Je, Wajua Waraka wa TEC Sio Neno la Mungu? Ili Kuepuka Kuchanganya Dini na Siasa, Kuna Haja Waumini Tuambiwe Ukweli Waraka wa TEC Sio Neno la Mungu?

Je, Wajua Waraka wa TEC Sio Neno la Mungu? Ili Kuepuka Kuchanganya Dini na Siasa, Kuna Haja Waumini Tuambiwe Ukweli Waraka wa TEC Sio Neno la Mungu?

comte said:
You think God created churches? or government? These are not creatures, for god's sake.
Click to expand...
I disagree.

Read for your self below....

==============


The Political Nature of Man

As we have seen, Aquinas mentions that one of the natural goods to which human beings are inclined is “to live in society.”

This remark presents the ideal point of departure for one of the most important teachings of Thomistic political philosophy, namely, the political nature of man.

This doctrine is taken primarily from the first book of Aristotle’s Politics upon which Aquinas wrote an extensive commentary (although the commentary is only completed through book 3, chapter 8 of Aristotle’s Politics, Aquinas seems to have commented upon what he considered to be the Politics’ theoretical core.).

Following “the Philosopher” Aquinas believes that political society (civitas) emerges from the needs and aspirations of human nature itself.

Thus understood, it is not an invention of human ingenuity (as in the political teachings of modern social contract theorists) nor an artificial construction designed to make up for human nature’s shortcomings. It is, rather, a prompting of nature itself that sets humans apart from all other natural creatures.

To be sure, political society is not simply given by nature. It is rather something to which human beings naturally aspire and which is necessary for the full perfection of their existence.

The capacity for political society is not natural to man, therefore, in the same way as the five senses are natural. The naturalness of politics is more appropriately compared to the naturalness of moral virtue (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [40]).

Even though human beings are inclined to moral virtue, acquiring the virtues nonetheless requires both education and habituation. In the same way, even though human beings are inclined to live in political societies, such societies must still be established, built, and maintained by human industry.

To be fully human is to live in political society, and Aquinas makes a great deal of Aristotle’s claim that one who is separated from society so as to be completely a-political must be either sub-human or super-human, either a “beast or a god.” (Aristotle’s Politics, 1253a27; Cf. Aquinas’Commentary, Book 1, Lesson 1 [39]).

Aquinas admits, of course, that political society is not the only natural community. The family is natural in perhaps an even stronger sense and is prior to political society. The priority of the family, however, is not a priority of importance, since politics aims at a higher and nobler good than the family.

It is rather a priority of development. In other words, politics surpasses all other communities in dignity while at the same time depending upon and presupposing the family.

On this point Aquinas follows Aristotle’s explanation of how political society develops from other lower societies including both the family and the village. The human family comes into existence from the nearly universal tendency of males and females joining together for purposes of procreation.

Humans share with other animals (and even plants) a “natural appetite to leave after them another being like themselves,” (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [18]) and immediately see the utility if not the necessity of both parents remaining available to provide for the needs of the children and one another.

As families grow in size and number there also seems to be a tendency for them to gravitate towards one another and form villages. The reasons for this are primarily utilitarian.

Whereas the household suffices for providing the daily necessities of life, the village is necessary for providing non-daily commodities (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [27]).

What Aquinas and Aristotle seem to have in mind in describing the emergence of the village is the division of labor.

Whereas humans can reproduce and survive quite easily in families, life becomes much more productive and affluent when families come together in villages, since one man can now specialize in a certain task while fulfilling his family’s remaining material needs through barter and trade.

Despite the village’s usefulness to man, it nevertheless leaves him incomplete. This is partly because the village is still relatively small and so the effectiveness of the division of labor remains limited.

Much more useful is the conglomeration of several villages, which provides a wider variety of commodities and specializations to be shared by means of exchange (Commentary on the Politics Book 1, Lesson 1 [31]).

This is one reason why the village is eclipsed by political society, which proves much more useful to human beings because of its greater size and much more elaborate governmental structure.

There is, however, a far more important reason why political society comes into existence. In addition to yielding greater protection and economic benefits, it also enhances the moral and intellectual lives of human beings.

