Geza Ulole
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SGR Tanzania took $1.4 bln of a concession loan out of $3.1 bln needed for construction of her phase I n II! Hiyo commercial loan ni ipi? hebu leta evidence!
Cost comparison SGR Kenya vs SGR Tanzania
Cost comparison SGR Kenya vs SGR Tanzania
- Thread starter Geza Ulole
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Geza Ulole
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- Oct 31, 2009
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Ethiopia and Kenya are struggling to manage debt for their Chinese-built railways
June 4, 2019
By Yunnan Chen
FROM OUR OBSESSION
Because China
Even small changes in China have global effects.
In the wake of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Forum in Beijing six weeks ago, Ethiopia gained another Chinese debt-concession. China’s second-largest African borrower and prominent BRI partner in infrastructure finance also received a cancellation on all interest-free loans up to the end of 2018. This was on top of previous renegotiated extensions of major commercial railway loans agreed earlier in 2018.
These concessions highlight the continuing debt-struggles that governments have in taking on Chinese large infrastructure projects. But they also demonstrate the advantages and flexibility, that African governments can gain in working with China—if they can leverage it.
Ethiopia’s railway projects have been an instructive case of both the benefits and pitfalls of Chinese finance.
Ethiopia’s railway projects have been an instructive case of both the benefits and pitfalls of Chinese finance. It has been over a year since the Chinese-built and financed Addis-Djibouti standard gauge railway (SGR) opened to commercial service in January 2018. A flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Horn of Africa, and constructed in parallel with Kenya’s showy Chinese-built SGR, the project was Ethiopia’s first railway since a century ago (another urban-rail project, the Addis light-rail transit (LRT) was completed earlier in 2015), as well as being the first fully-electrified line in Africa.
Costing nearly $4.5 billion, the SGR was partly financed through $2.5 billion in commercial loans from China Eximbank, according to figures from SAIS-CARI with further loan packages dedicated to transmission lines and the procurement of rolling stock and locomotives. Part of China’s wider ‘export-supply chain’ strategy, the railway uses a package of Chinese trains, Chinese construction companies, Chinese standards and specifications—and is currently operated under a six-year contract by a joint venture of the two Chinese contractors, CREC and CCECC, who built it.
As part of a wider nine-line railway network plan under the Ethiopian Railway Corporation (ERC), the line cuts travel time from the capital Addis Ababa to Djibouti from two days by road to 12 hours. Passing several industrial zone clusters in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, it also serves the government’s wider export-led industrialization strategy, through the strategy of “transit-oriented development”, writ on a national scale.
REUTERS/TIKSA NEGERI
Stewardesses stand in line during the inauguration of the new train line linking Addis Ababa-Djibouti line in October 2016.
But despite these lofty ambitions, the project has been afflicted by technical and financial challenges, calling into question the wisdom of relying on Chinese technology, as well as debt-financing, for major infrastructure. Despite the line’s completion in 2016, delays in the construction of the transmission network held up the railway’s commission, and problems with power outages and technical issues of over-voltage have continue to plague the line in the first year of operation.
Other social challenges have also emerged out of railway design choices: the decision to not erect fencing along rural tracts of the railway (both for cost-saving purposes and a concern to not divide pastoral communities) has led to the regular phenomenon of collisions between the train and livestock, resulting in conflicts over compensation; the railway become a target for blockades in regional ethnic tensions in the last year, leading several instances of disruption to service.
On an economic front, actual uptake of the railway by the industrial zones it was intended to serve remains low—even after a year, the vast majority of the railway’s freight cargo is made up of imports, not exports. Integration with export and industrial zones is low, as the main trunk line does not connect to individual industrial zones, creating significant last-mile shipping and logistics for firms, particularly at port connections. Most exporters continue to use road transport, despite the higher time and financial cost, due to its greater flexibility and reliability compared to the train’s twice-daily schedule.
REUTERS/STRINGER
The flashy Mombasa terminal of the SGR line constructed by the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and financed by the Chinese government in Kenya
This is a major problem for the railway’s economic prospects. Few passenger-based rail systems in the world are profitable; in developing countries, most railways connect to mines: one of the few bulk goods that can generate returns for such capital-intensive transport.
China also bears these costs. State insurer Sinosure publicly commented on $1 billion in losses written off for the project, and Eximbank has halted previously-discussed funding for the country’s second line, the section from Weldiya to Mekele. Though contracted to another Chinese SOE, CCCC, Ethiopia faces little prospect of further loan finance from China, until the first railway can show demonstrable success.
Further financial challenges afflict the projects, along with Ethiopia’s growing debt burden. A long-term foreign exchange shortage, worsened by poor export performance, has challenged Ethiopia’s ability to repay many of the loans that financed these projects. Repayments on the principal for the Chinese railway loan began in 2017, before the line was even operational. As of the beginning of 2019, the ERC was not only behind in its loan repayments to China, but also unable to front the remainder of the management fees for the Chinese companies operating the railway.
In late 2018, Ethiopia negotiated with Beijing to restructure of the Eximbank loan terms, extending the repayment period from 15 to 30 years.
China’s railway loan concessions to the Ethiopian government also contrast to the other debt-financed railway project the government is constructing: under Turkish contractor Yapi Merkezi, Ethiopia’s second railway line from Awash to Weldiya is still under construction, financed by a consortium of mostly European lenders including Turkish Eximbank and led by Credit Suisse. Despite its delayed Chinese debt repayments, Ethiopia has reportedly never missed a payment to its European creditors, where the penalties to future access to credit are harder.
