Hapana kwenye mkataba kuna kitu kinaitwa privity, mimi nikisaini mkataba na wewe ukanipangisha nyumba ikitokea mimi nimefariki auna mkataba na mwanafamilia yoyote yule anaenihusu na upo huru kuvunja mkataba; na ikitokea wewe umetangulia mimi pia sina mkataba na mrithi wako those are rules of privity of contracts kuondoa third party claims (unless hiyo nchi ina sheria husika inayotoa maelezo ya third party).
Kwa hivyo mkataba wa TANESCO na IPTL ni agreement between those two parties (na IPTL imesajiliwa Tanzania majina ya owners wake yatakuwa BRELA).
Sasa mtu mwingine kudai na yeye ni mmiliki wa IPTL kutokana na nyaraka gani sijui alizopewa kwanza aliondoi ubia wa VIP na pili umiliki wake is disputable kama IPTL wako tayari kulipa deni maana kisheria atambuliki kwa sababu hayuko kwenye jina la usajili wala wa IPTL ata ukienda BRELA. Hizo actions wanazofungua kimataifa na kusikilizwa ni kutambua kwamba awawezi shinda hiyo kesi Tanzania na pili hazina mantiki na kwa sababu Rugemalira ajaenda kutaka kupambana naye in short SCB hana kesi ya umiliki labda deni.
On December 16, 2008, the Tanzanian High Court appointed a Provisional Liquidator (the
“PL”), an appointment to which Mechmar objected. A few days later, SCB HK informed
the PL that it held security over IPTL’s assets under the Security Deed.75
71. On January 27, 2009, upon SCB HK’s request made a few days earlier, the High Court of
Tanzania appointed
ex parte an administrator over IPTL (the “Administrator”). On the
ground that notice should have been issued to all of the interested parties, the appointment
of the Administrator was set aside by the Tanzanian Court of Appeal on April 9, 2009.76
SCB HK withdrew its first petition and filed a second petition to appoint an Administrator
on September 17, 2009 (“SCB HK’s Second Administration Petition”).
TANESCO has not made the distinction between a mortgage and a charge a primary aspect
of its submissions. In fact the distinction is addressed in a single footnote in TANESCO’s
Rejoinder:
SCB HK argues that the security assignment is a “mortgage” and not a “charge.”
See
SCB HK Reply Memorial ¶195. TANESCO does not believe the Tribunal will find
placing these labels on the security assignment is particularly useful in resolving the
issue of whether the security needed to be registered. One difficulty is that while the
charging language in Section 3.2 appears to create an assignment where
“ownership of
the property used as security is transferred to the lender,” which SCB HK classifies as
a “mortgage,” the lenders in the Facility Agreement at Section 19(C) contract with
IPTL that unless it is in default, the Facility Agent will not allow the Security Agent to
exercise the rights, including the step-in rights, granted to the Security Agent in the
Security Deed, such that SCB HK’s supposed “mortgage” in practice only “gives the
lender recourse to the property used as security in the event that the debt is not repaid,”
which SCB HK says is the essential definition of a “charge.” The substance of the
business arrangement, and in this regard, even SCB HK acknowledges “clause 3.2.1 of
the Security Deed constitutes a ‘charge’ for the purposes of section 79 of the
Tanzanian Companies Ordinance.” Reply Memorial at ¶ 221.137
143. TANESCO thus concludes that the nature of the security interest is irrelevant: the critical
point in its view is that it had to be registered and it was not and therefore it is void. In the
Tribunal’s view, this conclusion conflates several issues. The nature of the security
interest may have an impact on the scope of rights that SCB HK has in relation to the PPA.
Source:
Request Rejected