible cover story.
The official press release frames this as a purely commercial diversification strategy by state energy giant KazMunayGas (KMG) to mitigate the ‘geopolitical instability’ of the Russian-controlled CPC route. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s energy ministry director of oil transportation and refining, Daulet Arykbayev, stated on 1 October that Kazakhstan aims to increase its crude supply through the BTC pipeline, which runs from Azerbaijan to Turkey, to 7 million metric tons per year (mtpy). To put that into context, Kazakhstan exported 1.2 million mtpy of oil via the BTC in 2025 and around 700,000 metric tons in the first half of this year, according to KazTransOil.
“That’s clearly a huge increase -- more than five-fold -- from a country whose domestic oil production is declining, and which never sent anywhere near that amount through the BTC,” said the EU source. “We believe this sudden, aggressive pivot to the BTC corridor starting in February [2027] is specifically timed to act as the primary, next-generation relief valve for the heavily discounted Russian-Iranian military-energy swap,” he told OilPrice.com.
Indeed, the clandestine blueprint centred on the Northern Corridor -- the trans-Caspian land and sea route that physically links Iran and Russia through the Caspian Sea, connecting them directly into the South Caucasus transit grid -- aims to pump a staggering 600,000 to 750,000 bpd through the BTC by March-April 2027.
That is a volume equivalent to nearly half of Kazakhstan’s entire OPEC+ national production quota, which is currently locked at 1.628 million bpd. “Kazakhstan’s target is highly improbable, given existing infrastructure limits, meaning the massive deficit can only be met by the illicit introduction of heavily discounted oil from the Russian-Iranian crude swap,” he concluded.
Ultimately, the upcoming February 2027 pipeline pivot exposes the official Western sanctions timeline as little more than political theatre. As the front doors to Russian and Iranian energy are legally bolted shut, the infrastructure of the South Caucasus is being systematically re-engineered to absorb the overflow. For global oil markets, the message is clear: the volume will always find a way to flow. By the time the EU officially celebrates its total detachment from Russian crude at the end of 2027, the illicit, heavily discounted flows running through Ceyhan will have already become the global market’s worst-kept and most lucrative open secret.
By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com
* Urusi na Iran zinaripotiwa kuandaa kutumia bomba jingine la mafuta la Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) kuanzia 2027, na huenda yakapitisha bpd 600,000–750,000 kupitia ukanda ili kuepuka vikwazo vya Magharibi.
* Kiasi cha mafuta ghafi (ambayo yanadaiwa kuwa yanatoka Kazakhstan pekee) kinachopitishwa kila mwaka kimeongezeka kutoka tani metriki milioni 52 — sawa na mapipa milioni 1.04 kwa siku — hadi kufikia kiwango cha rekodi cha tani metriki milioni 72; ongezeko kubwa la asilimia 38.5. Hata hivyo, katika kipindi hicho, uzalishaji halisi wa mafuta ndani ya Kazakhstan umeongezeka kwa chini ya asilimia 2 pekee.
* Kulingana na chanzo cha ngazi ya juu sana ndani ya kitengo cha usalama wa nishati cha Umoja wa Ulaya (EU) kilichozungumza na OilPrice.com wiki iliyopita; tofauti kubwa kati ya ongezeko la kiasi cha mafuta ghafi katika mfumo wa CPC na kiasi halisi cha uzalishaji wa mafuta wa Kazakhstan katika kipindi hicho, inaashiria kuwepo kwa kile kinachoitwa "kiasi kivuli" (ghost volume).
* Katika mchakato huu, mchanganyiko wa mafuta ghafi ya Urusi kutoka Iran huchanganywa kwa siri na kusafirishwa moja kwa moja hadi maeneo barani Ulaya, huku yakikwepa kabisa mfumo wa "meli kivuli" (shadow fleet) za Urusi zinazofuatiliwa na kundi la nchi za G7.
==========
As has been proven time and time again in multiple scenarios: ‘Where there’s a will, there’s a way around any sanctions’ and, despite looming deadlines to end all Russian oil and gas imports -- with promises to keep reducing them before that -- the European Union (EU) appears to be continuing to play a sanctions-skirting game with Moscow.
Under the strict terms of Regulation (EU) 2026/261, a hard legal cliff drops on 1 January 2027, completely banning all long-term Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports, followed by a total phase-out of remaining piped gas and crude exemptions by the end of that same year. On paper, the West’s regulatory chokehold on the Kremlin’s war machine in Ukraine is reaching its absolute zenith. In reality, however, a massive, highly sophisticated infrastructure back door has been swung wide open for Russia and Iran to exploit, but which keeps European grids alive through a toxic, sanctions-busting military-energy swap between Moscow and Tehran.
