Mfiaukweli
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Pendekezo: Kiswahili kitumike kama lugha ya kufundishia ngazi zote za elimu, ili tukomboke kifikra
Pendekezo: Kiswahili kitumike kama lugha ya kufundishia ngazi zote za elimu, ili tukomboke kifikra
- Thread starter Kidagaa kimemwozea
- Start date
Akilindogosana
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Upo sahihi kabisa.
Ukisoma kwa lugha yako ya asili unaelewa vizuri zaidi na ubunifu unakuwepo, ila unaposoma kwa lugha ambayo sio ya kwako usomi wako ni wa kufaulu mitihani kwa kukariri halafu kichwani ni chenga. Ndio maana nchi zilizoendelea wanasoma kwa lugha zao za asili.
Muingereza anasoma kwa kiingereza
Mjerumani anasoma kwa kijerumani
Mfaransa anasoma kwa kifaransa
Mrusi anasoma kwa kirusi
Mchina anasoma kwa kichina
Mjapan anasoma kwa kijapan
Mkorea anasoma kwa kikorea
Kwa nini sisi waswahili tunasoma kwa lugha isiyo ya kwetu? Kiswahili kimetukosea nini?
Ndio maana tunao wasomi nguli, tena ni wabobevu, wenye vyeti vya kutukuka ila kichwani ni chenga na ndio wamelitia taifa letu hasara toka 1961 mpaka leo. Wakati wasomi wa nchi kama China, Japan na Korea kusini wanaendeleza nchi zao.
Chanzo cha vyanzo vya matatizo ya Tanzania ni kusoma kwa lugha ya kiingereza
Ukisoma kwa lugha yako ya asili unaelewa vizuri zaidi na ubunifu unakuwepo, ila unaposoma kwa lugha ambayo sio ya kwako usomi wako ni wa kufaulu mitihani kwa kukariri halafu kichwani ni chenga. Ndio maana nchi zilizoendelea wanasoma kwa lugha zao za asili.
Muingereza anasoma kwa kiingereza
Mjerumani anasoma kwa kijerumani
Mfaransa anasoma kwa kifaransa
Mrusi anasoma kwa kirusi
Mchina anasoma kwa kichina
Mjapan anasoma kwa kijapan
Mkorea anasoma kwa kikorea
Kwa nini sisi waswahili tunasoma kwa lugha isiyo ya kwetu? Kiswahili kimetukosea nini?
Ndio maana tunao wasomi nguli, tena ni wabobevu, wenye vyeti vya kutukuka ila kichwani ni chenga na ndio wamelitia taifa letu hasara toka 1961 mpaka leo. Wakati wasomi wa nchi kama China, Japan na Korea kusini wanaendeleza nchi zao.
Chanzo cha vyanzo vya matatizo ya Tanzania ni kusoma kwa lugha ya kiingereza
Akilindogosana
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Nyerere tumemkuza kupita kiasi. Na yeye alikuwa na kasumba ya ukoloni, kwa nini asingeweka elimu yetu isiwe ya kiswahili? Kwa nini asinge lazimisha sheria ziwe kwa kiswahili? Kwa nini nyaraka nyingi za serikali asingeamrisha ziwe za kiswahili?
Halafu Nyerere alikua anadharau sana nchi yake kila siku anasema sisi ni nchi maskini, Je nchi hii kirasilimali ni maskini?
Mimi bado mdogo, ila pamoja na udogo wangu naona Nyerere was overrated.
Akilindogosana
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100% ya wasomi wa nchi hii ni watu wa kukariri. Ndio maana ubunifu ni 0.
Kukariri hulemaza ubunifu na ndio hali halisi ya nchi yetu.
Red Giant
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- Mar 9, 2012
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Kwa mfumo wa kutumia kiingereza sekondari ni bora kumuanzisha mtoto na kiingereza toka chekechea. Ili kupunguza tatizo. Ila mtu huwezi mudu lugha vizuri kama siyo lugha franca. Hivyo tukisoma kwa kiingereza toka chekechea kutapunguza ila hakutaondoa tatiz0
Mfiaukweli
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China hadi leo hii haitaki kuitwa first world (developed) country. Na ina vyuo vingi tu vinavyotoa kozi zao kwa Kiingereza. Unadhani ni kwa nini?
