Gazeti la The Citizen lahoji nani aliishauri Serikali kujenga SGR wakati wataalamu wanasema italeta hasara?

[Omulasil]

Huu ni ujinga wa Karne..Huwa wanajenga kumnufaisha mjukuu gani?

Nyumba sio reli,reli inaenda na teknolojia ya wakati huo Ili ilete faida sio kusubiria ,ukisubiria teknolojia inapita inakuwa chuma chakavu.

Pia ni ujinga karne. Bila kuwaza reli iliyopo leo iko tangu teknolojia ya zamani.
Lakini wajinga na ubinafsi kuwaza mambo ya leo bila kuwa na mawazo yakuona manufaa ya mbele si tu wajukuu bali vitukuu

 

[Omulasil]

SGR haikuwa na uharaka Sana kihivyo wakati pana mbadala wake tayari. Hakuna mizigo yeyeto nchini iliyokwama eti kisa Hakuna sgr. Hio pesa ya kujenga reli na kununua mabehewa ingepelekwa kwenye miundombinu ya kuwapa uwezo vijana wazalishe uchumi ungekua sana

[emoji107]

 

[Kadhi Mkuu 1]

Hao Citizens ni sawa na Chadema

Wanasema watajenga Makao makuu siku wakiwa Chama Tawala!

Mawazo ya kimaskini kabisa

Huyu ni Eric yule aliyechongelewa kwa Magu na Pasikali, sasa naona kaenda the citizen badala ya the economist .
Mwanasheria p njoo hukuuu.

 

[Sir robby]

Habari za leo,

Gazeti la The Citizen limeandika makala kuhoji busara iliyotumika kuamua kujenga SGR Wakati tafiti za Kitaalamu zinaonesha tutapata Hasara?

Kwa mujibu wa WB Ili reli ilete faida inatakiwa mzigo angalau Tani mil.55 wakati utafiti unaonyesha Hadi kufikia 2030 EAC yote itakuwa na uwezo wa kusafirisha Tani asilia 14 tuu ya mahitaji Ili upate faida..

Kwamba Kwa nini Magufuli na Serikali yake walichagua expensive option ambayo itakuwa ni liability Kwa Taifa miaka na miaka?

My take: Hivi kwa nini tusiwe tunawawajibisha watu wanaotoa hasara Taifa kwa maamuzi yao ya Hovyo?[emoji116]

=====

Trucks and tracks: Will Tanzania’s SGR ever work?
Charles Makakala
6-7 minutes
Summary

The government’s gung-ho approach to SGR is commendable. At this stage of the project, developing cold feet would make no sense. Nonetheless, much more needs to be done to ensure the SGR’s future commercial and economic viability.

Tanzania continues to show strong commitment to its grand $14 billion, 1,800km standard gauge railway (SGR) project. According to recent reports, the government is pushing forward with the Tabora-Gitega and Isaka-Kigali phases, connecting the infrastructure with Burundi and Rwanda, respectively. This will, hopefully, make Tanzania a transportation hub for its many landlocked neighbours.

The government’s gung-ho approach to SGR is commendable. At this stage of the project, developing cold feet would make no sense. Nonetheless, much more needs to be done to ensure the SGR’s future commercial and economic viability.

To start with, while economic and population growth, global supply chains, landlocked countries and mining investments all call for better and more reliable transport infrastructure, the SGR was not the right solution for Tanzania. Multiple reports have made this quite clear. There is no economic justification for SGR investment anywhere in East Africa at this point.

A 2013 World Bank report observed that an SGR project requires a volume of 55 million tonnes to be viable, while EAC railways are estimated to achieve only 14.4 million tonnes in total by 2030. With such requirements, given that Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) achieved not even a third of that, refurbishing the Central Railway at one third of the SGR cost would have sufficed, but the powers that be chose the most expensive option possible!

Neighbouring Kenya is paying dearly for its headstrong decision to ignore the fundamentals of railway economics. Ian Taylor, author of Kenya’s New Lunatic Express, observes that the Madaraka Express was generating a loss of $7.35 million every month in 2018, operating at less than 15 percent of its planned capacity. This is the fate that awaits Tanzania unless the government has something quite special up its sleeve.

But the long list of failed or failing public projects – TRC, UDA, BRT, TTCL, NHC, ATCL, Tanganyika Packers, etc – suggests that that is quite unlikely. While the government may pull off a project here or there, it lacks the track record of successfully running considerable operations in the medium and long term. To give the SGR a chance, the government needs to show a very high degree of resolve to address its future challenges.


Firstly, the SGR will have to pass the quality of service test. In the 1990s, when the road between Tanga and Moshi was rebuilt, people abandoned the railway services fast, and they were withdrawn. People have choices today. There are 86,000 lorries and 49,000 buses crisscrossing the nation every day. If TRC will approach this challenge as casually as it did in the past, we can as well conclude today that Tanzania’s SGR will be the most expensive white elephant in East African history.

Secondly, the DRC challenge. As it stands, even though over 90 percent of goods to or from Rwanda and Burundi pass through Dar es Salaam, they comprise less than one third of goods that pass through the port. Integration of the economic region around Tanganyika Lake might improve the situation. For example, the populous eastern provinces of the DRC of North and South Kivu, Katanga, Maniema and Ituri, which are resource-rich but are forced to depend on the unwieldy railway line to South Africa, could use a solid alternative line to Dar which could very likely cut transport times by up to 70 percent.

