GE2025 A Cordial Letter to Cardinal Protase Rugambwa enroute to President Samia of Tanzania: An Argument for Reconciliations before 2025 General Elections

GE2025 A Cordial Letter to Cardinal Protase Rugambwa enroute to President Samia of Tanzania: An Argument for Reconciliations before 2025 General Elections

Matukio, Taarifa, Habari na Mijadala ya Wananchi WAKATI wa Mchakato wa Uchaguzi Mkuu 2025

Doctor Mama Amon

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1. INTRODUCTION

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA
, twice, in the social media, first on 27 August 2025, and then on 12 September 2025, you appeared in several common photographs, with President Samia Suluhu Hassan, who is also, the Presidential candidate for CCM in the ongoing 2025 general elections in Tanzania.

These pictures, have been circulated by anonymous persons to the general public with captions indicating you are praying for the ongoing general elections campaigns, despite the general public outcry.

I understand that, you are currently serving two posts simultaneously. Under the Cardinalship Post you are working as the Representative of the Pope, and hence a non-TEC member.

And under the episcopacy post you are working as the Tabora Archi-Diocese Bishop and hence a member of the Tanzania Episcopal Conference (TEC).

Under the episcopacy post you are directly linked to the nation-wide Fasting and Prayer program whose main theme was "Justice and Peace in Tanzania," as organised by TEC on 23-24 August 2025.

One of the key events under this program was citation of "The National Prayer for Justice and Peace," in which Christians petitioned God for leaders who are willing to promote and comply with fundamental democratic principles, meaning, "viongozi watakaosimamia na kuiishi demokrasia ya kweli".

As you may know, one of the fundamental democratic principles is consent of the freely governed people, as opposed to consent of the coercively governed people, where, the former is normally given to the government through free, fair and transparent elections.

So, kindly allow me to use you as a stepping stone for relaying to President Samia "the hopes and fears of the people of this age," in so far as the ongoing asymmetrical general elections are concerned.

2. PROBLEM STATEMENT

The pictures I have mentioned above, in which you appear parading with President Samia Suluhu Hassan, appear to communicate an ambiguous message, that happens to mislead the People of God, who deserve proper leadership from you.

In one sense they appear to imply that, since the Cardinal is a part of the TEC team, which recently organized a national prayer for justice and peace, under which we petitioned God for “reconciliation” between the people and their unjust government, then, most probably, the Cardinal is presiding over a reconciliation process.

In another sense the pictures appear to imply that, given the green attire by Samia, since Samia is the CCM presidential candidate, and considering that the 2025 general elections timetable has already been rolled on by the INEC, then, most probably, the Cardinal is tacitly endorsing the CCM presidential candidate.

From the time when these pictures went viral, your office has never issued an official disambiguation notice to the general public to clear these ambiguities, and so assist the people of God to be free from committing a formal sin of unknowingly participating in a sinful election processes.

Given such a silence, some critical observers have conclude that, our Cardinal is using the doctrine of “mental reservation” to mislead people of God into believing that Samia Suluhu Hassan is the best presidential candidate, in the eyes of TEC.

Such a conclusion is however problematic in that it undermines your credibility and the credibility of TEC by portraying them as intentional equivocators in favor of an unjust government. Let me clarify.

Mental reservation, or mental equivocation, is an ethical theory which recognizes the "lie of necessity", and holds that when there is a conflict between justice and telling the truth, it is justice that should prevail.

Under this doctrine, a prompt is made easier by using "the principle of equivocation,” which allows one to knowingly mislead people “without being guilty of lying.”

This principle distinguishes between the following two definitions of “lying”: On one hand, “to lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead someone into error.” Let us call this the first definition of lying.

And on the other hand, “to lie is to speak or act against the truth in order to lead into error someone who has the right to know the truth.” Let us call this the second definition of lying.

Under the doctrine of double effect, the general teaching about “mental reservation” is that you are not permitted to directly tell a lie, as understood in terms of the second definition.

However, you can use an ambiguous expression realizing that the person who you are talking to will accept an untrue version of a statement, while foreseeing and permitting that to happen without directly intending it to happened, as the latter would be lying, as understood in terms of the second definition.

One of the chief defenders of this doctrine was the late Cardinal Connell (1926–2017), the Archi-Bishop of Dublin, in England. In 2009, through The Murphy Report (p.643), he explained the concept of “mental reservation” as follows:

“The general teaching about mental reservation is that you are not permitted to tell a lie. On the other hand, you may be put in a position where you have to answer, and there may be circumstances in which you can use an ambiguous [sign] realizing that the person who you are [communicating] to will accept an untrue version of whatever it may be. [Here you are] permitting that [untrue version] to happen, [but] not willing that it happened, [for] that would be lying. It really is a matter of trying to deal with extraordinarily difficult matters that may arise in social relations where people may ask questions that you simply cannot answer [directly]. Everybody knows that this kind of thing is liable to happen. So mental reservation is, in a sense, a way of answering without lying.”

A better example is this one: Let’s assume we were in Nazi Germany. Let’s assume you are harboring a Jewish family in one of the rooms in your house, and you know that the Nazis are hunting Jews to kill them.

Then, some Nazis come, knock on the door, enter, find you seated in the sitting room, and asked you, “Are there Jews here?” The following are the possible answers:
  • "Yes," as a dry answer without hiding anything.
  • "No,” as a dry answer without qualification, which would be a lie and a sin.
  • “No," while reserving to yourself that the complete answer is "No, they are not here today”
  • "No," while reserving to yourself that the complete answer is "No, they are not here in the sitting room”
  • "No," while reserving to yourself that the complete answer is "No, they are not at home to you."
In the first response, you would assist the killers to exterminate innocent Jews. Via the second response, being a dry answer without qualification, you would be telling lies and sinning.

However, under any of the last three options, given the qualifications in your mind, your response of “no” does not amount to lying and you are not a sinner. You have decided to hide truth to those who do not deserve it, the Nazi killers.

To this extent, by reason of the doctrine of double effect, mental reservation is a form of deception which is not an outright lie.

Lying is the direct act of communicating something known to be false, whereas deception is the broader act of intentionally causing someone to believe something that isn't true, which may or may not involve an outright lie

In other words, mental reservation is a method of fulfilling obligations both to tell the truth and comply with the principles of justice that require keeping secrets from those not entitled to know them. It depends on equivocations and amphibologies to imply an untruth that is not actually stated.

However, I do not find a justification for using the doctrine of mental reservation to mislead the People of God into voting for Samia in 2025 general elections.

As you well know, a just government can only exist within the limits of the consent of the freely governed people, the limits Samia regime has crossed long ago. This is the reason why I have been motivated to write this cordial letter.

Since you are the Ambassador of Christ, who is an icon of “Justice and Peace,” kindly allow me to relay to you the nature and scope of these injustices, with a focus on the ongoing 2025 general elections, my hope being that you will relay the same to Samia and her Deep State Team, whom you now happen to be closer.

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3. PROPOSED INQUIRY METHODOLOGY

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA
, consent is what distinguishes a free society, where autonomy is a core value, from a coercive society, where coercion is a core value.

Essentially, consent is a voluntary obligation-creating act that, either (1) creates a positive obligation on the promissory consent giver and a claim right for the consent-receiver relative to the consent-giver; or (2) creates a negative obligation on the permissive consent giver and a liberty right for the consent-receiver relative to the consent-giver.

So, as a rule, "the obligation to request valid consent" places a duty on one party, such as a doctor or data controller, to seek permission or promise from another party such as a patient, while "the right to give the requested consent" refers to an individual's power to grant or refuse that permission or promise.

This interplay upholds the principle of personal autonomy, ensuring people have control over their daily lives, bodies, personal information, and decisions through clear, voluntary, and informed agreement.

What is critical for consent is that agent X communicates with agent Y such that agent Y knows that agent X has either authorized agent Y to perform action A or agent X has promised agent Y to perform action A.

Specifically, in the political domain where state-citizen relations obtain, governance by consent is extremely demanding of both governments and their citizens, but it is less costly and less dangerous than governance by coercion.

While there is a strong coercive element to all governments, whatever the regime form, democracy's maintenance requires, as well, a significant degree of voluntary and active compliance.

This is the felt and activated obligation to cooperate with the demands of government in those domains that are constitutive of citizenship and citizenship rights. These are among the lessons of the historical events and struggles for the past 7,000 years.

Accordingly, I politely request you to ask President Samia and her Deep State to carefully address themselves to the following general question:

Given the constitutional and legal injustices that have been happening in Tanzania through the instrumentality of the government machinery, under the current government, where, valid consent of the freely governed people has been, and continues to be, replaced by invalid consent of the coercively governed people, in a way that is violative of the constitutional limitations, does Samia Suluhu Hassan and her current administration team deserve to remain in office any longer?

Given two concerned parties, in a given life domain, the following specific questions, should be answered, as a way toward finding a solution to the above general question:
  1. What is consent and why does it matter in human relations?
  2. How can the consent of one party be given to, or refused against, another party?
  3. Which domains of human life are sensitive to "an obligation to request valid consent" and the related "right to give or refuse the requested consent"?
  4. Which parties have obligations that can be affected by a consent transaction?
  5. Which human obligations are sensitive to a consent transaction?
  6. Why does consent create legitimacy of human actions which are illegitimate in its absence?
  7. What are the conditions of a valid consent?
  8. What are the limits of a valid consent?
  9. What is the nature of a politically valid consent in a democratic state?
  10. What are the limits of a valid consent that obtains in a state-citizen relationship?
  11. How can the governed people give to, or refuse consent against, the government of the day?
  12. Given this understanding of consent, what are the political implications, in so far as the consent of the governed to their government of the day in Tanzania is concerned?
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4. CONSENT OF THE GOVERNED, DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED, COERCION BY GOVERNMENT, AND PATRIOTIC COMPLIANCE TO THE STATE AS OUR CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State Team should know that, "coercion of government to the governed" as opposed to "consent of the governed to government" are contrastive phrases that neatly distinguish two distinct principles of political legitimacy, and there has been a war between the two principles for 7,000 years up to now.

On one hand, the "consent of the governed to government" posits that a government's right to rule is justified only by the people's approval through direct or indirect voting. This is the view supported by our state constitution and laws.

In contrast, the "coercion of government to the governed" implies that the legitimacy and authority of the individual ruler or governing body is inherent, say via inheritance or divine command, rather than being derived democratically from the people's votes. This view is neither supported by our state constitution nor by our laws.

For this reason, Samia and her Deep State should know that, the doctrine of government by consent of the governed people, which is a core principle of modern democracies, and which is grounded in a long global history, disqualifies them from office.

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, under the phrase "government by assent of the people," the key word that requires historical tracing, clarification and expository analysis is "assent." henceforth “the principle of assent.”

According to this principle, assent is the voluntary communication by one person to another person of a particular message signifying a decision to alter an already existing mutual relationship through a permissive act that waves a certain duty on the second person (consent) or through a promissory act that creates a new obligation on the first person (promise).

From this definition, then, “the principle of assent” either refers to “the principle of consent.” or “the principle of promise,” where, the applicable meaning will depend on context.

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, against this clarification, the doctrine of "government by assent of the people" has gradually evolved for the past 7,000 years from direct democracy to representative democracy, and from a theocratic government by assent of the people to a democratic government by assent of the people.

Consent of the governed from a historical perspective

Realities before democratic government by consent of the governed:
Before the doctrine of government by consent of the governed was born, rulers were sovereign, meaning they were the supreme authority and sole or unitary representation of their states.

The people were not citizens but subjects. They did not consent to be governed but still owed obedience and loyalty to the ruler. And disobedience was punished, often by pain of torture, imprisonment or death.

Around the year 1450 BC, the Decalogue covenant at Mount Sinai, as documented in the Hebrew Bible, at Exodus 24:3, was founded on the collective consent of the Israelite people.

In this covenant that is central to the narrative of the Hebrew Scriptures, the form of government God proposes to the Israelites is a theocracy, not a ‘‘popular’’ government. But it is also a government by consent of the governed.

It is true that God is the author of that government in the sense that he defines its major provisions and fundamental laws.

The people’s role is limited to the act of consent to those provisions. Yet without that consent, there would be no covenant, the Israelites would not enjoy the benefits God promises to them, and God would not receive their acceptance of his terms.

It is true that the kind of consent God elicits in his covenant with the Israelites is quite constrained. God dictates the terms of the covenant and offers the Israelites no opportunity to bargain over those terms.

It is also noteworthy that the Israelites’ consent is a collective act in which a group of elders represents and speaks for the people, not an act in which the opinion or will of each individual is registered and the results are aggregated in a democratic process.

These features are typical of the conception of consent that plays a role in the legitimation of government in the literatures of the Israelites, Greeks, and Romans.

As it will be instantly argued, from a modern, democratic and individualistic viewpoint, that conception is shockingly inadequate.

Yet the conception of consent to government that runs through much of these ancient literatures was not mere window dressing.

For the act of consent, even when collective and constrained, was understood to shift some portion of responsibility to those who had given their consent.

Through their consent, a government became, in a meaningful sense, their government, and its acts became their acts.

Realities after democratic government by consent of the governed: The first significant historical examples of democratic government by consent of the people were the city-states of Athens in the fifth century BCE, which practiced direct democracy, and the Roman Republic from the sixth to first centuries BCE, which practiced representative democracy.

In 1215, England promulgated the "Great Charter" which postulated that, everyone including the king is subject to the law of the land, that everyone has a right to a lawful judgment, and that taxation required consent from a council, not just the king, laying the groundwork for the concept of the "consent of the governed."

In 1648, the Westphalian principle of state sovereignty was born. This principle established that each nation-state has exclusive sovereignty over its territory and domestic affairs.

Its core tenets are non-interference in other states' internal affairs and the territorial integrity of states. This norm allowed rulers to determine the religion and laws within their own borders without outside meddling, regardless of their citizens' wishes.

In 1776, America published the Declaration of Independence, which stated that in order to secure citizens rights, governments are instituted amongst humans, democratically deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

The American Declaration added that, whenever any government of the day becomes destructive of the constitutionally protected human rights, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to protect, promote and fulfill their rights.

The Declaration’s rejection of monarchy and its assertion of the "will of the people" as a principle for sovereign rule made consent of the governed an ideal for a new form of government that broke with all previous forms of autocracy and inspired revolutionary movements in the world.

In 1789, France inaugurated the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, which declared that sovereignty resides not in a monarch, but in the nation, and that political authority stems from the will of the people.

The French Declaration averred that, no individual may exercise any political authority which does not proceed directly from the nation; and that, law is the expression of the "general will" of the people, where every citizen has a right to participate in its foundation, either personally or through their representatives.

Realities of government by democratic consent in the 1960s and 1970s: The Declaration's original its anti-monarchist values, as expressed in the motto of “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” inspired a tradition of republicanism in the world.

In 1961, on the independence day, the Founding Fathers of our Nation, asserted that, the United Republic of Tanzania is “a sovereign United Republic” because “sovereignty resides in the people,” meaning that “it is from the [the consent of the governed] people that the Government” necessarily “shall derive all its power and authority” over the people “through [the provisions of] this Constitution,” such that, “the Government shall be accountable to the [governed] people.” (Constitution 1977, articles 1 and 8).

Our Founding Fathers, further added that, the United Republic of Tanzania is “a democratic state” which “adheres to multi-party democracy,” because “every citizen of the United Republic is entitled to take part in matters pertaining to the governance of the country, either directly or through representatives freely elected [based on an informed consent given] by the people, in conformity with the procedures laid down by, or in accordance with, the law,” which calls for the rule of law as opposed to the rule of arbitrary power (Constitution 1977, articles 3 and 21).

Beginning in 1970s, the entire world saw steady expansion of democracy and self-rule, as the number of electoral democracies counted by Freedom House’s survey, Freedom in the World, rose from 44 out of 135 countries and territories in 1973, when the annual review was launched, to 120 out of 192 countries and territories in 2000.

However, while the larger trend since 1970s, was towards democracy and away from dictatorship, many exceptions remained.

These included the communist dictatorships in China, Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam; the autocracies that took hold in the former Soviet Union such as Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan; the theocracy of the Islamic Republic of Iran; and monarchical rule and other forms of dictatorship in the Middle East, Africa and Asia, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Sudan.

And yet still, today, the struggle for self-governance and democracy against dictatorship, and the continuing urge of the few to impose arbitrary rule over the many, remains the central drama of modern times.

People around the world continue to raise their voices in opposition to dictatorship and in support of democracy and freedom through mass protest and other forms of resistance. This is the case even in harshly repressive and violent circumstances, such as China and Sudan.

The logical structure of consent

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, from the above long history of human consent, we can make the following summary about the meaning of consent of people, as it applies to various domains of human life, including the political domain.

Permission and promise as two forms of consent: Consenting is an agreement between two concerned parties, where, one party either permits another party to perform some action, or one party promises to obligate oneself to perform or abstain from performing some action in favor of another party.

Consenting permissively creates a consent-giver and a consent-receiver, where the consent-giver gives to the consent-receiver a moral permission, approval, or license, to do something that, prior to the consent-giver's permission, was morally impermissible, illegitimate or unauthorized.

In this case, the consent-giver waives one’s rights of non-interference in one's domain that she has against the consent-receiver in a way that excuses the consent-receiver from a non-interference duty that the consent-receiver had toward the consent-giver.

Consenting promissorily creates an act of obligating, where the promise-giver binds oneself to a duty of performing or not performing a certain action, hence giving the promise-receiver a right that, before the promise-giver's commitment, was absent.

Specifically, the promise-giver creates one’s duty toward the promise-receiver in a way that makes the promise-receiver the beneficiary of a new duty that was previously absent, and could not claim from the consent-giver.

So, both permitting and promising are subspecies of consenting. They are similar insofar as both involve a commitment to some action. They only differ in what form that commitment takes.

On one hand, permission involves the consent-giver committing to waiving a right he had against the consent-receiver's interfering with the consent-giver's interests in certain specified respects.

And on the other hand, promise involves the promise-giver committing to incurring a duty to do whatever the promise-giver has promised to the promise-receiver.

In other words, when understood as permission, consent functions like a gate that one opens to allow another’s access, access that would be impermissible absent the act of voluntarily opening the gate.

In this sense, permissive consent is about giving permission for something to happen, whether it's a sexual act, a medical procedure, or the use of personal data. It means waiving a right one possesses, such as the right to privacy or bodily autonomy.

In this case, I may assent to another’s proposal to use of my car, to perform an operative procedure, or disseminate information concerning myself.

And when understood as promise, consent functions like a normative rope whereby one binds oneself to the performance of a duty for the benefit of another person.

A promissory consent is an undertaking or assurance to do or refrain from doing something, thereby creating an obligation or duty for the promisor.

Like permissive consent, a promissory consent is future-oriented, as one cannot promise to do something in the past. In this case, I may consent to another’s request that I give a lecture or join a committee.

In other words, consent is a social act in which one party conveys something to the second party, something that, once communicated, now gives the second party a moral right or entitlement that the second party previously lacked.

From a psychological point of view, consent is a mental attitude, and from a social point of view it is an interpersonal communication which indicates to others of what they have your permission to do or not to do.

In short, consent is an act by which changes the existing structure of rights and obligations between two parties, where, one party undertakes new obligations and authorizes another party to act in ways which were impermissible before.

One consents to an act or arrangement in response to a request by others, where, the said consenting is so strongly linked with such acts as permitting, promising, contracting, taking oaths and entrusting, so that, it is best to regard all of these acts as sources of different kinds of consent.

In the most general terms, then, consent is any act by which an agent deliberately and suitably communicates to another the intention to undertake by that act new obligations and to convey by that act new rights to others.

Given the satisfaction of various conditions of validity, consent then initiates, authorizes, permits, justifies, legitimates or licenses actions between two parties based on which their subsequent decisions may rely as the two parties interact with teach other.

This concept is a concept of central importance in moral, political and legal philosophy, where is widely recognized as justifying or legitimating acts, arrangements or expectations.

Consent and promise as two different forms of assertion: Permission and promise are subspecies of assertion. They are assertions that involve morally transformative commitments to someone for doing something.

In promising, the promise-giver asserts that he is now morally under a duty that he used not to be under to do the thing promised to or for the promise-receiver.

In consenting, the consent-giver asserts that the consent-receiver is now morally permitted to do something that, without the consent-giver's consent, would have been morally impermissible.

In making those assertions, those giving a promise or consent invite those to whom they give it to rely on the truth of their claims that the moral landscape has indeed been transformed in those ways.

The promise-giver invites the promise-receiver to rely upon the fact that the promise-giver has incurred a duty and one that he will discharge to do as he promised.

The consent-giver invites the consent-receiver to rely upon the fact that the consent-receiver now has permission to do whatever the consent-giver has consented for him to do.

Consenting and promising are thus assertions that typically create expectations in other people, expectations about what consenter-givers will permit and expectations about what promise-givers will do.

Consent-receivers and promise-receivers, having been invited to trust the truth of those assertions, legitimately organize their affairs on the basis of the belief that those assertions are true.

Just as lying would be a breach of trust, so too would failing to honor one's consent or promises be a breach of trust. That is one strong other-regarding reason for consent givers and promise-givers not to breach trust.

And in so far as they do, consent-receivers or promise-receivers have a morally legitimate complaint and typically a claim for compensation in consequence of that breach of trust.

Consenting as self-executory and promising as not self-executory: The commitments involved in consenting and promising also differ in their force. In the case of consent, the commitment is self-executory.

That is, by the sheer act of consenting, you bring about the very waiver that that act of consent commits you to making.

In the case of a promise, in contrast, the commitment is not self-executory. Instead, the commitment is to do something further in the future.

In both cases, the moral transformation in view occurs at the moment the consent or promise is given. In the former case the waiver is made, in the latter case the obligation is incurred, at that very instant.

Furthermore, in both cases there is something further you must subsequently do to honor the terms of that moral transformation.

That is most obvious in the case of promising, which explicitly commits you to doing something further in the future.

And something similar is true of consenting as well: to honor the terms of the consent one has given, the consent-giver must abstain from interfering with the consent-receiver’s doing what the former's consent has given the latter permission to do.

Promise as not unilaterally revocable and consent as unilaterally revocable: When agent X promises agent Y to perform action A, agent X gives agent Y a right to agent X's performance of action A. That means the choice of whether agent X performs action A or not is agent Y's.

Agent Y can release agent X from his duty to perform action A, if he so chooses. But agent X cannot release himself, as the choice is one for agent Y to make, not agent X.

In contrast, when agent X consents to agent Y's performance of action A, agent X has merely given agent Y permission to perform action A, waiving any right agent X would have otherwise had to object to it.

The moral upshot of agent X's consenting is that agent X has no-right to object to agent Y's performance of action A. But, consent does not confer on agent Y a claim-right to perform action A, but merely a liberty-right to perform action A.

Different remedies for breach of promise and breach of permission: Taking away someone else’s right is importantly different, morally, from merely retracting permission.

When agent X promises agent Y to perform action A, agent X makes a commitment to agent Y that agent X will. In consequence, agent Y has a right against agent X that agent X should perform action A.