Unadhani ni kwa nini nchi nyingi duniani hadi leo zinatumia terminologies za Kilatini kwenye legal matters?
Can you explain that?
Akilindogosana
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Achana na China haiwezi kukusaidi kitu, ongelea Taifa lako.
China wamekataa cheo cha kuwa developed ili wapate 'fursa' fulani za kiuchumi. Kwa ulingano ni kwamba vyuo vinavyofundisha kwa kichina ni vingi kuliko kiingereza.
Ishu za kilatini ni misamiati na inatoholewa kwenda kwenye lugha mbali mbali ili kurahisisha uelewa.
Mfiaukweli
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Akilindogosana,
Hesabu primary schools zinafundishwa kwa Kiswahili na bado ufaulu wake ni mdogo. Kiswahili chenyewe wanafunzi wana-fail. Nimesoma Masters course nje ya nchi kwenye nchi ambayo official language yao sio English lakini hiyo course niliyosoma iliendeshwa kwa Kiingereza (na hata wazawa walikuwa wanachukua course hiyo hiyo na in English).
Acheni unyonge wenu. Kama hujui jambo jifunze, sio kulisagia.
Hesabu primary schools zinafundishwa kwa Kiswahili na bado ufaulu wake ni mdogo. Kiswahili chenyewe wanafunzi wana-fail. Nimesoma Masters course nje ya nchi kwenye nchi ambayo official language yao sio English lakini hiyo course niliyosoma iliendeshwa kwa Kiingereza (na hata wazawa walikuwa wanachukua course hiyo hiyo na in English).
Acheni unyonge wenu. Kama hujui jambo jifunze, sio kulisagia.
Mfiaukweli
JF-Expert Member
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Nashukuru kwa kuchagua username uliyojichagulia. Need I say more?
Akilindogosana
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Nina maswali yafuatayo juu ya nchi uliyosomea masters.
Nchi uliyosomea masters je ni nchi iliyoendelea?
je kozi uliyosomea hapakuwa na chuo kingine kwenye nchi hiyo uliyoenda ambapo walikuwa wakifundisha kwa lugha ya taifa lao?
Je wanatumia lugha ipi kufundishia kuanzia chini?
Akilindogosana
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Unashangaa akilindogosana inakuzidi uwezo msomi nguli katika taifa letu kama wewe? Hata wewe umeathiriwa na kusoma kwa kiingereza. Inatakiwa ukubaliane na ukweli.
Mfiaukweli
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Na kweli. Nimeamini kuwa WEWE umeweza kuepuka kwenye athari zote KABISA ambazo watu wengi (akiwemo Mwalimu na wengineo wote waliotokea kwenye nchi wanachama wa commonwealth kwa uchache) tumeathirika nazo
Swadakta, umeongea point muhimu hata wakifundishwa kwa kiSwahili wataendelea kukariri huku uvumbuzi zero.
Swadakta, umeongea point muhimu hata wakifundishwa kwa kiSwahili wataendelea kukariri huku uvumbuzi zero.
Kama kweli waTanzania tungekuwa wavumbuzi na watu wenye uwezo wakufikiri kuunda nyenzo kutatua changamoto katika mazingira yetu, basi wale wanaoongea kilugha angalau wangeweza ku- 'tame' wanyama wawabebee mizigo mizito ya kuni na mazao ya shambani. Lakini tunao punda, vihongwe na farasi hatuwatumii kukabiliana na changamoto za mazingira yetu. Ikiwa jambo kama hili jepesi tumeshindwa makubwa tutaweza?