Thirdly, the marketing challenge. In the heyday of railway transportation in Africa, people often lacked viable transport alternatives, but today, all across sub-Saharan Africa, lorries dominate tracks even in cases where tracks have very clear cost advantages.

Statistics suggests that TRC is not competitive in the transportation of fertiliser, ores and minerals, cement, and oil, the kind of deals which successful operators thrive on. Similarly, even when ticket prices were half those of buses, people still preferred the convenience that buses offered. A laissez faire approach to the market will not persuade Tanzanians to use railway transport.

Finally, Dar es Salaam Port, which deserves its own discussion.

Generally speaking, railway is a nationally strategic resource. Unfortunately, Africans have been going about the railway business in the wrong way.

In the 1870s, only two decades after the introduction of railways, Indian mechanics began to manufacture locomotives which were better and cheaper than the British ones. Today, Indians are advising the British how to manage their railway networks. Similarly, in the 1930s’ South Africa, railways were pumping skilled craftsmen to the rest of the economy, leading to the industrialisation of South Africa. At its peak in the 1970s, South Africa Railways had 230,000 employees. Such is the potential of railways in economic transformation.

Pumping billions into a project will not bring such outcomes. There must be a paradigm shift without which the thousands of lorries will continue to damage roads, congestion will continue to cost the nation dearly and accidents will continue to cut short livesas hundreds of new vehicles hit the roads every day.

In this case, will the SGR ever work?

Given Tanzania’s track record, it is difficult to see anything beyond failure here. The most likely scenario is that the network will function well below expectations for years, incurring losses that the government will struggle to subsidise. As the situation worsens, TRC will start to cut corners in maintenance, making the infrastructure degrade faster, thus reducing the network speeds and reliability. Then clients will drop en masse going back to privately owned lorries and buses, leading to exactly where we started.

That’s the Tanzania we know and love, huh?


View attachment 2302965View attachment 2302966View attachment 2302967View attachment 2302968

MZEE HAKUNA ALIYEMSHAURI ALIKUWA ANAANZISHA MIRADI YA KUTAFUTA SIFA BADALA YA TIJA

 

[Chiwa]

ni kazi kujua binadamu anataka nini hasa ili alidhike! natumaini kama tunaelewa kinachotengenezwa ili huitaji wa biashara zetu usimame siku zijazo! sina uhakika kama Waafrika tuko sawa!

 

[The Sunk Cost Fallacy]

Ni mjinga tu anaweza kuhoji hilo.
1. Kuna malori kila siku hanafanya uharifu wa barabara kila siku. Hilo nayehoji haoni.
2. SGR Ikitumia hata saa 2 kwenda Moro. Nani mjinga ataenda na bus. Anayehoji haoni
3. Jam nyingi njiani sababu ninlori za mizigo inatoka bandari za Dar na Tanga. Anayehoji haoni
4. Ajali nyingi zinasabishwa na malori yanayotembea barabarani na mizigo kuitoa Dar
Ni ujinga unaoamini kuwa mizigo mizito na itasafiri kwa lori

Hakuna cha maana ulichoandika hapo zaidi ya ujinga wako..

Return ya sgr itatoka wapi kama hakuna cha kubeba? Wataalamu Wanasema Ili reli ya sgr iwe efficient inahitaji mzigo Tani mil.55..

Ziko wapi?

 

[petrol]

Habari za leo,

Gazeti la The Citizen limeandika makala kuhoji busara iliyotumika kuamua kujenga SGR Wakati tafiti za Kitaalamu zinaonesha tutapata Hasara?

Kwa mujibu wa WB Ili reli ilete faida inatakiwa mzigo angalau Tani mil.55 wakati utafiti unaonyesha Hadi kufikia 2030 EAC yote itakuwa na uwezo wa kusafirisha Tani asilia 14 tuu ya mahitaji Ili upate faida..

Kwamba Kwa nini Magufuli na Serikali yake walichagua expensive option ambayo itakuwa ni liability Kwa Taifa miaka na miaka?

My take: Hivi kwa nini tusiwe tunawawajibisha watu wanaotoa hasara Taifa kwa maamuzi yao ya Hovyo?👇

=====

Trucks and tracks: Will Tanzania’s SGR ever work?
Charles Makakala
6-7 minutes
Summary

The government’s gung-ho approach to SGR is commendable. At this stage of the project, developing cold feet would make no sense. Nonetheless, much more needs to be done to ensure the SGR’s future commercial and economic viability.

Tanzania continues to show strong commitment to its grand $14 billion, 1,800km standard gauge railway (SGR) project. According to recent reports, the government is pushing forward with the Tabora-Gitega and Isaka-Kigali phases, connecting the infrastructure with Burundi and Rwanda, respectively. This will, hopefully, make Tanzania a transportation hub for its many landlocked neighbours.

The government’s gung-ho approach to SGR is commendable. At this stage of the project, developing cold feet would make no sense. Nonetheless, much more needs to be done to ensure the SGR’s future commercial and economic viability.

To start with, while economic and population growth, global supply chains, landlocked countries and mining investments all call for better and more reliable transport infrastructure, the SGR was not the right solution for Tanzania. Multiple reports have made this quite clear. There is no economic justification for SGR investment anywhere in East Africa at this point.

A 2013 World Bank report observed that an SGR project requires a volume of 55 million tonnes to be viable, while EAC railways are estimated to achieve only 14.4 million tonnes in total by 2030. With such requirements, given that Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) achieved not even a third of that, refurbishing the Central Railway at one third of the SGR cost would have sufficed, but the powers that be chose the most expensive option possible!

