Black Butterfly
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- Aug 31, 2022
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Ripoti ya Kiashiria cha Demokrasia 2023 kutoka Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) inaonyesha kuwa Kenya ilipata jumla ya alama za kiashiria cha demokrasia 5.05, nyuma ya Tanzania ambayo ilipata 5.35. Alama hizi hazijaonyesha maboresho kutoka kiashiria cha mwaka jana, ambacho kimebaki vile vile tangu mwaka 2020.
Sub-Saharan Africa's Decline in Democratic Practices
Decline in Aggregate Index Score
The aggregate index score for Sub-Saharan Africa declined in 2023, dropping from 4.14 in 2022 to a historic low of 4.04. This indicates a significant reduction in democratic practices across the region.
Rise of Military Regimes
- Military Coups: Over the past two decades, 25 out of the 54 African states have experienced one or more coups or coup attempts.
- Sahel Region: The recent military coup in Niger in July completed the military takeover of governments throughout the Sahel region, from Guinea in the West to Sudan in the East.
Causes of Military Rule
- Public Dissatisfaction: There is growing public dissatisfaction with political systems and widespread poverty.
- Political Leaders' Failures: Political leaders have failed to uphold democratic values and provide effective governance and economic progress, discrediting the concept of electoral democracy for many Africans.
- Support for Military Rule: Surveys show increasing support for military rule in various African countries, such as Gabon and Niger. This support has risen as trust in supposedly democratic political elites has further eroded in 2023.
The trends indicate a troubling shift away from democratic governance in Sub-Saharan Africa, with significant implications for political stability and development in the region.
The decline in the continent's score was driven by a broad-based deterioration across all five categories of the Democracy Index. A significant drop in the category of electoral process and pluralism was caused by a series of successful and attempted coups in 2023. The functioning of government category, which saw a slight decline in 2023, has the lowest score in the region at 3.09, and ranks as the second-lowest score of any region except for the Middle East and North Africa. The region's scores for political participation, political culture, and civil liberties all decreased in 2023.
Out of the region's 44 countries, 18 experienced a decline in their score, with the sharpest declines observed in Niger (-1.36), Gabon (-1.22), Sierra Leone (-0.71), Mali (-0.65), and Madagascar (-0.44). The scores for nine countries improved, although from a low starting point, with the most significant improvements seen in Benin (+0.40), Tanzania (+0.25), and Angola (+0.22). The region still only has one "full democracy" - Mauritius - and six "flawed democracies," the same as in the 2022 index. The number of countries classified as "hybrid regimes" increased to 15, up from 14 in 2022, as Angola improved its score in the category of political participation. As a result, the number of "authoritarian regimes" decreased to 22, although this remains the most prevalent form of government in Africa.
The trend of democratic backsliding in West and Central Africa, discussed in recent editions of the Democracy Index report, continued apace in 2023. This trend was vividly illustrated by military takeovers in Niger in July and Gabon in August. These two countries recorded the biggest declines in the index of any on the African continent, dropping by 1.36 and 1.22 points, respectively. On July 26th, the presidential guard, with the backing of the Nigerien armed forces, announced that they had overthrown the president, Mohamed Bazoum. The coup received strong popular support owing to widespread domestic dissatisfaction with Mr. Bazoum over political, security, economic, and social issues.
Riddled with cronyism and corruption, many governments in the region have clung to power by unconstitutional means and have also failed to ensure basic security for their citizens in the face of a deadly Islamist insurgency. Popular anger has turned not only against domestic regimes but also against France, the former colonial power in the region, whose armed forces were deployed to bolster security and repel insurgents between August 2014 and November 2022. In Niger, many opponents of Mr. Bazoum disliked his close ties with France, which many prefer to blame for the region’s problems rather than acknowledge that they are largely homegrown. Mr. Bazoum’s removal coincided with a growing wave of anti-French sentiment in the Sahel. This trend was especially acute in neighboring Burkina Faso and Mali, which both experienced military coups between 2020 and 2022.
Soon after the coup in Niger, on August 30th, a military coup in Gabon brought an end to the rule of the president, Ali Bongo Ondimba. This was followed by the dissolution of the government and the suspension of the constitution. Mr. Bongo had just been declared the emphatic victor of the presidential election held a week earlier and would have served a third term in office—extending the Bongo family dynasty that started back in 1967. However, public support for the dynasty had dwindled amid widespread discontent over corruption, cronyism, dynastic politics, and economic mismanagement. In contrast to the negative reaction outside the country, the coup was received with some support domestically mainly positively in Gabon. This may reflect optimism about the prospects for a return to civilian rule without Mr Bongo, but in the absence of institutional safeguards, an increasingly authoritarian pivot by the putschists is likely.