Kuna mataifa madogo yanaongea kiSerbia, kiMongolia, waEskimo kwa kutaja kwa uchache ku-'tame' wanyama waliweza bila kwenda chuo kikuu karne kibao zilizopita na wanyama hao wakaweza kutatua changamoto za kubeba, kusafiri na hata kuendesha mifumo ya kusukuma / kupandisha maji.
Lazima kuna mushkeli ktk elimu kuanzia ile mtoto anayopewa na wazazi wake kabla hajafikia ngazi ya serikali kuanza kumfinyanga kwa social engineering ya kuanzia chekechea mpaka elimu ya juu.
Tukiweza kutambua wapi tumekwama lugha yoyote iwe ya Kiingereza, Kiarabu, KiChina au kiSwahili itaweza kutuletea mapinduzi ya mfumo wa kufikiri na kujiongeza zaidi ya kile unachojifunza ktk mfumo rasmi wa shule, vyuo vya ufundi na masomo mengine ya elimu ya juu kama nano technology n.k
Tusijidanganye kwa majibu mepesi kuwa kiSwahili kitatuokoa na kutupiga teke la chura tukaruka ghafla na kuwa kama Singapore, Oman kiuchumi halafu kutupeleka mbele zaidi kiufundi, kiteknolojia, kiFamakolojia, kiviwanda n.k
By Warren Bass
April 20, 2012
"WHY NATIONS FAIL" by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson
“Why Nations Fail” is a sweeping attempt to explain the gut-wrenching poverty that leaves 1.29 billion people in the developing world struggling to live on less than $1.25 a day.
You might expect it to be a bleak, numbing read. It’s not. It’s bracing, garrulous, wildly ambitious and ultimately hopeful. It may, in fact, be a bit of a masterpiece.
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, two energetic, widely respected development scholars, start with a bit of perspective: Even in today’s glum economic climate, the average American is seven times as prosperous as the average Mexican, 10 times as prosperous as the average Peruvian, about 20 times as prosperous as the average inhabitant of sub-Saharan Africa and about 40 times as prosperous as the average citizen of such particularly desperate African countries as Mali, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone.
What explains such stupefying disparities?
The authors’ answer is simple: “institutions, institutions, institutions.” They are impatient with traditional social-science arguments for the persistence of poverty, which variously chalk it up to bad geographic luck, hobbling cultural patterns, or ignorant leaders and technocrats.
Instead, “Why Nations Fail” focuses on the historical currents and critical junctures that mold modern polities: the processes of institutional drift that produce political and economic institutions that can be either inclusive — focused on power-sharing, productivity, education, technological advances and the well-being of the nation as a whole; or extractive — bent on grabbing wealth and resources away from one part of society to benefit another.
To understand what extractive institutions look like, consider les Grosses Legumes (the Big Vegetables), the sardonic Congolese nickname for the obscenely pampered clique around Mobutu Sese Seko, the strongman who ruled what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1965 to 1997.
When Mobutu decreed that he wanted a palace built for himself at his birthplace, the authors note, he made sure that the airport had a landing strip big enough to accommodate the Concordes he liked to rent from Air France.
Mobutu and the Big Vegetables weren’t interested in developing Congo. They were interested in strip-mining it, sucking out its vast mineral wealth for themselves. They were, at best, vampire capitalists.
But the roots of Congo’s nightmarish poverty and strife go back centuries. Before the arrival of European imperialists, what was then known as the Kingdom of Kongo was ruled by the oligarchic forerunners of the Big Vegetables, who drew their staggering wealth from arbitrary taxation and a busy slave trade.
And when the European colonists showed up, they made a dreadful situation even worse — especially under the rapacious rule of King Leopold II of Belgium.
When Congo finally won its independence in 1960, it was a feeble, decentralized state burdened with a predatory political class and exploitative economic institutions — too weak to deliver basic services but just strong enough to keep Mobutu and his cronies on top; too poor to provide for its citizenry but just wealthy enough to give elites something to fight over.
Acemoglu and Robinson argue that when you combine rotten regimes, exploitative elites and self-serving institutions with frail, decentralized states, you have something close to a prescription for poverty, conflict and even outright failure.