By virtue of that right, agent Y has a claim against agent X that agent X should perform action A, or, failing that, a claim that agent X provide compensation adequate to make agent Y as well off as agent Y would have been had agent X kept his promise to perform action A.

In the language of contract law, agent X owes agent Y either specific performance of committing action A or damage payments equivalent to agent Y's expectation interest in agent X's performance of action A.

But, things are different with consent. When agent X consents to agent Y's performance of action A, agent X merely waives agent X's rights against agent Y’s performance of action A.

That is to say, when consenting agent X merely commits to not standing in the way of agent Y's performance of action A in one particular way, namely, by invoking rights against agent Y's performance of action A that he waived when consenting to agent Y's performance of action A.

When agent X promised agent Y to perform action A, agent X was committing to make performance of action A happen to the best of his abilities.

When agent X consented to agent Y's performance of action A, agent X was not in the least committing to make agent Y's performance of action A happen. Instead, agent X was merely committing to remove one particular obstacle to agent Y's performance of action A, namely, agent X's right against Y's performance of action A.

For that reason, when agent X does something that breaches his consent to agent Y's performance of action A, such as revoking his consent to agent Y's performance of action A, there is no need for agent X to pay agent Y compensation adequate to make agent Y as well off as he would have been if agent Y had successfully performed action A.

Agent X need only pay agent Y compensation sufficient to make agent Y as well off as agent Y would have been had agent X never consented to agent Y's performance of action A.

That is to say, agent X need only compensate agent Y for costs, both out-of-pocket costs and other opportunities agent Y has foregone, that agent Y has incurred by acting in reliance on agent X's consent to agent Y's performance of action A.

In the language of contract law, that amounts to damages adequate to compensate agent Y for his reliance interests in agent X's consent to agent Y's performance of action A.

The need to communicate both promise and permission: The verb to promise is a transitive verb with a two place predicate. You make a promise to someone for do something. Similarly, you give your consent to someone for that person to do something.

Morally, the function of both promising and consenting is to effect moral transformations, incurring an obligation in the former case and waiving rights in the latter.

Socially, the function of both promising and consenting is to let others know what they can expect of you, in line with those moral commitments.

There is a longstanding controversy over whether or not the ontological essence of consent is purely a “state of mind,” and communication is merely “evidence” of that state of mind.

A reasoned position is that, while a mental element, a mental act of consent specifically, is necessary both ontologically and morally for consent, communicating it might be unnecessary ontologically but is nonetheless socially very necessary.

The bare acts of will can have no effect amongst men, unless manifested and declared by some external tokens that are signs sufficient to express the inward purpose of his mind.

That is to say it is “socially necessary” that we not merely “mentally consent” but also that we “physically communicate” our consent, in order for us to do what is socially necessary to give our consent to others.

If agent Y does something that is morally permissible only with agent X's consent, and agent Y does not know that he has agent X's consent to do it, then agent Y has acted wrongly, and that remains true, even if agent X privately consents to agent Y's doing it and so agent Y has not wronged X in the process.

Socially, our concern is with whether or not someone has acted wrongly, not with the abstraction of whether someone was or was not wronged in ways no one else could ever have ascertained.

You can of course make insincere promises. That is to say, agent X can promise agent Y to perform action A, without X's having any intention of honoring that commitment and actually performing action A. Has agent X then really made a promise at all, or is an insincere promise just a pseudo-promise?

Debates have raged over this issue for centuries. Some insist that agent X must intend to perform action A in order for him to have promised to perform action A. Others say that, while there is clearly something unhappy' or infelicitous about an insincere promise, it is not like a misfire.

We should not say that the person didn't in fact promise, but rather that he did promise but promised insincerely. This much, in any case, is clear and incontrovertible.

Even when agent X has no intention of performing action A, agent X must at the very least be intending for agent Y to understand agent X to be incurring a duty to to perform action A when agent X insincerely promises Y to perform action A.

Something similar is true of consenting. It too can be insincere. Consenting insincerely might take various forms. Agent X might consent to agent Y's performance of action A in a way that agent X knows to be inefficacious, not using the prescribed form of words to effect consent, for example.

Or agent X might consent to agent Y's performance of action A fully intending to revoke that consent before agent Y can performing action A or in some way render it impossible for agent Y to take advantage of agent X's consent to agent Y's performing of action A.

Again, debates rage over the status of insincere consent. Some say it is genuine consent others say it is merely pseudo-consent. But, it is reasonable to say that it is false consent, while nonetheless insisting that it has some of the same consequences as genuine consent.

But again, this much is clear. Even when agent X has no intention to give effective permission for agent Y to perform action A, agent X must be intending for agent Y to understand agent X to be giving agent Y permission to perform action A when agent X insincerely ‘consents’ to agent Y's performance of action A.

Particularly importantly, in order for promising or consenting to serve its social function, agent X's promise or consent must be somehow communicated to agent Y.

Perhaps they need not always be communicated by agent X himself; in some cases, that can be done through an intermediary.

And for certain purposes, it can be said that agent X has consented as soon as he has communicated that to the intermediary, even before the intermediary has passed the message along to agent Y.

It is typically said that being of a promising state of mind is a necessary condition for having really promised. But it would be absurd to say that agent X's being of a promising state of mind is in itself sufficient to constitute agent X's making a promise to perform action A.

Certainly, anyway, it hardly seems sufficient to constitute agent X's making a promise to agent Y. In order to make a promise to agent Y to perform action A, agent X must perform the “act of promising” not only internally but also externally.

And to make the act of promising socially efficacious, agent X must also communicate the promise to agent Y, either directly or indirectly.

All the same can be said of consenting. To consent is to “give permission,” and giving is both an active and transitive verb.

Merely being of a “consenting state of mind” even understanding that, as having performed a mental act of consent is not sufficient for agent X to give consent to agent Y for agent Y to perform action A. Giving consent requires communicating.

Even if success in communicating, that is, successful uptake on the part of the consent-receiver, is not ontologically necessary for consent to have been given, socially of course that is the whole point of the exercise.

One can of course communicate consent falsely, either through a deliberate intention to deceive or through innocent or not-so-innocent error.

Insofar as being of a standardly consenting state of mind, that is, having performed a mental act of consent, is an ontologically necessary condition of consenting, you cannot be said to be genuinely consenting when sending false signals of consent.

But even if you have not “mentally consented” you have “socially consented.” On this view, cours have held that, if the plaintiff's behavior was such as to indicate consent on her part, the defendant was justified in his act, whatever her unexpressed feelings may have been.

In determining whether she consented, he could be guided only by her overt acts and manifestations of her feelings. One famous way of parsing that point is to say the following.

If agent X acted in reliance on agent Y's false sign of consent to do action A to agent Y, where action A is something that may not permissibly be done to agent Y without agent Y's consent, agent X has committed a wrong against Y, but faultlessly so, given agent Y's false signal of consent.

But has agent X even committed a wrong, necessarily? Perhaps so, if agent Y's misleading signal of consent was sent in completely innocent error.

But consider the case in which agent Y deliberately sent a socially conventional signal knowing agent X would take it as betokening consent, when agent Y did not actually mentally consent.

There, agent Y has committed a wrong against agent X in intentionally sending a false signal of consent. Such deliberate fraud causes agent Y to forfeit the rights which his false consent purported to waive.

Even those who would not go as far as that 'rights forfeiture' claim might nonetheless agree that agent Y's wrong doing in making deliberately fraudulent reports of consent greatly mitigates, perhaps even cancels, the wrongness of agent X's performing action A without agent Y's consent.

At least in the case of deliberately fraudulent false consent on agent Y's part, agent X has not merely an excuse but a justification, a complete justification on the “forfeits/cancels” view, at least a strong partial justification on the “greatly mitigates” view, for doing that thing which would otherwise be wrong, that is, perform action A without Y's genuine consent.

That seems to be clearly the correct approach in the case of deliberately fraudulent signals of consent. Less draconian consequences seem more appropriate in cases of false signals growing out of either culpable negligence in triggering the conventions of consenting or culpable ignorance of what those conventions are.

Those are still faulty (culpable) performances, however, even if they are faulty to a lesser degree. And even if we are tempted to say, on account of that fact, that X's wrong is merely excused rather than erased altogether, note well why it is excused, not on account of external, unavoidable circumstances but rather on account of agent Y's wrongful performance.

And even in the case of agent Y sending a false signal of consent in wholly innocent error, it nonetheless was his error, however faultless it may have been, and agent Y owes agent X something in recompense.

Different domains of consent

Consent works as a criterion of legitimacy, deeply pervading all domains of human life, between parties who have reached the age of majority.

It makes moral difference by transforming prohibited actions into permitted actions, transforming the harmful actions into harmless actions, and transforming unjustified colonial actions against citizens into justified state actions against citizens, hence, confirming the slogan according to which, “to the willing no injury is done.”

It is a criterion for legitimizing human action because it signifies an individual's voluntary, informed, and uncoerced agreement to an action or situation, thereby respecting their autonomy and agency.

Without valid consent, actions that involve an infringement on another person's will, such as medical treatment or data processing, lack legitimate grounding and can be considered harmful or invalid.

On one hand, the notion of consent is applied to relations among individual persons. In this context, acts of consent establish entitlements, create obligations, and shift risks and responsibilities from some persons to others in various domains of human life such as:
  • commercial transactions,
  • sexual relations,
  • gambling,
  • employment relations,
  • gifts and donations,
  • health care services,
  • educational services,
  • CSO memberships,
  • company shareholder-ship,
  • religious membership,
  • poliical relations between citizens and their government, and
  • many others.
Consent in these domains focuses on questions about the range of entitlements and obligations that can be created or transferred through acts of consent and about the kinds of persons who should be considered competent to give consent.

On the other hand, the concept of consent, understood as political consent, has been deployed in discussions of the relationship between governments and the collectivities over which they rule.

In this case, the consent theory of political obligation, requires that, the actual, personal consent of each adult citizen is necessary for that citizen’s political obligations, and that consent is also, at least within certain limits, a sufficient ground of political obligation.

Whenever people have thought to ask whether their government is legitimate, one of the most prominent claims that have been made in partial response is that governments are legitimated by the collective consent of the governed.

However, political consent, insofar as it can be agreed to have been given, can be particularly treacherous.

Except in referenda, which are often stated in fairly precise terms, the usual context for political consent, voting for a political party or person, is necessarily open-ended, and we may find our consent abused.

The party that we voted for because it promised not to raise taxes may decide, once in power, to raise taxes.

Our consent is not easily withdrawn, given the institutional structures in place to give it effect, though we may wish to argue that the moral ramifications of our consent have been forfeited.

Often, given the unsatisfactoriness of waiting for a next election, our best hope may be to protest the decision and seek to garner enough public support to lead to its revocation. In any case, our consent can be reconsidered and judged misguided or abused.

Political consent and voting are complex in other ways. When I vote for C in an election, it will not usually be said that I did not consent to D’s election should C lose election to D.

Those who vote are ordinarily taken to have consented not simply to some particular person’s election but to the outcome of the electoral process. That is what they intend.

What we consent to is a particular decisional process, usually adopted in circumstances in which unanimity is unlikely, in which the outcome binds those who participate in it.

There may be rare situations in which A takes the view that if C does not win he will not recognize D.

But such a person will then have the burden of explaining why he participated in a particular process designed to resolve the issue of representation. Why not boycott the election altogether if only one candidate is deemed acceptable?

The question is not rhetorical; nevertheless, the onus will be on A to make good his claim that participation did not amount to his consenting to the outcome, and hence to D’s election in the event of D getting the most votes. In certain cases, that onus can surely be met. It will, nevertheless, be for A to meet it.

This raises a further question with regard to those who do not participate in the electoral process.

Presuming that participation is freely available to them, that they know of it and of what is at stake, can their failure to vote betaken as consenting to its outcome? I think not.

At best it amounts to acquiescence, and with acquiescence, as with condonation, there may be some responsibility for the outcome.

But this does not amount to consent, as is recognized by those who bemoan low participation rates and worry about the extent to which actual political outcomes can truly be said to manifest the ‘‘consent of the governed.’’

Different modes of giving and refusing consent

What consent is, in fact, is one thing and what consent giving is, operationally, is another thing altogether.

The latter issue is concerned with how consent-givers communicate that they mentally consent and how consent-receivers conclude that others have mentally consented, and when, those communications can be true or false, correct or incorrect.

Generically, consent giving is done through an act or forbearance prescribed by some well-known and widely accepted social convention for communicating consent to others.

Consentual justification of an act or policy can be actual or hypothetical. Justification by appealing to the actual consent of the affected persons means that the consent has been given in fact either by some discrete act or by some ongoing series of acts such as active participation in the practices of some group.

And actual consent may be either explicit or tacit (implicit, indirect). Explicit consent is consent given by an explicit verbal or written undertaking or by other direct but nonverbal consensual acts such as raising one’s hand or nodding one’s head.

Tacit consent is given by actions or omissions, such as inactivity or silence, that do not involve an explicit undertaking, but that none the less constitute the making of a morally significant choice in the context of a clear, non-coercive choice situation.

Hypothetical consent can be ideal (what fully rational persons would consent to), counterfactual (what real persons could or would have consented to, had they been pressed to give their consent), or dispositional (what real persons would have consented to, had they been able).

Generally then, there are five different modes of socially consenting. They are: (1) explicit actual consent; (2) tacit actual consent; (3) presumed actual consent; (4) implicit actual consent; and (5) hypothetical consent.

Explicit actual consent: This occurs when someone expresses consent by saying so explicitly. For reasons of validity, the words must be said voluntarily, willingly, by a competent person, and in a language understood by both the consent giver and the consent receiver.

Explicit consent is a form of “express consent.” That is to say, in this case the consent giver expresses an intention for others to take him to be consenting.

He does so verbally, either orally or in written words or through sign language. An example is shouting out ‘Yes’ as a way of registering your vote in a meeting or putting a tick on the ballot paper in an election.

Tacit actual consent: This occurs when someone expresses consent by doing or refraining from doing something that in the circumstances he intends to be understood, and expects others to understand, as constituting consent.

Tacit consent is a form of “express consent.” That is to say, in this case the consent giver expresses an intention for others to take him to be consenting.

He does so non-verbally, through affirmative body language, but no less intentionally. An example is raising your hand or nodding one’s head as ways of registering your vote in a meeting.

There can be no doubt that it is possible to give consent tacitly. Indeed, genuine instances of tacit consent, at least in non-politcal contexts, are relatively frequent.

The standard example is that of a meeting in which some proposal is on the table and the chairperson asks, ‘Any objections?”

Virtually every commentator agrees that, in this case, one’s silence may be legitimate expression of consent, at least presuming that one has heard and understood the call and has been able, at not unreasonable cost, to make known any objection one has.

In this example, not objecting would not have counted as valid tacit consent if the chairperson had said, “Anyone with an objection to my proposal will kindly so indicate by loping off his arm at the elbow?”

Doubts surrounding tacit consent concern not whether it is possible but instead whether the conditions making tacit consent valid actually about particular occasion or in certain whole domains of social interaction more generally.

Some of those conditions are the same as required to make explicit consent valid. The consent must be voluntary, conscious and free from fraud.

But inferring tacit consent is more tricky. It must be possible for the person tacitly consenting to have done otherwise, at not unreasonable cost.

In addition, and particularly importantly, for one’s action or inaction to count as actually giving tacit consent you must know that what you are doing or not doing will be taken as a token of tacit consent.

Otherwise one would be consenting unintentionally, which is impossible, since consenting must be an intentional act.

For tacit consent to be given robustly socially successfully in any given instance, there must be “mutual knowledge” between the tacit consent-giver and the tacit consent-receiver regarding what betokens act consent.

The consent receiver has to know that, by that token, the consent giver means to tacitly consent; the consent-giver has to know that the consent receiver will understand that token to constitute tacit consent; each has to know that the other knows; and so on.

That mutual knowledge can arise in several ways. Custom and usage is the standard mechanism. Among a group of people frequently interacting with one another in a club or assembly or trade or society, customs grow up governing, inter alia, what will be taken to be tokens of consent.

And members of the group know, or anyone can be presumed to know, because they could and should have known their own customary practices and usages.

On that basis, customary tokens of consenting act can ground valid consent, a least among those who are, or can reasonably be expected to be, privy to the same customs and practices.

We can analyze “consent by conversational implicature” in the same way. When my son asks “Can I borrow the car?” and I reply “The keys are on the counter,” I have given him consent to borrow the car. I did not say so in as many words. But that was the clear implication of what I did say.

Similarly, a conversational implicture of my asking “Can I walk with you?” is that I consent to your walking with me. Some would also say that my asking “Can I have sex with you” carries the conversational implicature that I consent to your having sex vith me, although that may be less clear-cut.

If everyone concerned knows that that conversational implicature will be read into the request, then it is indeed the case that you have given your own consent in making the request for the other's consent.

When talking of signs of consent by inference, some lump together many different forms of non-verbal consent. Consent by silence, in circumstances in which silence clearly betokens consent, is one of them.

Raising your hand, when the chairperson of a meeting says, “All in favour raise your hands’, is another. And when the patient presents for evaluation and care, consent can be implied although in surgical settings, much more explicit consent to medical treatment is ordinarily sought.

Generally, we can just note that when we are inferring people’s consent in any of these ways, we are inferring that they actually do consent.

That is to say, we are inferring that they do indeed mean by their actions or forbearance to give non-verbal signals of their intention that others take them to be consenting.

Sometimes people's actual, albeit tacit, consent can be inferred from the ‘nature and circumstances of the business” in which they are voluntarily engaged. Betting is a prime example in which consent can be inferred from the nature of the business.

Everyone can infer from the nature of the betting business that anyone laying a wager must sacrifice what he has staked if he loses the wager, for in betting the only way the winner can be paid more than he wagered is from the pooled stakes forfeited by those who lost the wager.

Since winners dividing the winnings from the pooled losses of the losers is the very essence of betting, anyone knowingly engaging in the practice must by the nature of the practice consent to forfeiting their stakes if they lose.

A much more dramatic version of the same might be consenting to known risks of injury when voluntarily participating in violent sporting activities like boxing. It is in the nature of business of boxing that you will get hit.

The rules under which boxing matches are conducted permit that; indeed, the whole point of a boxing match is for boxers to hit one another, which is how they score points. When consenting to fight a match, boxers consent to the risk of getting hit by their opponents.

Sometimes the nature of the business is established by pure stipulation. Conditions are posted for entry to an establishment, and everyone voluntarily entering the establishment tacitly consents to those conditions by the very act of their voluntarily entering.

Similarly, where there is a contest being conducted according to publicly known rules, the sheer fact of your entering the competition implies acceptance of the rules. Other times, the nature of the business is fixed by law.

By law, it is in the nature of the business of calling a physician to attend upon you that you consent to pay his fee.

When we are inferring people's consent from 'the nature of the business' in all such ways, what we are inferring is that they actually do consent, however tacitly.

Presumed actual consent: Presumed consent is assumed to exist unless a person actively expresses dissent. It is a default position that takes the absence of an objection as consent.

It occurs when the supposed consent-receiver believes, for good agent-specific or community-specific reasons, that the supposed consent-giver actually gives unexpressed consent. Let me explain the hidden meaning.

A statement has the status of a presumption at a given juncture of an interchange if and only if at that juncture any party who refuses to concede it is obliged to present an argument against it – that is to say, is obliged either to concede it or to make a case against it.

Then, a presumption, according to this definition, indicates that in the absence of specific counterindications we are to accept how things ‘as a rule’ are taken as standing.

The presumption places the burden of proof on the opponent’s side as long as there is some general rule favoring the argument on the proponent’s side. In this case, the notion of plausibility serves as the crucial determinant of where presumption resides.

Generally, presumptive propositions are inferred from presumptive rules. They are the result of presumptive inference structure in which there is a presumption rule, which is combined with a premise asserting an antecedent fact to yield a presumptive conclusion. For example:
  • Everyone accused of a crime is to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, by providing missing evidence. [Presumption rule that argues from ignorance]
  • John has been accused of a crime. [Antecedent fact]
  • Thus, there is a presumption that John is innocent until proven guilty. [Presumptive proposition]
Thus, a presumed inference is a conclusion drawn because there's an absence of evidence or proof to the contrary, which is the core of an argument from ignorance.

Generally, then, presumed consent exists if: (1) under prevailing social norms, the actor is justified in engaging in the conduct in the absence of the other person's expressed consent; and (2) the actor has no reason to believe that the person would not have actually expressed consent to the conduct if the actor had requested the person's consent.

The fact that an action is in accordance with existing social norms gives rise to presumption that the person actually does consent to that action. But that is a defeasible presumption, and it is defeated if the person clearly does not consent to it. Unless and until he clearly disavows consent, however, we are entitled to presume that he does consent.

Here, we are presuming tacit consent rather than inferring it from anything that has been said or done. Most probably, we are grounding our presumption on the simple fact that the vast majority of people in similar circumstances do actually consent.

Let us consider the sort of argument often heard in rape cases. The defendant often claims to have had good grounds for presuming the victim's consent, based on various other things that she had said or done.

He will ask, rhetorically, “What was she doing, there at 3 o'clock in the morning? What did she think was going to happen? Why did she think he invited her back? Should women who put themselves in compromising positions complain when they are compromised?”

One way of reading such aspersions is as claiming that the perpetrator had reasonable grounds for presuming that the victim consented.

That claim would of course be vitiated if, as it is typically the case, the victim did actually say “No” clearly and loudly before the rape occurred.

But imagine she failed to do so. Should being scantily clad lat at night in a bad neighborhood really constitute sufficient grounds for a presumption of consent to sexual inter course?

Surely not. Even if some women dressing in that way and walking in those neighborhoods at those hours do intend that as a signal of consent to sexual relations (prostitutes, for example), not all women do so.

However, what is true of most people in similar circumstances does not necessarily warrant presuming the same of any particular person.

So, all women should surely be entitled to the presumption that they have not waived their rights against sexual assault, in the absence of much more direct evidence than that indicating that they personally, and not just “most women there at that hour dressed like that” generically, have waived their rights in that way.

The legal principle of presumed innocence will clarify the matter. In court proceedings, the defendant is to be presumed innocent until when proven guilty, based on evidence.

That presumption holds, both legally and morally, even if the vast majority of people brought before the court on the same charge are found guilty.

People are entitled to the presumption of innocence, even if very much more often than not that presumption is eventually rebutted.

Likewise in the case of consent, in any high-stakes situation people should surely be entitled to a strong presumption that they have not waived any important rights of non-interference in the absence of clear evidence that they have done so.

In other cases, we presumed consent is considered to exist in the form of an on-going consent under on-going practices. Let us briefly have a look at this too.

That is, consent may legitimately be presumed is in connection with on-going practices, where consent to the practice had clearly been given, either explicitly or tacitly, on an earlier occasion and no indications have been given that that consent has been withdrawn, even though the consent giver could have done so without undue cost.

Then one may legitimately presume that consent previously given to practice still persists. Consent of that sort is what is involved in the “implied in fact doctrine contract law.”

Those are cases in which, while there is no explicit agreement, the behavior of the parties is such as to make it clear that there actually was tacit agreement.

A classic application is in labor law, when workers continue working for a firm after the expiration of their previous contract while a new contract is being negotiated.

