britanicca
Platinum Member
- May 20, 2015
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- 48,864
People in the Global South are asking why Russia and China are not intervening in Venezuela instead of just issuing condemnations.
The truth is that China’s and Russia’s lack of physical intervention highlights the often unspoken cold realities of geopolitics.
Like everything in geopolitics, the reasons are complicated. However, a few things immediately stand out: For one, Russia is already at war in Ukraine, 10 000 kilometres away. This is not a small detail.
Power is finite, and states act based on capacity, risk, and return. Russia being tied down in a large, grinding war thousands of kilometres away is decisive here. Military intervention is about logistics and sustainment. Opening a second front in the Western Hemisphere would be a strategically reckless move.
Second, geography still matters, even in a globalised world. Venezuela sits deep inside what has historically been treated as the United States’ strategic backyard. Any overt military intervention there would immediately trigger confrontation with the United States on its home turf.
Unlike Russia, which has had a minor military presence in Venezuela, China lacks the power projection capabilities to challenge the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean, especially against the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier group currently stationed there.
Venezuela is not what Ukraine is to Russia or Taiwan to China in strategic terms. It does not sit at the centre of Russia’s security perimeter or China’s long-term territorial ambitions. States are far more willing to fight when defeat would threaten regime survival or core sovereignty. Venezuela does not meet that threshold for either nation.
While Maduro often touted his “ironclad” friendship with Putin and Xi, these relationships have proven to be largely transactional. When faced with the prospect of a direct kinetic conflict with the United States in its own “backyard,” both Moscow and Beijing have prioritised their own national security and economic interests.
Also, unlike NATO, the agreements between Venezuela, Russia, and China do not include mutual defence clauses. Legally and strategically, neither country is obligated to go to war for Venezuela.
Beijing’s 2025 policy papers on Latin America emphasised “strategic partnership” but steered clear of military guarantees, prioritising a “peaceful multipolar world” over direct confrontation.
In fact, China has not been to war in many decades, and this is by design. Its model of power projection prioritises economic leverage, infrastructure, trade dependency, and diplomatic insulation instead of warfare.
Intervening militarily in Venezuela would undermine the very image China works hard to project, that of a non-interventionist alternative to Western coercion.
By condemning US “hegemonic behaviour” and “illegal abduction,” China presents itself as the defender of international law and the UN Charter without firing a single shot.
This is not to say China has nothing to lose in this situation. Quite the opposite, actually. Venezuela owes Beijing an estimated $60 billion. A US-installed administration could use the legal doctrine of “Odious Debt.”
A new government could argue that the loans provided by China were used by the Maduro regime to “finance narco-terrorism” and “suppress the people,” and therefore, the debt is not the responsibility of the new state.
Trump and his handlers would likely support this move. Cancelling Venezuelan debt to China would simultaneously relieve Caracas’s balance sheet and inflict a significant financial loss on Beijing. Oil exports currently directed to China as debt repayment could be rerouted to the US and Western markets, leaving China with unpaid loans and stranded supply contracts.
A US-friendly government would likely redirect oil exports, which currently go primarily to China to pay off debt, back toward the US and Western markets, leaving China with empty tankers and unpaid bills.
This explains why China is currently “fuming” but physically stuck. They know that a military confrontation with the US in the Americas would be a total loss, but they also know that a US-led regime change could lead to a total financial default.
Beijing may have hoped that Maduro could survive long enough to pay back more of the debt. Now that he is captured, China is shifting to a legalist defence, using the UN Security Council to demand that “private contracts and international debt obligations” be respected by any successor government.
China has essentially been “priced out” of Venezuela by American military force. The “might makes right” reality today means that Beijing’s $60 billion investment may have just vanished into the Caribbean along with Maduro.
So, both Russia and China are forced to resort to attempts to shape outcomes through vetoes, financial mechanisms, energy deals, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic delay.
This is the same MO deployed by South Africa, which is leading the diplomatic charge at the UN, accusing the US of “state-sponsored kidnapping” and “state terrorism,” arguing that if a leader can be plucked from their capital by a foreign power, the UN Charter is effectively dead.
The argument here is that international law has become “meaningless,” and we have entered an era where if a power can enforce its will in its own backyard, it will. This puts pressure on the rest of the world to decide whether it agrees that “might makes right” or not.
Both Russia and China are now using the US action to win a diplomatic war in the Global South. By allowing the US to act like a gangster, they can point to it as the “true aggressor” and “lawbreaker” on the global stage.
More cynically, they can use the “dangerous precedent”, as noted by the UN Secretary-General, to justify their own future actions in their respective spheres of influence in Taiwan and Eastern Europe.
In that sense, Venezuela is a marker of a world drifting from “rules” toward raw enforcement, and forcing every state to decide whether “might makes right” is now the governing principle.