“Nations fail,” the authors write, “when they have extractive economic institutions, supported by extractive political institutions that impede and even block economic growth.”
But even as vicious cycles such as Congo’s can churn out poverty, virtuous cycles can help bend the long arc of history toward growth and prosperity.
Contrast the conflict and misery in Congo with Botswana — which, when it won its independence in 1966, had just 22 university graduates, seven miles of paved roads and glowering white-supremacist regimes on most of its borders.
But Botswana today has “the highest per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa” — around the level of such success stories as Hungary and Costa Rica.
How did Botswana pull it off? “By quickly developing inclusive economic and political institutions after independence,” the authors write. Botswana holds regular elections, has never had a civil war and enforces property rights. It benefited, the authors argue, from modest centralization of the state and a tradition of limiting the power of tribal chiefs that had survived colonial rule.
When diamonds were discovered, a far-sighted law ensured that the newfound riches were shared for the national good, not elite gain. At the critical juncture of independence, wise Botswanan leaders such as its first president, Seretse Khama, and his Botswana Democratic Party chose democracy over dictatorship and the public interest over private greed.
In other words: It’s the politics, stupid. Khama’s Botswana succeeded at building institutions that could produce prosperity.
Mobutu’s Congo and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe didn’t even try. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the protesters in Egypt’s Tahrir Square had it right: They were being held back by a feckless, corrupt state and a society that wouldn’t let them fully use their talents.
Egypt was poor “precisely because it has been ruled by a narrow elite that has organized society for their own benefit at the expense of the vast mass of people.”
Such unhappy nations as North Korea, Sierra Leone, Haiti and Somalia have all left authority concentrated in a few grasping hands, which use whatever resources they can grab to tighten their hold on power.
The formula is stark: Inclusive governments and institutions mean prosperity, growth and sustained development; extractive governments and institutions mean poverty, privation and stagnation — even over the centuries.
The depressing cycle in which one oligarchy often replaces another has meant that “the lands where the Industrial Revolution originally did not spread remain relatively poor.” Nothing succeeds like success, Acemoglu and Robinson argue, and nothing fails like failure.
So what about China, which is increasingly cited as a new model of “authoritarian growth”? The authors are respectful but ultimately unimpressed. They readily admit that extractive regimes can produce temporary economic growth so long as they’re politically centralized — just consider the pre-Brezhnev Soviet Union, whose economic system once had its own Western admirers.
But while “Chinese economic institutions are incomparably more inclusive today than three decades ago,”China is still fundamentally saddled with an extractive regime.
In fairly short order, such authoritarian economies start to wheeze: By throttling the incentives for technological progress, creativity and innovation, they choke off sustained, long-term growth and prosperity.
(“You cannot force people to think and have good ideas by threatening to shoot them,” the authors note dryly.) Chinese growth, they argue, “is based on the adoption of existing technologies and rapid investment,” not the anxiety-inducing process of creative destruction that produces lasting innovation and growth.
By importing foreign technologies and exporting low-end products, China is playing a spirited game of catch-up — but that’s not how races are won.
Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ente...s-a-robinson/2012/04/20/gIQAcHs8VT_story.html
April 20, 2012
"WHY NATIONS FAIL" by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson
“Why Nations Fail” is a sweeping attempt to explain the gut-wrenching poverty that leaves 1.29 billion people in the developing world struggling to live on less than $1.25 a day.
You might expect it to be a bleak, numbing read. It’s not. It’s bracing, garrulous, wildly ambitious and ultimately hopeful. It may, in fact, be a bit of a masterpiece.
Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, two energetic, widely respected development scholars, start with a bit of perspective: Even in today’s glum economic climate, the average American is seven times as prosperous as the average Mexican, 10 times as prosperous as the average Peruvian, about 20 times as prosperous as the average inhabitant of sub-Saharan Africa and about 40 times as prosperous as the average citizen of such particularly desperate African countries as Mali, Ethiopia and Sierra Leone.
What explains such stupefying disparities?