In such circumstances, courts recognize a contract implied-in-fact, under which the workers continue working on the same terms as in the previous, but now expired, contract until a new one is concluded.

In the cases “customary consent on notice,” “silence on notice” or “on-going practices” to which one has previously consented, we are entitled to presume that people consent because people actually have done or not done something that, in the context, conveys their consent.

In the on-going practice, they actually consented at some point in the past to what they knew would be an on-going practice and they have not given notice of their intention to revoke that consent.

In cases of “silence on notice” and “customary consent on notice,” they have been put on notice that remaining silent is a way of consenting, and they have remained silent.

We are entitled to presume that we have their consent because they have, in those ways, actually communicated it to us. However, in all of these cases that presumption of consent is a defeasible one.

And all a person needs to do to defeat the presumption that he consents is to indicate that he does not. Taking previous consent to an on-going practice, or silence in the face of notice, as consent merely shifts the burden of speaking up.

Ordinarily, a person who wants to give consent needs to speak up (or do something equivalent) to give positive indication of that fact.

In cases where consent may be presumed, a person who wants not to give consent needs to speak up (or do something equivalent) to indicate that fact.

Implicit actual consent: This occurs when the supposed consent-receiver believes, for logical or pragmatic reasons, that an individual's explicit agreement to one action implies consent to another related action, to which the presumed consent-giver has not given explicit agreement.

When inferring from something that someone has said or done that he tacitly consents to something, we are inferring something about the state of his mind. When presuming that someone consents, we are presuming something similar about the state of his mind.

But, with “implicit consent” we are doing something different from that. Here, we are concluding from the nature of the situation that he is paradigmatically or logically compelled to consent.

In the former cases we are saying “he actually does consent” while in the latter we are saying "logically he must consent.”

Those two are clearly different, of course, often the person will see the logic of the situation, and he will proceed to do as logically he must and actually give his consent. When he does, implicit consent will have been converted into tacit or perhaps even explicit consent.

And once that has happened, we have no further occasion for speaking of implicit consent in relation to that case at all.

Here, therefore, we shall address the case in which implicit consent remains no more than that it remains merely implicit.

In the absence of actual consent, we can at most treat someone in that situation in the same way “as if he consents.”

Let us first look at logically implicit consent. When a person consents, he permits another person to perform a certain kind of act. In addition, being an act of giving permission to another person, consent is always directed towards a recipient.

Finally, giving permission for the performance of a certain kind of act, consent is always restricted to the kind of act specified by the consenter, e.g. a medical procedure, sex, or transfer of property.

Against this understanding, the paradigmatic case of “implicit consent” is one in which (i) X consents to Y's performance of action A and (ii) Y's performance of action A logically entails Y's performance of action B.

Sometimes that latter proposition might be true because of an identity relation between action A and action B. So when I consent to your frying the fish, I implicitly consent to your cooking the fish, because frying is one form of cooking.

Or, again, when I consent to your walking across my land, I implicitly consent to your stepping on it, because walking just is a series of steps.

Other times performance of action A may logically entail performance of action B because the one is a logically necessary condition of the other.

Thus, when consenting for my ashes to be buried at sea I implicitly consent to my body being burned, because ashes by definition are the product of combustion. And when consenting to invasive surgery I am, by definition, consenting to my bodily cavity being penetrated.

Even if Y's performance of action A is logically equivalent to or logically entailed by Y's performance of action B, however, the fact remains that it is Y's performance of action A, and not Y's performance of action B, to which X has consented, since consent is given under a description.

Given the logical equivalence or entailment, by consenting to Y's performance of action A, X may well be committed to consenting to Y's performance of action B. But being committed to doing it and actually doing it are two separate things.

Next, let us look at pragmatically Implicit consent. In this case, we can offer the following examples that have something of the same flavor:

(1) A prince or magistrate, who by covenant gives leave to strangers to frequent his markets; is supposed to consent likewise, that they shall carry home the goods they purchase there.

(2) In the same manner, he who lets out a chamber to hire is supposed to consent withal, that the lodger shall make use of such other parts of the house as he cannot be without; as of the doors, entries and the like; at least so far as to have free access to his apartment and free passage from it.

While there is certainly a pragmatic absurdity in refusing the further consent in both of those cases, there is nothing logically absurd about doing so.

One can imagine a sharp dealer consenting to the rental of a room without consenting to the renter's using the hallway required to access it.

Thus, even if Y's performance of action A is only pragmatically implicit in Y's performance of action B, X's consenting to Y's performance of action A can reasonably be taken to commit him to consenting to Y's performance of action B.

That would certainly be so if Y's performance of action B is literally the only way for Y to performance of action A; and it would arguably be so if Y's performance of action A is much the most practicable or reasonable way for Y too.

But again, being committed to doing something or abstaining from doing something (consenting in this case) and actually doing it are wholly separate matters.

But, what morally follows from the conjunction of the facts that (i) X has consented to Y's performance of action A and (ii) Y's performance of action A logically (or even just pragmatically) entails Y's performance of action B?

Any of three possible conclusions might follow in order of increasing strength:

Either, X, while he has not consented to Y's performance of action B, X nonetheless ought to permit Y to performance of action B because that is necessary for giving practical effect to his consent to Y's performance of action A.

Or, we might say that X's commitment (via his consent) to permitting Y's performance of action A entails that X is thereby also committed to permitting Y's performance of action B.

Or, since whoever wills the end also wills the indispensably necessary means to it, X's consenting to Y's performance of action A means that X wills Y's being permitted to Y's performance of action B logically.

Tacit actual consent versus presumed actual consent: Tacit and implicit consent are sometimes used as synonyms. However, we should make a distinction between these two forms of consent.

Implicit and tacit consent are both unstated, but in a different sense. The basic difference between these two forms of unstated consent maybe illuminated by the following examples.

First, suppose that a lecturer says to the audience: “Is it okay witheveryone that we meet tomorrow one hour earlier than normally?”

If the answer is silence, then we say that the audience has given its tacit consent to the lecturer’s proposal. Tacit consent is given by being quiet; it is an omission, not an act.

Second, consider the following statement of consent: “You may play my piano while I am on holiday.”

In this statement, I explicitly consent to you playing my piano while I am on holiday, but this is the only thing I explicitly consent to. However, for you to play my piano, you must be able and allowed to come into my house.

When I explicitly give you consent to play my piano while I am on holiday, I am, by this very same statement, implicitly accepting that you come into my house while I am on holiday. We can put this implicit consent in a more general way:

When one gives an explicit consent to action X, one implicitly gives consent to all those things necessary to fulfill action X.

However, this is not the only way one may implicitly consent to something.

For example, if you start smoking and you know that with a certain probability p you will get lung cancer, then you have implicitly consented to the fact that you will get lung cancer with probability p. Thus, we can also make the following statement:

When one gives an explicit consent to action X, knowing that action X entails action Y, one has given implicit consent to action Y.

Implicit consent is a form of unstated consent, but it is not tacit in a strict sense. The conditions for tacit consent are different from those of implicit consent.

The basic difference between tacit and implicit consent is that tacit consent is an omission while implicit consent is an act; both are forms of actual consent.

The basic question with tacit consent is: “Under what conditions can silence be taken as a sign of tacit consent?”

It is clear that not every silence constitutes tacit consent. When we consider implicit consent, we are asking: “Does someone’s explicit consent to action Y also imply consent to action X?”

Hypothetical consent as opposed to actual consent: Hypothetical consent is an assumed consent in situations where, although actual consent has not been given by one person to another person, it nevertheless seems reasonable to logically infer that if certain conditions about persons and their choice situations (1) had obtained, or (2) were to obtain, or (3) will obtain in the future, then someone’s consent (1) would have been given, or (2) would be given, or (3) will be given.

I propose to show that, only one model of hypothetical consent under very restricting assumption appears to have independent moral force. This model includes three assumptions.

Namely, when: (1) An agent is not able to choose according to her self-interest, that is, an agent does not know what is best for her; (2) An agent lacks relevant information for her choice; and (3) An agent would choose differently if she had the relevant information available.

Sample situations of hypothetical consent: Some contexts in which hypothetical consent is often assumed include: substituted judgment in medical ethics, benevolent paternalism, respect for those who have died, interpreting legislative intent, not obtaining actual consent even though it would have been perfectly possible to do so, and ideal contract theory in moral and/or political philosophy.

Substituted judgment’ in medical ethics: A person who previously had, but presently lacks, decision-making capacity is in a condition that raises questions about possible medical treatments—treatments that might prolong life, improve health, prevent disability, and/or alleviate discomfort.

It is hypothesized that if the individual in question were to regain decision-making capacity, and were to know and understand the prognosis, the treatment options, the prospective benefits, and associated risks, and so forth, then that individual would authorize family members and/or doctors to undertake certain measures.

Benevolent paternalism: A parent is concerned to have her beloved child vaccinated against a deadly and/or debilitating disease. As the child unhappily resists, the parent comforts herself with the thought that later on, if and when he is more mature, more thoughtful, and more adequately informed about health matters, the adult that the child becomes will endorse what the parent has done and will consent to comparable measures that might be needed to maintain and/or enhance the immunity thus established.

Respect for those who have died: Friends and relatives are trying to honor a recently deceased person by handling some of that person’s posthumous affairs in a way that they believe that person would have wanted them to do and indeed would have authorized them to do, if only the deceased had managed to anticipate and more explicitly address such matters with greater specificity.

Knowing the deceased person’s values and lifestyle commitments, they hypothesize that their beloved relative would not have consented to a large funeral with lots of eulogies or to burial in an expensive casket.

Knowing the great love he had for his niece and nephew and the genuine empathy with which he related to them, they hypothesize that he would have consented to transferring his butterfly collection to his nature-loving niece and his baseball card collection to his baseball-loving nephew.

Interpreting legislative intent: A court hears a case in which the literal application of an existing statute would provide an unexpected incentive to engage in behavior that other well-established statutes, for example, prohibiting and punishing murder, are clearly aimed at discouraging.

For example, a man has been murdered by his grandson who, having feared that he would soon be cut off from the grandfather’s will, took deadly action to make sure that such changes not be made.

The extant will, bequeathing a generous sum to the grandson, would be considered technically valid in light of the literal meaning of the statutes governing wills. But the majority on the court bench reasons differently.

They hypothesize that if the legislators had managed to anticipate a circumstance such as the one that has now come before the court, they would surely have qualified the statute to make perfectly clear that a designated heir loses his right to inherit when he has sought to activate the execution of the will by committing a crime, such as murder, against the testator.

Thus, their hypothesis about what the legislators would have agreed to had they only known about cases of this sort plays a critical role in their interpretation and application of the law actually legislated.

Not obtaining actual consent even though it would have been perfectly possible to do so: Researchers set out to observe ‘‘subjects’’ instead of soliciting the informed consent of those individuals, they contend that actual consent is unnecessary.

They hypothesize that the research in question is sufficiently non-burdensome to the individuals thus observed, and that if they were to be asked, such individuals would surely give their consent anyway.

Contract theory in political philosophy: Reasoning is advanced to the effect that the parties to the hypothesized contract would agree to certain general principles for regulating the design of society’s most basic political and economic institutions.

The truth of this hypothesis is thought to lend significant support to the view that such principles do indeed specify what is most reasonable and just.

Framework for evaluating the validity of hypothetical consent: Conditions about agents and choice situations can be actual or imaginary.

Thus, we have four possible scenarios of hypothetical consent: actual agent in actual choice situation, actual agent in imaginary choice situation, imaginary agent in actual choice situation, and imaginary agent in imaginary choice situation. Let us look at each briefly.

Actual Agent in Actual Choice Situation: The idea behind the first type of hypothetical consent argument is that since an agent would have consented ex ante to a certain policy, it is justified to impose that policy ex post.

We can put this argument in a general form as follows: Actual agent S would have consented to x in the actual circumstances she was in at time t1; therefore, Actual agent S is obliged to accept x at time t2.

According to this model, for example, it is justified for a court to impose certain terms of contract ex post because the contracting parties would have consented to these terms when they entered into the transaction.

The intuition behind the argument is that a person’s actual consent to a policy provides a good moral reason to impose that policy on her, and hypothetical consent is sufficiently similar to actual consent to have a similar kind of normative force.

In other words, the fact that a person would have consented ex ante to the imposition of a particular policy p is a sufficient moral reason to impose that policy p on her ex post.

One way to defend this kind of hypothetical consent argument is to say that by using this model, one promotes individual autonomy in a way similar to what is being done in the case of actual consent.

By applying this model, in other words, we promote one’s freedom of choice, because this is the choice that one would have made. This kind of defense, however, does not seem to be successful.

If actual agent S had chosen x at time t1, then x would have promoted agent S’s self-interest at time t1. On the other hand, if we know that x was against actual agent S’s self-interest, then we cannot plausibly argue that agent S would have chosen it.

To say that one would have chosen something is simply to say that it was in one’s self-interest. This model thus claims that actual agent S is obliged to accept x at time t2, because it was in her self-interest at time t1.

If this is correct, then the argument is troublesome. To say that one would have consented to a particular state of affairs at time t1 is to say that it was compatible with one’s preferences at time t1.

But why should I now, at time t2, accept something that was my preference at time t1, if my preferences have changed?

The only possible answer seems to be that one is not allowed to change preferences, but this answer could not be correct. There is nothing morally improper about changing one’s preferences when circumstances change, so there is no reason to hold me to my earlier preference.

The mistake behind this model lies in its assumption that one is not morally allowed to change one’s preferences when circumstances change.

If the justification for this model is that it promotes one’s self-interest, then if one’s preferences change, there is no reason to hold one to one’s earlier preference.

There is also another problem with this model. It could be the case that the agent possesses information at time t2 that was unavailable at time t1.

It is hardly an acceptable conclusion that I am now, at time t2, obliged to buy your broken-down car because I would have wanted to buy it at time t1 when I did not know it was broken.

Actual Agent in Imaginary Choice Situation: This model of hypothetical consent argument can be put in a general form as follows: Actual agent S would have consented to x in the imaginary circumstances C; therefore, agent S is obliged to accept x now in the different kind of circumstances C2.

A crucial question with arguments of this type is how the circumstances are idealized. The term “imaginary circumstances” is too ambiguous if we want to evaluate the normative force of this model. Circumstances can be imaginary in many ways.

Let us consider two fundamental ways of doing this. First, facts of the actual choice situation may be changed; and second, information available about the facts of the actual choice situation may be changed.

If the choice situation is imagined through changing the facts of the actual choice situation, the model seems to have no moral force whatsoever. It might be true that you would have bought my car if it were in good working order, but that is no reason for you to be obliged to buy my car when it has broken down. Changing the facts of the situations is thus prohibited when using this model.

Let us now consider the situation where the circumstances are imagined regarding the information available.

The choice situation may be imagined in two ways regarding information: there can be more or less information available than in the actual choice situation.

Let us consider first the case in which the agent is deprived of some relevant information in the choice situation.

There may be several reasons for using this type of hypothetical consent argument. The most obvious reason is that by imagining the choice situation, those features of the agent which are thought to be “morally irrelevant” can be disregarded.

In other words, the choice situation can be idealized so that the agent does not know whether she will in the end actually benefit or lose from her choice.

If the agent does not know some relevant features of the situation, then she does not know whether her decision will benefit her personally.

This variation of the model says that actual agent S is obliged to accept policy p, because actual agent S would have consented to the policy p in the situation where she did not have information on some relevant features of her situation.

This variation of the model, however, seems to get into deep trouble. First, one may ask “what reasons does an agent have to comply with the hypothetical terms to which she would have agreed in totally different circumstances?”

In fact, the case when there is less information available resembles the situation where the facts of choice situation are changed. It might be true that if you had not had the information that my car had broken down, you would have bought it.

However, that is no reason for you to be obliged to buy my car. I will turn back to the problematics of idealized choice positions later.

Let us now turn to the case when there is more information available. This is perhaps the most widely used variation of the model.

Compared to former variations, this also seems to be more reasonable. It sounds quite reasonable that you would not have bought my car if you had had the information that it was not functioning, and therefore you are not obliged to accept our transaction.

This example uses the model in negative form, in other words: Actual agent S would not have consented to x in the idealized circumstances C; therefore, S is not obliged to accept x.

One advantage of this model, in its positive and negative forms, lies in its confirmability in principle. Judgments about what actual agent S would have done in such and such circumstances can be confirmed by asking actual agent S what she would have done.

Of course, there are cases when it is difficult to imagine what to do in certain conditions, and one’s word about what she would do in such circumstances is not reliable.

For example, if you ask someone how much money she would give to charity if she had one million dollars, the amount she says she would give is probably much greater than she would give if she had the money in reality.

The car example suggests that when a person lacks some relevant information, it could be sometimes plausible to appeal to one’s hypothetical consent.

Let us consider another example: If either a public officer or anyone else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him of his danger, they might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement of his liberty; for liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall into the river, it is so argued.

This argument can also be presented in terms of hypothetical consent. It is justified to turn him back because he would consent to that if he knew that the bridge is unsafe.

The general form of argument is the following: Actual agent S would give her consent to x if she had the relevant information; therefore, actual agent S is obliged to accept x.

In this case, actual agent S is obliged to accept the interference because S would give her consent to the interference if she had the information that those who interfere have—information that would change her choice.

The most important advantage of this reformulated model is that it respects individual autonomy.

It does not impose any alien goals on an agent, and so it does not conflict with the right of a competent person to direct his own life. In fact, this reformulated model can be seen to facilitate the achievement of goals held by the agent.

There are, however, two problems with this reformulated model. First, there are occasions when we might appeal to the reformulated model in a manner which fails to respect a person’s most basic beliefs.

Someone can, for example, claim that if a Jehovah’s Witness believed that there is no God, she would have consented to a blood transfusion, and is therefore obliged to accept the blood transfusion. Although it could be true that there is no God, this conclusion does not seem plausible.

To avoid this problem, we must clarify what it actually means to say that someone would have consented to something if she had had the relevant information for making her decision.

This condition only requires the agent to be aware of all evidence or arguments relevant to her choice.

The question is not what one would choose if she had beliefs that she lacks in reality, but what she would choose if her epistemological decision base were in some respect different.

Although a Jehovah’s Witness would choose differently if she believed that there is no God, this is not the thing we are interested in.

The question we should ask is what she would choose if she had all the relevant information for making her choice. Even if there were strong evidence that God does not exist, she surely can still believe in God.

We should also note that some beliefs are central to the subjects’ conceptions of their own personal identity.

There is a vast difference, for example, between preventing someone from drinking poisoned wine and imposing a transfusion on a Jehovah’s Witness.

The belief that one ought to drink poison is not central to anyone’s conception of her personal identity, but the belief that God exists might be.

The second problem with the reformulated model is more complicated: We do not need the whole idea of hypothetical consent in the reformulated model types of justifications.

The reformulated model claims that one is obliged to accept x because it is in her self-interest. If x is not in one’s self-interest, then the argument simply fails.

Because the justificatory force of the reformulated model relies solely on one’s preferences, there is a good reason to ask if it is a form of consent justification at all.

The problem is that the argument builds consent analytically into the ordering of a person’s preferences. There is absolutely nothing in the concept of consent that is not already contained in a statement about one’s preferences.

To say that one would consent to the move from one state of affairs to another adds nothing to the claim that one prefers one state of affairs over the other.

It seems to be exactly the same thing to say that something is justified because it increases one’s welfare, and to say that it is justified because one would give consent to it.

Thus, the reformulated model seems to be merely a welfarist argument in a contractarian disguise.

This objection, however, assumes that one is the best evaluator of one’s own interests. If one is not a reliable evaluator of one’s self-interest, it will not be the same thing to say that something is justified because it increases one’s welfare, and to say that it is justified because one would give consent to it.

Let us consider again the blood transfusion case. One might argue that a blood transfusion is actually in the Jehovah’s Witness’s self-interest, although she would not give her consent to it.

On the basis of one’s self-interest, it would, thus, be justified to impose a transfusion, but on the basis of one’s hypothetical consent, it is not.

On this account, the reason why it is not morally right to impose a transfusion on a Jehovah’s Witness cannot be one’s self-interest. The reason, instead, must be that one would not give her consent to it. It would violate her autonomy.

One may disagree with this example and argue that it is, in fact, in the interest of the Jehovah’s Witness to refuse to agree to a transfusion.

However, it is not at all difficult to imagine other examples where one clearly is not a reliable evaluator of one’s self-interest in a sense that one does not know what is best, given one’s goals.

In that kind of case, it seems justified to say that although a certain policy p would be in the agent’s best self-interest, it is not accepted because one would not give one’s consent to it. In other words, any other kind of policy would go against one’s autonomous will.

Under these assumptions, the reformulated model seems to be a plausible form of hypothetical consent argument.

Imaginary Agent in Actual Choice Situation: In some cases, instead of asking what the actual agents would have wanted, one may also ask what an imaginary agent would have wanted.

This kind of argument says that a similarly situated agent with certain imaginary agent properties would have consented to a policy.

The argument can be put in a general form as follows: Imaginary agent A would have consented to x in the actual circumstances actual agent S was in at time t1; therefore, actual agent S is obliged to accept x at time t2.

Agents may be idealized at least in three respects: their preferences, beliefs, and cognitive capacities.

One reason for using this kind of hypothetical consent argument is that we do not know the preferences, beliefs, or cognitive capacities of the actual agent.

An agent may be unable to express herself or be unreliable. Then, for example, we can argue that a person with preferences, beliefs, and cognitive capacities that the majority of similarly situated agents have would have consented to policy p, and, therefore, one is obliged to accept policy p.

Another, and probably more common, form of this model goes as follows: Fully rational agent A would have consented to x in the circumstances actual agent S was in at time t1; therefore, actual agent S is obliged to accept x at time t2.

One problem with the reformulation is that an action that would have been chosen by a fully rational person is not necessarily the same that some actual agent S would have chosen.

The choices of a fully rational person A and the choices of an actual agent S may in many cases coincide, but it is not always so.

Because the choices of a fully rational agent and an actual agent are not identical, this reformulation fails to respect individual autonomy. Therefore, it does not seem possible to call this a form of hypothetical consent.

One may argue that actual agent S would change her choice if S were aware that a fully rational person would choose differently. A person always prefers the choices of fully rational persons if her choices are not the same.

What is going on here is that we are trying to justify one form of consent argument by appealing to another. It is justified to appeal to the choices of fully rational agents because if S were aware of the choice of a fully rational person, she would make this choice.

This argument, however, seems to be a purely welfarist justification. The notion of hypothetical consent is playing no independent role in the justification.

We should also note that, although I may always prefer the choices of a fully rational agent, in the case of hypothetical consent, I am not making a choice at all.

Someone else makes the choice for me, and justifies it by the fact that a fully rational person would have consented to it, and that I would choose what a fully rational person chooses.

However, it is a different thing for me to actually change my mind and make a new choice. If I do change my choice because it is not the one a fully rational agent would have made, I am practicing my autonomy. But in the argument presented above, I am not making a choice at all; someone else makes it for me.

It is important to see that not only the content of consent but the act of consent itself matters. To be able to choose is valuable in itself. In other words, to be able to choose is a good that is independent of the wisdom of what is chosen.