By identifying with a political community, human beings begin to see the world in broader terms than the mere satisfaction of their bodily desires and physical needs.

Whereas the residents of the village better serve their individual interests, the goal of the political community becomes the good of the whole, or the common good, which Aquinas claims (following Aristotle) is “better and more divine than the good of the individual.” (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [11]).

The political community is thus understood as the first community (larger than the family) for which the individual makes great sacrifices, since it is not merely a larger cooperative venture for mutual economic benefit. It is, rather, the social setting in which man truly finds his highest natural fulfillment.

In this sense, the political community, even though not directed to the individual good, better serves the individual by promoting a life of virtue in which human existence can be greatly ennobled.

It is in this context that Aquinas argues (again following Aristotle) that although political society originally comes into being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of “living well.” (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [31]).

Aquinas takes Aristotle’s argument that political society transcends the village and completes human social existence to prove that the city is natural. Similar, but not identical, to this claim is Aquinas’ further assertion that man is by nature a “civic and social animal.” (ST, I-II, 72.4).

To support this, Aquinas refers us to Aristotle’s observation that human beings are the only animals possessing the ability to exercise speech. Not to be confused with mere voice (vox), speech (loquutio) involves the communication of thoughts and concepts between persons (ST, I-II, 72.4).

Whereas voice is found in many different animals that communicate their immediate desires and aversions to one another (seen in the dog’s bark and the lion’s roar) speech includes a conscious conception of what one is saying (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lecture 1 [36]).

By means of speech, therefore, human beings may collectively deliberate on core civic matters regarding “what is useful and what is harmful,” as well as “the just and the unjust.” (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lecture 1 [37]).

Whereas other animals exhibit a certain social tendency (as bees instinctively work to preserve their hive), only humans are social in the sense that they cooperate through speech to pursue a common understanding of justice, virtue, and the good.

Since speech is the outward expression of his inner rationality, man is political by nature for the same reason he is naturally rational.

The fact that man is a naturally political animal has far-reaching implications. In addition to being a father, a mother, a farmer, or a teacher, a human being is more importantly identified as a citizen.

Achieving genuine human excellence, therefore, most always means achieving excellence as a citizen of some political society (Aquinas does mention the possibility that someone’s supernatural calling may necessitate that they live outside of political society.

As examples of such people, he mentions “John the Baptist and Blessed Anthony the hermit.”

See his Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lecture 1 [35].). To be sure, the requirements of good citizenship vary from regime to regime, but more generally conceived the good citizen is the one that places the common good above his own private good and acts accordingly.

In doing so, such a person exhibits the virtue of legal justice whereby all of his actions are referred in one way or another to the common good of his particular society (ST, II-II, 58.5).

Following the progression of Aristotle’s discussion of citizenship, however, Aquinas recognizes a certain difficulty in assigning an unqualifiedly high value to citizenship. What sense does it make to speak of a good citizen in a bad regime?

One does not need to consider the worst sorts of regimes to see the difficulty inherent in achieving good citizenship.

In any regime that is less than perfect there always remains the possibility that promoting the interests of the regime and promoting the common good may not be the same.
To be sure, good men are often called to stand up heroically against tyrants (ST, II-II, 42.2, ad 3), but the full potential of the good citizen will never be realized unless he lives in best of all possible regimes.

In other words, only in the best regime do the good citizen and the good human being coincide (Commentary on the Politics, Book 3, Lecture 3 [366]).

In fact, even the best regime will fall short of producing a multitude of good citizens, since no society exists where everyone is virtuous (Commentary on the Politics, Book 3, Lecture 3 [367]).

But what is the best regime? Following Aristotle, Aquinas argues that all regimes can be divided into six basic types, which are determined according to two criteria: how the regime is ruled and whether or not it is ruled justly (that is, for the common good).

As he explains, political rule may be exercised by the multitude, by a select few, or by one person.

If the regime is ruled justly, it is called a monarchy or kingship when ruled by one single individual, an aristocracy when ruled by a few, and a polity or republic when ruled by the multitude.

