Mzee Mwanakijiji
Platinum Member
- Mar 10, 2006
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what is sociocapitalism? to say "we practice both" doesn't define what we practice.
We practice both.........
Uvivu wetu ni wa kufanya kazi kwa bidii na kwa ziada, uvivu wa kufikiria, uvivu wa kila namna ambao unatufanya tuwe hapa tulipo, masikini tuliolimbikwa na utajiri mwingi lakini hatutaki kufany akazi yeyote, tunasubiri mwingine aje afanye hiyo kazi au atupe kamsaada nasi tuendelee na "Mwendo mdundo" kama Jasusi anavyosema na kutanua kama Kikwete!
what is sociocapitalism? to say "we practice both" doesn't define what we practice.
We kind of practice socialism still but we lean more towards capitalism....
what is this "socialism" and what is this "Capitalism" and how does both of them manifest themselves in sociocapitalism? What are the characteristics of sociocapitalism?
Socialism is a social and economic system in which the economic means of production are owned and controlled collectively by the people whereas Capitalism utilizes the willpower of individuals, especially entrepreneurs, to foment economic activity. Capitalism is based on the assumption that individuals operate based on self interest; however, by doing so they not only help themselves, but also propel others towards economic success.
Sociocapitalism is an improved version of capitalism that corrects its weaknesses. It has the following guidelines:
1. The mechanism is based on the self-regulating supply and demand (the "invisible hands").
2. The basic principle is free competition and seeking profit (the principle of "survival of the fittest"). But it also adopts social policy to help the disadvantaged through universal healthcare, low income subsidy, etc.
3. It normally requires private ownership of capital and properties.
4. It favors free market, deregulated rather than centrally planned economy, and minimum government intervention.
5. It prevents excessive uneven wealth distribution through social policies such as ceiling of wealth or accumulative tax.
6. It adopts some regulations in regard to international trade to reduce the disadvantages of developed market due to its higher cost and to protect the emergent market from imperialism.
7. It utilizes government intervention in a mixed economy to prevent "market failure" such as the Great Depression or what is going on now with the markets.
8. It adopts regulations to prohibit immoral business practice, poor labor treatment, imperialism, etc. It also uses regulations to protect the environment from profit-driven pollution or abuse.
vizuri sana; sasa katika Tanzania hayo mambo nane yanaonekana vipi ili kuthibitisha kuwa tuna sociocapitalism?
Kwa vile ndo tunaanza kujaribu ku practice sociocapitalism, ni vigumu kuthibitisha yanaonekana vipi lakini tunakoelea ndio huko.
Koba,Zakumi,Nyani McCain,Kuhani,Kafara,Pundit,Kishoka,Mwanakijiji,Jasusi,...
..samahani kwamba hii posting hapa chini ni ndefu kidogo.
..hiki ni kipande cha ripoti AID and REFORM in Tanzania.
..Ripoti hiyo iliandaliwa na wasomi toka Goteborg University na ESRF.
..Ripoti nzima inapatikana kwa kubonyeza hapa
1979-1982: Stalemate
After the collapse of the commodity boom of 1975-1978, the Uganda war (1978-79) and thesecond oil crisis in 1979, the economy was faced with very severe economic problems. As aresponse to this, Tanzania agreed to a stand-by credit with the IMF in 1979, but since it failed toobserve the agreed budget ceiling the agreement was cancelled. During the discussion of therelease of the second tranche the head of the visiting IMF mission was ordered to leave thecountry. The Minister of Finance, Mtei, was perceived by President Nyerere as being to close tothe IMF and was removed. Mtei was succeeded by Jamal, who was less eager to reform the economy. Nyerere made a speech in which he criticised the IMF for trying to set itself up as the International Ministry of Finance and rejected their demands. Tanzania then turned to the WorldBank for assistance, but although the Bank had been supportive throughout the 1970s it now refused to support the Tanzanian government. Then there was little communication for about two years until 1981, when the Bank indicated that it could provide quick-disbursing aid if certainpolicy changes were undertaken and an agreement could be reached with the IMF. The latter demanded at 50-60 per cent devaluation, a significant reduction of the budget deficit, removal or reduction of consumer and producer subsidies, positive real interest rates, and higher agriculturalprices and import liberalisation. Some new measures were proposed in the National Economic Survival Programme (NESP) of 1981, which was essentially part of an application to the IMF.