Then, the main problem with this reformulation is that it allows imposing goals on actual agent S that she would not autonomously choose.

The other problem is that there seems to be no reason for the real life agents to comply with the hypothetical terms to which ideal agents would have agreed.

Imaginary Agent in Imaginary Choice Situation: The last type of argument from hypothetical consent under consideration is an argument where both the consenting agent and circumstances are imaginary.

We may formulate this in a general form as follows: Imaginary agent A would have consented to x in the imaginary circumstances C; therefore, actual agent S is obliged to accept x now in the different kind of circumstances C2.

There are some obvious reasons for using this kind of hypothetical consent argument. Arguments of this type are usually thought to have some special moral force because the self-interest of the agents can be disregarded.

By this model, it is thought to be possible to use consent-based justification, that is, autonomy-based justification, for decisions where there are both losers and winners.

In other words, it is possible to say that the losers of some policy decision would themselves have consented to that policy.

In other words, it is possible to exclude nonethical subjective preferences if an individual’s preferences indicate what social situation he would choose if he did not know what his personal position would be in the new situation chosen, and in any of its alternatives, but rather had an equal chance of obtaining any of the social positions existing in this situation, from the highest to the lowest.

The argument says that because an idealized agent A from some idealized choice position would have found it in her own interest to agree to the policy p, those agents who lose from that policy decision are obliged to accept that policy.

An argument for principles of justice as fairness based on the idea of an original position, where rational egoists make a choice behind the veil of ignorance, is the most famous example of this kind of argument.

The choices are thought to have moral force when the veil of ignorance is removed and the agents have revealed their actual characteristics.

Behind the veil of ignorance, the agents do not know their race, gender, age, natural abilities, conception of good, and other similar things. Agents are also supposed to be rational, not envious egoists.

Thus, in this argument, both the choice situation and the choosing agent are imaginary. The idea is that choices made in this kind of choice position have moral force which makes agents obliged to accept policies they have chosen behind the veil of ignorance after the veil has disappeared.

However, there are some doubts on this model. Why should we think that the choices of idealized agents who do not know their personal characteristics apply to either the winners or losers of the chosen policy? It does not seem to be “their” choice at all.

We can then bring up the following objection: Real life agents seem to have no reason to comply with the hypothetical terms to which ideal agents in the ideal circumstances would have agreed.

The focus of this criticism here: This model is unable to prove the existence of any duty. This is an important distinction when we consider the normative force of hypothetical consent arguments.

The mere fact that agents are impartial in the choice position is insufficient to make the outputs of the choice position anyone’s duty.

Justification for imposing significant losses on someone cannot simply be that the loser would have consented to it behind the veil of ignorance. In no sense is it the loser’s choice; losers would not consent to that policy.

The basic problem with this kind of argument is that it makes no sense at all to speak of choosing or consenting to something in the absence of knowledge of one’s personal social position, preferences, tastes, etc.

The hypothetical choice of an ideal agent in ideal circumstances is in no sense any real agent’s choice, and therefore there seems to be no reason to talk about one’s hypothetical consent.

Conclusion: I have analyzed four different ways of understanding hypothetical consent arguments. There are three kinds of problems with all arguments using the notion of hypothetical consent: conceptual, substantive, and technical.

The conceptual problem concerns how we should understand the notion of hypothetical consent. The substantive problem concerns the normative consequences of this kind of argument. The technical problem concerns the way to determine what someone would have wanted.

I have argued that the appeals to hypothetical consent are often either unjustified, or, when they seem to be justified, can be presented in welfarist terms, and the whole idea of hypothetical consent becomes pointless.

Only one model of hypothetical consent under very restricting assumption appears to have independent moral force.

This model includes the following assumptions: (1) An agent is not able to choose according to her self-interest, that is, an agent does not know what is best for her; (2) An agent lacks relevant information for her choice; and (3) An agent would choose differently if she had the relevant information available.

Then appealing to one’s hypothetical consent in all the other cases is unjustified, or, if justified, simply a utilitarian argument, leaving the idea of hypothetical consent with no independent role in justification.

In short, we have seen that, by definition, hypothetical consent is not real consent at all. It is only hypothetical or imaginary.

Hypothetical consent arguments can be construed or modeled in several different ways since both the choice situation and the consenting agent can be idealized in multiple ways.

We can distinguish four basic types of hypothetical consent arguments, characterized by:
  • the features of consenting agents, and
  • the features of the situation in which consent is given, hereafter called the choice situation.
By combining these two variables, we get four basic models of hypothetical consent argument based on:
  • actual agent in actual choice situation (actual),
  • actual agent in idealized choice situation (hypothetical),
  • idealized agent in actual choice situation (hypothetical), and
  • idealized agent in idealized choice situation (hypothetical)
Accordingly, we have discussed four different kinds of arguments for hypothetical consent.



Deontological structure of consent

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, within human rights framework, it is common that we have a natural right to autonomy that requires others not to interfere with our personal domains.

In this case, our right correlates with a consent-sensitive duty on others not to commit certain actions, which is a duty to omit those actions.

For example, in terms of human rights based thinking, we can say that, agent X is indebted to agent Y for a consent-sensitive duty to refrain from performing action A.

This view of consent in terms of human rights based thinking clearly reveals the fact that consent has a transformative role in interpersonal interactions.

Specifically, permissive assent transforms the rights and obligations that exist between persons, rendering impermissible acts permissible and changing the expectations between the assent-giver and assent-receiver.

For example, before permissive assent we have the following scenario: Agent Y is indebted to agent X for a duty to omit action A if and only if agent Y has a claim-right against agent X's commission of action A.

And after permissive assent we have the following scenario: Agent Y is not indebted to agent X for a duty to omit action A since agent Y has no claim-right against agent X's commission of action A.

So, if agent Y gives permissive assent to agent X of committing action A, then agent Y releases agent X from a duty not to commit action A, whereby agent Y waives one's right against X's commission of action A.

To this extent, a permissive assent transaction is a four-term relation between a permissive assent indicator, the permissive assent-giver, the permissive assent-receiver, and a permitted act description, whose nature can be political, social, economic, sexual or otherwise.

Similarly, before promissory assent we have the following scenario: Agent Y is not indebted to agent X for a duty to commit action A since agent X has no claim-right against agent Y's commission of action A.

And after promissory assent we have the following scenario: Agent Y is indebted to agent X for a duty to commit action A since agent X has claim-right against agent Y's commission of action A, arising from the promise made by agent Y.

So, if agent Y gives promissory assent to agent X of committing action A, then agent Y binds oneself to agent X under a duty to commit action A, since, through one's promise, agent Y created this duty in favor of against X.

To this extent, again, a promissory assent transaction is a four-term relation between a promissory assent indicator, the promissory assent-giver, the promissory assent-receiver, and a promised act description, whose nature can be political, social, economic, sexual or otherwise.

Anthropological origins of consent

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, anthropologically speaking, every human person is born with a natural inclination to self-determination, from which, the natural right to be free from interference by others in one's domain, without one’s free, informed and deliberative consent, necessarily follows.

This is to say that, humans are autonomous agents that deserve to be treated as self-determining actors, and this fact predates any social contract they may enter. In order to respect autonomous agents’ interests, one must seek their consent in any interaction that involves them.

Failure to get the consent of others creates an obligation to refrain from interfering with them. And securing consent of others, in this sense, is a sufficient condition of treating individuals with respect. In this case, consensus follows from, as opposed to being derived from, the duty of respect for personal autonomy.

Accordingly, we can say that, the word “consent” refers to voluntary agreement among all suitably informed, competent, intending and concerned parties.

In other words, for an ethically valid consent, an individual must have the competence to make a decision, receive and understand information about the matter, provide it voluntarily without coercion, have a clear intention to agree and be concerned party to the matter under consideration.

Conditions of Valid Consent

We have seen that, consenting is a way of committing ourselves under a moral duty to accept some action as performed by another party. An argument from consent can be formulated as follows:
  • Agent X has consented to action Y to be performed by agent Z;
  • Consenting to action Y to be performed by agent Z means permitting agent Z to perform action Y;
  • Therefore, agent X is obliged to accept action Y as performed by agent Z.
However, this argument does not say that every action to which someone has given consent is morally permissible. For example, it is not morally permission for someone to kill you just because you have consented.

Only certain types of consent have moral relevance. It is one thing to ask which acts count as consent, and another to ask which acts of consent have moral force.

To distinguish the acts of consent which have moral force from those which have none we need to introduce a notion of valid consent, where this notion has its key attributes.

Generally, consent has moral force, meaning that it is valid consent, if and only if, it is based on an agreement which is subject to suitable (1) information, (2) competence, (3) intention, (4) voluntariness, and (5) content.

Where one is deceived or misled about an arrangement, or where one is otherwise non-negligently ignorant of crucial facts, apparent consensual acts may not bind (because consent is not ‘informed’).

Binding consent must be intentional, not only in the sense that the acts themselves must be intentionally performed, but also that they must involve the intention to give consent and thereby alter existing moral relations.

Consent can only be given by the competent, which may exclude in various contexts apparent consent given by the insane, severely retarded, emotionally disturbed, immature, intoxicated and so on.

Binding consent must be voluntary, limiting it to cases not involving the extraction of consent by coercion, undue influence, exploitation, unfair bargaining advantage and so on.

And consent only binds given acceptability of content. In most legal systems, for instance, agreements you make to commit crimes, become a slave or allow yourself to be killed are not enforceable. Further clarification on each cond8ition follows.

The Competence Condition: Young children lack the cognitive development to consent. They are not conceptually or emotionally equipped to provide the authorization or commitment for many of the situations that would ordinarily require their consent.

As they develop they acquire an increasing capacity for making determinations with regard to such matters. Until that time, though, we usually consider that parents or others guardians who can be expected to have their best interests in view will provide the consent that is needed.

Nevertheless, the capacity to consent does not occur all at once. The level of competence required to join a scout club is very different from that required to buy a house or accept an offer of marriage.

As children become cognitively and otherwise capable of making certain kinds of decisions concerning interests over which they should have moral jurisdiction, the authority to consent passes to them from their guardians.

But even if competence in the sense of a certain level of cognitive development has been reached, it may be subverted in other ways.

Intoxication impairs one’s ability to consent, though the impairment may be a matter of degree. Insanity and other forms of mental illness may also impair the capacity to consent to the point that what appears to be consent no longer transforms relations with others.

Cases of acute or chronic pain can also impair consent. We do not usually hold people responsible for what they agree to under torture because the pain of torture so consumes their consciousness that they can usually focus on little beyond what can be done to alleviate it.

In other cases in which a person may have lost the capacity to consent to matters that would ordinarily require consent, decisions might be made not on the basis of what are deemed to be the person’s best interests, but on the basis of what that person might have been expected to consent to, given what is known about her.

This substituted judgment standard presumes that we know enough about the person to draw reasonable inferences about what that person would have consented to.

In cases in which the consent that agent A gives concerns the affairs of another agent, call that other B, who would ordinarily be expected to give or withhold consent, we need to offer an argument for transferring the authority that would ordinarily belong to B to A.

The expectation would be that the moral guardian would know enough about B either to make appropriate judgments about what B could have been expected to consent to, given her settled desires, values, and life plans, or, in the absence of that, what would be in B’s best interests, something which, in the absence of better knowledge, B could be presumed to consent to having secured for her.

The Voluntariness Condition: Ensuring the voluntariness of agreements is one of the conditions that enable acts of consent to constitute a responsible transformation of the moral landscape for those who are party to it.

So, if agent A is coerced into doing what ordinarily signifies consent, be it the raised hand or the uttered ‘‘yes,’’ he does not act voluntarily and what he does does not constitute consent.

Some might argue that in such cases consent is given but, because it is coerced, it is not valid. But invalid consent no more counts as consent than an invalid vote counts as a vote. It has form but no substance. It is more accurate to say that although agent A gave his assent, this did not amount to consent.

Lack of voluntariness may have a variety of sources, most dramatically from the knife to the throat but more subtly from the felt threat of social ostracism.

Responsibility-defeating or responsibility-diminishing coercion takes many forms. It is generally agreed, for example, that assent given as a result of physical threats is coercive.

Similarly, certain inner forces may negatively affect the voluntariness of what we agree to and therefore on our responsibility for what would otherwise be taken to signify consent.

For example, prisoners who ‘‘volunteer’’ to participate in clinical trials give their consent under circumstances that may subvert the voluntariness of their agreement.

Under plea bargains, the option of pleading guilty to a lesser charge in exchange for trial on other and more serious charges may not appear coercive. But if the penalties faced at trial are considerably greater than those offered through the plea agreement, even an innocent defendant may feel pressured to plead guilty.

Again, although there is a tradition of thinking that coercion requires threats, there is some reason to think that, in appropriate circumstances, even offers may be coercive.

They may be coercive either because a refusal of the offer is associated with some threat or, alternatively, because the baseline circumstances in which the offer is made are humanly unacceptable.

If a factory owner takes advantage of economic conditions to advertise a subsistence wage for heavy work, we may see the offer as genuine but coercive.

The Knowledge Condition: A morally valid consent includes a knowledge condition or an understanding condition, which is premised on access to correct, timely and sufficient information, on one hand, and on the other hand, freedom from dis-information, mis-information and mal-information and under-information.

The understanding condition is an epistemic issue. It concerns what information putative consent-givers should have before they can give morally valid consent to others, and in turn what information putative consent-receivers have a duty to disclose to others.

Experience shows that, this understanding condition can be divided into three mutually exclusive categories of descriptive information, contextual information and trust, where each type of information is sufficient to satisfy the understanding condition.

Information is central for consenting because it constitutes a reason, something that we point to as a justification for the choice we make, demonstrating that we are making that choice and aware of what we are doing. We have descriptive information, contextual information and trust-related information.

Description of an action covers only basic information about the act itself that is sufficient for a rudimentary grasp. It is a basic description of what the agent will undergo, injections, for example.”

This basic understanding does not require that the consent‐giver's beliefs be completely true about the action, but only that they can conceive of a possible action and they consent to an action of this type.

Sometimes our understanding of an action is sufficiently vague that what we know does not give us confidence that would trigger our willingness. Contextual information can compensate for insufficient descriptive information. But contextual information is not the only way to cover this gap.

Trust is another crucial element that often compensates for lack of understanding when making important decisions, such as buying a home, receiving medical treatment, or

So, trustworthiness can also be a type of information that does the same work as descriptive and contextual information in satisfying the understanding condition for valid consent.

Accordingly, the understanding necessary for valid consent can be expressed by the following disjunctive understanding condition: Agent X consents to agent Y for action Z only if (a) either agent X understands a rudimentary description of action Z, or (b) agent X understands the purpose, benefits, and risks of action Z and alternatives to action Z, or (c) agent X understands that agent Y is trustworthy with respect to action Z.

In other words, we have seen that, the responsibility that undergirds the moral force of consent also requires that the act of signifying consent be a knowledgeable one.

That is, for consent to have its force unqualified, it should be informed. The term ‘‘unqualified’’ may mean a number of things. It may be uninformed and irresponsible or it may be ill-informed or misinformed and by virtue of that either fail as consent or have its moral force qualified in some way.

Some people may choose to consent irresponsibly by refusing to inform themselves about the circumstances under which they are giving their consent.

Agent A may consent to enter into a business partnership with agent B without looking carefully at its financial prospects. Even though risk may be part of any such arrangement, the assumption of risk ought to be informed.

One might be equally uninformed and irresponsible when voting for a political candidate. As long as one is eligible to vote and one’s vote is voluntary, it may not matter, so far as the genuineness or the validity of the vote is concerned, if one’s vote is ill-informed. Those who vote irresponsibly may have themselves to blame for its outcome.

In medical contexts, however, there is usually some effort made to ensure that consent is not ill-informed. Institutionally, that now usually requires the signing of a consent form under certain conditions.

Thus, for example, if consent to a medical procedure is to be regarded as valid, it needs to be described in adequate detail and in a language that is familiar to the patient; the costs and risks associated with the procedure need to be made clear and alternatives to the proposed procedure, where available, need to be noted, along with some indication of the prognosis.

Although a morally adequate consent may require less or more than the formalities usually involved in medical consent, the point is that if an onus is to be shifted or obligation is to be assumed, the person whose consent is given ought to understand the nature and ramifications of what he is doing.

Deceptive knowledge failures may affect consent in more than one way. An old legal distinction between ‘‘fraud in the execution’’ and ‘‘fraud in the inducement’’ suggests how disinformation may sometimes negate consent but at other times not do so yet nevertheless provide the consenter with a significant cause for complaint.

On one hand, “fraud in the execution” is a type of fraudulent practice where a party is tricked into taking part in a transaction, often relating to a contract, without understanding the actual nature of what they are getting involved in.

For example, agent A consents to a gynecological examination by agent B, who is her doctor, who, she believes, inserts a vaginal speculum for widening the vaginal walls so that the medical practitioner can examine the vaginal tube and the cervix, while in fact, the doctor inserts his penis for recreational purposes. Call this the second example.

In this first example agent A did consent to therapeutic examination, whereas in fact, it turned out to be recreational sex from the perspective of the doctor’s conduct and intention. Here, there is sexual fraud that goes to the very ‘‘fact’’ of what was done without consent of agent A.

On the traditional account of consent, agent A’s consent in the first example is negated by agent B’s deception, and agent B is guilty of sexual assault.

And on the other hand, “fraud in the inducement” occurs when one party misleads another to enter into a contract, often by providing false information or omitting crucial details.

For example, agent A consents to sexual intercourse with agent B, who is her doctor, after the doctor has deceptively induced her to believe that it will be therapeutically beneficial. Call this the second example.

In this second example agent A did consent to intercourse, albeit falsely believing it to be therapeutic, whereas in fact it was recreational sex from the perspective of the doctor’s intention.

Accordingly, in this second example, only a form of sexual fraud occurs, but no sexual assault occurs. The reason is that, the committed fraud does not go to the very ‘‘fact’’ of what was done, but it concerns circumstances of what was done, which is only a ‘‘collateral matter.’’

However, what might appear to be a clear-cut distinction between these two types of fraud in the first and second example gets muddied in other cases.

Consider the third example, where agent A consents to intercourse with agent B, falsely believing that the man who, in the dark, has slipped into bed beside her is her husband.

Here, there was consent to sexual intercourse, although there was not consent to extramarital intercourse. Agent A was not sexually assaulted but sexually defrauded to consent to extra-marital sex by making her believe that she was consent to marital sex.

Also consider the fourth example, where agent A consents to her first intercourse with agent B having been deceptively induced to believe that the papers she recently signed were marriage documents, while in fact they were not.

Here again, there was consent to sexual intercourse, although there was not consent to extramarital intercourse. Agent A was not sexually assaulted but sexually defrauded to consent to extra-marital sex by making her believe that she was consent to marital sex.

Finally, consider the fifth example, where agent A, who is a prostitute, consented to intercourse with agent B after he deceptively led her to believe that he would pay after sex, but finally did not pay.

Here, agent A, a prostitute, consented to intercourse with agent B after he deceptively led her to believe that he would pay, though he did not. We might view it as simple economic fraud rather than as a sexual offense.

What these examples tend to show is that underlying our judgments about the moral effect of disinformation are normative considerations concerning the seriousness of the deception.

Leaving aside the varied ways in which the laws of different jurisdictions might view such cases, they indicate how normatively charged are our judgments concerning the impact of knowledge deficits.

The Intention Condition: When agent A consents to some action, agent A consents under a certain description.

If agent A consents to agent B’s using his car and agent B uses the car to carry out a bank robbery, it would ordinarily be misleading to say that agent A consented to agent B’s use of the getaway vehicle.

Consent is relatively determinate, and even though agent A did not explicitly exclude the possibility of its use as a getaway vehicle, some conventional expectations can usually be assumed to inform such acts of consent.

In certain circumstances, it will be important to specify fairly precisely what is consented to. If agent A consents to engage in sexual intercourse with agent B, agent A does not thereby consent to risk contracting the STD with which agent B knows herself to be infected.

Agent A may be foolish not to inquire or take some prophylactic precaution, and agent B may be irresponsible in not informing agent A.

But if agent A is aware that agent B is infected but nevertheless proceeds to have sex without a condom, we might want to argue that agent A voluntarily assumed the risk of contracting the STD.

But this would still not amount to consenting to infection with the STD unless agent A stated that it was his intention to contract the STD. What we might say in such a case is that agent A consented to risk contracting an STD.

Though not incoherent, a so-called ‘‘Whatever you wish consent” would ordinarily be seen as either conventionally constrained or as irresponsible.

The ‘‘whatever you wish’’ answer in response to a request that requires permission, is ordinarily bounded by the set of mutual understandings that is implicit in the relationship existing between agent A and agent B.

Even so, a person who consents so generally may have to bear some moral responsibility for the risk that is implicit in giving such free rein to another.

Contact sports pose something of a challenge to what their participants consent to. It can be asserted with some confidence that those who play such sports professionally consent to certain risks inherent in the nature of the sport, and that injuries caused do not constitute either assaults or tortious harms.

But, if the injury is caused as the result of deliberate breach of the rules of the game—such as the ice hockey player who slashes at an opponent’s head with his stick, there is a problem.

It does not seem reasonable to hold that those who have consented to participate in the game have consented to the risks associated with deliberate breaches of the rules.

Political consent, insofar as it can be agreed to have been given, can be particularly treacherous. Except in referenda, which are often stated in fairly precise terms, the usual context for political consent, as given by voting for a party or person, is necessarily open-ended, and we may find our consent abused.

The party that we voted for because it promised not to raise taxes may decide, once in power, to raise taxes. Our consent is not easily withdrawn, given the institutional structures in place to give it effect, though we may wish to argue that the moral ramifications of our consent have been forfeited.

Often, given the unsatisfactoriness of waiting for a next election, our best hope may be to protest the decision and seek to garner enough public support to lead to its revocation. In any case, our consent can be reconsidered and judged misguided or abused.

Political consent and voting are complex in other ways. When I vote for agent C in an election, it will not usually be said that I did not consent to agent D’s election should agent C lose to election agent D.

Those who vote are ordinarily taken to have consented not simply to some particular person’s election but to the outcome of the electoral process. That is what they intend.

What we consent to is a particular decisional process, usually adopted in circumstances in which unanimity is unlikely, in which the outcome binds those who participate in it.

There may be rare situations in which agent A takes the view that if agent C does not win he will not recognize agent D.

But such a person will then have the burden of explaining why he participated in a particular process designed to resolve the issue of representation. One has an option of boycotting the election altogether if only one candidate is deemed acceptable.

Otherwise, the onus will be on agent A to make good his claim that participation did not amount to his consenting to the outcome, and hence to agent D’s election in the event of agent D getting the most votes. In certain cases, that onus can surely be met. It will, nevertheless, be for agent A to meet it.

This raises a further question with regard to those who do not participate in the electoral process. Presuming that participation is freely available to them, that they know of it and of what is at stake, their failure to vote cannot be taken as consenting to its outcome.

At best it amounts to acquiescence, and with acquiescence, as with condonation, there may be some responsibility for the outcome.