If, on the other hand, a regime is ruled unjustly (that is, for the sake of the ruler(s) and not for the common weal), it is called a tyranny when ruled by one, an oligarchy when ruled by a few, and a democracy when ruled by the multitude (On Kingship, Book 1, Chapter 1;Commentary on the Politics, Book 3, Lecture 6 [393-394]).

Simply Stated, the best regime is monarchy. Aquinas’ argument for this is drawn from a mixture of philosophical and theological observations.

Inasmuch as the goal of any ruler should be the “unity of peace,” the regime is better governed by one person rather than by many.

For this end is much more efficaciously secured by a single wise authority who is not burdened by having to deliberate with others who may be less wise and who may stand in the way of effective governance.

As Aquinas observes in his letter On Kingship, any governing body comprised of many must always strive to act as one in order to move the regime closer to the intended goal. In this sense, therefore, the less perfect regimes tend to imitate monarchy in which unanimity of rule is realized at once and without obstruction (On Kingship, Book 1, Chapter 2).

This conclusion is confirmed by the example of nature, which always “does what is best.” For the many powers of the human soul are governed by a single power, i.e., reason. A hive of bees is ruled by a single bee, i.e., the queen.

And most convincingly of all, the universe is governed by the single authority of God, “Maker and Ruler of all things.” As art is called to imitate nature, human society is therefore best that is governed by a single authority of a eminently wise and just monarch who resembles God as much as humanly possible.

Aquinas is well aware, of course, that such a monarch is not always available in political societies, and even where he is available it is not always guaranteed that the conditions will be right to grant him the political authority he ought to wield. Even worse, there is always the danger that the monarch will be corrupted and become a tyrant. In this case the best of all regimes has the greatest tendency to become the worst.

This is why, whereas monarchy is the best regime simply speaking, it is not always the best regime in a particular time and place, which is to say it is certainly not always the best possible regime. Therefore, Aquinas outlines in the Summa Theologiae a more modest proposal whereby political rule is somewhat decentralized.

The regime that he recommends takes the positive dimensions of all three “good regimes.” Whereas it has a monarch at its head, it is also governed by “others” possessing a certain degree of authority who may advise the monarch while curbing any tyrannical tendencies he may have.

Finally, Aquinas suggests that the entire multitude of citizens should be responsible for selecting the monarch and should all be candidates for political authority themselves.

Whereas the best regime simply speaking is monarchy, the best possible regime seems to be the mixed government that incorporates the positive dimensions of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas appears to use the name of democracy in place of Aristotle’s conception of polity.).

To support this conclusion, Aquinas is able to cite the Hebrew form of government established by God in the Old Testament.

Whereas Moses (and his successors) ruled the Jews as a monarch, there also existed a council of seventy-two elders which provided “an element of aristocracy.” Inasmuch as the rulers were selected from among the people, this sacred regime of the Bible also incorporated a certain dimension of democracy (ST, I-II, 105.1).

Source: Aquinas: Political Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
 
mbussi said:
Ndugu Comte, sina comment na maneno ya Cardinal Pengo kama kweli ni yake. Siyo watu wote uwa na mtizamo wa aina moja ktk kila jambo.
Ila kuhusu hili la ndugu yangu Paschal Mayalla kwa kweli imebidi nimshangae maana kama yeye ni Mkatoliki ilibidi yeye ndiyo awe mstari wa mbele kuwaelimisha wasiyo wakatoriki taratibu za kanisa. Anaingia ktk mtego uleule wa kuchanganya siasa na dini.
Click to expand...
Je inawezekana dini kuchanganyika na siasa?
 
Sang'udi said:
Mapadre (wakiwemo maaskofu) wamepewa mamlaka hayo:

Mathayo 18:18
Amin, nawaambieni: yoyote mtakayoyafunga duniani yatakuwa yamefungwa mbinguni, na yoyote mtakayoyafungua duniani yatakuwa yamefunguliwa mbinguni.
Click to expand...
Yoyote yapi? Jibu ya Kipadri siyo ya Kibandari
 
Neno la Mungu hutokana na vitabu vitakatifu. Waraka umetoka kitabu gani kwenye Biblia kwa uelewa wako Ndugu mwandishi
Wepesi wepesi tutapinga na kuuzodoa ule waraka lakini tutaamini miujiza ya kufufua watu na kusema ni ya Mungu.
 