The authors’ answer is simple: “institutions, institutions, institutions.” They are impatient with traditional social-science arguments for the persistence of poverty, which variously chalk it up to bad geographic luck, hobbling cultural patterns, or ignorant leaders and technocrats.
Instead, “Why Nations Fail” focuses on the historical currents and critical junctures that mold modern polities: the processes of institutional drift that produce political and economic institutions that can be either inclusive — focused on power-sharing, productivity, education, technological advances and the well-being of the nation as a whole; or extractive — bent on grabbing wealth and resources away from one part of society to benefit another.
To understand what extractive institutions look like, consider les Grosses Legumes (the Big Vegetables), the sardonic Congolese nickname for the obscenely pampered clique around Mobutu Sese Seko, the strongman who ruled what is now the Democratic Republic of the Congo from 1965 to 1997.
When Mobutu decreed that he wanted a palace built for himself at his birthplace, the authors note, he made sure that the airport had a landing strip big enough to accommodate the Concordes he liked to rent from Air France.
Mobutu and the Big Vegetables weren’t interested in developing Congo. They were interested in strip-mining it, sucking out its vast mineral wealth for themselves. They were, at best, vampire capitalists.
But the roots of Congo’s nightmarish poverty and strife go back centuries. Before the arrival of European imperialists, what was then known as the Kingdom of Kongo was ruled by the oligarchic forerunners of the Big Vegetables, who drew their staggering wealth from arbitrary taxation and a busy slave trade.
And when the European colonists showed up, they made a dreadful situation even worse — especially under the rapacious rule of King Leopold II of Belgium.
When Congo finally won its independence in 1960, it was a feeble, decentralized state burdened with a predatory political class and exploitative economic institutions — too weak to deliver basic services but just strong enough to keep Mobutu and his cronies on top; too poor to provide for its citizenry but just wealthy enough to give elites something to fight over.
Acemoglu and Robinson argue that when you combine rotten regimes, exploitative elites and self-serving institutions with frail, decentralized states, you have something close to a prescription for poverty, conflict and even outright failure.
“Nations fail,” the authors write, “when they have extractive economic institutions, supported by extractive political institutions that impede and even block economic growth.”
But even as vicious cycles such as Congo’s can churn out poverty, virtuous cycles can help bend the long arc of history toward growth and prosperity.
Contrast the conflict and misery in Congo with Botswana — which, when it won its independence in 1966, had just 22 university graduates, seven miles of paved roads and glowering white-supremacist regimes on most of its borders.
But Botswana today has “the highest per capita income in sub-Saharan Africa” — around the level of such success stories as Hungary and Costa Rica.
How did Botswana pull it off? “By quickly developing inclusive economic and political institutions after independence,” the authors write. Botswana holds regular elections, has never had a civil war and enforces property rights. It benefited, the authors argue, from modest centralization of the state and a tradition of limiting the power of tribal chiefs that had survived colonial rule.
When diamonds were discovered, a far-sighted law ensured that the newfound riches were shared for the national good, not elite gain. At the critical juncture of independence, wise Botswanan leaders such as its first president, Seretse Khama, and his Botswana Democratic Party chose democracy over dictatorship and the public interest over private greed.
In other words: It’s the politics, stupid. Khama’s Botswana succeeded at building institutions that could produce prosperity.
Mobutu’s Congo and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe didn’t even try. Acemoglu and Robinson argue that the protesters in Egypt’s Tahrir Square had it right: They were being held back by a feckless, corrupt state and a society that wouldn’t let them fully use their talents.
Egypt was poor “precisely because it has been ruled by a narrow elite that has organized society for their own benefit at the expense of the vast mass of people.”
Such unhappy nations as North Korea, Sierra Leone, Haiti and Somalia have all left authority concentrated in a few grasping hands, which use whatever resources they can grab to tighten their hold on power.
The formula is stark: Inclusive governments and institutions mean prosperity, growth and sustained development; extractive governments and institutions mean poverty, privation and stagnation — even over the centuries.