But this does not amount to consent, as is recognized by those who lament low participation rates and worry about the extent to which actual political outcomes can truly be said to manifest the ‘‘consent of the governed.’’

The issue of intention also comes into play in discussions about so-called tacit consent. Tacit consent resolves consent into a signifying act that has been detached from that which it is intended to signify.

There is no reason to think that the person who travels freely on the highway consents to the laws of the government within whose jurisdiction the highway is located.

Perhaps such a person, in exchange for the ability to travel freely on the highway, ought to consent to such laws. But having good reason to consent is not to consent.

And perhaps a person who enjoys the benefit of free passage has a duty to obey the laws of a jurisdiction that enables this to be so. But such a duty arises out of other considerations, not because consent to them has been given. It is not that the idea of tacit consent is incoherent. It is coherent, but it is narrowly bounded by intention.

When a person makes no response to the question ‘‘Any objections?’’ when it is asked in relation to a proposal that is to be voted on and we have every reason to think that she heard the question and was capable of responding to it, then her silence can be taken as tacit consent, as distinguished from express consent, to the proposal.

But here the conventions regarding signification are clearly understood. Of course, to remove all possible ambiguity, the person conducting the vote may call for “yes’s” and “no’s” or raising hands. But often that will not be necessary.

There is a question of a deceptively intended consent. If agent A consents to agent B’s request for permission to enter premises and then calls the police to report an intruder, he can not deny that he consented because he intended revenge.

Here, had the proceedings been taped or had agent A given permission in his handwriting, then, barring some exotic set of circumstances, agent A consented to B’s entering the premises.

Summary: We have seen that, agent X is in a position to validly consent to agent B with respect to the performance of action A if and only if X satisfies at least the following three conditions:
  • The competence condition, whereby, agent X’s general cognitive and emotional abilities at the time of consenting are sufficiently mature and they are not at the time of consenting impaired by conditions like being depressed, seriously intoxicated, in excruciating pain, agitated, and irritable, and so on.
  • The knowledge condition, whereby, agent X has sufficient knowledge of all the facts that are relevant to the performance of action A by agent B, such as the purpose of the action, how the action is related to that purpose, and what are the potential benefits and risks of the action.
  • The voluntariness condition, whereby, agent X is not being coerced, unduly persuaded, or manipulated.
Parties affected by consent transaction

Consent affects concerned parties. Concerned parties in the context of consent are the individuals or groups involved in a situation for whom consent is being sought or who are affected by the decision-making process.

These can include the primary subject needing to give consent, but also may include others such as parents or guardians for children, legally appointed representatives, or anyone named by the individual to be consulted, especially if the individual lacks the mental capacity to decide for themselves.

In effect, the doctrine of consent may be put thus: Any act is morally permissible if and only if all competent, suitably informed, and intending concerned parties voluntarily, or can reasonably be predicted to voluntarily, consent.

Put negatively, any act by people that negatively affects others who have not voluntarily agreed to being so affected is an immoral act. Loosely, this may be abbreviated to the following pocket principle: "Don’t do anything to others without their consent."

Generally, negatively stated, the principle of consent stipulates that, so as to enable individuals with disparate aspirations to cohabit peacefully, do not do anything to others without their consent to you, or their expected consent, or what they would consent to if they had sufficient cognitive capacity.

The merit of the principle of consent rests on how we delimit the concept of competence, knowledge, intention, and "concerned parties." The latter term warrants further clarification at this point.

In this regard, I suggest that, anyone suffering or expected to suffer physical adverse effects is a concerned party. Otherwise, one is a concerned party only so long as the actor cannot fulfil her desires without use of the other person or the other person's property. We can call this, the "harm-use" definition of a concerned party.

But, the "harm-use" definition of a concerned party should not be thought to do all the needed moral work. It must be understood within the larger framework of the principle of consent, namely: Any act is morally permissible if and only if all competent, suitably informed, concerned parties voluntarily consent.

But understanding a concerned party within this larger framework creates other worries. For example, the moral condition of agreement among all concerned parties (1) seems to preclude many transactions we are inclined to label morally permissible, and (2) seems to permit actions we are disposed to call immoral.

Consider the following example of the first worry. An association, church, or club ejects one of its members for policy violations. In such a case, the following conditions seem to be met: (i) the act is deemed morally permissible; (ii) the ejected member is a concerned party by the Harm-Use definition; and (iii) the ejected member would not (we can imagine) agree to being ejected if she had any say in the matter.

But the principle of consent would indicate that since the excommunicated member is a concerned party, yet did not consent to such treatment, the action ought to be deemed immoral.

So either the large claim that morality entails agreement among all concerned parties is false, or one of these conditions is not met.

The answer is that condition (iii) is not met, or is at least misleading. The concept of consent is ambiguous. When we speak of consent, we have to distinguish between ex post agreement and ex ante agreement.

For example, when I make the bet, I agree ex ante to pay up if I lose despite my likely ex post disinclination to do so at the time.

Without that ex ante consent, no one would negotiate with me. Similarly, those who enter clubs, churches, and associations take on ex ante agreements to abide by the rules of the club, church, or association, and to accept the consequences for violating them. That they do not agree with the consequences ex post is irrelevant, even though they are concerned parties.

Another example of a case that does not stymy consent theory is that consent theory would seem to outlaw punishment by the state, since no one consents to be born and raised in a state.

The same holds for self-defence case. We normally believe it is permissible to kill those who are about to kill innocents. Killing unprovoked aggressors, however, would be done without the aggressor’s consent, and so consent theory would seem to frown upon self-defence.

The truth of the matter is that, consent theory’s merit is conditional upon the compliance of others. Absent that, all bets are off.

In case the of punishment or retaliation, these are deserved only in the case where the “aggressor” has already violated (in the case of punishment) or is presently in the act of violating (in the case of self-defence) the principle of consent.

Violating the principle of consent entails resigning from the protection the principle of consent normally affords one.

Morality, we should recall, is conditional, not unconditional. There are cases where the conditions fail to apply. The correct response to a defector is defection. Consent theory is not forbidden from saying that.

A more common worry about the principle of consent follows from imagining cases where someone is not deemed to be a concerned party by the Harm-Use criterion yet toward whom we are morally obligated.

Consider the case of helping someone from drowning. If Smith, who is drowning, calls out to Jones for help, and no one else is around, and Jones can save Smith without harm to Jones, and Jones can reasonably predict that no harm to Jones will ensue from Jones’s rescuing Smith, we feel it would be morally reprehensible if Jones nevertheless declines to help, or offers to help only for a fee.

But Smith would not count as a concerned party to Jones’s actions in this case if we rely on the Harm-Use definition. Jones can carry on with his affairs without Smith, and Smith is not made worse off by Jones. Smith is drowning with or without Jones’s presence.

Thus, Smith would not be accorded any moral obligation toward Jones by the principle of consent. So either the principle of consent is wrong, or there is no moral obligation to help, or Smith really is a concerned party to Jones’s action in which case the Harm-Use criterion of a concerned party is flawed.

I short, this clarification shows that not everybody’s consent matters every time and everywhere. To distinguish consent that matters from consent that does not matter, we have seen the following criterion:

Anyone suffering or expected to suffer physical adverse effects as a result of an action is a concerned party to that act. Otherwise, one is a concerned party only so long as the actor cannot fulfil her desires without use of the other person or the other person's property.

If one satisfies this condition on a particular occasion, what he/she says matters. And if one does not satisfy that condition on a particular occasion, what he/she says about that occasion does not matter.

The Scope of Consent

The scope of someone’s consent is the range of actions that they permit by giving consent.

For example, if some one consents to sex, what is the scope of this consent? It could mean consent to vaginal, anal, or oral penetration.

And such consent is only present where someone agrees to that penetration and has freedom and capacity to make that choice.

By appealing to the idea that someone can justify their behavior by appealing to another person’s consent, we can defend the view that consent consists in behavior that expresses a consent-giver’s will for how a consent-receiver behaves.

The ultimate conclusion is that the scope of consent is determined by certain evidence that bears on the appropriate interpretation of the consent.

Formally speaking, the scope of consent depends centrally on the evidence — both the evidence one already has available, and the evidence that would be uncovered by an exercise of due diligence.

In other words, at time t, an action A falls within the scope of the consent that agent X gives to agent Y if and only if:

(i) at time t, agent X gives consent, or prior to time t, agent X has given consent and has not subsequently revoked this consent;

(ii) at time t, the available reliable evidence sufficiently supports the interpretation that X intends their consent-giving behavior to apply to agent Y performing action A; and

(iii) at time t, the enhanced reliable evidence also sufficiently supports this interpretation.

The “available reliable evidence” is the total relevant evidence agent Y has; the “enhanced reliable evidence” is the relevant evidence agent Y would have upon fulfilling their due diligence obligations.

Morality, law, consentability and inconsentability: The limits of valid consent

If agent Y’s performance of action A is consent-independently impermissible, then agent X’s consenting to agent Y’s performance of action A cannot make it permissible.

For example, it can never be the case that there is decisive reason for agent Y to make agent X his slave, or to kill agent X for some trivial reason.

So agent X cannot validly consent to becoming agent Y’s slave or to allow agent Y to kill him for some trivial reason. When an action is consent-independently impermissible we say that it is inconsentable.

If so, when is an action consent-independently impermissible? So far we have seen that, consent plays a unique and critical role in a society that is premised upon individual liberty rights and claim rights.

In such a society, consent is a continuous variable, as opposed to a binary variable, being context-dependent, and incrementally relative.

Thus, the meaning of consent is amorphous and what the law and society deem to constitute consent in one context, would not suffice to constitute consent in another.

Then, the conception of consent as an all or nothing phenomenon where the actions of the parties are considered objectively and statically provides no guidance regarding which acts should be consentable.

Under this new framework, then, we can use the term “consentability” to capture the distinction between those situations where valid consent is possible and, in light of the threat to autonomy interest, those where it is not.

Consentabilitity framework: A popular consentability framework has two major prongs.

The first responds to the question, “Is it possible to validly consent to the proposed activity?”

It concerns the consenting individual and what it means for consent to be valid given the risk an activity poses to that individual.

The hierarchy of autonomy interests examines, not the perceived morality of an activity, but the potential risk to the consenter. People may have additional and specific objections based upon personal beliefs which would be addressed by the second prong of my consentability.

And the second prong of my consentability framework: “Are social harms caused by the proposed activity outweighed by its social benefits?”

Against this framework, it would be suggested that, those who are “desperately poor” are vulnerable to exploitation and predatory solicitations and should not be presumed to have validly consented to any paid transaction involving a high-level threat to autonomy.

This would include paid maternal surrogacy, sex work, and paid kidney transfers. It is unlikely that the voluntariness condition would be sufficiently robust given the threat to autonomy posed by the bodily intrusive activity.

This does not, however, mean that the desperately poor should not be permitted to participate in these types of transactions.

The proposal is that consent given by one who is desperately poor should be presumed defective.

The presumption of defective consent, however, is not the same thing as a void transaction.

Thus, the transaction would be lawful, but the desperately poor consenter can avoid it.

Moreover, the consent seeker must be prepared to rebut the presumption of defective consent.

This position is warranted by the fact that, those who are desperately poor often operate under a “scarcity mindset” which impedes decision making. Thus, flawed decision making is often the result of a person’s circumstances.

The desperately poor are deserving of special protections not because there is anything deficient about the cognitive abilities of someone who is poor, but because anybody would make decision-making errors given similar conditions of scarcity.

It does no good, and much harm, to pretend that severe financial constraints have no effect on decision making.

To ignore the differences that the condition of poverty makes to consent serves to validate unfair terms and perpetuate inequality.

It justifies harms under the guise of free will—and is precisely the reason for a consentability framework.

Also this position is warranted by the fact that, the poor are often taken advantage of precisely because they are poor.

They are exploited because their economic condition leaves them with few choices. It is not solely bodily integrity contracts that are susceptible to opportunism and exploitation.

The groupings in the hierarchy of autonomy interests represent a band or range, and the precise nature or level of the threat depends upon different factors or variables associated with the activity.

The “threat level” thus depends upon “both the nature of the threat and the interest being threatened.”

Also, some purely economic transactions, such as home mortgage loans and employment agreements, pose substantial autonomy risks because they involve economic necessities and impose onerous, long-term obligations.

These types of transactions should also be subject to regulatory safeguards regarding limits on solicitations and substantive “fair terms” because of the high potential for exploitation.

Bodily integrity transactions, however, are sui generis because, unlike purely economic commercial transactions, the act cannot be undone by a court.

A kidney cannot be returned to a deceived transferor the way that a consumer may be allowed to rescind a bad mortgage loan agreement; the bodily intrusion cannot be erased like a debt can be erased.

The scarcity mindset is particularly vulnerable to the skilled manipulation of marketers. Marketers and solicitors may frame offers to take advantage of the cognitive blind spots and impulsivity that the condition of scarcity creates.

This is the reason that the often proposed defective consent presumption in the context of bodily integrity transactions prohibits solicitations.

Then, we can say that, a proposed activity is not consentable if, either (1) it’s not possible to validly consent to it; or (2) the social harms caused by the proposed activity outweigh the social benefits.

In order to determine consentability, an assessment must be made of the type of harm the proposed activity poses to the consenter’s autonomy.

The type, degree, character, and duration of potential harm to autonomy posed by the activity affects how robust each of the conditions of consent must be in order for one to conclude there was valid consent to the activity.

In other words, consent is invalid where the threat to autonomy outweighs the conditions of valid consent.
And consent is valid where the conditions of valid consent outweigh the threat to autonomy.

The following hierarchy of threats to the autonomy interest, being a sliding scale, from mild threat to severe threat, applies: property restrictions, waiver of rights, non-forceful physical compulsion, and bodily integrity/harm to mind or body.

Along this scale, the factors to consider at each step are as follows:
  • Property restrictions: duration of restriction. types of restriction, type of property, alternative compensation for restriction.
  • Waiver of rights: duration of waiver, type of right/importance, likelihood of exercising right, availability of alternatives to waiver.
  • Non-forceful physical compulsion: duration of compulsory service or exposure, condition or nature of threat, degree of physical exertion or offensiveness, alternatives (degree of difficulty to avoid)
  • Bodily integrity/harm to mind or body: duration, impact/severity (permanent/reversible), pain, availability of alternatives to bodily harm.
The hierarchy of autonomy interests distinguishes activities based upon their threat to individual autonomy.

For example, consenting to a kiss requires less robust conditions than consenting to sex.

The greater the risk associated with the activity, the more certain we want to be that consent was given—and so the more robust must be the conditions of consent.

When it comes to applying the framework, we can conceptualize two guiding principles: the Regret Principle and the Opportunism Corollary.

The Regret Principle considers, and seeks to avoid to the extent possible, severe regret on the part of the consenter.

It seeks to improve the conditions of consent and discourages people from engaging in acts which they will profoundly regret because these acts will have diminished their future autonomy.

The Opportunism Corollary prevents those who knowingly harm or take advantage of others from benefitting from their opportunistic conduct.

It recognizes the mutuality of human interactions involving consent and thus applies to the conduct of both parties in a consent scenario.

Under this framework, autonomy is defined as the freedom to move, act or think without assistance or constraint.

Accordingly, the term "consentability" has two different meanings. The first involves moral possibility.

Consentability as moral permissibility: An act which is consentable means that it is possible for there to be consent given the nature of the proposed activity. The nature of the act itself makes us question the validity of the consent.

We believe that something went awry in the decision-making process—that there was some type of coercion involved, a lack of information about what the activity entailed, or some other defect in the decision- making process.

We suspect, in other words, that given what the activity entails, nobody would really want to participate.

Consentability as legal permissibility: The second meaning of consentability involves legality. An act which is consentable is legally permitted.

To this extent, consentability allows us to understand why the law permits individuals to consent to some activities but not others.

Certain acts are simply not permitted and so one is not allowed to consent to them. These activities include paid sex work, selling one’s organs, human trafficking, slavery and consenting to exploitation.

Generally, consentability refers to the concept of whether a person should be allowed to consent, addressing the ethical and legal boundaries of agreement, especially for vulnerable individuals or in high-risk situations.

The concept argues that consent is not fixed but is context-dependent and subject to limits based on factors like cognitive limitations, vulnerability, economic pressures, the potential for harm, and the changing nature of agreement over time.

In short, the possibility of valid consent is essential to consentability but it is not sufficient.

Consentability is thus determined by assessing the effect of an activity upon both the individual and society.

Limits of citizen-state interactions: Generally, the limits of consent represent an attempt to strike a balance between individual freedom and the interests of the State.

So, we need a framework for evaluating consentability that recognizes the integrality of consent with respect to the hard cases regarding consentability.

These hard cases illustrate the complexities of consent. They involve physically intrusive acts, exposure to grave bodily injury, or transgressions of custom and social norms.

These acts elicit unease and often stronger reactions, such as shame, fear, anger, contempt or disgust. They generally fall under one of three categories.

The first category consists of “self-directed" activities, such as suicide or body modifications.

The second category, "bodily integrity exchanges," consists of activities which involve the body on an intimate or personal level.

They pose varying degrees of risk of harm but the risk is generally considered acceptable.

The basis for the objection to the activity is not that the risk is unreasonably high, but that the commercialization of the exchange or activity is morally objectionable because it commodifies the body.

This category includes surrogacy contracts and kidney sales. The third category encompasses activities which involve a high-risk of serious bodily injury or death.

The purpose of the activity is not to harm oneself but to achieve some other objective through a dangerous or highly risky undertaking.

Examples of these high-risk activities include participating in an experimental study or a dangerous maiden voyage or quest, such as a mission to Mars.

Consentbaility of abortion: The difficulty of consensus on how to assess the relevant factors in determining consentability can be demonstrated by using the issue of abortion as an example.

Society recognizes that one has a duty to undergo a “high-threat” level act, such as pregnancy and childbirth, for the benefit of another. To donate a kidney to save the life of another is another example of this kind.

One side supporting reproductive rights, will support the right to an abortion because they believe that the woman carrying the fetus is an autonomous being with autonomy rights and the fetus is not. Accordingly, abortion is a matter involving women’s health, not fetal rights.

Another side may disagree, but their disagreements are based upon religious beliefs regarding when life begins. They are not based upon what is factually known now, which is that a fetus is wholly dependent upon the woman and lacks autonomy.

There are undeniable physiological differences between a fetus and a baby—a fetus depends entirely upon the woman to survive and a baby can survive outside the womb and has independently functioning organs.

In other words, disagreements about abortion are essentially disagreements involving religious beliefs.

In a diverse and secular society, the state should not restrict one person’s autonomy, especially where doing so poses a high level threat to autonomy, because it offends another’s religious beliefs.

That is the very essence of autonomy—the freedom to make decisions and act according to one’s desires so long as those beliefs do not harm the autonomy interest of another. This presupposes that the other is an autonomous being.

Consentability and contractibility: Closely related to the issue of consentability is that of contractibility. If paid organ transfers are consentable thenshould they also be contractible?

Contractibility raises disturbing questions where the subject matter of the contract involves a bodily intrusive activity, such as a paid organ transfer.

How would such a contract be enforced? If, for example, X agrees to sell her kidney to Y, and then later changes her mind, can Y specifically enforce the contract? Could Y sue X for monetary damages?

The answer to the first question is obviously no. Courts generally do not specifically enforce services contracts because doing so raises the specter of involuntary servitude.

The law does, however, permit monetary damages for their breach. But the idea of allowing Y to sue X—someone who was willing to sell her kidney for money—for monetary damages seems distasteful, even coercive. One mightthink that paid kidney transfers should be consentable but not contractible.

Yet, refusing to recognize a contract—and the legal protection that it provides—would leave the consenter too vulnerable given the acts that must be performed

While consent is a prerequisite for all contracts, a contract is not a prerequisite for consentable activities. Consent is dynamic and may shift when the context and the relationship changes.

Consent can usually be withdrawn freely. For example, X may consent to engage in an activity with Y but may withdraw such consent at any time typically without repercussions. The exception is where X has signed a contract with Y to engage in the activity.

It is contractibility that is at the heart of the concerns raised by those who ask how to address the gendered power imbalance in prenuptial agreements given “different issues of power, involving factors like unpaid care, domestic labour, changing circumstances, and career sacrifice.

Thus, prenuptial agreements raise many of the same consent related concerns as bodily integrity contracts and the same types of safeguards could alleviate or diminish many of the concerns about exploitation by fortifying the conditions of consent and limiting the effect of the agreement.

5. A THEORY OF POLITICAL CONSENT AND OBLIGATION

In light of the above said, political consent is an act granting permission to a government to proceed in making and implementing laws.

It implies some commonality of interest between those giving and those receiving consent, but it does not necessarily connote approval of particular laws and policies.

On this view, consent requires evidence of benefits from membership in the polity and that acceptance of those benefits obligates citizens to perform the duties expected of members.

Most classical political theory concerns itself with consent to a regime, but more recent theorists include in their compass both general consent and consent to a specific course of action.

In either case, willing obedience to law is most likely when the law emanates from a voluntary agreement of the interested parties or is imposed by an authority which is held to be legitimate and therefore meets with compliance.

Otherwise, dissent or resistance is an option originating from "unhappy slaves" as opposed to "happy slaves." The former are individuals who do not agree to participate in a social system that is morally unacceptable, while for the latter the issues that the morality of the relationship that consent entails do not necessarily matter.

This means that, while consent is essential to legitimate government, citizens have the right to rebel against unjustified authority.

The linked themes of consent and dissent to government have been major subjects in political theory since 5000 BC.

The most relevant argument for empirical theorists concerned with assessing when government might expect more or less compliance from the people comes from theories of justice.

It is an argument about rational individuals who seek to be able to defend their actions to others by an appeal to having behaved fairly; and of institutional arrangements that give them confidence that they, in turn, have been treated fairly by the government demanding their compliance.

These are the principles and rules that are capable of forming the basis of free agreement among people seeking agreement on reasonable terms. These are procedural requirements.

On this view, a standard for evaluating the legitimacy of government authority is this: To the extent that the major institutions conform to the demands of justice as impartiality they are legitimate. This means that the members of the society can justifiably demand the cooperation of others in maintaining those institutions.

What it means for a government to conform involves procedures that ensure adequate dispersal of information about the effects of a policy, recognition and due consideration in the decision-making process of the interests of all concerned actors regardless of social identity, and impartial implementation.

Essential institutions are education, health, media, electoral management bodies, and other institutions that ensure the possibility of good information and relatively equal access to government.

Justice as impartiality is not available to every society as an operative criterion for institutional design. Where social war rages, might, and not justice, defines policy.

Where a powerful group can enforce rules that enslave or disadvantage individuals on the basis of ascriptive or cultural characteristics, injustice prevails.

The prerequisites of a society that meets the high standard of justice as impartiality are widespread commitments not only to the avoidance of conflict, and, if possible, the achievement of consensus but also to equality among citizens.

A society that lacks these conditions may be operating according to prevailing beliefs about the meaning of justice but not according to justice as impartiality.

What all this does have to do with explaining behavioral consent is this: compliance by citizens is a quid pro-quo for services provided by government.

That is, voluntary compliance in democracies requires that quid pro quo plus fair and impartial treatment by government actors and by citizens of each other.