The goals stated in the plan were to increase export revenue and to eliminate food shortagesthrough various supply side measures and to reduce public expenditures. This was to be achievedby tighter state control of public expenditures and increased production. The plan was whollyunrealistic, and the IMF found it to be completely lacking. Tanzania anti-reform elements arguedthat the problems causing the crisis were external and not internal policy weaknesses. The governments position was that Tanzania was a structurally weak economy and that the remediesproposed, including the dismantling of the socialist structures and major cuts in social spendingon education, health and water, would not help revive the economy. The government was notready to accept to carry out significant reforms. This partly explains why NESP I (1981) and NESP II (1982) were more of exhortations than policy change documents.
Moreover, at this time there were very few senior officers in central ministries capable as a groupto undertake independent macro-economic and sectoral analysis to generate new ideas and develop new programmes to address the crisis. Local intellectual capacity was not sufficientlyavailable to engage in a meaningful debate with the IFIs and even to counter-balance the ruling partys inclinations towards maintaining the status quo. There was excessive reliance on ahandful of expatriate advisors, most of who preferred to toe the party line. Sometimes, theseadvisors held divergent policy perspectives and it was a task to maintain harmony among them.
The academia at the University of Dar es Salaam had generally been weakened either by thesocialist ideology or by opportunists within the institution who were eager to please the partyleadership. To identify with the party could open up opportunities for accelerated promotions orfor transfer to more remunerative positions in parastatal organisations or political structures.Because of a severe shortage of qualified people, such transfers were very frequent at the timeand contributed to the lack of consolidation of intellectual policy groups within the Governmentor around it.
1982-1985: Hard internal debate
The country was now in a desperate situation with the exchange rate greatly overvalued andexports at very low levels. The bilaterals and the World Bank were trying to find some middleground and sponsored a Technical Advisory Group (TAG) with well-known economists, whowere asked to come up with some compromise package. It proposed a more moderate devaluation, but the government did not accept even this. The government used the report toproduce its own reform package, which was a dilution of the policy changes, which wereproposed in the TAG report. This revision was done by the Planning Ministry, then underMinister Malima who was basically anti-reform (1980-1992), although he later became morepro-reform (1992-94). The government turned to the Nordic bilaterals to fill the gap left by the IFIs, but by now also those were becoming increasingly critical and did not provide the extrafunds. There was thus a steep decline in aid flows between 1982 and 1985, which was period ofextreme economic crisis.
Still, a sign of some movement on the government side was the appointment in 1982 of the then PM Msuya as Minister of Finance: He was more aware of the need to mend fences with the IFIs. Together with Rutihinda, who was the PS in the Ministry of Finance at the time, he tried within the government to push for reforms. There were similar attempts at the Bank of Tanzania. Still,the supporters of reform in the Ministry of Finance had to work hard to build up support for it within the government. There was at that time a large dominance of hard-line left-wingers in the Cabinet opposed to the reforms, with the Minister of Finance Msuya as one of the few advocatesof reform. The Minister of Planning Malima was a leading opponent of the reformers, and he quickly brought in Ajit Singh from Cambridge to write a counter-proposal to the reform plan.There was a head-on collision between Msuya and Malima, where the latter even wrote a memo to the President accusing the reformers of being traitors. The parastatal establishment was also a major stumbling block in the process, although some could see that devaluation would make itpossible for them to improve their results.
It took time for the government to realise that parastatals were a problem. First, there wereattempts to peg the desired exchange rate at a level, which was sufficient to clear losses ofparastatals. This point was favoured very much in 1983 and 1984. Second, the extreme opposerof the reforms, Malima, submitted a paper to the ruling party suggesting that the problem ofparastatals was rooted in the existence of the private sector. The private sector would have to bephased out in order to give room for parastatals to recover! Presumably he had in mind that private sector was doing harm to the parastatals through the deals they had with them (e.g.supplying them with overpriced goods and services).
Public opposition to the policies of the early 1980s was limited, and people rather chose to withdraw into subsistence or to find other ways to deal with shortages and regulations. Parallel markets emerged, as did illegal cross-border trade. The rapid expansion of the underground economy as well as capital flight undermined the tax base. Semi-public discussions was started at the behest of the reformers within government, and an informal network of economists from the University of Dar es Salaam as well as private consultants plus personnel from key ministriessuch as agriculture, transport, industry and trade and the Planning Commission was set up toprovide a forum for debate and to increase the understanding of the politicians and the policymakers.