Attempted coups were thwarted in Guinea-Bissau and Sierra Leone. In early December the president of Guinea-Bissau, Umaro Sissoco Embaló, once again dissolved the opposition-led parliament. He alleged that opposition leaders had given political support to what Mr Embaló has deemed a failed coup attempt, which took place on November 30th. Mr Embaló’s increasingly authoritarian rule in recent years has led to a severe crackdown on all opposition and a centralisation of power around his presidency. Guinea-Bissau had been without a parliament since May 2022, when Mr Embaló had previously dissolved it over differences with parliamentarians. Mr Embaló’s increasingly dictatorial rule contributed to a deterioration in Guinea Bissau’s political participation score, which fell from 3.13 in 2022 to 2.78 in 2023.
In Sierra Leone, the presidential and parliamentary elections in June 2023—in which Julius Maada Bio secured a second five-year term and the Sierra Leone People’s Party won an absolute parliamentary majority—were contested by the opposition. International observers cited inconsistencies in the vote-counting process and a lack of transparency in the functioning of the election commission. On November 26th Sierra Leonean authorities declared a nationwide 24-hour curfew after rogue members of the military attacked Wilberforce military barracks and broke into several prisons in the capital, Freetown, in a foiled coup attempt. Sierra Leone’s overall score fell from 5.03 in 2022 to 4.32, driven by a significant decline in the electoral process and pluralism and political culture categories.
Growing electoral restrictions and crackdown on civil liberties
The spread of military rule has severely weakened Sub-Saharan Africa’s score in the electoral process and pluralism category, which declined further in 2023, from 3.63 in 2022 to 3.44. Military rule became more entrenched in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad and Guinea in 2023. The Malian junta announced the postponement of planned elections in February 2024, and the Burkinabè junta leader, Captain Ibrahim Traoré, announced that elections are unlikely to take place in July 2024 because of security issues. Civil liberties have worsened significantly as the regime has cracked down on dissent. With most of northern and central Mali under either jihadist or rebel occupation, there is little consensus about how to return the country to democratic rule. Worryingly, a survey conducted in July 2023 by Afrobarometer, a research organisation, pointed to reduced popular support for democratic rule.
The coups in West and Central Africa have also led to a deterioration in Sub-Saharan Africa’s scores for civil liberties and political culture. The space for independent media and critics of the regime shrank in 2023. In Burkina Faso, several Burkinabè civil society figures and journalists who raised uncomfortable questions about the ruling junta received death threats and were subjected to other forms of intimidation. Mali permanently suspended two French state-owned broadcasters, Radio France International and France24, and Burkina Faso banned their broadcasts. Numerous local radio stations have been shut down in both countries. In Chad, at least 50 people were arrested in the leadup to a constitutional referendum in December 2023 as the military government sought to weaken political opposition. Internet shutdowns are used increasingly as a means of stifling dissent. Guinea experienced an internet disruption in May, ahead of a highly anticipated two-day anti-government protest. The military regime in Guinea also shut down two radio stations owned by the Afric Vision group, limited access to popular websites and social media, and threatened to close any media that “undermines national unity”.
Even the region’s self-proclaimed democracies (classified by the Democracy Index as “hybrid” and “authoritarian” regimes) are not averse to using similar tactics. Many adopt the trappings of multiparty systems—allowing opposition party participation in elections, for example—but use their monopoly of institutional power and control of the media to prevent a level playing field and rig the results. Madagascar is such an example. In November 2023 the president, Andry Rajoelina, was re-elected for a third term following a controversial and contested poll. Most of the opposition rejected the results, citing severe restrictions on political activity in the lead-up to the election.
On a positive note, it was a year of fragile reconciliation and peace in Ethiopia following a twoyear civil war that pitted federal forces against the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), a left-wing paramilitary group and former ruling party. The peace deal signed in November 2022 prevailed in 2023, resulting in an improvement in the country’s overall score, albeit from a low base, driven by an improvement in the political culture category as reconciliation measures in the peace deal were implemented. The federal government removed the TPLF from the terrorist list and approved a TPLFled transitional government in Tigray.
Chanzo: Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU)