Then, it seems reasonable to assume that citizen approval of a policy a necessary precondition to evoking a sense of obligation that would promote consent.

However, although consent is important, it is not sufficient. The condition of sufficiency is that the people’s perception should be such that government actors and other citizens are behaving according to widespread notions of justice. More concretely, what is required is for citizens to have confidence in the fairness of government.

To trust government to be just is to possess the expectation that government decisions will result from a process that represents and seriously considers all of the relevant interests; that government actors will keep the spirit of their policy promises; and that government actors will implement the policy non-discriminatorily. This is an ideal of justice as impartiality.

This is not the whole story, however. Citizen obligations are activated only where compliance produces presumptive goods. These are indispensable goods which are necessary for an acceptable life for all members of the community.

The list includes collective goods such as national defense, law and order, protection from a hostile environment, and provisions for satisfying basic bodily needs.

Free-riding on the bus or tram, jay-walking, smoking in a nonsmoking underground station, speeding, and other such offenses, while indicative perhaps of a certain breakdown of social order, are not necessarily indicative of a decrease in consent.

On the other hand, non-compliance with conscription, taxation, and social security regulations most definitely are. Interestingly, many case studies reveal a greater propensity toward behavioral consent when the presumptive benefit is clearer. As a rule, wartime armies evoke volunteering at a much higher rate than do peacetime armies.

Second, there is an implicit understanding of ethical reciprocity among citizens as well as between citizens and government.

Consent requires that an individual believe not only that she is obliged to comply but also that others are or should be obliged to comply too.

When she has evidence of widespread non-compliance, she has two possible responses. Either, she herself may no longer feel obligated to comply, or she may feel she has the right to compel the compliance of others. Several case studies have provided evidence of both reactions.

Both reactions conform with obligations that derive from principles of fairness. Fairness becomes the normative justification for both individual non-compliance and, equally important, for calling on central government to enforce the compliance of others.

In short, if a norm is defined as an informal rule that defines appropriate behavior in a particular context so as to promote collective benefits then contingent consent depends on two different norms of fairness.

The first establishes the standards of fairness by which a citizen evaluates the behavior of government and its trustworthiness. The second defines when members of a community should ethically reciprocate with each other.

In conclusion, then, although this claim on the supremacy of government by consent, now occupies a virtually hegemonic position in the modern political thought, it has gained that position only quite recently.

For most of human history, this idea of government by consent contended with major rivals, such as the rule by the holy, rule by the wise and rule by the divine right of kings, but finally it emerged the winner.

Derivatively, then, the notion of the "consent of the governed" is a two-pronged political concept, in that, it has a political authority arm and political obligation arm.

Under "political authority" arm, the "consent of the governed" means that, the state has the right to exercise political power only over those who consent to its rule.

And under "political obligation" arm, the "consent of the governed" means that, people are obliged to obey the state only if they consent to do so.

To this extent, the notion of the "consent of the governed" is the common answer to the two related questions, namely: “why does the state have authority?” and “why are people obliged to obey they state?”

Generally, the idea of government by consent, also known as popular sovereignty, as opposed to absolute sovereignty, posits that a government's legitimacy and moral right to use state power are only justified and lawful when derived from the consent of the people it governs.

In other words, the idea of government by consent refers to the permission citizens grant to government officials, to occupy political offices and perform key state administration functions in the name, and on behalf, of the people.

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5. DEMOCRACIES AND CONTINGENT CONSENT

In the political domain, contingent consent is a citizen's decision to comply or volunteer in response to demands from a government only if she perceives government as trustworthy and she is satisfied other citizens are also engaging in ethical reciprocity.

A trustworthy government is a necessary but insufficient condition for large-scale contingent consent. Although the perception of a trustworthy government might explain the choices of some individuals, its effects will be significantly enhanced by the additional presence of ethical reciprocity.

If most other citizens are nonreciprocal, even though government appears trustworthy, then the possibility of contingent consent is remote.

An assessment of costs and benefits also influences the decision to comply, but they are not the only consideration of contingent consenters.

Even when short-term material self-interest would make free-riding the individually best option, the contingently consenting citizen still prefers to cooperate.

However, if the costs of compliance become too high, then a cost-benefit calculation will probably trump other considerations.

Contingent consent encompasses quasi-voluntary compliance, which involves compliance with a law when the actor chooses to comply but faces punishment if caught not complying, for example, tax paying or complying with conscription.

However, contingent consent is a broader category, for it also includes compliance and volunteering not required by law, for example, voluntary military service or donations of blood.

Contingent consenters fit an account of "citizens as ethical actors" with each citizen as an individual with her own unique hopes and desires who is at the same time joined with others, part of and continually giving shape to a common social and political life.

Given a set of ethical standards about what makes a government just and what is involved in being fair, contingent consenters are those individuals who want to act ethically, who would like to contribute to the collective good, all things being equal, but who will do so only under certain contingencies.

The model of contingent consent implies a relationship that requires ongoing sustenance. It involves give and take, trust, and knowledge between those being asked to consent and those doing the asking. It is both fragile and resilient.

Consent withers easily, but it sometimes withstands gale force winds. The strength of ethical reciprocity among citizens and their confidence and trust in government determine the durability of consent.

From the model of contingent consent emerge the following hypotheses to explain variation in compliance:

(1) The more trustworthy citizens perceive government to be, the more likely they are to contingently consent to its policies and, therefore, comply.

(2) The larger the proportion of citizens contributing from a given population, the more likely others from that population will also contribute.

(3) Government policy makers, their supporters, and their opposition will devote resources to disseminating information about the trustworthiness of government and the probability of ethical reciprocity among the relevant population.

The following sections elaborate the reasoning behind these hypotheses.

Government trustworthiness: To make an evaluation of government trustworthiness, citizens consider, one, the history of and present capacity of government actors to make credible commitments about the use of their contributions and, two, government's procedures for making and implementing policy.

The more a government is capable of credible commitments and the more its procedures meet prevailing standards of fairness, the more trustworthy that government will seem.

Both credible commitments and procedures are largely functions of institutional arrangements.

Institutions are composites of rules and incentives that structure social interactions and whose existence and applicability are commonly known within the relevant community.

Institutions, so defined, structure the individual choices of strategic actors so as to produce equilibrium outcomes, that is, outcomes that no one has an incentive to alter.

The rules have this effect because they convey expectations about sanctions, opportunities, and the behavior of others. This information then enables each actor to make an informed strategy choice.

In principle institutions are distinct from organizations. Institutions are the rules of the game and organizations the players and their strategies.

All institutions are embodiments of rules, all have a legalistic aspect, and all possess enforcement mechanisms.

They are considered political institutions when the state enforces the rules, social institutions when enforcement is through mechanisms such as approval and shunning, and economic institutions when enforcement is by means of profit and loss.

Institutional arrangements for promoting credible commitments: Credible commitments depend on institutions that ensure that transgressors will be punished.

In polities under rule of law, government use of public coffers or citizen armies for illicit purposes can lead to jail sentences, fines, and other direct and tangible penalties.

Corrupt governments are certainly likely to undermine contingent consent, but an even more common problem for democracies is creating institutions that ensure the credible commitments of government officials to protect minority interests.

Elected government officials may face the punishment of defeat in the next election if they break promises to the majority,6 but the threat of electoral reprisal seldom safeguards a minority, especially if they are in a different political party or not an active part of the electorate.

Another source of credible commitments is reputational mechanisms, both bilateral and multilateral, that create relatively reliable expectations about the behavior of others. They can be very important in accounting for cooperation within large democracies.

Legislative institutions structure the relations among the legislators and between legislators and the executive so that they become repeat transactions among individuals who bargain with each other over a variety of quite distinct issues.

This creates the possibility of long-term interactions that depend on continued confidence that one's bargaining partner is trustworthy.

The relations between street-level bureaucrats and clients can take on similar characteristics. Corporatist relations among unions, employer groups, and government agencies can also promote cooperation, at least for a time.

However, even among those for whom a reputational mechanism would suffice and especially for those for whom it would not, there may still need to be enough common knowledge to produce sufficient trust and confidence for individuals to undertake the risk of cooperation.

Common knowledge can result from a preliminary game or set of communications, from shared values, or from networks of social embeddedness.

Punishment cannot occur unless the offense is evident, however. Monitoring of government officials is sometimes difficult, and even more difficult is citizen determination of the appropriateness of official behavior in the face of problems citizens may not adequately understand.

Thus, the next problem is credible information. Within contemporary democracies, institutional arrangements that ensure credible information require the establishment or protection of third parties for whom the incentives are to monitor government actors and citizens and then to reveal all.

Such are the institutions of the independent judiciary, legislative oversight committees, public hearings, and free press. Together, they provide more reason for faith that commitments will be kept or, at least, that transgressions will be discovered and punished.

On the other hand, the easy availability of information may make it harder to maintain contingent consent over time.

For example, media revelations of government corruption or secrecy, public debates and inquiries, and regulations affecting accountability have made the normal behaviors of government officials a matter of public and moral concern.

It has also become more difficult to prevent one group of actors from knowing about the behavior of another group of actors. So, taxpayers soon enough learn about tax evaders.

Those playing by the official rules of the welfare system soon learn how "to play the game." The effect is to undermine the credibility of government in its commitment to enforce contributions.

Fair policy-making and implementation processes: In both contingent consent and contingent refusal to consent, the assessment of the actual policy can make a difference.

However, in most cases citizens are willing to go along with a policy they do not prefer as long as it is made according to a process they deem legitimate, and they are less willing to comply with a policy they like if the process was problematic.

Contingent consent in modern democracies is constructed around three possible criteria of fairness. The first concerns an equitable principle of participation in the making of the policy.

If a group perceives that its voice is systematically ignored, it will not accept the policy-making process as fair. The second has to do with outcomes and equity.

A policy that some of the population perceives as discriminatorily harmful is likely to be considered unfair and unjust. The third emphasizes procedural justice as a universalistic principle.

A policy that is enforced discriminatorily is likely to be considered unfair. These are not universal norms, however.

What is understood as inequitable participation, discriminatorily harmful, procedurally unjust, or nonreciprocal varies across time, place, and group.

The process by which policy is made, the collective good to be achieved, the anticipated contributions of government actors and citizens, and the estimate of any private benefits are all part of citizen considerations of what it means for a policy to be fair.

The crucial ingredients, however, are the extent to which citizens feel that their arguments are considered in the policy debate; the delineation of circumstances under which citizens are willing to contribute lives, labor, goods, and money to government or in some other way cede power to government over their persons and purses; and the belief in the relative evenhandedness of government administration of those obligations.

Much of the history of democratic and responsible governance is the history of the search for institutions that provide voting minorities with a means to block majoritarian policies that harm them.

Institutions and government actions may prove insufficient, however, to overcome distrust based on recent experiences of government untrustworthiness or on cultural beliefs, expectations about the credibility or trustworthiness of others based on group membership.

Culturally based distrust does not constitute a freestanding ideology. It draws on concrete historical events to differentiate in-group from out-group members, the trustworthy from the untrustworthy.

When a cultural identity is triggered, it usually generates an important and non-universalistic set of views concerning appropriate collective goods and standards of fairness.

Ethical reciprocity: Ethical reciprocity is a norm requiring that individuals in a given population cooperate with government demands but only as long as others are also contributing.

Key to ethical reciprocity is a definition of the population of those to whom each member should behave fairly.

This population may encompass all citizens in the country or even world, or it may encompass only those with certain shared attributes, such as religion, race, or political ideology.

Sometimes ethical reciprocity evokes mutual cooperation in support of the government, and sometimes it evokes mutual cooperation in opposition to the government, reducing the likelihood of compliance.

When there is no ethical reciprocity, there is less likelihood of contingent consent and compliance.

When some members of a population feel ethical obligations only to a small subset of the others or when there is conflict about whether to cooperate with the government, compliance is correspondingly reduced.

Contingent consent is not possible without confidence that other citizens will keep their side of the agreement. Once such confidence in others breaks down, so does contingent consent.

Contingent consenters are strategic but ethical actors; they want to cooperate if others are also cooperating.

They have a prior commitment to an ethical position of fair play combined with a perception of the extent to which others who presumably share that position are cooperating with each other or free-riding.

Thus, ethical reciprocity is distinct from both reciprocity for mutual advantage, a matter only of tit for tat, and social pressure, a question of selective incentives.

Ethical reciprocity rests on a desire to behave fairly and is reinforced by evidence that others are doing their part. It has more of the structure of an assurance than a prisoner dilemma's game.

Small communities are arguably the best locus of mechanisms that provide information and assurances at the lowest cost.

The relationships of a community produce the long time horizons, cross-cutting and repeat interactions, and mutual knowledge that in turn promote conditional cooperation or nice tit for tat.

Dependence on the community and fear of possible exclusion from its benefits encourages cooperation. Such sanctions are relatively inexpensive and endogenous to the community, requiring no construction of a centralized state apparatus.

In large polities, however, individuals often find themselves in situations where they would benefit from cooperation with those about whom they have very imperfect information.

This is possible only to the extent that they can have confidence that they will not be exploited by those they trust. One response, of course, is to refrain from taking the risk and to trust only those within a relatively small network.

Others search for mechanisms that will enable them to cooperate with people outside their group. Community accountability and reputational mechanisms, both bilateral and multilateral, produce institutions that can solve this dilemma.

Community accountability was a common practice in Republican Rome, which relied on the gens to collect taxes and in medieval England, where villages were held responsible for contracts made by any of their members.

Community accountability is also quite viable for citizens with strong religious or ethnic ties; the social pressures on them to conform can be quite strong.

However, as distinct villages and regions with distinct laws and traditions evolve into a nation, the salient reference group for ethical reciprocity increasingly becomes the whole society rather than the particular cultural group of birth.

Not all agree, of course, but a generalized ethical reciprocity has increasingly become the norm in democratic nation states, at least when it comes to paying taxes or going to war.

Governmental institutional arrangements designed to provide incentives and to facilitate monitoring and enforcement can also promote contingent consent.

Under some circumstances institutional arrangements exist that make normative and instrumental motivations operate in the same direction; government enforcement of compliance assures those considering contingent consent that they will not be suckers.

To the extent such institutions affect behavior by influencing the relative costs and benefits of compliance, they contribute to opportunistic obedience.

To the extent government coercive capacity assures potentially supportive citizens that there will, in fact, be relative equality of sacrifice, governmental institutions contribute to contingent consent.

Socially provided information: Citizen compliance is in response to government actions; a government demand for contributions, cooperation, or obedience engenders the choice to comply.

However, the decision to contingently consent does not occur in a social and political vacuum. Estimates of government trustworthiness and the likely behavior of other citizens derive from a combination of personal observations and information provided by acquaintances, media, and organizations.

Although government actors may be aware that the behavior of each depends on evidence that others are complying or volunteering, this does not necessarily lead to suppression of information about noncompliance.

The state might reveal widespread citizen (or corporate) noncompliance as a side effect of its efforts to demonstrate its enforcement power. Or the press might make revelations as the side effect of getting a story.

Moreover, the media has incentives to uncover government corruption or secret policies and to report public inquiries and debates; libel and other laws make it increasingly difficult to turn pure fiction into fact.

We live in a relatively high information society in which it is hard not to know about the behavior of government officials and other citizens. So taxpayers soon enough learn about tax evaders and conscripts about draft dodgers.

Political and cultural organizations can also affect perceptions of the trustworthiness of government and of the extent of ethical reciprocity.

Churches, mosques, and other places of worship can provide assurances about the behavior of others and, at the same time, influence evaluations of government policy-making.

Charismatic leaders, nationalists, and self-serving entrepreneurs can also serve that role. Often, the individuals who distrust government or other groups in their society are not the same individuals who had the relevant experiences.

The Bosnians, Serbs, and Croats who are slaughtering each other in the twentieth century inhabit a material and political world quite different from that of the ancestors upon whose history they draw.

Crucial to the political salience of their beliefs are, first, re-stimulation of past grievances by the experience of new grievances; second, organizations and entrepreneurs who mobilize people around those cultural memories, long past and recent; and, third, the absence (or destruction) of institutions that protected their particular interests.

Of course, the interpretation of cultural experiences and events is colored by the teller of the tales.

Indeed, tellers of the tales are crucial for effectively activating cultural identity and consequent antagonism to the government and other sets of citizens.

6. ALTERNATIVE CITIZEN’S COMPLIANCE MODELS

There are three alternative models of compliance. In each, institutions and organizations provide information, but the salient information is different. From these models are derived alternative hypotheses for explaining consent. The alternative models of compliance are:
  • Habitual obedience: The more developed the habits of conformity, the more compliance.
  • Ideological obedience: The more strongly and widely held are ideological positions in support of a particular policy, the more compliance.
  • Opportunistic obedience: The greater the marginal benefit to each individual from compliance, the more compliance.
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Habitual obedience: A custom is a regular and normatively acceptable course of action, which may become consensual but was not necessarily established by conscious voluntary agreement. It cannot be overstressed that the mere habituation to a mode of action, the inclination to preserve this habituation, and much more so, tradition, have a formidable influence in favor of a habituated legal order."

Customary obedience may be a consequence of tradition, habits of obedience, or following the crowd, but even the most traditional, habit bound, or fashion-sensitive actor might change with new stimuli or information.

If what appears to be customary obedience is actually a response to social pressure or legal coercion, customary obedience is actually incentive-based behavior.

If customary obedience is in response to reinforcement, it becomes obedience to a social norm, that is, a rule that regulates behavior by means of sanctions. Reliance on norms may enable an individual to avoid excessive calculations.

Nonetheless, such reliance renders the model of customary obedience consistent with models derived from rational choice and most particularly the model of opportunistic obedience described below.

To the extent that this is the case, customary obedience will be subsumed by opportunistic obedience. Customary obedience is not readily susceptible to investigation through historical case studies.

Thus, it will not be directly subject to falsification. To the extent that the other hypotheses fail to account for compliance and to the extent that a story of conformity appears to fit the facts, then custom or habit will emerge as the explanation.

Ideological consent: The second alternative model posits that the causes of compliance are ideological or moral principles that motivate people to comply with - or resist - government demands with little regard to individual selective incentives. At its most extreme, a principled commitment is not affected by what others do; it is a personal moral code that drives behavior.

The nature of the collective good is usually what matters, but for some ideological consenters or refusers the evaluation of the nature of the government itself may be important.

For example, both the Black Panthers and the Freemen reject the laws of the United States as emanating from an illegitimate government.

American Quakers, on the other hand, believe they have political obligations to uphold U.S. law in general, but in the case of war their political obligation is outweighed by the moral obligation to refrain from killing.

Thus, they will not comply with conscription, but they will pay their taxes, respect the police and courts, and even serve in dangerous wartime positions.

The only factors that cause behavioral change are changes in the definition of what constitutes moral duty or in the policies of the government to more closely approximate what the ideologically motivated actor believes is right.

For example, a change in religious or political identity may affect compliance; thus, joining the Klu Klux Klan in the 1940s, the Weathermen in the 1960s, or one of the militant militias in the 1990s bolsters tendencies toward noncompliance and even terrorism.

On the other hand, the abolitionist, suffragist, and anti-apartheid movements lost their raisons d'etre with the elimination of policies to which they objected.

The most parsimonious explanation of variation in compliance is variation in ideological or principled commitment to a particular policy.

This is a hard variable to measure since it is an internal motivation; attitudes and values, even when captured by surveys and the like, do not always correlate with behavior.

Thus, ideology, as in the case of habit, is often a residual. However, patriotism, pacifism, anarchism, and many other -isms are powerful motivators for some people in some places and at some times.

Opportunistic obedience: Incentives also provide a parsimonious explanation. The costs and benefits of actions are usually both observable and measurable and thus are the most straightforward source of explanation for behavioral variation.

Indeed, the usual rational choice expectation is that aggregate compliance will vary with individual costs and benefits.

Opportunistic obedience is compliance due to fear of sanctions or promise of inducements. Opportunistic disobedience is noncompliance motivated by expectations of net gains from law-breaking.

Variations in obedience and disobedience are a function of the combination of selective incentives and mechanisms of monitoring and enforcement.

They are the effect of material self-interest, that is, a utility function that includes only tangible benefits and costs to oneself and, possibly, a small group of significant others such as family and close friends.

Opportunistically obedient and disobedient citizens are indifferent to the collective good to which they are being asked to contribute, and neither ethical nor strategic considerations influence their behavioral choices.

Differences between democratic and nondemocratic institutions: Increased democratization facilitates the ability of citizens to act and fundamentally changes the constraints on governmental actors.

The difference in the number of political moves illustrates the difference between democratic and nondemocratic institutions.

In the nondemocratic move, the political game has only three political moves. First, the government chooses a policy that the polity views as fair or one the polity views as unfair. Second, the populace chooses to comply or to refuse to comply.

Third, the government chooses to uphold its agreements if the polity complies or to punish the refusers who do not comply.

In the democratic political tree, there are four political moves. In this case, the electorate can sanction the government if it disapproves its second move.

By providing citizens with a variety of effective means for sanctioning government actors, democratic institutions create a new basis for cooperation between government officials and citizens.

They make possible credible commitments by government actors and thus reduce citizen concerns that government actors will break their policy promises.

The effect is to increase the probability that citizens will approve governmental regulations and obey them.

Points out, you will not trust government to do on balance what is expected of it if you do not trust that it will be thrown out of power if it does not do on balance what is expected of it.

The threat of citizen sanctions are not enough, however, to produce policy change compatible with citizens' interests.

In numerous countries in quite recent years, antagonism toward various economic austerity measures has produced campaign promises but not necessarily policy delivery - and without severe consequences for those elected officials who broke the promises.

It may be the case that the elected officials have succeeded in gaining citizen trust by persuading citizens that the policy in fact reflects a common interest.

If so, then something more is involved than the institutional arrangements permitting sanctions. Signaling, persuasion, and other acts by politicians are making a difference.

The ability of the prime minister to win some trust from the francophones was certainly a factor in accounting for their increased compliance in World War II, and the reverse may have been a factor in the number of votes against conscription in Australia during the World War I. Thus, politics as well as institutions matter.

Experience: The introduction of new actors into the political process changes the location of the median voter and the median legislator and thus may lead to alterations in policy without any overt pressure.

However, democratic institutions and democratic ideology may actually mold preferences. At the least, democratic ideology establishes grounds for evaluating perceived government actions and the actions of other citizens.

At the most, democratic institutions constrain behavior until the available alternatives become what people effectively demand.

Once-common American practices such as slavery, discrimination against women, smoking, and guntoting have become either beyond the pale or, at the least, socially questionable.

Consequently, certain possibilities become unthinkable; there develop what Tetlock, Peterson, and Lerner label "taboo tradeoffs in press and Walzer calls blocked exchanges.

For example, the sale of human beings, the sale of offices, and the purchase of substitutes for military service or jail time are no longer within the realm of legal, ethical, or even cognitive except possibly for economists possibility.

The democratic element in democratic institutions may have the effect of changing preferences in regard to what constitutes fair influence over government, equitable policies, or standards of behavior for governmental actors. What begins as a norm of the few becomes the norm for the many. What is becomes what ought.