Neighbouring Kenya is paying dearly for its headstrong decision to ignore the fundamentals of railway economics. Ian Taylor, author of Kenya’s New Lunatic Express, observes that the Madaraka Express was generating a loss of $7.35 million every month in 2018, operating at less than 15 percent of its planned capacity. This is the fate that awaits Tanzania unless the government has something quite special up its sleeve.

But the long list of failed or failing public projects – TRC, UDA, BRT, TTCL, NHC, ATCL, Tanganyika Packers, etc – suggests that that is quite unlikely. While the government may pull off a project here or there, it lacks the track record of successfully running considerable operations in the medium and long term. To give the SGR a chance, the government needs to show a very high degree of resolve to address its future challenges.


Firstly, the SGR will have to pass the quality of service test. In the 1990s, when the road between Tanga and Moshi was rebuilt, people abandoned the railway services fast, and they were withdrawn. People have choices today. There are 86,000 lorries and 49,000 buses crisscrossing the nation every day. If TRC will approach this challenge as casually as it did in the past, we can as well conclude today that Tanzania’s SGR will be the most expensive white elephant in East African history.

Secondly, the DRC challenge. As it stands, even though over 90 percent of goods to or from Rwanda and Burundi pass through Dar es Salaam, they comprise less than one third of goods that pass through the port. Integration of the economic region around Tanganyika Lake might improve the situation. For example, the populous eastern provinces of the DRC of North and South Kivu, Katanga, Maniema and Ituri, which are resource-rich but are forced to depend on the unwieldy railway line to South Africa, could use a solid alternative line to Dar which could very likely cut transport times by up to 70 percent.

Thirdly, the marketing challenge. In the heyday of railway transportation in Africa, people often lacked viable transport alternatives, but today, all across sub-Saharan Africa, lorries dominate tracks even in cases where tracks have very clear cost advantages.

Statistics suggests that TRC is not competitive in the transportation of fertiliser, ores and minerals, cement, and oil, the kind of deals which successful operators thrive on. Similarly, even when ticket prices were half those of buses, people still preferred the convenience that buses offered. A laissez faire approach to the market will not persuade Tanzanians to use railway transport.

Finally, Dar es Salaam Port, which deserves its own discussion.

Generally speaking, railway is a nationally strategic resource. Unfortunately, Africans have been going about the railway business in the wrong way.

In the 1870s, only two decades after the introduction of railways, Indian mechanics began to manufacture locomotives which were better and cheaper than the British ones. Today, Indians are advising the British how to manage their railway networks. Similarly, in the 1930s’ South Africa, railways were pumping skilled craftsmen to the rest of the economy, leading to the industrialisation of South Africa. At its peak in the 1970s, South Africa Railways had 230,000 employees. Such is the potential of railways in economic transformation.

Pumping billions into a project will not bring such outcomes. There must be a paradigm shift without which the thousands of lorries will continue to damage roads, congestion will continue to cost the nation dearly and accidents will continue to cut short livesas hundreds of new vehicles hit the roads every day.

In this case, will the SGR ever work?

Given Tanzania’s track record, it is difficult to see anything beyond failure here. The most likely scenario is that the network will function well below expectations for years, incurring losses that the government will struggle to subsidise. As the situation worsens, TRC will start to cut corners in maintenance, making the infrastructure degrade faster, thus reducing the network speeds and reliability. Then clients will drop en masse going back to privately owned lorries and buses, leading to exactly where we started.

That’s the Tanzania we know and love, huh?


View attachment 2302965View attachment 2302966View attachment 2302967View attachment 2302968

Mwandishi, ukweli ni kwamba ukizungumzia sekta ya uchukuzi siku za usoni SGR haepukiki. Tukumbuke wazo hili lilianzia awamu ya nne. tofauti na awamu ya tano ni kuweka mfumo wa vichwa vya umeme badala ya dizeli. Reli itakapokamilika itakuwa a game changer.

tusihofu SGR itaathiri biashara ya mabasi na malori. Huko Ulaya, uchina na Japan, kwa mfano, njia zote zinatumika na kwa ufanisi mkubwa.

Suala la ufanisi katika uendeshaji wake ni hoja nzuri. bila shaka wahusika watalishughulikia wakati wake utakapofika. tuendelee kupiga moyo konde SGR itakamilika, inshallah.

 

[edwayne]

Yani sgr ilete hasara [emoji23][emoji23][emoji23]walamba asali wamechanganyikiwa kama reli ingekuwa na hasara wazungu wangeachana nazo kama njia ya kusafirisha mizigo.. Hv makaa ya mawe au machine nzito unahamishashe kirahisi kama sio kupitia reli we kichwa kimoja kinaweza beba makontena 70 huoni ni msaada mkubwa sana

 

[Bemendazole]

Gazeti la The Citizen limeandika makala kuhoji busara iliyotumika kuamua kujenga SGR Wakati tafiti za Kitaalamu zinaonesha tutapata Hasara?

Hapana. Haitaleta hasara endapo tutatumia 'Token Accounting'. Token accounting ni mfumo wa uhasibu unaotumika for reporting purpose ya kwenye miradi ya umma ambapo depreciation rate, for reporting purpose is kept below 5% (even though the actual depr could be higher) for two reasons...
1. To be able to set aside maintenance budget which is equivalent to depr (5%).
2. To enable public project to report profits if any...
Kwa sababu ukiwa na reli yenye thamani ya Tril 14, uka sema kuwa annual depr ni 20%. There is no way utaweza ku report profit kwa kutumia mfumo wa uhasibu wa kawaida wa kureport uchakavu.