The strong political leadership made it possible to push through major decisions (or to rejectothers) without proper analysis and debate. Nevertheless, there were individuals of courage notably Edwin Mtei or Cleopa Msuya who could put forward reform ideas to the partyhierarchy and the Cabinet. Naturally, such people faced major resistance from the party and, assuch processes go, vacillating positions developed within the Cabinet depending on who couldget the Presidents ear. But the increasingly precarious social situation arising from severeshortages of consumer goods, especially in large cities, forced the leadership to search for solutions and, ultimately, to consider seriously the implementation of more comprehensive reform packages.
Up until 1983 the government essentially preserved existing policies. Instead of introducing measures to deal with the dis-equilibria, the government pursued campaigns against corruption and profiteers. Stewart, Klugman and Neyapti (1999, p. 82) argue that a side-effect of the political stability that characterised Tanzania was that it postponed pressures for economic reforms that were essential for economic development. Adam et al (1994) argue that the backing from a range of bilateral donors also made it possible to delay adjustment.
A second home-grown Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was anyway launched in 1983.This was more ambitious than the previous one, but it did not change any of the majorparameters of policy. Here one tried to identify a series of structural problems in the economyand then adjust the type of state-intervention for the economy to do better. It was not a matter ofliberalisation and deregulation. The main aim was to increase agricultural production andexports, and among the measures was a modest devaluation. It did have some positive effect on exports and agriculture, but was far from closing the gap between the official and the parallelrates. There was a further tightening of fiscal and monetary policies. Still, the measures were insufficient to reverse the trend. The situation remained grave, and there was increasing public criticism of the shortages. The increasingly tough security measures against smugglers and profiteers only increased the goods shortages, and it was mainly the smaller culprits that were sentenced in the end. Campaigns against corruption and profiteers were directed at attacking stockpiling of goods and improving distribution of goods. It was believed that the problem of shortages was caused by hoarding or unfair distribution of goods. When the shortage of goods became worse even with the campaigns, then the champions of this campaign began to realise that the problem of shortage of goods was more deep-rooted. This realisation influenced the decision to permit partial import liberalisation in 1984. In fact Mr. Sokoine, then Prime Minister,led the campaign against profiteers and later he also led the initiative towards partial liberalisation starting with transport (imports of pick-ups were allowed and supply improved)and these positive results were used to argue for further import liberalisation.
The failure of SAP was also aggravated by the two other factors. First, the receding aid inflows worsened the already low levels of capacity utilisation and therefore worsened the shortage ofgoods. Second, the allocation of whatever foreign exchange was available through CIS favoured projects, which had earlier been funded by the respective donors rather than follow efficiency criteria. The few resources available were spread too thinly to be effective.
In 1984 economists from the University of Dar es Salaam started to hold public meetings, wherethey advocated liberalisation measures. The initial discussions targeted policy makers andpoliticians and some private sector leaders. These meetings were, of course, against the officialparty line, but were supported by the reformers within the government, for example in theMinistry of Finance and the Bank of Tanzania. So in 1984, in the face of extreme goodsshortages, the government finally made a more substantial move. It chose to allow own fundedimports, it devalued the currency and it increased agricultural prices by about 30%. There was anexport retention scheme, and user charges were introduced in health. This was the first step onthe road to the restoration of relations with the IFIs. There was now some improvement in theeconomy and imports could increase somewhat. The government tried to mend relations with theIMF, which felt that the new reform programme was a least a basis for further discussion. Talks were reopened between the Government and the IMF at the end of the Nyerere era.
Let say that Ujamaa was wrong, what about Kujitegemea? Why kujitegemea never succeded? was it Nyerere's fault? and lets not talk about Serikali or the system itself, turudi katika nafsi zetu mtu mmoja mmoja. Je tutatafuta sababu nyingine za kudai tumeshindwa kujifunza kujitegemea kwa kuwa Nyerere alileta Ujamaa au kutupeleka vijiji vya ujamaa?
Mtanzania kafanya nini kwa nafsi moja au nafsi mkusanyiko kama jamii na taifa kujitegemea?