Mama Amon said:
I disagree.

Read for your self below....

==============


The Political Nature of Man

As we have seen, Aquinas mentions that one of the natural goods to which human beings are inclined is “to live in society.”

This remark presents the ideal point of departure for one of the most important teachings of Thomistic political philosophy, namely, the political nature of man.

This doctrine is taken primarily from the first book of Aristotle’s Politics upon which Aquinas wrote an extensive commentary (although the commentary is only completed through book 3, chapter 8 of Aristotle’s Politics, Aquinas seems to have commented upon what he considered to be the Politics’ theoretical core.).

Following “the Philosopher” Aquinas believes that political society (civitas) emerges from the needs and aspirations of human nature itself.

Thus understood, it is not an invention of human ingenuity (as in the political teachings of modern social contract theorists) nor an artificial construction designed to make up for human nature’s shortcomings. It is, rather, a prompting of nature itself that sets humans apart from all other natural creatures.

To be sure, political society is not simply given by nature. It is rather something to which human beings naturally aspire and which is necessary for the full perfection of their existence.

The capacity for political society is not natural to man, therefore, in the same way as the five senses are natural. The naturalness of politics is more appropriately compared to the naturalness of moral virtue (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [40]).

Even though human beings are inclined to moral virtue, acquiring the virtues nonetheless requires both education and habituation. In the same way, even though human beings are inclined to live in political societies, such societies must still be established, built, and maintained by human industry.

To be fully human is to live in political society, and Aquinas makes a great deal of Aristotle’s claim that one who is separated from society so as to be completely a-political must be either sub-human or super-human, either a “beast or a god.” (Aristotle’s Politics, 1253a27; Cf. Aquinas’Commentary, Book 1, Lesson 1 [39]).

Aquinas admits, of course, that political society is not the only natural community. The family is natural in perhaps an even stronger sense and is prior to political society. The priority of the family, however, is not a priority of importance, since politics aims at a higher and nobler good than the family.

It is rather a priority of development. In other words, politics surpasses all other communities in dignity while at the same time depending upon and presupposing the family.

On this point Aquinas follows Aristotle’s explanation of how political society develops from other lower societies including both the family and the village. The human family comes into existence from the nearly universal tendency of males and females joining together for purposes of procreation.

Humans share with other animals (and even plants) a “natural appetite to leave after them another being like themselves,” (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [18]) and immediately see the utility if not the necessity of both parents remaining available to provide for the needs of the children and one another.

As families grow in size and number there also seems to be a tendency for them to gravitate towards one another and form villages. The reasons for this are primarily utilitarian.

Whereas the household suffices for providing the daily necessities of life, the village is necessary for providing non-daily commodities (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [27]).

What Aquinas and Aristotle seem to have in mind in describing the emergence of the village is the division of labor.

Whereas humans can reproduce and survive quite easily in families, life becomes much more productive and affluent when families come together in villages, since one man can now specialize in a certain task while fulfilling his family’s remaining material needs through barter and trade.

Despite the village’s usefulness to man, it nevertheless leaves him incomplete. This is partly because the village is still relatively small and so the effectiveness of the division of labor remains limited.

Much more useful is the conglomeration of several villages, which provides a wider variety of commodities and specializations to be shared by means of exchange (Commentary on the Politics Book 1, Lesson 1 [31]).

This is one reason why the village is eclipsed by political society, which proves much more useful to human beings because of its greater size and much more elaborate governmental structure.

There is, however, a far more important reason why political society comes into existence. In addition to yielding greater protection and economic benefits, it also enhances the moral and intellectual lives of human beings.

By identifying with a political community, human beings begin to see the world in broader terms than the mere satisfaction of their bodily desires and physical needs.

Whereas the residents of the village better serve their individual interests, the goal of the political community becomes the good of the whole, or the common good, which Aquinas claims (following Aristotle) is “better and more divine than the good of the individual.” (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [11]).