The depressing cycle in which one oligarchy often replaces another has meant that “the lands where the Industrial Revolution originally did not spread remain relatively poor.” Nothing succeeds like success, Acemoglu and Robinson argue, and nothing fails like failure.
So what about China, which is increasingly cited as a new model of “authoritarian growth”? The authors are respectful but ultimately unimpressed. They readily admit that extractive regimes can produce temporary economic growth so long as they’re politically centralized — just consider the pre-Brezhnev Soviet Union, whose economic system once had its own Western admirers.
But while “Chinese economic institutions are incomparably more inclusive today than three decades ago,”China is still fundamentally saddled with an extractive regime.
In fairly short order, such authoritarian economies start to wheeze: By throttling the incentives for technological progress, creativity and innovation, they choke off sustained, long-term growth and prosperity.
(“You cannot force people to think and have good ideas by threatening to shoot them,” the authors note dryly.) Chinese growth, they argue, “is based on the adoption of existing technologies and rapid investment,” not the anxiety-inducing process of creative destruction that produces lasting innovation and growth.
By importing foreign technologies and exporting low-end products, China is playing a spirited game of catch-up — but that’s not how races are won.
Source: https://www.washingtonpost.com/ente...s-a-robinson/2012/04/20/gIQAcHs8VT_story.html
BEDUI Jr
JF-Expert Member
- Dec 15, 2016
- 2,041
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Red Giant,
Hauielewi vizuri sababu tunakuwa kama wapumbafu, primary watoto wanasoma kiswahili, sekondari kwa lugha ya kiingereza, kama sio upunguani kwa watunga Sera ni nini?
Hawaoni hii inconsistency ndio unaleta aibu kwa taifa Leo viongozi wanaongea kiingereza kama sio wasomi? Kama wanaona ni sawa mbona wakipata madaraka na vijisenti watoto wa hawa viongozi wanasoma better schools medium of instruction ni kiingereza?
Lugha watu wanajifunza, kwann tuhangaike na li lugha LA kiswahili wakati hata inventions hatufanya? Technologies zote tunanunua? Hicho kiswahili hakitusaidii chochote zaidi ya kutuunganisha kama taifa huko mtaani!!
Hauielewi vizuri sababu tunakuwa kama wapumbafu, primary watoto wanasoma kiswahili, sekondari kwa lugha ya kiingereza, kama sio upunguani kwa watunga Sera ni nini?
Hawaoni hii inconsistency ndio unaleta aibu kwa taifa Leo viongozi wanaongea kiingereza kama sio wasomi? Kama wanaona ni sawa mbona wakipata madaraka na vijisenti watoto wa hawa viongozi wanasoma better schools medium of instruction ni kiingereza?
Lugha watu wanajifunza, kwann tuhangaike na li lugha LA kiswahili wakati hata inventions hatufanya? Technologies zote tunanunua? Hicho kiswahili hakitusaidii chochote zaidi ya kutuunganisha kama taifa huko mtaani!!
antimatter
JF-Expert Member
- Feb 26, 2017
- 47,274
- 126,778
Kweli kabisa. Ndo maana hutaona watu wakihangaika kujifunza lugha kama Kireno, kisomali, kihindi, kirundi, nk maana hakuna uchumi wa maana huko.
Ili lugha yako iwe dili, kuza kwanza uchumi
Mwana Mtoka Pabaya
JF-Expert Member
- Apr 22, 2012
- 15,118
- 16,485
Wengi wa binadamu wanaopigia chapuo huu mswada mfu watoto wao wamewapeleka English Medium Schools, hawataki kuwa mfano. Kiingereza ni lugha kubwa, kujifanya tunapenda saana Kiswahili ni kichaka cha kuficha kushindwa kwetu kumudu Kiingereza.
Wachina walianza kuendeleza teknolojia ndogo ndogo za mashambani ndio wakajifungia. Sisi tunaanza na mdomo
Wachina walianza kuendeleza teknolojia ndogo ndogo za mashambani ndio wakajifungia. Sisi tunaanza na mdomo