Wamarekani walipopata Uhuru wao, hawakuwa matajiri usiku wa pili, walichokivuna katika miaka 200 ni matunda ya kuchapa kazi pamoja na unyonyaji.
Marekani haikufika hapa bila kupitia misukosuko, shida au dhiki. Hata leo hii, pamoja na Utajiri wake wote, bado leo hii kuna umasikini wa hali ya juu katika baadhi ya wananchi wake kuliko hata Tanzania
unaposema Maendeleo, tunamaanisha maendeleo ya namna gani? Tunapima maendeleo kwa mizani gani? ni vipengele vya namna gani? Ni maendeleo ya Uchumi tuu? what about umoja wetu?
Je tujiulize wakati Marekani ilipopata Uhuru, kazi yake ya kwanza ilikuwa nini? je ni vikwazo gani viongozi wa kwanza wa Marekani walivikuta? Je Marekani ilikuwa na matatizo na mazingira ambayo Tanzania ilikuwa nayo? au walipopata Uhuru tayari nchi ilikuwa imepiga hatua mbele?
Sasa sisi tunaikana Historia ya dunia hii kwa kutaka kujenga Taifa kamili lenye viongozi Malaika wasio na makosa au kila walichokisema na kuahidi kitimilike na kinyume cha hayo, basi ni kosa na tutanyooshea vidole milele.
Lakini kuna tofauti kubwa sana kati ya Nyerere na kikwete ikiwa kuna watakaosema tumwachie Kikwete naye afanye makosa kama Nyerere, Mwinyi na Mkapa. Mswahili anasema kosa si kulifanya kwa mara ya kwanza, bali ni kulirudia kosa.
Tumefika hapa tulipo ambapo mimi Mndengereko nalonga na Msukuma bila woga huku nimekaa na mke wangu wa Kinyaturu. Hiyo pekee ni maendeleo makubwa.
Je kuna uwezekano kuwa kufeli kwa Ujamaa kulitokana si kwa sera au fikra za Nyerere tuu, bali ni pamoja na hali halisi ya Uafrika wetu ambayo Nyani anaukiri kuwa "Ndivyo Tulivyo"?
Leo hii tunasimanga detention act za Tanzania, lakini Patriotic Act ya Marekani tunaiamini kuwa itatulinda tunaoishi Marekani kupata balaa la Ugaidi!
In any society, even a liberal and progressive society like USA, if you are a dissident, you are an enemy. Take a look of the praised Capitalistic America with its attitudes towards minorities, communist or even muslims!
Yes I am an ardent Mwalimu fan, and there are things I did not agree with him and that does not make me an out of touch Mdingi mla Chumvi or Haambiliki!
Kila serikali na wananchi hufanya makosa, kama Zakumi alivyosema, je tumejifunza nini kutokana na makosa yetu? Jee awamu tatu zilizomfuata Mwalimu Nyerere zimefanya nini kusahihisha makosa ya awali?
Je sisi ambao leo hii tunashangilia "uhuru" wa kulonga na kuchambua mambo, tumepata mabadiliko gani ya nafsi kuwa watu huru wenye kujitegemea na hivyo kuwa mfano wa kuigwa na wenzetu milioni karibu 30 ambao bado ni waoga kama Kikokiko wa The Gods must be Crazy?
Lakini bado swali la awali ni je inawezekana kuwa Ujamaa wetu na Kujitegemea pamoja na Azimio la Arusha ni mkorogo wa mambo mengi na falsafa nyingi duniani na kama wale panya wa maabara kupima muundo wetu mpya wa kisiasa na uchumi, tulipewa pesa nzyingi za utaifiti (misaada) lakini priority zetu zikatuzidi uwezo?
Kujitegemea kulishindikana kwa sababu Kujitegemea hakuendani na Ujamaa. Msingi wa Ujamaa ni kutegemeana. The contradictory genius - or, arguably the incredible misconception - of J.K. Nyerere was to think that the two are compatible. They are not. Kuwa Wajamaa na Kujitegemea hakupikiki chungu kimoja. J.K. Nyerere alitaka eti tujitegemee kama Taifa. Kama Mkuu Pundit anavyosema, huwezi kutegemea watu wajitegemee kama Taifa wakati at the local level unawafundisha sera za kutegemeana. Unawachanganya. Huwezi sema sisi ni Watanzania katika international stage lakini ki loko loko sisi ni Wazanzibari na Wabara. It is such a confused Kikweterian proposition.