The political community is thus understood as the first community (larger than the family) for which the individual makes great sacrifices, since it is not merely a larger cooperative venture for mutual economic benefit. It is, rather, the social setting in which man truly finds his highest natural fulfillment.

In this sense, the political community, even though not directed to the individual good, better serves the individual by promoting a life of virtue in which human existence can be greatly ennobled.

It is in this context that Aquinas argues (again following Aristotle) that although political society originally comes into being for the sake of living, it exists for the sake of “living well.” (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lesson 1 [31]).

Aquinas takes Aristotle’s argument that political society transcends the village and completes human social existence to prove that the city is natural. Similar, but not identical, to this claim is Aquinas’ further assertion that man is by nature a “civic and social animal.” (ST, I-II, 72.4).

To support this, Aquinas refers us to Aristotle’s observation that human beings are the only animals possessing the ability to exercise speech. Not to be confused with mere voice (vox), speech (loquutio) involves the communication of thoughts and concepts between persons (ST, I-II, 72.4).

Whereas voice is found in many different animals that communicate their immediate desires and aversions to one another (seen in the dog’s bark and the lion’s roar) speech includes a conscious conception of what one is saying (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lecture 1 [36]).

By means of speech, therefore, human beings may collectively deliberate on core civic matters regarding “what is useful and what is harmful,” as well as “the just and the unjust.” (Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lecture 1 [37]).

Whereas other animals exhibit a certain social tendency (as bees instinctively work to preserve their hive), only humans are social in the sense that they cooperate through speech to pursue a common understanding of justice, virtue, and the good.

Since speech is the outward expression of his inner rationality, man is political by nature for the same reason he is naturally rational.

The fact that man is a naturally political animal has far-reaching implications. In addition to being a father, a mother, a farmer, or a teacher, a human being is more importantly identified as a citizen.

Achieving genuine human excellence, therefore, most always means achieving excellence as a citizen of some political society (Aquinas does mention the possibility that someone’s supernatural calling may necessitate that they live outside of political society.

As examples of such people, he mentions “John the Baptist and Blessed Anthony the hermit.”

See his Commentary on the Politics, Book 1, Lecture 1 [35].). To be sure, the requirements of good citizenship vary from regime to regime, but more generally conceived the good citizen is the one that places the common good above his own private good and acts accordingly.

In doing so, such a person exhibits the virtue of legal justice whereby all of his actions are referred in one way or another to the common good of his particular society (ST, II-II, 58.5).

Following the progression of Aristotle’s discussion of citizenship, however, Aquinas recognizes a certain difficulty in assigning an unqualifiedly high value to citizenship. What sense does it make to speak of a good citizen in a bad regime?

One does not need to consider the worst sorts of regimes to see the difficulty inherent in achieving good citizenship.

In any regime that is less than perfect there always remains the possibility that promoting the interests of the regime and promoting the common good may not be the same.
To be sure, good men are often called to stand up heroically against tyrants (ST, II-II, 42.2, ad 3), but the full potential of the good citizen will never be realized unless he lives in best of all possible regimes.

In other words, only in the best regime do the good citizen and the good human being coincide (Commentary on the Politics, Book 3, Lecture 3 [366]).

In fact, even the best regime will fall short of producing a multitude of good citizens, since no society exists where everyone is virtuous (Commentary on the Politics, Book 3, Lecture 3 [367]).

But what is the best regime? Following Aristotle, Aquinas argues that all regimes can be divided into six basic types, which are determined according to two criteria: how the regime is ruled and whether or not it is ruled justly (that is, for the common good).

As he explains, political rule may be exercised by the multitude, by a select few, or by one person.

If the regime is ruled justly, it is called a monarchy or kingship when ruled by one single individual, an aristocracy when ruled by a few, and a polity or republic when ruled by the multitude.

If, on the other hand, a regime is ruled unjustly (that is, for the sake of the ruler(s) and not for the common weal), it is called a tyranny when ruled by one, an oligarchy when ruled by a few, and a democracy when ruled by the multitude (On Kingship, Book 1, Chapter 1;Commentary on the Politics, Book 3, Lecture 6 [393-394]).

Simply Stated, the best regime is monarchy. Aquinas’ argument for this is drawn from a mixture of philosophical and theological observations.