 

[The Sunk Cost Fallacy]

Hapana. Haitaleta hasara endapo tutatumia 'Token Accounting'. Token accounting ni mfumo wa uhasibu unaotumika for reporting purpose ya kwenye miradi ya umma ambapo depreciation rate, for reporting purpose is kept below 5% (even though the actual depr could be higher) for two purpose.
1. To be able to set aside maintenance budget which is equivalent to depr (5%).
2. To enable public project to report profits if any...

Hayo maelezo yako ya ajibu vipi hoja za wataalamu kama zilivyonukuliwa na The Citizen?

 

[Bemendazole]

Hayo maelezo yako ya ajibu vipi hoja za wataalamu kama zilivyonukuliwa na The Citizen?

Kama hujui uhasibu, huwezi elewa kama maelezo yangu yamejibu hoja au lah...

 

[ras jeff kapita]

Habari za leo,

Gazeti la The Citizen limeandika makala kuhoji busara iliyotumika kuamua kujenga SGR Wakati tafiti za Kitaalamu zinaonesha tutapata Hasara?

Kwa mujibu wa WB Ili reli ilete faida inatakiwa mzigo angalau Tani mil.55 wakati utafiti unaonyesha Hadi kufikia 2030 EAC yote itakuwa na uwezo wa kusafirisha Tani asilia 14 tuu ya mahitaji Ili upate faida..

Kwamba Kwa nini Magufuli na Serikali yake walichagua expensive option ambayo itakuwa ni liability Kwa Taifa miaka na miaka?

My take: Hivi kwa nini tusiwe tunawawajibisha watu wanaotoa hasara Taifa kwa maamuzi yao ya Hovyo?👇

=====

Trucks and tracks: Will Tanzania’s SGR ever work?
Charles Makakala
6-7 minutes
Summary

The government’s gung-ho approach to SGR is commendable. At this stage of the project, developing cold feet would make no sense. Nonetheless, much more needs to be done to ensure the SGR’s future commercial and economic viability.

Tanzania continues to show strong commitment to its grand $14 billion, 1,800km standard gauge railway (SGR) project. According to recent reports, the government is pushing forward with the Tabora-Gitega and Isaka-Kigali phases, connecting the infrastructure with Burundi and Rwanda, respectively. This will, hopefully, make Tanzania a transportation hub for its many landlocked neighbours.

The government’s gung-ho approach to SGR is commendable. At this stage of the project, developing cold feet would make no sense. Nonetheless, much more needs to be done to ensure the SGR’s future commercial and economic viability.

To start with, while economic and population growth, global supply chains, landlocked countries and mining investments all call for better and more reliable transport infrastructure, the SGR was not the right solution for Tanzania. Multiple reports have made this quite clear. There is no economic justification for SGR investment anywhere in East Africa at this point.

A 2013 World Bank report observed that an SGR project requires a volume of 55 million tonnes to be viable, while EAC railways are estimated to achieve only 14.4 million tonnes in total by 2030. With such requirements, given that Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) achieved not even a third of that, refurbishing the Central Railway at one third of the SGR cost would have sufficed, but the powers that be chose the most expensive option possible!

Neighbouring Kenya is paying dearly for its headstrong decision to ignore the fundamentals of railway economics. Ian Taylor, author of Kenya’s New Lunatic Express, observes that the Madaraka Express was generating a loss of $7.35 million every month in 2018, operating at less than 15 percent of its planned capacity. This is the fate that awaits Tanzania unless the government has something quite special up its sleeve.

But the long list of failed or failing public projects – TRC, UDA, BRT, TTCL, NHC, ATCL, Tanganyika Packers, etc – suggests that that is quite unlikely. While the government may pull off a project here or there, it lacks the track record of successfully running considerable operations in the medium and long term. To give the SGR a chance, the government needs to show a very high degree of resolve to address its future challenges.


Firstly, the SGR will have to pass the quality of service test. In the 1990s, when the road between Tanga and Moshi was rebuilt, people abandoned the railway services fast, and they were withdrawn. People have choices today. There are 86,000 lorries and 49,000 buses crisscrossing the nation every day. If TRC will approach this challenge as casually as it did in the past, we can as well conclude today that Tanzania’s SGR will be the most expensive white elephant in East African history.

Secondly, the DRC challenge. As it stands, even though over 90 percent of goods to or from Rwanda and Burundi pass through Dar es Salaam, they comprise less than one third of goods that pass through the port. Integration of the economic region around Tanganyika Lake might improve the situation. For example, the populous eastern provinces of the DRC of North and South Kivu, Katanga, Maniema and Ituri, which are resource-rich but are forced to depend on the unwieldy railway line to South Africa, could use a solid alternative line to Dar which could very likely cut transport times by up to 70 percent.

Thirdly, the marketing challenge. In the heyday of railway transportation in Africa, people often lacked viable transport alternatives, but today, all across sub-Saharan Africa, lorries dominate tracks even in cases where tracks have very clear cost advantages.

Statistics suggests that TRC is not competitive in the transportation of fertiliser, ores and minerals, cement, and oil, the kind of deals which successful operators thrive on. Similarly, even when ticket prices were half those of buses, people still preferred the convenience that buses offered. A laissez faire approach to the market will not persuade Tanzanians to use railway transport.

Finally, Dar es Salaam Port, which deserves its own discussion.

Generally speaking, railway is a nationally strategic resource. Unfortunately, Africans have been going about the railway business in the wrong way.