Experience with a policy and evidence of its distributional impact are not always sufficient to create a demand for change. In the absence of an altered standard of fairness, no reform is likely to emerge.

However, sometimes experience reveals and, in the process, even alters the norms of fairness themselves.

Thus, voluntary military service appeared fair to most of the populace of Anglo-Saxon democracies at the onset of World War I until it became evident that it produced little equality of sacrifice.

Severe punishment of conscientious objectors appeared reasonable until a few principled martyrs revealed the illiberalism of such legislation.

Experience is most likely to produce change when an individual believes he is being asked to pay a high price when others do not.

This was an explicit concern of those who rioted against the Civil War drafts. There is also evidence that French recruits perceived unfairness during the levee en masse, the Napoleonic conscriptions, and after 1848.

In both cases, the ideology of democracy at the least reinforced and may even have contributed to the creation of these perceptions.

What is particularly interesting in several of the cases is how the standard of fairness that emerges produces a demand for institutions designed to enforce this standard.

In situations in which the majority, or at least a large percentage of the population, feels it should comply and a significant minority do, the majority is more likely to demand rules that compel universal obedience.

This was the case in Canada, where anglophone support of conscription was in part a function of their desire to evoke equal sacrifice from the francophones.

Indeed, the belief in military service as a citizen obligation and the desire to ensure equality of sacrifice provided a basis for support of conscription throughout the democracies.

On the other hand, the study of conscientious objection illustrates how a moral minority, willing to pay the costs of noncompliance, can influence the rules by influencing democratic standards of fairness to permit certain forms of principled dissent.

Noncompliance: One of the major findings of this study is that noncompliance is an important resource of political change, that inherent in the defiance of many rules is not only a threat to social order, but a challenge to the particular pattern of domination on which that social order rests.

Individuals who find themselves badly served by an institution will try to change it, if they can, but not all individuals have the economic, political, or organizational resources that would enable them to engage in successful bargaining with or collective action against the state.

Often, individual - but collectively informed - noncompliance is their best strategy.

Noncompliance can and demonstrably does lead to institutional change. However, even when it is self-conscious withdrawal of or refuse to give contingent consent, it does not always produce the changes sought by the noncompliant.

Perceptions of low volunteering more often became a justification for conscription of these groups rather than a reason to cease demanding their services.

Widespread draft evasion generally leads to a tightening of the rules and an increase in administrative capacity rather than an abandonment of the draft.

On the other hand, armies have reformed in response to the costs of implementing discriminatory policies.

The notion of individual rights has been expanded by conscientious objectors. United States and Australian foreign policy is still influenced by the effects of the Vietnam War experiences; fear of citizen resistance is a strong constraint on war-making and international interventions.

Facilitating ethical behavior by rational actors: Much of the philosophical and sociological literatures treat egoistic interest and ethical standards as in conflict, although there are some important exceptions.

Motivations based on egoistic interest are claimed to drive out motivations based on ethical standards or affect.

This may be true in some circumstances and for some ethical standards, but in many instances of political relevance, ethical standards and egoistic interest are in fact both compatible and mutually reinforcing. Under certain conditions, coercion strengthens ethical standards.

For example, revelation of the explicit enforcement pyramid by regulators seems to encourage agents to act upon ethical standards or to value goals other than egoistic interest.

Third-party enforcement ensures that others are complying; an individual can then choose to comply with more certainty that she is not a sucker.

Coercion strengthens norms when the enforceable rule makes a mandated behavior more commonplace and acceptable, such as was exemplified by the effects of Civil Rights legislation.

The expected behavior becomes both a "statistical" and a "pragmatic" norm. It is behavior that becomes, on the one hand, more usual and, on the other hand, the standard whose violation evokes disapproval.

Positive incentives may have the same effect. Young men volunteer to fight in wars because they are patriots, but this is not to deny the influence of coercion in the form of conscription or incentives in the form of pay and educational benefits.

Single parents and the unemployed comply with the regulations governing extra income because they fear losing benefits if they do not, but their willingness may be strengthened by the belief that it is their obligation to do so.

Even effective tax systems rely on both auditing and voluntary compliance derived from a sense of duty.

Certain kinds of reductions in the costs of compliance or volunteering can further facilitate the mutual reinforcement of ethical standards and egoistic interest.

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7. FINDINGS SUMMARY

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA
, the primacy of consent in our daily lives is so compelling such that, it seems difficult to reconcile its violations with our daily moral intuition about it.

Consent is the main reason for the difference between a theft and a gift, battery and a boxing match, hair shave and assault by a barber, rape and lovemaking, colonialism and self-rule, slavery and employment, or autocracy and democracy.

This way, a transfer of resources, a blow to the face, an act of sex, labor, and a set of laws is viewed very differently depending on the consent of the person acted on.

And yet there is abundant evidence that we, in both the private and public spheres of our daily lives, not only tolerate but routinely endorse coercive measures that forgo consent, and these examples seem equally persuasive.

Drivers are expected to stop at every red light, taxpayers are not exempt from funding public programs of which they do not approve, and the taking of private property by the state is often sanctioned.

Sometimes there are narrow but deep divides about coercion and consent.

But generally, coercion is defined as intentionally compelling someone to a choice at the threat of imposing a penalty for noncompliance. It is intentional in the sense that, the coercer seeks to compel the other.

On this view, a driver who accidentally runs a red light and forces another driver to swerve to avoid collision is not guilty of coercion, although the offender might be guilty of many other things.

On the other hand, consent involves the waiving of rights or entitlements of some kind, say, to one’s body, freedom, or property, where, these consensual acts grant others permission to constrain one’s own actions.

Accordingly, in order for one to make of these conflicting, and seemingly irreconcilable, intuitions and practices, we need a comprehensive framework that accounts for, and provides guidance on, the justifiable use of coercion and the obligation to secure consent.

Such a framework should explain why and when the consent of the freely governed people is preferred to the consent of the coercively governed people.

The right of political authority to coerce citizens is sometimes grounded on the consent of the governed, this being a deontological approach.

At other times, it is grounded by the consequences-based appeal to the general interests and needs of the governed, this being a teleological approach.

Tanzania has a constitutionally defined framework that prefers a deontological approach to a teleological approach.

According to this framework, the source of moral obligation to obey a government is the consent of the freely governed people, as often expressed by voting.

Such a voting exercise can only legitimize coercion as an ex-post intervention by legitimate government for enforcing an ex-ante citizen-state agreement, and not vice versa.

It is against this background, you have met with Samia Suluhu Hassan. In fact, you have met with her at an occasion when the time table for the 2025 general election is under implementation, with Sami being the only presidential candidate, practically speaking.

She has coercively eliminated all rival candidates turning the general elections into a mono-party election process for very obvious reasons, all of which point to one conclusion: she is not fit for the Job of Presidency. To prove this assertion let me highlight some facts.

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  1. Samia has caused the framing of a deceptive election campaign slogan that is meant to extract an invalid consent from the people by reason of the inherent disinformation. The deceptive slogan states that, "Kazi na Utu, Tunasonga Mbele, Chagua Samia, Chagua CCM, Oktoba Tunatiki, Mitano Tena." However, realities on the ground practically indicate that, there is a serious disinformation by reason of intentional omissions in this slogan. As a matter of reality, this slogan should be paraphrased to read as follows: "Kazi na Utumwa, Tunasonga Mbele Kihuni, Chagua Samia, Chagua Ccm ya Wanamtandao, Oktoba Tunatiki Tena Mkataba wa Ukoloni , Mitano Tena kwa Ukoloni Mkongwe."
  2. Samia has caused the co-optation and capture of the judiciary, by forcing it to serially rubber-stamp illegalities, entrench impunity, weaken other oversight institutions, and turning them into major a instrument in the hands of her regimes intent on subverting the checks and balances inherent in a democracy. For example, she has caused the court system to ban Chadema from carrying out any political activities.
  3. Samia has caused the co-optation and capture of the parliament, by forcing it to serially rubber-stamp bad government proposals for legislation in a way that amounts to an attack on national sovereignty. A clear case to prove this claim include the ratification of the DPW treaty that eroded our government sovereignty, parliamentary sovereignty, judicial sovereignty, and territorial sovereignty.
  4. Samia has caused the fusion of the defense and security organs, namely, the People's defense force, the police force, the secret service department and the prison police, contrary to the demands of the national security policy that requires the separation of the functions between military and paramilitary state organs. As a result of this unwarranted fusion, there is no longer any distinction between the military rules of engagement, police rules of engagement, and secret service rules of engagement. The country's security management has been thrown off-base opening doors for extra-judicial operations such as kidnappings and daylight killings of innocent citizens.
  5. Samia has caused the police force to repeatedly engage in brutalities against unarmed civilians,
  6. Samia has caused the prison system to unreasonably detain the main opposition party top leader called Tundu Lissu,
  7. Samia has caused the electoral management body to eliminate Luhaga Mpina the second top contender for the presidential post,
  8. Samia has caused the secret service department to engage in extra-judicial and extra-legal operations leading to state sponsored disappearances of government critiques,
  9. Samia has caused the attorney general's office to file an unwarranted impediment against presidential candidates via the national electoral management body of Tanzania (INECTA),
  10. Samia has caused the office of the DPP to open fake treasonous charges against the main opposition party top leader called Tundu Lissu,
  11. Samia has caused the electoral management body, to impose on political parties general election regulations that are violative of parties political rights, which are constitutionally protected.
  12. Samia has caused the office of the political parties registrar to disqualify the Presidential candidate called Luhaga Mpina,
  13. Samia believes that free speech is for her and her party but not for opposition political parties, and hence an illiberal leader.
  14. Samia believes that no contrary evidence can change her beliefs, and hence a fundamentalist,
  15. Samia believes that the state should punish those with contrary views, and hence a totalitarian leader,
  16. Samia does not recognise the distinction between ferogable and non-derogable rights, hence a primitive and naive leader, and
  17. Samia believes that political opponents should be punished with violence or death, and hence a terrorist minded leader.
  18. Samia has teamed up with the Jakaya Kikwete based deep state and her family to facilitate state capture, akin to what the "Akazu Deep State" in Rwanda, that organized the 1994 genocide and and then commissioned the Interahamwe to implement the plan. The phrase "deep state" is here used to mean a real, unauthorized and secretive networks of powerful agents operating within a government, but independently of its political leadership, and in pursuit of their own agendas, at the expense of the common good of the nation.
  19. And Samia's has turned a deaf ear to the call from the UN human rights experts who were alarmed by pattern of enforced disappearance and torture, of “more than 200 cases," to silence opposition and critics in Tanzania. They issued a statement in June 2025 to condemn these injustices calling upon President Samia to reverse the situation and release all individuals who are under extra-legal detentions. Samia has not cooperated the UN so far.
In short, Samia is serially committing constitutional and legal injustices through the instrumentality of the court system, the police force, the prison, the electoral commission, the secret service department, the attorney general's office, the independent national electoral commission, the office of the DPP, and the office of the political parties registrar.

Going by these ugly realities on the ground, the CCM campaign slogan, quoted above, is practically interpreted by critical political analysts as follows:

In short, for all these reasons, the ongoing election campaign is procedurally defective to an extent that it is littered with unspeakable injustices and conflicts, as opposed to justice and peace.

8. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There are four competing theories that explain the origin of political authority


So far, we have seen that, we can define political authority along the following lines: Person X has political authority over person Y if and only if the fact that X requires Y to perform some action Z gives Y a reason to do Z, regardless of what Z is, where this reason purports to override almost all reasons he may have not to do Z.

But where does this political authority come from? Answering this question involved understanding the kind of authority political rulers have.

Clearly, we have seen, they have authority to make and enforce rules, but these rules can not extend into every area of human life. Their authority does not allow them to make rules in any area of human life. There are limits on the scope of their control over citizens.

Moreover, their authority does have any moral constraints. That is, the rules they generate must have a certain moral content in order to be considered authoritative or binding for citizens.

In other words, citizens are not subject to these rules no matter what their content simply by virtue of their having been commanded by people who have authority over the citizens.

Specifically, there are four theories that attempt, in different ways ,to legitimate and define the extent and nature of political authority. They are the divine authority theory, the natural subordination theory, the perfectionist theory, and the consent-based theory.

Under the divine authority theory, a ruler has legitimate authority to govern people if and only if that authority in some way comes from the authority possessed by God, whose rule over human beings is supposed to be unquestionable.

Of course, where God's authority comes from is an interesting question: Does he rule only because he is supremely mighty so that in God's case, at least, "might makes right" after all?

Or does he rule because he is supremely good, in which case his authority comes from his goodness? Or does he have an authority over us that is somehow fundamental and intrinsic to his nature?

Whatever the explanation of God's authority, the theorist who advocates this view maintains that God's authority (whatever its basis) is in some way the source of any authority that a political ruler possesses over his people.

Historically, there were three basic ways in which a ruler's authority was "derived" from God. First, the ruler could turn out to be God inhuman form. It was not uncommon in the ancient world for rulers to proclaim themselves to have divine status? Call this the "ruler is God" view.

Second, if the people to be ruled would take such a proclamation to be dubious (or blasphemous),the rulers often tried arguing that even though they weren't God, they were (in some way) related to God or had (to some degree or other) divine status, and in this way partook of the divine authority to rule.

There were a number of ways that rulers made this connection with the divine: For example, in Egypt there are written and pictorial documents declaring that any person who is the legitimate king of the people is someone who is the son of a god by union with the royal mother; in Sumeria some kings claimed divine status by calling themselves "husbands of goddesses"; and in both realms kings often claimed they were nourished with divine milk. Call this the "ruler is related to God" view.

But the third and probably most common way that rulers appealed to the divine as a basis for their own authority was to admit their full humanity but argue that they had been given the authority to rule by God.

This view is known as the "divine right" view of political authority. Such a view was invoked in biblical times by rulers of the kingdom of Israel (many of whom were priests and ruled as priests) and in medieval times by the popes of the Christian Church, who argued that by virtue of being God's vicar on earth, they should have not only religious authority but also political authority over all of Christendom.

In early modern times, the kings and queens of European states maintained that it was not the pope but they who had been authorized by God to rule over their particular kingdoms.

Although there are still parts of the world in which some variant of the divine authority theory survives (e.g., in Morocco), in our time this theory of political authority has been largely rejected (so, for example, in today's Britain, no one considers Queen Elizabeth II or her son Charles "little gods"!).

This is, in part, because the beliefs that many modern people hold about religion generally do not support such a theory.

But the theory has also been rejected by many devoutly religious people, and many religious people in the seventeenth century were among its most prominent critics.

Aside from shifts in religious views, there are two reasons why the theory's popularity has plummeted.

First, the claim to divine authority is empty, in the sense that it is easy for anyone to make but impossible for anyone to prove.

Since anyone can make such a claim but no one can prove it, it cannot be effective in establishing authority. We need proof of such a claim to believe that it establishes political authority, and no such proof seems to exist.

The problem of establishing who has God's authorization has never been satisfactorily resolved, with the result that the divine authorization theory is empty: That is, it fails as a theory that would tell us who has political authority.

Most important, the idea that political authority is received from God has tended to encourage in some rulers the thought that because their authority comes from a divine source, that authority is absolute, meaning that it is unlimited in scope and content.

This conception of the nature of political authority has been (often bitterly and violently) attacked in the modern world, insofar as it is easily used to license the worst abuses by rulers. For these reasons, the divine authority theory has few advocates today.

Natural Subordination is the belief that some beings' natures are such that they instinctively do, and ought to, submit to and take direction from other beings whose natures fit them for dominance, rulership, and power.

It is a very ancient view: In Psalm 8 God is lauded for allowing the human being, by virtue of his superior nature, to "have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet/ All sheep and oxen, yea, and all the beasts of the field;/ the fowl of the air, and the fish of the sea, and whatsoever passes through the path of the seas" (Psalm 8:6-8).

Consider the way in which many people see themselves as entitled to control what they regard as "their" animals, such as pets or herds of cattle, horses, and so forth.

Animals are generally considered to be creatures that can be owned, or possessed, by human beings. Most people do not attribute to domestic animals any inherent right to independence or any "say" in how a family or a farm operates.

But can there be natural dominance within the human species? That is, can human beings be sufficiently unequal in capacities and talents such that the better-endowed human beings naturally (and inevitably) have dominion over these lesser-endowed human beings in the way that human beings have dominion over an ox or a sheep?

The psalm-writer suggests no such thing, but it has been commonplace throughout history to assume that the answer to this last question is yes. And those who do so accept an instance of what I call the natural subordination theory of political authority. In this view:

A person type X has authority over a person type Y if and only if Y's have a nature that makes them fit to take directions from X's, and X's have a nature that makes them fit to give directions to Y's, such that we can say the nature of X's fits them for rulership and dominance over Y's, and the nature of Y's fits them for governance and domination by X's.

Institutions such as colonialism, slavery, racism, and patriarchy have all been justified on the basis that those being ruled are inferiors who are naturally-and rightfully-dominated by their betters.

Conceptions of how that domination should be construed have varied: Sometimes the inferior has actually been allowed to be owned (as property) by the superior (e.g., in systems of slavery, which can vary in how much control the master has over the slave by virtue of owning him).

Other times the inferior is merely controlled by the superior, who is taken to be more like a guardian or a trustee than a master (for example, in nineteenth-century Britain married women were not allowed to have property in their own name, so that any property left to them would have to be administered for them by a male trustee).

The doctrine of governance by consent of the governed is at the heart of the legitimacy of authority. However, this doctrine has different content under democratic governance systems as opposed to non-democratic governance systems.

Samia and her deep state team repudiate the constitutional norm of government by consent of the people

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, the constitutional norm of government by consent of the people, according to which, government is legitimated by the consent of the governed people, is supposed to be the source of “the joys and hopes” for the people residing in Tanzania, as a whole.

However, “the griefs and the anxieties of the men and women of this age,” in Tanzania, arise from the fact that, President Samia has decided to overtly and serially violate this constitutional norm of government by consent of the people by misinterpreting it.

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, they have misinterpreted the constitutional doctrine of “government by consent of the people.”

To this end, I propose that, President Samia has chosen to dance the dizzy tune of an erroneous interpretations of the constitutional norm of government by consent of the people, as I hereunder clarify.

Samia and her deep state think government by consent means the consent of the strongest political party

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, government by consent of the people can mean the consent of the strongest party as opposed to the weaker parties, and this distorted view is endorsed by President Samia.

In this case party strength is measured in terms of physical assets, financial assets, support from giant domestic businesses, and the deep state which enjoys financial support from foreign direct investors from the Middle East.

But, the consent of the strongest party in a nation, so understood, is not a necessary and sufficient justification for the establishment or maintenance of a government that can legitimately control the whole nation including the weaker parties.

The reason is that, the principle of might makes right always is what grounds despotism, tyranny, and injustice against the minority by totalitarian governments as opposed to republican and democratic governments.

Moreover, the principle that the strongest party has a right to rule the weaker parties practically resolves all government into a mere contest between two parties, the strongest party seeking to be the master of the weaker parties, and the weaker parties resisting to be slaves of the strongest party, a contest, that can never be finally closed so long as human nature does not admit of externally imposed subjugation.

Samia and her deep state thinks government by consent means the consent of the most numerous political party

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, government by consent of the people can also mean the consent of the most numerous party in a nation as opposed to the less numerous parties.

In this case the party membership base is the criterion of distinction, and this distorted view is endorsed by President Samia too.

But the consent of the most numerous party in a nation, so understood, is not a necessary and sufficient justification for the establishment or maintenance of a government that can legitimately control the whole nation including the less numerous party.

The reason is that, in the entire world, the principle of majority makes right always is what often grounds despotism, tyranny, and injustice against the minority by totalitarian governments as opposed to republican and democratic governments.

In this case, the standard of truth is erroneously taken to be majority preferences as opposed to minority preferences, even when majority preferences violate human rights and duties.

Moreover, the principle that the majority party have a right to rule the minority party practically resolves all government into a mere contest between two parties, the majority party seeking to be the master of the minority party, and the minority party resisting to be the slave of the majority party, a contest, that can never be finally closed so long as humans naturally refuse to be a slave.

Samia and her deep state rejects the principle of government by democratic consent of the franchised people

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, democratically speaking, the permission of any candidate or party to occupy office is based on consent conferred upon them by voters in the previous election.

Specifically, one thing that electoral consent undeniably does do is to authorize the winners of a democratic election to occupy the offices to which they have been elected. What would have been democratically impermissible for them to do without the consent of the majority voters becomes democratically permissible for them to do with it.

This consent is morally transformative in this way only under certain conditions, however, one of them being that the consent should not be fraudulently, deceptively or coercively obtained by manipulating the voting process.

On this view, government by consent of the people finally means an aggregate of necessary and sufficient individual consents which are required to collectively form and support the government of the people, for the people, and by the people, in any way possible, either by contributing through taxation, or pensions or personal service, because of the understanding that, one’s consent is necessary though not sufficient for this purpose.

In fact, through the voting exercise, as conducted based on democratic principles, the franchised segment of "the people," while acting freely and voluntarily as individuals, consent, agree and declare to cooperate with each other in forming and sustaining a government, for their common good, as it is provided for in their state constitution.

In this case, the principle of might makes right, according to which, power defines morality, is replaced by the principle of right makes might, according to which, morality defines power.

This principle resolves all government into a cooperative project between two parties, the strongest party seeking to be the servant of the weaker parties, and the weaker parties enjoying their partnership with the strongest party, a cooperation that does not entertain unwarranted contests, since it is consistent with human nature which is fully compatible with internally imposed submission.

This is how many millions of culturally diverse humans, scattered over an extensive territory, each gifted by nature with unique attributes, nevertheless, come together to form a democratic government of the people, for the people and by the people.

Indeed, this understanding of consent as an aggregate of necessary and sufficient individual approvals which are required to collectively form and support the government of the people, for the people, and by the people, clearly distinguishes a republic from slavery and colonialism.

Chattel slavery deny human’s ownership of oneself and the products of one's labor, and assert that other humans may own another, and dispose of the other and one's property, for their uses, and at their pleasure.

Political slavery elevates this injustice to forcible taxation by a self-imposed domestic government. Similarly, colonialism is an instance of the injustice of forcible taxation by a self-imposed foreign government. The absence of free, fair and just elections is a direct gateway to political slavery and an indirect gateway to political colonialism.

Samia and her deep state practically oppose the claim that tanzania is a multi-party republican democracy

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, another constitutional norm which President Samia is overtly and consistently violating, since 2021, is the constitutional norm of democratic elections.

Two points need clarification from the constitutionally postulated norm of government by democratic electoral consent.

Specifically, I propose to specify a democratic system by using ten conceptual, procedural and outcome oriented attributes.

These attributes include: (1) The existence of a broad category of “citizens,” who can hold rulers accountable for their actions in the public realm through the competition and cooperation of elected representatives; and (2) Control of government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in public officials.

More attributes are: (3) Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which coercion is comparatively uncommon; and (4) Practically all willing adults have the right to vote in the election of officials.

Other attributes are: (5) Practically all willing adults have the right to run for elective offices in the government; and (6) Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe punishment on political matters broadly defined.