Britanicca
The truth is that China’s and Russia’s lack of physical intervention highlights the often unspoken cold realities of geopolitics.
Like everything in geopolitics, the reasons are complicated. However, a few things immediately stand out: For one, Russia is already at war in Ukraine, 10 000 kilometres away. This is not a small detail.
Power is finite, and states act based on capacity, risk, and return. Russia being tied down in a large, grinding war thousands of kilometres away is decisive here. Military intervention is about logistics and sustainment. Opening a second front in the Western Hemisphere would be a strategically reckless move.
Second, geography still matters, even in a globalised world. Venezuela sits deep inside what has historically been treated as the United States’ strategic backyard. Any overt military intervention there would immediately trigger confrontation with the United States on its home turf.
Unlike Russia, which has had a minor military presence in Venezuela, China lacks the power projection capabilities to challenge the U.S. Navy in the Caribbean, especially against the USS Gerald R. Ford carrier group currently stationed there.
Venezuela is not what Ukraine is to Russia or Taiwan to China in strategic terms. It does not sit at the centre of Russia’s security perimeter or China’s long-term territorial ambitions. States are far more willing to fight when defeat would threaten regime survival or core sovereignty. Venezuela does not meet that threshold for either nation.
While Maduro often touted his “ironclad” friendship with Putin and Xi, these relationships have proven to be largely transactional. When faced with the prospect of a direct kinetic conflict with the United States in its own “backyard,” both Moscow and Beijing have prioritised their own national security and economic interests.
Also, unlike NATO, the agreements between Venezuela, Russia, and China do not include mutual defence clauses. Legally and strategically, neither country is obligated to go to war for Venezuela.
Beijing’s 2025 policy papers on Latin America emphasised “strategic partnership” but steered clear of military guarantees, prioritising a “peaceful multipolar world” over direct confrontation.
In fact, China has not been to war in many decades, and this is by design. Its model of power projection prioritises economic leverage, infrastructure, trade dependency, and diplomatic insulation instead of warfare.
Intervening militarily in Venezuela would undermine the very image China works hard to project, that of a non-interventionist alternative to Western coercion.
By condemning US “hegemonic behaviour” and “illegal abduction,” China presents itself as the defender of international law and the UN Charter without firing a single shot.
This is not to say China has nothing to lose in this situation. Quite the opposite, actually. Venezuela owes Beijing an estimated $60 billion. A US-installed administration could use the legal doctrine of “Odious Debt.”
A new government could argue that the loans provided by China were used by the Maduro regime to “finance narco-terrorism” and “suppress the people,” and therefore, the debt is not the responsibility of the new state.
Trump and his handlers would likely support this move. Cancelling Venezuelan debt to China would simultaneously relieve Caracas’s balance sheet and inflict a significant financial loss on Beijing. Oil exports currently directed to China as debt repayment could be rerouted to the US and Western markets, leaving China with unpaid loans and stranded supply contracts.
A US-friendly government would likely redirect oil exports, which currently go primarily to China to pay off debt, back toward the US and Western markets, leaving China with empty tankers and unpaid bills.
This explains why China is currently “fuming” but physically stuck. They know that a military confrontation with the US in the Americas would be a total loss, but they also know that a US-led regime change could lead to a total financial default.
Beijing may have hoped that Maduro could survive long enough to pay back more of the debt. Now that he is captured, China is shifting to a legalist defence, using the UN Security Council to demand that “private contracts and international debt obligations” be respected by any successor government.
China has essentially been “priced out” of Venezuela by American military force. The “might makes right” reality today means that Beijing’s $60 billion investment may have just vanished into the Caribbean along with Maduro.
So, both Russia and China are forced to resort to attempts to shape outcomes through vetoes, financial mechanisms, energy deals, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic delay.
This is the same MO deployed by South Africa, which is leading the diplomatic charge at the UN, accusing the US of “state-sponsored kidnapping” and “state terrorism,” arguing that if a leader can be plucked from their capital by a foreign power, the UN Charter is effectively dead.
The argument here is that international law has become “meaningless,” and we have entered an era where if a power can enforce its will in its own backyard, it will. This puts pressure on the rest of the world to decide whether it agrees that “might makes right” or not.
Both Russia and China are now using the US action to win a diplomatic war in the Global South. By allowing the US to act like a gangster, they can point to it as the “true aggressor” and “lawbreaker” on the global stage.
More cynically, they can use the “dangerous precedent”, as noted by the UN Secretary-General, to justify their own future actions in their respective spheres of influence in Taiwan and Eastern Europe.
In that sense, Venezuela is a marker of a world drifting from “rules” toward raw enforcement, and forcing every state to decide whether “might makes right” is now the governing principle.
Britanicca