Sidhani kama tumeanza juhudi mahsusi za kujitegemea. Kiongozi wetu "Mkwere anafahamika kwa bakuli na vikengele vile vinavyovaliwa miguuni wakati wa kucheza ngoma," kuazima lugha ya Mkuu mmoja kulieleza tatizo hili. Wengine tunasema hii dhana hatutaki. Tumepinga hata taswira mbaya ya viongozi wetu kukimbilia matibabu nje ya nchi. Hususan waasisi waliohubiri kujitegemea. Bado hatujui kujitegemea maana yake nini kwa sababu tulikuwa indoctrinated kutegemeana.
Ni kweli. Lakini ingevumilika kama ingekuwa maendeleo nchini kwetu yanakuja taratibu. Nchini kwetu tunarudi nyuma! Waziri Ngeleja na TANESCO wanatangaza kwamba wanakata Umeme kwa sababu mashine zimezeeka. Wanatuambia kuna mashine hazijawahi kufanyiwa ukarabati toka zisimikwe siku za Ukoloni! Yaani, tunarudi nyuma! Hii hoja ya "Marekani hakuwa tajiri usiku wa pili" ni kidonge cha placibo. Ni danganya toto ya toto dogo aliyechoka na safari anaeuliza mbona hatufiki mbona hatufiki. Mama anamwambia tutafika tutafika hivi karibuni, kumbe wanazunguka zunguka pale pale na na kurudi nyuma kwa sababu Mama kapotea njia!
Hiyo data Mkuu Kishoka, mmmmh! Isije ikawa dataz!
Nadhani kuna umuhimu wa kuangalia vitu vingine zaidi ya Uchumi. Tanzania imeipita Northern Ireland kwa national stability, na hayo inawezekana tunaweza kuyaita maendeleo. Tumeendelea kuwazidi Northern Ireland, kwa kipimo hicho. Lakini historia inaonyesha kwamba mara nyingi tumbo likiwa linauma maendeleo mengine yote yanakuwa sio muhimu sana, tena yanaweza kupelekea kupoteza hayo maendeleo mengine kwa sababu patakuwa hapaliki wala hapalaliki. Sasa sisi matumbo yanatuuma!
Marekani walijenga nchi yao lakini Wamarekani hawakuanza kuendelea wakiwa Marekani. Wamarekani, zaidi ya Wahindi wekundu, ni Wa Europea waliokwenda Americana na maendeleo yao vichwani. Wakayatumia kujenga nchi. Waliowapa Uhuru na waliopewa Uhuru walikuwa wana kiwango kile kile cha elimu, ujuzi, maendeleo vichwani, upeo wa kisiasa, kiitikadi na vinginevyo. Na Wamarekani walipopata Uhuru hawakuanza kuwekana vizuizini willy nilly walipotofautiana mawazo.
Tunapojifunza na kujadili historia hatunyooshi vidole. Hata tunaposema, kwa mfano, Waasisi wetu walikuwa wanafiki na wazandiki kwa kupigania Uhuru wa majirani na haki za Waafrika Kusini wakati wao hapa nyumbani walikuwa na wafungwa wengi wa Kisiasa kuliko Afrika Kusini wakati wa kilele cha siasa za kibaguzi za Kaburu, tunaonyesha tu yaliyojiri nchini kwetu. Tunataka historia isipindishwe. Halafu kusema viongozi sio malaika ni kujaribu kuhalalisha kila anachofanya kiongozi. Tunajua hakuna Mwana wa Adamu ambae ni malaika. Hata "Mkwere" sio Malaika. Sasa kwa nini mwamtusi na "mabakuli na kengele" zake? Si na yeye sio Malaika?
Kikwete nae anajaribu sera zake. Hafanyi yale yale ya B. Mkapa na J. Nyerere. Kama J. Nyerere sio Malaika basi J. Kikwete nae sio Malaika. Tusitetee failures kwa kurushia mpira kwa wengine.