Extra attributes include: (7) Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, alternative sources of information exist and are protected by law; and (8) Citizens also have the right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political parties and interest groups.

And additional attributes are: (9) Popularly elected officials must be able to exercise their constitutional power without being subjected to overriding, albeit informal, opposition from unelected officials; and (10) the polity must be self-governing, meaning that, it must be able to act independently of constraints imposed by some other overarching political system.

This is a valiant and up-to-date effort to pin down the dominant political science understanding of what democracy presently is.

It is an inventory of “what democracy is” and what it is not. It is a precise understanding because it implies that there is no democracy in the absence of any of the mentioned attributes, say, lack of universal adult suffrage.

In light of all these facts, it follows that, under President Samia regime most of these attributes do not obtain, although she took an oath of office in which she promised to defend, protect and uphold the constitution.

Samia and her deep state practically reject the rule of law

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, President Samia does not believe in most of these principles, including rejection of the rule of law.

The concept of “rule of law” does not require a lot of things. It simply requires (1) that, the government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law; (2) that, the laws are clear, publicized, stable and fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property; and (3) that, the process by which the laws are enacted, administered and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient;

It also requires (4) that, the laws are upheld, and access to justice is provided, by competent, independent, and ethical law enforcement officials, attorneys or representatives, and judges, who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve;

It also requires (5) that, every act of government which affects the legal rights and duties of any person, must be shown to have a strictly legal derivation; (6) that, the government should conduct its affairs within a framework of recognized rules and principles which restrict discretionary power;

And it requires (7) that, an essential part of the rule of law is a system of rules for preventing the abuse of discretionary power; and (8) that, all public authorities should be subject to normal legal duties and liabilities which are not inconsistent with their governmental functions.

There is substantively and circumstantially credible evidence to suggest that, President Samia has caused interventions which are meant to eliminate the rights of citizens to organize politically so as to create their political options, at a policy and candidates levels.

Overt harassments against Chadema by using the police force, the court system, the office of the political party’s registrar, and state sponsored kidnappings, disappearances, and killings are cases in point.

And there is substantively and circumstantially credible evidence to suggest that, President Samia has caused interventions which are meant to violate the rights of citizens to participate in the administration of the affairs of their nation by voting for policies and candidates of their choice, at an election level.

Inaccuracies and Permanent Voter Register accessibility from CCM headquarters and NIDA offices is a case in point.

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, I have briefly demonstrated that, President Samia endorses the doctrine of people’s consent which promotes, “the consent of the strongest party as opposed to the weaker parties,” elevates “the consent of the most numerous party as opposed to the less numerous parties,” rejects people’s consent understood as “an aggregate of necessary and sufficient individual approvals for the common good,” and in effect, she practically refutes the constitutional position according to which, “the United Republic of Tanzania is a multi-party republican democracy.”

8. CALL FOR RECONCILIATION BEFORE 2025 GENERAL ELECTIONS

DEAR CARDINAL RUGAMBWA, Samia and her Deep State should know that, given that you happen to be so close to President Samia, I thought that I should tell you these facts, so that you may find ways of providing proper advice to her.

She is already travelling around campaigning for her presidency without a meaningful competitor. Along the process she has been heard promising to form a reconciliation committee within 100 days after assuming power.

Given what is happening on the ground now, such a promise is incredible. It does not differentiate her from a carnivorous wolf that requests to be elected by herbivorous lambs on promise that upon being elected it will abandon carnivorous behavior and start eating grass like the herbivorous lambs. No sane person can believe such a deceptive promise.

The optimal solution is reconciliation before elections. To this end, unconditional release of Tundu Lissu and all other individuals who are under extra-judicial detentions, such as Deusdedit Soka, Mdude Nyagali, and many over 80 others, is a necessary step.

Any other route will lead us to nowhere for a very simple reason, which I wish to restate as follows:

The world of democracy sorts citizens into winners and losers. But winners and losers of elections have essential responsibilities in functioning democracies. Just winners do not exact revenge on their opponent by abusing the powers of their office and jailing their opponents. And losers do not refuse to accept the results of a vote judged free and fair by a country’s electoral management body. In short, a well functioning democracy depends on the consent of the just losers to just winners to run the country.

Sincerely,

Dr. Mama Amon,
“Sumbawanga Town,”
Tanzania.


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This cardinal is a fool, no different from that KKKT idiot who said he was not born to oppose the government.
 

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa, although I hail from Sumbawanga and your home is in Kagera, I have known you since 1990s, as a student at Biharamulo (Biseco), in Kagera. By then, I remember, you were a teacher at Katoke Junior Seminary, in our school neighborhood, just a stone-throwing distance.

Occasionally, we used to attend your Sunday homilies at Katoke Parish, where, you often came to administer mass to the general community while accompanied by your smartly dressed seminarians.

Together, we Biseco students, always valued highly your homilies, whose core message focused on the thesis according to which, “the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ,” whom you serve.

You really animated us to an extent that, some of my Muslim girl students, such Maimuna Hassan from Mabira in Karagwe, used to attend the Sunday Masses with us, just to listen to you.

And a few years later when we heard about your elevation to episcopacy and later to Cardinalship we rejoiced and wished you well.

Under your present role as a Cardinal, I have personally seen you twice, in the social media, first on 27 August 2025, and then on 12 September 2025, appearing in a common photograph, with the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Samia Suluhu Hassan. She is also, the Presidential candidate for CCM in the ongoing 2025 general elections in Tanzania.

Since you are the Ambassador of Christ, who is an icon of “Justice and Peace,” kindly allow me to relay to you “the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age,” in relation to constitutional injustices pertaining to these general elections, with hope that you will relay the same to President Samia.

The injustices I am referring to are orchestrated by President Samia through the instrumentality of the court system, the police force, the prison, the electoral commission, and the office of the political parties registrar.

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa, as a teacher of history, you are fully aware of the fact that, the United Republic of Tanzania is “a sovereign United Republic” because “sovereignty resides in the people,” meaning that “it is from the [the consent of the governed] people that the Government” necessarily “shall derive all its power and authority” over the people “through [the provisions of] this Constitution,” such that, “the Government shall be accountable to the [governed] people,” in that, it is the [governed] people who shall determine how they will be governed. (Constitution 1977, articles 1 and 8).

This constitutional fact is supposed to be the source of “joys and the hopes” for us all. However, “the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age,” in Tanzania, arise from the fact that, President Samia has decided to overtly violate this constitutional norm.

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa, for you to see the reason why this is the case, let me briefly explain what is implied by “the consent of the people to the government of the day,” in light of articles 1 and 8 in the state constitution (1977).

I propose that, there are three possible interpretations of the phrase, “the consent of the people to the government of the day,” two of which being wrong, and one of them being right, where, President Samia has chosen to dance the tune of the wrong interpretations.

The consent of the strongest party as a mockery to national unity

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, the consent of the people to the government of the day can mean the consent of the strongest party as opposed to the weaker parties.

In this case party strength is measured in terms of physical assets, financial assets, support from giant domestic businesses, and support from foreign direct investors.

But, the consent of the strongest party in a nation, so understood, is not a necessary and sufficient justification for the establishment or maintenance of a government that can legitimately control the whole nation including the weaker parties.

The reason is that, the principle of might makes right always is what grounds despotism, tyranny, and injustice against the minority by totalitarian governments as opposed to republican and democratic governments.

Moreover, the principle that the strongest party has a right to rule the weaker parties practically resolves all government into a mere contest between two parties, the strongest party seeking to be the master of the weaker parties, and the weaker parties resisting to be slaves of the strongest party, a contest, that can never be finally closed so long as human nature does not admit of externally imposed subjugation.

The consent of the most numerous party as a mockery to peace and order

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, the consent of the people to the government of the day can also mean the consent of the most numerous party in a nation as opposed to the less numerous parties. In this case the party membership base is the criterion of distinction.

But the consent of the most numerous party in a nation, so understood, is not a necessary and sufficient justification for the establishment or maintenance of a government that can legitimately control the whole nation including the less numerous party.

The reason is that, in the entire world, the principle of majority makes right always is what often grounds despotism, tyranny, and injustice against the minority by totalitarian governments as opposed to republican and democratic governments.

In this case, the standard of truth is erroneously taken to be majority preferences as opposed to minority preferences, even when majority preferences violate human rights and duties.

Moreover, the principle that the majority party have a right to rule the minority party practically resolves all government into a mere contest between two parties, the majority party seeking to be the master of the minority party, and the minority party resisting to be the slave of the majority party, a contest, that can never be finally closed so long as humans naturally refuse to be a slave.

Consent of the people for their common good

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, the consent of the people to the government of the day can finally mean an aggregate of necessary and sufficient individual consents which are required to collectively form and support the government, for their common good, in any way, either by contributing through taxation, pension contribution or personal service, because of the understanding that, one’s consent is necessary though not sufficient for this purpose.

In fact, through the voting exercise, as conducted based on democratic principles, the franchised segment of the people, while acting freely and voluntarily as individuals, consent, agree and declare to cooperate with each other in forming and sustaining a government, for their common good, as it is provided for in their state constitution.

In this case, the principle of might makes right is replaced by the principle of right makes right. This principle resolves all government into a cooperative project between two parties, the strongest party seeking to be the servant of the weaker parties, and the weaker parties enjoying their partnership with the strongest party, a cooperation that does not entertain unwarranted contests, since it is consistent with human nature which is fully compatible with internally imposed submission.

This is how many millions of diverse humans, scattered over an extensive territory, each gifted by nature with individual freedom; required by the law of nature to call no man, or body of men, his masters; authorized by that law to seek his own happiness in his own way, to do what he will with himself and his property so long as he does not trespass upon the equal liberty of others; authorized also, by that law, to defend his own rights and redress his own wrongs, and to go to the assistance and defense of any of his fellow men who may be suffering any kind of injustice, come to form a democratic government.

Tanzania is a multi-party democracy

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, for these reasons, the United Republic of Tanzania is “a democratic state” which “adheres to multi-party democracy,” because “every citizen of the United Republic is entitled to take part in matters pertaining to the governance of the country, either directly or through representatives freely elected [based on an informed consent given] by the people, in conformity with the procedures laid down by, or in accordance with, the law,” which calls for the rule of law as opposed to the rule of arbitrary power (Constitution 1977, articles 3 and 21).

The concept of “rule of law” does not require a lot of things. It simply requires (1) that, the government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law; (2) that, the laws are clear, publicized, stable and fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property; (3) that, the process by which the laws are enacted, administered and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient; (4) that, the laws are upheld, and access to justice is provided, by competent, independent, and ethical law enforcement officials, attorneys or representatives, and judges, who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve;

It also requires (5) that, every act of government which affects the legal rights and duties of any person, must be shown to have a strictly legal derivation; (6) that, the government should conduct its affairs within a framework of recognized rules and principles which restrict discretionary power; (7) that, an essential part of the rule of law is a system of rules for preventing the abuse of discretionary power; and (4) that, all public authorities should be subject to normal legal duties and liabilities which are not inconsistent with their governmental functions.

President Samia rejects the rule of law

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, President Samia does not believe in any of these principles. There is substantively and circumstantially credible evidence to suggest that, President Samia has caused interventions which are meant to eliminate the rights of citizens to organize politically so as to create their political options, at a policy and candidates levels.

Overt harassments against Chadema by using the police force, the court system, the office of the political party’s registrar, and state sponsored kidnappings, disappearances, and killings are cases in point.

And there is substantively and circumstantially credible evidence to suggest that, President Samia has caused interventions which are meant to violate the rights of citizens to participate in the administration of the affairs of their nation by voting for policies and candidates of their choice, at an election level. Inaccuracies and Permanent Voter Register accessibility from CCM headquarters and NIDA offices is a case in point.

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa, I have briefly demonstrated that, President Samia endorses the doctrine of people’s consent which promotes, “the consent of the strongest party as opposed to the weaker parties,” elevates “the consent of the most numerous party as opposed to the less numerous parties,” rejects people’s consent understood as “an aggregate of necessary and sufficient individual sanction for the common good,” and in effect, she practically refutes the constitutional position according to which, “the United Republic of Tanzania is a multi-party democracy.”

Call for reconciliation before general elections

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, given that you happen to be so close to President Samia, I thought that I should tell you these facts, so that you may find ways of providing proper advice to her.

She is already travelling around campaigning for her presidency without a meaningful competitor. Along the process she has been heard promising to form a reconciliation committee within 100 days after assuming power.

Given what is happening on the ground now, such a promise is incredible. It does not differentiate her from a wolf that requests to be elected by lambs on promise that upon being elected the wolf will abandon carnivore behavior and staring eating grass like the herbivore lambs.

It is my hope that you don’t believe her too. The optimal solution is reconciliation before elections. Unconditional release of Tundu Lissu is a necessary step to this end. Any other route will lead us to nowhere.

Sincerely,

Dr. Mama Amon,
“Sumbawanga Town,”
Tanzania.
IMG-20250912-WA0007.jpg
 
Eti I have known you since 1990s, as a student at Biharamulo (Biseco)🤣🤣🤣🤣 andika kiswahili mkuu
 

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa, although I hail from Sumbawanga and your home is in Kagera, I have known you since 1990s, as a student at Biharamulo (Biseco), in Kagera. By then, I remember, you were a teacher at Katoke Junior Seminary, in our school neighborhood, just a stone-throwing distance.

Occasionally, we used to attend your Sunday homilies at Katoke Parish, where, you often came to administer mass to the general community while accompanied by your smartly dressed seminarians.

Together, we Biseco students, always valued highly your homilies, whose core message focused on the thesis according to which, “the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age, especially those who are poor or in any way afflicted, these are the joys and hopes, the griefs and anxieties of the followers of Christ,” whom you serve.

You really animated us to an extent that, some of my Muslim girl students, such Maimuna Hassan from Mabira in Karagwe, used to attend the Sunday Masses with us, just to listen to you.

And a few years later when we heard about your elevation to episcopacy and later to Cardinalship we rejoiced and wished you well.

Under your present role as a Cardinal, I have personally seen you twice, in the social media, first on 27 August 2025, and then on 12 September 2025, appearing in a common photograph, with the President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Samia Suluhu Hassan. She is also, the Presidential candidate for CCM in the ongoing 2025 general elections in Tanzania.

Since you are the Ambassador of Christ, who is an icon of “Justice and Peace,” kindly allow me to relay to you “the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age,” in relation to constitutional injustices pertaining to these general elections, with hope that you will relay the same to President Samia.

The injustices I am referring to are orchestrated by President Samia through the instrumentality of the court system, the police force, the prison, the electoral commission, and the office of the political parties registrar.

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa, as a teacher of history, you are fully aware of the fact that, the United Republic of Tanzania is “a sovereign United Republic” because “sovereignty resides in the people,” meaning that “it is from the [the consent of the governed] people that the Government” necessarily “shall derive all its power and authority” over the people “through [the provisions of] this Constitution,” such that, “the Government shall be accountable to the [governed] people,” in that, it is the [governed] people who shall determine how they will be governed. (Constitution 1977, articles 1 and 8).

This constitutional fact is supposed to be the source of “joys and the hopes” for us all. However, “the griefs and the anxieties of the men of this age,” in Tanzania, arise from the fact that, President Samia has decided to overtly violate this constitutional norm.

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa, for you to see the reason why this is the case, let me briefly explain what is implied by “the consent of the people to the government of the day,” in light of articles 1 and 8 in the state constitution (1977).

I propose that, there are three possible interpretations of the phrase, “the consent of the people to the government of the day,” two of which being wrong, and one of them being right, where, President Samia has chosen to dance the tune of the wrong interpretations.

The consent of the strongest party as a mockery to national unity

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, the consent of the people to the government of the day can mean the consent of the strongest party as opposed to the weaker parties.

In this case party strength is measured in terms of physical assets, financial assets, support from giant domestic businesses, and support from foreign direct investors.

But, the consent of the strongest party in a nation, so understood, is not a necessary and sufficient justification for the establishment or maintenance of a government that can legitimately control the whole nation including the weaker parties.

The reason is that, the principle of might makes right always is what grounds despotism, tyranny, and injustice against the minority by totalitarian governments as opposed to republican and democratic governments.

Moreover, the principle that the strongest party has a right to rule the weaker parties practically resolves all government into a mere contest between two parties, the strongest party seeking to be the master of the weaker parties, and the weaker parties resisting to be slaves of the strongest party, a contest, that can never be finally closed so long as human nature does not admit of externally imposed subjugation.

The consent of the most numerous party as a mockery to peace and order

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, the consent of the people to the government of the day can also mean the consent of the most numerous party in a nation as opposed to the less numerous parties. In this case the party membership base is the criterion of distinction.

But the consent of the most numerous party in a nation, so understood, is not a necessary and sufficient justification for the establishment or maintenance of a government that can legitimately control the whole nation including the less numerous party.

The reason is that, in the entire world, the principle of majority makes right always is what often grounds despotism, tyranny, and injustice against the minority by totalitarian governments as opposed to republican and democratic governments.

In this case, the standard of truth is erroneously taken to be majority preferences as opposed to minority preferences, even when majority preferences violate human rights and duties.

Moreover, the principle that the majority party have a right to rule the minority party practically resolves all government into a mere contest between two parties, the majority party seeking to be the master of the minority party, and the minority party resisting to be the slave of the majority party, a contest, that can never be finally closed so long as humans naturally refuse to be a slave.

Consent of the people for their common good

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, the consent of the people to the government of the day can finally mean an aggregate of necessary and sufficient individual consents which are required to collectively form and support the government, for their common good, in any way, either by contributing through taxation, pension contribution or personal service, because of the understanding that, one’s consent is necessary though not sufficient for this purpose.

In fact, through the voting exercise, as conducted based on democratic principles, the franchised segment of the people, while acting freely and voluntarily as individuals, consent, agree and declare to cooperate with each other in forming and sustaining a government, for their common good, as it is provided for in their state constitution.

In this case, the principle of might makes right is replaced by the principle of right makes right. This principle resolves all government into a cooperative project between two parties, the strongest party seeking to be the servant of the weaker parties, and the weaker parties enjoying their partnership with the strongest party, a cooperation that does not entertain unwarranted contests, since it is consistent with human nature which is fully compatible with internally imposed submission.

This is how many millions of diverse humans, scattered over an extensive territory, each gifted by nature with individual freedom; required by the law of nature to call no man, or body of men, his masters; authorized by that law to seek his own happiness in his own way, to do what he will with himself and his property so long as he does not trespass upon the equal liberty of others; authorized also, by that law, to defend his own rights and redress his own wrongs, and to go to the assistance and defense of any of his fellow men who may be suffering any kind of injustice, come to form a democratic government.

Tanzania is a multi-party democracy

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, for these reasons, the United Republic of Tanzania is “a democratic state” which “adheres to multi-party democracy,” because “every citizen of the United Republic is entitled to take part in matters pertaining to the governance of the country, either directly or through representatives freely elected [based on an informed consent given] by the people, in conformity with the procedures laid down by, or in accordance with, the law,” which calls for the rule of law as opposed to the rule of arbitrary power (Constitution 1977, articles 3 and 21).

The concept of “rule of law” does not require a lot of things. It simply requires (1) that, the government and its officials and agents are accountable under the law; (2) that, the laws are clear, publicized, stable and fair, and protect fundamental rights, including the security of persons and property; (3) that, the process by which the laws are enacted, administered and enforced is accessible, fair and efficient; (4) that, the laws are upheld, and access to justice is provided, by competent, independent, and ethical law enforcement officials, attorneys or representatives, and judges, who are of sufficient number, have adequate resources, and reflect the makeup of the communities they serve;

It also requires (5) that, every act of government which affects the legal rights and duties of any person, must be shown to have a strictly legal derivation; (6) that, the government should conduct its affairs within a framework of recognized rules and principles which restrict discretionary power; (7) that, an essential part of the rule of law is a system of rules for preventing the abuse of discretionary power; and (4) that, all public authorities should be subject to normal legal duties and liabilities which are not inconsistent with their governmental functions.

President Samia rejects the rule of law

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, President Samia does not believe in any of these principles. There is substantively and circumstantially credible evidence to suggest that, President Samia has caused interventions which are meant to eliminate the rights of citizens to organize politically so as to create their political options, at a policy and candidates levels.

Overt harassments against Chadema by using the police force, the court system, the office of the political party’s registrar, and state sponsored kidnappings, disappearances, and killings are cases in point.

And there is substantively and circumstantially credible evidence to suggest that, President Samia has caused interventions which are meant to violate the rights of citizens to participate in the administration of the affairs of their nation by voting for policies and candidates of their choice, at an election level. Inaccuracies and Permanent Voter Register accessibility from CCM headquarters and NIDA offices is a case in point.

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa, I have briefly demonstrated that, President Samia endorses the doctrine of people’s consent which promotes, “the consent of the strongest party as opposed to the weaker parties,” elevates “the consent of the most numerous party as opposed to the less numerous parties,” rejects people’s consent understood as “an aggregate of necessary and sufficient individual sanction for the common good,” and in effect, she practically refutes the constitutional position according to which, “the United Republic of Tanzania is a multi-party democracy.”

Call for reconciliation before general elections

Dear Cardinal Rugambwa
, given that you happen to be so close to President Samia, I thought that I should tell you these facts, so that you may find ways of providing proper advice to her.

She is already travelling around campaigning for her presidency without a meaningful competitor. Along the process she has been heard promising to form a reconciliation committee within 100 days after assuming power.

Given what is happening on the ground now, such a promise is incredible. It does not differentiate her from a wolf that requests to be elected by lambs on promise that upon being elected the wolf will abandon carnivore behavior and staring eating grass like the herbivore lambs.

It is my hope that you don’t believe her too. The optimal solution is reconciliation before elections. Unconditional release of Tundu Lissu is a necessary step to this end. Any other route will lead us to nowhere.

Sincerely,

Dr. Mama Amon,
“Sumbawanga Town,”
Tanzania.
The sad and painful truth you don't know is that, the man you account as a holy man is not. There, is the female witch and Catholic priests who are one in their deeds behind the stage curtain.

It is not long since I realized that, this woman is a terrible witch (from my past experiences, I can discern a witch when I meet one) from what she did in her visit at Simiyu, where he gathered all strong men and chiefs from all of the witch territories around the region for the ritual, a night before the campaign gathering. It is said that the woman has been doing the same in all areas she visits for campaigning.

On the picture are the priests of White witchcraft with another witch conversing and making plans but fooling the ignorants with those camouflage pieces of paper quoting some words from scriptures.
 
This cardinal is a fool, no different from that KKKT idiot who said he was not born to oppose the government.

This is an unsupported claim.
Unsupported claims can be either true or false.
Popular opinion is in favor of the Cardinal's innocence.
Thus, he remains presumed innocent until when proved wrong.

Remember:

Shouts, insults, repetitions and evidence dishing are all options for you.
The latter is the best option.
Take this route, if you have evidence.
Otherwise, withdraw your unsupported accusations, and apologise.

Not carefully:

Cardinal Rugambwa is a man of God who is doing a great job of reconciling the nation.
 

“Our results suggest that moderate alcohol consumption can reduce inhibitions when speaking a English language and lead to more fluent pronunciation"

Dr. Jessica Werthmann​

​

 
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