In terms of Russian crude oil exports continuing to be transported specifically via pipeline to Europe -- which the EU has committed to completely phase out by 31 December 2027 -- the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) is the primary, active corridor through which the EU effectively evades its own sanctions framework, and that of the U.S., as managed by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
While the EU has officially banned seaborne imports of Russian crude, the ‘CPC Blend’ crude oil stream -- which terminates at and ships from the Russian port of Novorossiysk -- was granted a specific legal exemption by Brussels on 3 June 2022. This carve-out was justified on the grounds that the underlying volumes originate in Kazakhstan. Since that date, annual throughput of this supposedly Kazakh-only crude oil has surged from 52 million metric tonnes -- around 1.04 million barrels per day (bpd) -- to a record-breaking 72 million metric tonnes: a massive 38.5% increase.
However, over that period, Kazakhstan’s actual domestic oil production has grown less than 2%, with its true crude oil output this year having fallen significantly due to operational disruptions and strict OPEC+ quota limits. According to a very senior EU source in its energy security complex exclusively spoken to by OilPrice.com last week, the huge discrepancy between the crude oil volume rise in the CPC over the period and Kazakhstan’s own oil output volume over the period represents the active ‘ghost volume’ where a heavily discounted cocktail of Russian crude -- mixed with Iranian oil -- is being quietly blended and laundered straight to European destinations completely outside the G7-monitored Russian shadow fleet.
This is not merely an energy laundering operation -- it is a direct, infrastructure-backed financing mechanism for Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and its terrorist proxies around the world. Deeply embedded in the trade is Khatam al-Anbiya, the engineering and industrial wing of the IRGC, alongside the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC).
Because Tehran cannot easily conduct transactions via Western financial networks, for reasons fully analysed in my latest book on the new global oil market order, it is allocating massive tranches of crude directly to the IRGC and its proxies to cover expenses and to pay Moscow for advanced Russian military hardware and software.
This includes specialised air-to-air missiles, ‘Verba’ man-portable air-defence systems and real-time Russian orbital surveillance and satellite data that directly aids the IRGC in tracking Western and regional military installations, among many others. According to the EU source, this Iranian crude is transferred to Russia at a staggering discount of 35% to 42%, and then seamlessly integrated into Russia’s domestic pipeline matrix via a rapidly expanding fleet of non-aligned tankers in the secure, unmonitored waters of the Caspian Sea. It is then pushed into the CPC network under forged Kazakh certificates.
As devastating as this active CPC loophole is for Western policy credibility, things are set to become much worse. With Russia (and therefore Iran) facing an imminent capacity crunch as the EU’s statutory 31 December 2027 phase-out date approaches, the EU source highlights that Moscow and Tehran are organising a clandestine operational pivot to integrate the highly strategic Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline into this exact Russian-Iranian-Kazakh mix. To lay the groundwork for this upcoming shift, Moscow, Tehran, and Astana are already utilising the public corporate media to build a plausible cover story.
The official press release frames this as a purely commercial diversification strategy by state energy giant KazMunayGas (KMG) to mitigate the ‘geopolitical instability’ of the Russian-controlled CPC route. Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s energy ministry director of oil transportation and refining, Daulet Arykbayev, stated on 1 October that Kazakhstan aims to increase its crude supply through the BTC pipeline, which runs from Azerbaijan to Turkey, to 7 million metric tons per year (mtpy). To put that into context, Kazakhstan exported 1.2 million mtpy of oil via the BTC in 2025 and around 700,000 metric tons in the first half of this year, according to KazTransOil.
“That’s clearly a huge increase -- more than five-fold -- from a country whose domestic oil production is declining, and which never sent anywhere near that amount through the BTC,” said the EU source. “We believe this sudden, aggressive pivot to the BTC corridor starting in February [2027] is specifically timed to act as the primary, next-generation relief valve for the heavily discounted Russian-Iranian military-energy swap,” he told OilPrice.com.
Indeed, the clandestine blueprint centred on the Northern Corridor -- the trans-Caspian land and sea route that physically links Iran and Russia through the Caspian Sea, connecting them directly into the South Caucasus transit grid -- aims to pump a staggering 600,000 to 750,000 bpd through the BTC by March-April 2027.
That is a volume equivalent to nearly half of Kazakhstan’s entire OPEC+ national production quota, which is currently locked at 1.628 million bpd. “Kazakhstan’s target is highly improbable, given existing infrastructure limits, meaning the massive deficit can only be met by the illicit introduction of heavily discounted oil from the Russian-Iranian crude swap,” he concluded.
Ultimately, the upcoming February 2027 pipeline pivot exposes the official Western sanctions timeline as little more than political theatre. As the front doors to Russian and Iranian energy are legally bolted shut, the infrastructure of the South Caucasus is being systematically re-engineered to absorb the overflow. For global oil markets, the message is clear: the volume will always find a way to flow. By the time the EU officially celebrates its total detachment from Russian crude at the end of 2027, the illicit, heavily discounted flows running through Ceyhan will have already become the global market’s worst-kept and most lucrative open secret.
By Simon Watkins for Oilprice.com