Inasmuch as the goal of any ruler should be the “unity of peace,” the regime is better governed by one person rather than by many.

For this end is much more efficaciously secured by a single wise authority who is not burdened by having to deliberate with others who may be less wise and who may stand in the way of effective governance.

As Aquinas observes in his letter On Kingship, any governing body comprised of many must always strive to act as one in order to move the regime closer to the intended goal. In this sense, therefore, the less perfect regimes tend to imitate monarchy in which unanimity of rule is realized at once and without obstruction (On Kingship, Book 1, Chapter 2).

This conclusion is confirmed by the example of nature, which always “does what is best.” For the many powers of the human soul are governed by a single power, i.e., reason. A hive of bees is ruled by a single bee, i.e., the queen.

And most convincingly of all, the universe is governed by the single authority of God, “Maker and Ruler of all things.” As art is called to imitate nature, human society is therefore best that is governed by a single authority of a eminently wise and just monarch who resembles God as much as humanly possible.

Aquinas is well aware, of course, that such a monarch is not always available in political societies, and even where he is available it is not always guaranteed that the conditions will be right to grant him the political authority he ought to wield. Even worse, there is always the danger that the monarch will be corrupted and become a tyrant. In this case the best of all regimes has the greatest tendency to become the worst.

This is why, whereas monarchy is the best regime simply speaking, it is not always the best regime in a particular time and place, which is to say it is certainly not always the best possible regime. Therefore, Aquinas outlines in the Summa Theologiae a more modest proposal whereby political rule is somewhat decentralized.

The regime that he recommends takes the positive dimensions of all three “good regimes.” Whereas it has a monarch at its head, it is also governed by “others” possessing a certain degree of authority who may advise the monarch while curbing any tyrannical tendencies he may have.

Finally, Aquinas suggests that the entire multitude of citizens should be responsible for selecting the monarch and should all be candidates for political authority themselves.

Whereas the best regime simply speaking is monarchy, the best possible regime seems to be the mixed government that incorporates the positive dimensions of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy (In the Summa Theologiae, Aquinas appears to use the name of democracy in place of Aristotle’s conception of polity.).

To support this conclusion, Aquinas is able to cite the Hebrew form of government established by God in the Old Testament.

Whereas Moses (and his successors) ruled the Jews as a monarch, there also existed a council of seventy-two elders which provided “an element of aristocracy.” Inasmuch as the rulers were selected from among the people, this sacred regime of the Bible also incorporated a certain dimension of democracy (ST, I-II, 105.1).

Source: Aquinas: Political Philosophy | Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
Click to expand...
Thank you very much. very enlightening, and this paragraph below, extracted from the reading you provided, easily serves my skin. You see human nature—selfish and wishful—constructing what, where, and how they want it. This is how God made us, but politics, religion, etc. did not create them; they are our constructions.
Following “the Philosopher” Aquinas believes that political society (civitas) emerges from the needs and aspirations of human nature itself.
 
comte said:
Je inawezekana dini kuchanganyika na siasa?
Click to expand...
Ndiyo, dini inawezekana kuchanganyika na siasa kutegemea jamii inayohusika pamoja na sheria za hiyo jamii. Kwenye context ya kinachoendelea hapa kwetu, hakuna dini yoyote ambayo imechanganywa kwenye siasa. Ni utamaduni wetu tangu hapo hawali viongozi wa dini kuhusishwa na wanasiasa wenyewe ktk mambo ya siasa.

Imetokea ilivyotokea, waraka umekosoa mkataba wa serikali, lakini kama ungukuwa ni waraka wa kuunga mkono, ungeona viongozi wakimimina sifa kwa TEC. Ni utamaduni wa watu wanafiki, ambao wanapenda sifa tu lakini kukosolewa hawataki. Pia, hii imetokea kwasababu ya kukosekana majibu sahihi kwa hoja zilizotolewa. Ndiyo, sababu kama umeshagundua, wanaoshadadia kujibu waraka wa TEC, ni watu wa kawaida wasio na vyeo ama serikalini au kwenye taasisi kubwa za kidini. Ni watu wenye elimu ya kawaida na wengine hawana uwezo kabisa wa kuchanganua mambo. Mzee wa upako na BASUTA wanaingia ktk kundi hili.
 