In the 1870s, only two decades after the introduction of railways, Indian mechanics began to manufacture locomotives which were better and cheaper than the British ones. Today, Indians are advising the British how to manage their railway networks. Similarly, in the 1930s’ South Africa, railways were pumping skilled craftsmen to the rest of the economy, leading to the industrialisation of South Africa. At its peak in the 1970s, South Africa Railways had 230,000 employees. Such is the potential of railways in economic transformation.

Pumping billions into a project will not bring such outcomes. There must be a paradigm shift without which the thousands of lorries will continue to damage roads, congestion will continue to cost the nation dearly and accidents will continue to cut short livesas hundreds of new vehicles hit the roads every day.

In this case, will the SGR ever work?

Given Tanzania’s track record, it is difficult to see anything beyond failure here. The most likely scenario is that the network will function well below expectations for years, incurring losses that the government will struggle to subsidise. As the situation worsens, TRC will start to cut corners in maintenance, making the infrastructure degrade faster, thus reducing the network speeds and reliability. Then clients will drop en masse going back to privately owned lorries and buses, leading to exactly where we started.

That’s the Tanzania we know and love, huh?


View attachment 2302965

Mpuuzi kazini

 

[Kitoabu]

SGR haikuwa na uharaka Sana kihivyo wakati pana mbadala wake tayari. Hakuna mizigo yeyeto nchini iliyokwama eti kisa Hakuna sgr. Hio pesa ya kujenga reli na kununua mabehewa ingepelekwa kwenye miundombinu ya kuwapa uwezo vijana wazalishe uchumi ungekua sana

Vijana wazalishe uchumi?
Hawa vijana wenu waliozoea kushinda kwenye mapooltable!

 

[ngalelefijo]

Kwani wanaojenga magorofa ya mabilioni ya pesa, unadhani hizo nyumba zinawanufaisha wao? Ni wajukuu ndio watakuja kula matunda.

Inawezekana kwenye hii post tunayochangia,wewe ndo mjinga peke yako

 

[bagamoyo]

Data za mabeberu zimelenga kukatisha tamaa ili tusijenge reli ya SGR. Huu ni uwekezaji wa muda mrefu uliolenga kusaidia taifa letu kwa mamia ya miaka mbele yetu. Ushauri wao ni sawa na ushauri wa mtu aliyejenga nyumba nzuri kwa wanaotaka kujenga nyumba!! Mara nyingi huwakatisha tamaa kwa kuwatajia mamilioni marefu yanayohitajika. Lakini wenye akili zao huanza mdogo mdogo na baada ya miaka kadhaa hufanikiwa kumalizia ujenzi na kumiliki jumba kubwa la hadhi. Wale wanaoogopa gharama wanazotishiwa nazo hubaki wakisumbuana na "mama mwenye nyumba" kwenye ulipaji wa kodi, au hujenga vibanda kama vibanda vya kuku.

Siku zote mabeberu watajitahidi kutukatisha tamaa kwenye miradi mikubwa ya maendeleo inayolenga kutukomboa kwa miaka mingi ijayo. Kwa mfano mradi wa Stigler's Gorge almaarufu kama bwawa la mwalimu Nyerere unaolenga kutufanya tujikomboe kabisa kwenye mahitaji ya umeme, umepigwa vita sana na mabeberu miaka nenda rudi wanaotaka waendelee kutupiga kwa kuwalipa capacity charges kwenye miradi ya kinyonyaji ya kufua umeme! Ndiyo maana walimchukia sana Magufuli kwa kukomaa na hiyo miradi miwili na namshukuru sana mama ameamua kuimalizia kwa gharama yoyote ile!. Tutafika tu hata kama ni kwa kuchelewa na hii ndiyo mikopo ambayo watoto wetu na wajukuu zetu watakapokuwa wanalipa mikopo hii wataelewa maana kuna kitu chenye tija wanachokiona!Lakini mikopo ya corona kama ni kwa kununulia chanjo au madawa watakuja walipe huku wanaona kuwa wazazi wao waliwauza!!

Hawa wataalamu wanaodai huu mradi wa SGR hauna faida watakuwa ni vibaraka wa mabeberu na wamenunuliwa kwa bei ya aibu ili tuendelee kuwategemea mabeberu hao huku wakitunyonya kama kupe!!! Watukome!

100 YEARS BELBASES​

A FORGOTTEN PAGE OF BELGIAN COLONIALISM IN AFRICA​

Belgian bases in East Africa​

The Belgian colonial period ended with the independence of Burundi and Rwanda on July 1, 1962, but there is still a vestige of our colonial past: the Belbases (Belgium Bases) in Tanzania.

In 1919, during the negotiation of the Treaty of Versailles, Great Britain was able to seize almost all the German colonies in East Africa. Rwanda and Burundi have become areas of Belgian mandate.

But Belgium, which had also participated in the war effort in East Africa, was not satisfied, protested strongly.

It received in 1921 from the British a commercial gesture by way of consolation, the so-called Belbases (of "Belgian Bases"), sites in two ports of Tanganyika: Kigoma on Lake Tanganyika, and Dar es Salaam on the Indian Ocean , with free transit on the railway between these two ports.

This agreement was signed 100 years ago, on March 15, 1921.

Belgium receives a lease of the concession for a symbolic Franc per year, where it could build quays and warehouses, initially in perpetuity, from 1956 for 99 years.
Goods to and from Belgian colonies in Central Africa could pass tax free via rail.