Hii si kweli kwamba hatukuwepo hapo toka siku za nyuma. Ni myth, ni hadithi. Ni hekaya fulani ambayo imeaminika na kukubalika. Ukinionyesha kwamba katikati ya Karne ya 20 Tanganyika kulikuwa na Ukabila ndio tutasema tumepata maendeleo ya kuufuta na kujenga undugu. Lakini hilo halijaonyeshwa. Harakati za Uhuru zilikuwa ni za mchanganyiko wa watu wote. Waasisi wengi wa Taifa letu walikuwa "walugha lugha" kutoka maziwani na milimani katikati ya nchi, waliokaribishwa Kariakoo na Wazaramo wa pwani. Cha ajabu, tunawasifia waasisi wetu hawa kwa kutoendekeza ukabila. Lakini, humpi mtu sifa kwa kufanya alilotakiwa kufanya. Ukiwahi kazini kila siku hudai bonus au sifa. Kusema waasisi wetu wameleta maendeleo ya kutokuwepo na ukabila ni myth.
Sasa hapa ndio huwa napoteza utu wangu hapa, na najikuta naziita hoja kama hizi kuwa ni za ki hohehahe, za ki baradhuli. Mtu una wonder kama tumefeli kwa sababu ndivyo tulivyo! Bado utanipa pole za matatizo yanayokusibu nikisema hizi hoja ni za kihayawani, za kizugezuge ?
Hakuna Mmarekani anawekwa kizuizini bila mashitaka isipokuwa adui mpiganaji anaekutwa kwenye milima na mapango mashariki ya kati huko. Tanzania hiyo draconian law ilitumika kumuweka kizuizini Mwanasheria Mkuu mstaafu aliyetoa maoni mbele ya Tanganyika Law Society kuhusu mabadiliko ya katiba! Imagine that. Hebu fikiria hilo sekunde moja. Wabunge wana jadili fiscal policy bungeni unawatumia political police wawasweke kwenye vyumba vya giza Oysterbay police bila mashitaka kweli? Kujadili bajeti ? Imagine that!
Halafu tunasema eti Waasisi walikuwa wana hoja kali kiasi cha kuogopwa. Una hoja kali ungetuma political police kuweka detention watu wanaojadili ishu katika jamii ? Kuna siku, Mwalimu, utajibu kwa haya uliyoyafanya.
Muslims and minorities are not dissidents. Mchungaji vipi tena ? Wakomunisti wapo America na sio maadui wa kuwekwa kizuizini bila mashitaka. Tusitetee maovu.
Nini usicho kubaliana nae ?
Mwinyi alifunguliwa soko huria. Mkapa alipigilia msumari wa mwisho kwenye jeneza la sera za Ujamaa. Kikwete anarudi kule kule kwa uomba omba.
Wengi tunayaongelea haya nyuma ya vioo tu. Bado hakuna uhuru Bongo. Much less kujitegemea.
Ndio. Waasisi wetu walitufanya panya wa maabara. Wewe wasema.
Kuhani,
Inaonekana hujasikia habari za Seneta Joseph McCarthy na crusade zake za anti-communism hapa Marekani. Watu walipoteza ajira zao kwa kusingiziwa tu kuwa walikuwa ni communist symphathisers katika enzi za kuanzia miaka ya 40 hadi hamsini na kitu katika US. Hata katika miaka ya 60 Edgar Hoover alitumia anti communist phobia kuwanyanyasa watu, akiwemo Martin Luther King Jr, pamoja na maprofesa chungu nzima ambao waliachishwa kazi kwa kusingiziwa tu ni communist sypmhathiser.
Mchungaji nadhani siyo vema kumdismiss Kuhani...
Inaonekana hujasikia habari za Seneta Joseph McCarthy na crusade zake za anti-communism hapa Marekani. Watu walipoteza ajira zao kwa kusingiziwa tu kuwa walikuwa ni communist symphathisers katika enzi za kuanzia miaka ya 40 hadi hamsini na kitu katika US. Hata katika miaka ya 60 Edgar Hoover alitumia anti communist phobia kuwanyanyasa watu, akiwemo Martin Luther King Jr, pamoja na maprofesa chungu nzima ambao waliachishwa kazi kwa kusingiziwa tu ni communist sypmhathiser.
Unavyoupenda Ujamaa nifikiri kuwa hupo Venezuala, Cuba au North Korea kumbe huko hapa hapa Mtoni.
Baniani mbaya kiatu chake dawa.