FaizaFoxy said:
Kanisa la katoliki la Kirumi (Roman Catholi Church} halijawahi kumuani Mwenyezi Mungu mmoja.

Ukatoliki ni imani ambayo utamaduni, mila, mila na kanuni za kanisa katoliki tu zinaOkubaliwa na kufatwa.

Huanzia kwa ubaba wa duniani huishia kwa ubaba wa duniani, kinyume hata na biblia yao, binafsi siamini kama biblia ni kitabu cha Mungu, nainukuu kwa kuwa wao ndicho kitabu wanakitumia kudanganyia watu.
Click to expand...

Kama wewe ulivyodanganywa na kitabu ulichosoma
 
Mama Amon said:
TEC ni sehemu ya Kanisa Katoliki la Roma. Hivyo, dhana ya UTU wa binadamu na UTU wa Mungu, zinazotambuliwa na Kanisa Katoliki la Roma zinatambuliwa na TEC.

Nakukumbusha kwamba, Kanisa Katoliki la Roma linafundisha, na TEC wanakubali, hoja ifuatayo:

1. Kwa kuwa UTU wa Mungu ni chimbuko la UTU wa binadamu;

2. Na kwa kuwa kuna uhusiano usiotenganishika kati ya chanzo na matokeo yanayotokana na chanzo husika;

3. Basi, kuna uhusiano usiotenganishika kati ya UTU wa binadamu na UTU wa Mungu.

Kwa hiyo, maneno yako kwamba "Dini zote zina sifa ya kutenganisha UTU wa MUNGU na UTU wa BINADAMU," japo umelisema hilo kwa kujiuma uma midomo, hayakubaliki kwa Kanisa Katoliki la Roma, linaloamini juu muungano wa kudumu wa kietiolojia (an inseparable etiological connection) kati ya Mungu aliye sababu na Binadamu aliye matokeo.
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Mdanganyane kuhusu }utu" wa Mungu hukohuko kanisani, Biblia inawasuta:

Numbers 23:19
King James Bible
God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should repent: hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?
 
FaizaFoxy said:
Mdanganyane kuhusu }utu" wa Mungu hukohuko kanisani, Biblia inawasuta:

Numbers 23:19
King James Bible
God is not a man, that he should lie; neither the son of man, that he should repent: hath he said, and shall he not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall he not make it good?
Click to expand...

Tatizo lako FazaFoxy unatumia muda mwingi kufua, kupiga pasi na kufunga hijabu na hivyo kukosa muda wa kujielimisha!

Mwalimu gani alikwambia kuwa neno "mtu" ni kisawe cha "man" wewe bibie?

Ni hivi: man is a synonym of human, ambayo ni kinyume cha divine.

Hivyo kuna human personhood na divine personhood.

Na divine personhood inaweza kumaanisha Godly personhood au angelic personhood.

Kwa hiyo neno "mtu" katika Kiswahili ni kisawe cha neno "person" katika Kiingereza.

Kuna wakati wa kuhijabika na wakati wa kuelimika.

Punguza muda wa kuhijabika bibie!
 
Mkuu kwa kukusaidia tu kama kweli wewe ni mkristo mkatoliki, nenda kajiulize nini maana ya neno la Mungu, ni mamlaka gani wanapewa makasisi wa kikatoliki pale wanapopakwa mafuta, ni mlaka gani tunapewa waumini pale tunapopakwa mafuta katika sakramenti ya kipaimara. Kisheria katoliki kwenye canon law, kasome ili ili jambo liwe na hadhi ya tamko na waraka wa baraza la maaskofu linapitia michakato ipi na kua na sifa gani, na mpaka limeitwa tamko na waraka jua limeisha sajiliwa rasmi kua moja ya mafundisho ya kanisa. Kwa hiyo kama nafsi yako ina wasiwasi jua kwamba unajua unachokifanya sio sahihi, kama haina wasiwasi endelea na shughuli zako lakini usitake kutuwakilishi sisi, kila mtu ana imani yake.
 
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