The Belgian government entrusted the operation to a private company, the Belgian East African Agency, which later became the International Maritime Agency (AMI).
In 1956, the Belbases were transferred to the colonial government, which now funded the infrastructure. After the independence of the Congo, Burundi and Rwanda, the Belbases became the joint property of the former colonies.

The transit zone gradually lost its economic importance and, certainly after the riots of 1991 (Congo) and 1994 (Rwanda), traffic from Central Africa stopped. Between 1994 and 1995, the AIM (Agence Maritime Internationale) began discussions on an "honorable end" of the management agreement, in 1996 Tanzania took over the sites.

• • SUMMARY
  • DETAILED HISTORY
  • CONTACT

100 YEARS BELBASES
A FORGOTTEN PAGE OF BELGIAN COLONIALISM IN AFRICA​

Belbases Convention​

​

Extract from the Moniteur Belge n° 113 du 23.4.1921
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
-----
CONVENTION BETWEEN BELGIUM AND GREAT BRITAIN
TO FACILITATE BELGIAN TRAFFIC THROUGH THE
TERRITORIES OF EASTERN AFRICA
-----
The British Government and the Belgian Government wishing, on the one hand, to give effect to the agreements in principle concluded between them, on the occasion of the common effort accomplished in Africa, after the violation of the neutrality of the Belgian Congo; taking into account, on the other hand, the special needs, from the point of view of access to the sea, of part of the Belgian Congo and of the territories whose administration has been entrusted to Belgium,

Have agreed on the following provisions :

Item 1. In the present convention, the expression "Belgian Congo" refers not only to the territories of the Belgian Congo properly speaking, but also to the territories of the former German protectorate to be administered by Belgium.

The expression "East Africa" refers, in addition to the present protectorates of Great Britain, to the territories of the former German protectorate to be administered by her.

The expression "vessel" applies to any ship or boat.

Art. 2. Great Britain undertakes to grant freedom of transit through East Africa on such routes as are or shall be most suitable for transit, whether by rail, lake, navigable river or by canal, to all persons, post, all goods and all ships, cars and wagons coming from or heading towards the Belgian Congo and, for this purpose, the crossing of territorial waters will be permitted. Such persons, post, goods, ships, carriages and wagons shall not be subject to any right of transit or to unnecessary delays or restrictions and they shall be treated, as regards taxes, facilities and all matters, on the same footing as British people, post, goods, ships, cars and wagons. Goods in transit will be exempt from all customs duties or other similar charges. All charges, in respect of carriage in transit, shall be reasonable, having regard to the conditions of the traffic, and no charge, facility or restriction shall depend, directly or indirectly, on the quality of the owner or the nationality of any vessel or any other means of transport which has been, or will have to be, used during any part of the total journey.

It is expressly understood that the term "transit charge" does not refer to the tax of 25 cents per parcel currently levied on goods in transit from East Africa; however, this tax will not be levied on goods in transit from or to the Belgian Congo passing through the locations of Kigoma and Dar-es-Salaam referred to in Article 5.

Art 3. Belgian subjects and property, and ships flying the Belgian flag shall, in all respects, be treated on a footing of perfect equality in all ports and on the inland waterways of East Africa, in such a way so that no distinction is made to the detriment of Belgian subjects, property and flag between the latter and British subjects, property and flag.

No other impediments to the movement of persons and buildings shall be introduced other than those resulting from the provisions relating to the police, customs, health requirements, emigration or immigration, and the import or the export of prohibited goods. These reasonable and uniform provisions shall not unnecessarily impede traffic.

Art 4. Travelers, post and goods from or to the Belgian Congo shall automatically benefit, on the railways and shipping lines of East Africa linking or capable of linking the Belgian Congo to the sea, from the point of view of taxes to be levied (taking into account all discounts and bonuses), facilities and, in all other respects, the most favorable treatment applied to travellers, to the post office, as well as to goods of the same nature or same class transported on the respective lines of East Africa, either in internal traffic, or on import, export or in transit, under similar conditions of transport, in particular from the point of view of the length of the journey.

It is understood that fares on the line from Dar-es-Salaam to Kigoma will never be unreasonably high to divert traffic between the Belgian Congo and the Indian Ocean from the port of Dar-es-Salaam.

At the request of the Belgian state, combined rates may be created between any point in the Belgian Congo on the one hand, the ports listed in article 5, as well as the places of destination and overseas origins , on the other hand. To this end, the Belgian and British Administrators will endeavor to conclude agreements with a view to combining the railway tariffs with the tariffs of the Belgian navigation services which may serve the said ports.

Any advantages which may be accorded by the railways to a British navigation service serving the said ports shall be extended, as of right, to the Belgian navigation services.

The Belgian state will be able to circulate on the Kigoma - Dar-es-Salaam route its own wagons for the transport of goods between the Belgian Congo and the sea. The conditions which these wagons must meet from the point of view of conditioning, weight, dimensions, brakes, etc., will be fixed by the British Authority, the Belgian Authority being consulted beforehand.

In the event that the general classification of goods adopted by a railway or a shipping line in East Africa does not mention certain products originating from or destined for the Belgian Congo, these products will, from the point of view of the application tariffs, treated by assimilation and placed as far as possible in the category of the most similar products.

Art 5. In order to facilitate the access of the Belgian Congo to the sea, the British Government will lease, in perpetuity, to the Belgian Government, in return for an annual fee of fr. 1, locations in the ports of Dar-es-Salaam and Kigoma.

The extent of these locations will be determined taking into account the probable increase in traffic with the Belgian Congo.

Commissioners will be designated on both sides, with a view to the choice and demarcation of these sites.

The sites will be chosen in such a way:

1° To present a sufficient berthing front in deep water

2° To be able to be easily connected to the railway

3° To allow the construction under favorable conditions of the maritime installations envisaged in the following article .

If necessary, the British Government will extend to the main railway line the connections existing or to be established on these sites.

Art 6. The locations shall remain subject to the laws and general regulations enacted by the competent British Authority, and British officials and agents shall have free access thereto, with a view to maintaining order and the application of these laws and regulations. regulations. The Belgian Authorities may carry out any work on the sites and carry out any installations that they deem useful for the development of traffic. However, the plans for works which may affect the regime of the navigable passes or the circulation of vessels must be drawn up by mutual agreement between the two Governments.

Buildings erected on the sites, in particular for the accommodation of staff, must meet the requirements of British regulations on building and hygiene. Dwellings will be subject to ordinary municipal taxes.

The commercial operation of the pitches is entrusted to the Belgian Government. The tariffs for the use of these sites and their installations will not be lower than the tariffs of the surplus of the port. It is understood that in principle they will be reasonable, having regard to the expenses of the initial establishment, improvement, maintenance and administration of the sites.

In the application of these tariffs, no distinction shall be made between the nationals of the High Contracting Parties and those of other Powers admitted to the benefit of national treatment, either by reason of the nationality of the persons, or by reason of the origin or the destination of the goods.

The Belgian Government may entrust the operation to concessionaires to be designated by it. However, these concessionaires must be approved by the British government, and the duration of the concession may not exceed twenty-five years.

Art 7. On entering and leaving ports, vessels calling at the above-mentioned locations must comply with the port police regulations and the orders of the British authorities.

Art 8. Subject to complying with the regulations governing the use of these installations, the ships, calling at the sites, will have access to slips, and dry docks of the surplus of the two ports; the same will apply to floating equipment assigned to the operation of the sites, such as lighters, tugs, tankers, etc.

Art 9. In the above locations, which can only be used for the traffic of goods in transit from or to the Belgian Congo, and not for the traffic of goods from or to East Africa, the British Customs Authorities will not be involved and the goods may not be subject to any duty or tax other than a statistical duty of one thousandth ad valorem at most, which will be collected by the Belgian authorities and assigned to cover the costs of the service responsible for establish the statistics of the trade and the movement of the Belgian location.

Art 10. On the railway between Kigoma and Dar-es-Salaam, wagons in transit between the sea and the Belgian Congo which will have been sealed by Belgian agents, in a manner to be agreed between the competent Administrations of the two countries , will be exempt from any British customs formalities.

The British Customs Authorities shall have the right to be represented at the sealing operations.

Art 11. The British Government will simplify, as far as possible, customs formalities with regard to goods in transit from or to the Belgian Congo via Kigoma and Dar-es-Salaam which do not pass through the locations referred to in the preceding articles.

Under the conditions to be determined between the competent British and Belgian Administrations, the transit of these goods will not be subject by British customs to consignments, sureties or other financial guarantees.

Art 12. In general, the British Government will ensure that Belgian traffic in East Africa is provided with the greatest possible facilities.

In witness whereof the undersigned have signed this Agreement and have affixed thereto their seals.

Done in duplicate at London, March 15, 1921

Baron Moncheur

Curzon of Kedleston


Certified true by the Secretary General
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

H.Costermans​

Copyright © 1995 - 2021 by Guido FALLENTHEYN - All Rights Reserved.
Contact	Sources

Source : Belbases - Une page oubliée du colonialisme Belge en Afrique

Even if they have not been used for 25 years, in theory these Belbases still exist, because the four countries (Tanzania, Burundi, Congo and Rwanda) have not yet been able to agree on compensation for the resumption of the installations.

 

[nazidaka]

Daima mbele, nyuma mwiko!

 

[katitu]

Hi i kipindi Mkoroni anajenga reli kati alikuwa na uwezo wa kusafirisha tani ngapi?

Ni adui wa uchumi huyu aliyeandika huo upuuzi tukipata hasara yeye kinamuuma nini?aache polojo zake hakuna mjinga wa kudanganywa ktk zama hizi

 

[bagamoyo]

Njia pekee ya kunusuru mradi huu wa SGR reli mpya ubebe angalau robo ya tani 55 milioni na bandari za Kigoma na ile kubwa ya Dar es Salaam ziwe kitovu cha mizigo ya DR Congo, Rwanda na Burundi ni kwa kuusoma kwa kina, umakini na kuigiza makubaliano ya mwaka 1921 yaliyoasisi BelBases Tanganyika. Source : Belbases -Convention 1921

 

[Mjomba Fujo]

Inawezekana kwenye hii post tunayochangia,wewe ndo mjinga peke yako

Kuwa na adabu

 

[Havizya]

Habari za leo,

Gazeti la The Citizen limeandika makala kuhoji busara iliyotumika kuamua kujenga SGR Wakati tafiti za Kitaalamu zinaonesha tutapata Hasara?

Kwa mujibu wa WB Ili reli ilete faida inatakiwa mzigo angalau Tani mil.55 wakati utafiti unaonyesha Hadi kufikia 2030 EAC yote itakuwa na uwezo wa kusafirisha Tani asilia 14 tuu ya mahitaji Ili upate faida..

Kwamba Kwa nini Magufuli na Serikali yake walichagua expensive option ambayo itakuwa ni liability Kwa Taifa miaka na miaka?

My take: Hivi kwa nini tusiwe tunawawajibisha watu wanaotoa hasara Taifa kwa maamuzi yao ya Hovyo?[emoji116]

=====

Trucks and tracks: Will Tanzania’s SGR ever work?
Charles Makakala
6-7 minutes
Summary

The government’s gung-ho approach to SGR is commendable. At this stage of the project, developing cold feet would make no sense. Nonetheless, much more needs to be done to ensure the SGR’s future commercial and economic viability.

Tanzania continues to show strong commitment to its grand $14 billion, 1,800km standard gauge railway (SGR) project. According to recent reports, the government is pushing forward with the Tabora-Gitega and Isaka-Kigali phases, connecting the infrastructure with Burundi and Rwanda, respectively. This will, hopefully, make Tanzania a transportation hub for its many landlocked neighbours.

The government’s gung-ho approach to SGR is commendable. At this stage of the project, developing cold feet would make no sense. Nonetheless, much more needs to be done to ensure the SGR’s future commercial and economic viability.

To start with, while economic and population growth, global supply chains, landlocked countries and mining investments all call for better and more reliable transport infrastructure, the SGR was not the right solution for Tanzania. Multiple reports have made this quite clear. There is no economic justification for SGR investment anywhere in East Africa at this point.

A 2013 World Bank report observed that an SGR project requires a volume of 55 million tonnes to be viable, while EAC railways are estimated to achieve only 14.4 million tonnes in total by 2030. With such requirements, given that Tanzania Railways Corporation (TRC) achieved not even a third of that, refurbishing the Central Railway at one third of the SGR cost would have sufficed, but the powers that be chose the most expensive option possible!

Neighbouring Kenya is paying dearly for its headstrong decision to ignore the fundamentals of railway economics. Ian Taylor, author of Kenya’s New Lunatic Express, observes that the Madaraka Express was generating a loss of $7.35 million every month in 2018, operating at less than 15 percent of its planned capacity. This is the fate that awaits Tanzania unless the government has something quite special up its sleeve.

But the long list of failed or failing public projects – TRC, UDA, BRT, TTCL, NHC, ATCL, Tanganyika Packers, etc – suggests that that is quite unlikely. While the government may pull off a project here or there, it lacks the track record of successfully running considerable operations in the medium and long term. To give the SGR a chance, the government needs to show a very high degree of resolve to address its future challenges.


Firstly, the SGR will have to pass the quality of service test. In the 1990s, when the road between Tanga and Moshi was rebuilt, people abandoned the railway services fast, and they were withdrawn. People have choices today. There are 86,000 lorries and 49,000 buses crisscrossing the nation every day. If TRC will approach this challenge as casually as it did in the past, we can as well conclude today that Tanzania’s SGR will be the most expensive white elephant in East African history.

Secondly, the DRC challenge. As it stands, even though over 90 percent of goods to or from Rwanda and Burundi pass through Dar es Salaam, they comprise less than one third of goods that pass through the port. Integration of the economic region around Tanganyika Lake might improve the situation. For example, the populous eastern provinces of the DRC of North and South Kivu, Katanga, Maniema and Ituri, which are resource-rich but are forced to depend on the unwieldy railway line to South Africa, could use a solid alternative line to Dar which could very likely cut transport times by up to 70 percent.

Thirdly, the marketing challenge. In the heyday of railway transportation in Africa, people often lacked viable transport alternatives, but today, all across sub-Saharan Africa, lorries dominate tracks even in cases where tracks have very clear cost advantages.

Statistics suggests that TRC is not competitive in the transportation of fertiliser, ores and minerals, cement, and oil, the kind of deals which successful operators thrive on. Similarly, even when ticket prices were half those of buses, people still preferred the convenience that buses offered. A laissez faire approach to the market will not persuade Tanzanians to use railway transport.

Finally, Dar es Salaam Port, which deserves its own discussion.

Generally speaking, railway is a nationally strategic resource. Unfortunately, Africans have been going about the railway business in the wrong way.

In the 1870s, only two decades after the introduction of railways, Indian mechanics began to manufacture locomotives which were better and cheaper than the British ones. Today, Indians are advising the British how to manage their railway networks. Similarly, in the 1930s’ South Africa, railways were pumping skilled craftsmen to the rest of the economy, leading to the industrialisation of South Africa. At its peak in the 1970s, South Africa Railways had 230,000 employees. Such is the potential of railways in economic transformation.

Pumping billions into a project will not bring such outcomes. There must be a paradigm shift without which the thousands of lorries will continue to damage roads, congestion will continue to cost the nation dearly and accidents will continue to cut short livesas hundreds of new vehicles hit the roads every day.

In this case, will the SGR ever work?

Given Tanzania’s track record, it is difficult to see anything beyond failure here. The most likely scenario is that the network will function well below expectations for years, incurring losses that the government will struggle to subsidise. As the situation worsens, TRC will start to cut corners in maintenance, making the infrastructure degrade faster, thus reducing the network speeds and reliability. Then clients will drop en masse going back to privately owned lorries and buses, leading to exactly where we started.

That’s the Tanzania we know and love, huh?


View attachment 2302965

WALIOSHAURI WAKO HAI, ALIYESHAURIWA KATANGULIA.
SASA HAWA WASHAURI WAKAMATWE WANYONGWE MARA MOJA, NA KABURI LA MWENDA ZAKE LIKATIWE MNYORORO NA PINGU ZA SHABA. PERIOD