Despite delayed Chinese debt repayments, Ethiopia has never missed a payment to its European creditors, where penalties are harder.
In this, China’s deep and strategically-tied pocketbook has been a big advantage, allowing Ethiopia to juggle its external obligations and leverage Chinese flexibility where it can. Ethiopia’s renegotiation and rollover of debt indicates that this BRI project is unlikely to have a Hanbantota-esque Chinese takeover. In contrast, Kenya’s Mombasa-Nairobi railway—another Chinese-designed and built SGR which has seen similar concerns over debt-burdens—but curiously has not received similar concessions from China—and has struggled to gain further funding from China for its expansion. Longer-term challenges remain in the national railway’s development and success. Financial concessions buy Ethiopia more time, but the government still faces an ongoing challenge of capacity building for the eventual handover of railway operations to Ethiopian ownership. China has supported through training exchanges in the form of student exchanges and in the construction of a new railway academy dedicated to vocational staff training—and the case of the light rail transit shows some early success: after three years, daily operation has been entirely localized to Ethiopian staff.
However, the Addis-Djibouti SGR has seen more missed opportunities: the very fact that operations and maintenance were awarded to construction contractors with no actual railway operations experience is indicative of the failure of adequate capacity building during construction. The government too, has learned from this, pressuring Turkish contractors Yapi Merkezi in the Awash-Weldiya rail project much harder on capacity building for ERC engineers and construction staff.
Under Ethiopian premier Abiy, the Horn of Africa country is also learning and adapting in other ways in managing its external partners, increasingly looking to encourage private sector finance and public private partnerships to finance future railway developments.
Outside of railway, though, China remains a viable partner: the recent signing of a new power project still demonstrates the considerable sway that China holds as a financier where other international sources of credit remain scarce. But both sides have been burned: while the strategic discourse of the Belt and Road mean that the SGR will not be abandoned, both lender and borrower now show greater caution in the infrastructure they pour money into.
*The author acknowledges the generous support of SAIS China Africa Research Initiative in funding field research for this article.
Ethiopia and Kenya are struggling to manage debt for their Chinese-built railways
CC: Zigi Rizla Kafrican Depay Teargass Tony254 pingli-nywee komora096
June 4, 2019
By Yunnan Chen
FROM OUR OBSESSION
Because China
Even small changes in China have global effects.
In the wake of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) Forum in Beijing six weeks ago, Ethiopia gained another Chinese debt-concession. China’s second-largest African borrower and prominent BRI partner in infrastructure finance also received a cancellation on all interest-free loans up to the end of 2018. This was on top of previous renegotiated extensions of major commercial railway loans agreed earlier in 2018.
These concessions highlight the continuing debt-struggles that governments have in taking on Chinese large infrastructure projects. But they also demonstrate the advantages and flexibility, that African governments can gain in working with China—if they can leverage it.
Ethiopia’s railway projects have been an instructive case of both the benefits and pitfalls of Chinese finance.
Ethiopia’s railway projects have been an instructive case of both the benefits and pitfalls of Chinese finance. It has been over a year since the Chinese-built and financed Addis-Djibouti standard gauge railway (SGR) opened to commercial service in January 2018. A flagship project of China’s Belt and Road Initiative in the Horn of Africa, and constructed in parallel with Kenya’s showy Chinese-built SGR, the project was Ethiopia’s first railway since a century ago (another urban-rail project, the Addis light-rail transit (LRT) was completed earlier in 2015), as well as being the first fully-electrified line in Africa.
Costing nearly $4.5 billion, the SGR was partly financed through $2.5 billion in commercial loans from China Eximbank, according to figures from SAIS-CARI with further loan packages dedicated to transmission lines and the procurement of rolling stock and locomotives. Part of China’s wider ‘export-supply chain’ strategy, the railway uses a package of Chinese trains, Chinese construction companies, Chinese standards and specifications—and is currently operated under a six-year contract by a joint venture of the two Chinese contractors, CREC and CCECC, who built it.
As part of a wider nine-line railway network plan under the Ethiopian Railway Corporation (ERC), the line cuts travel time from the capital Addis Ababa to Djibouti from two days by road to 12 hours. Passing several industrial zone clusters in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa, it also serves the government’s wider export-led industrialization strategy, through the strategy of “transit-oriented development”, writ on a national scale.
REUTERS/TIKSA NEGERI
Stewardesses stand in line during the inauguration of the new train line linking Addis Ababa-Djibouti line in October 2016.
But despite these lofty ambitions, the project has been afflicted by technical and financial challenges, calling into question the wisdom of relying on Chinese technology, as well as debt-financing, for major infrastructure. Despite the line’s completion in 2016, delays in the construction of the transmission network held up the railway’s commission, and problems with power outages and technical issues of over-voltage have continue to plague the line in the first year of operation.
Other social challenges have also emerged out of railway design choices: the decision to not erect fencing along rural tracts of the railway (both for cost-saving purposes and a concern to not divide pastoral communities) has led to the regular phenomenon of collisions between the train and livestock, resulting in conflicts over compensation; the railway become a target for blockades in regional ethnic tensions in the last year, leading several instances of disruption to service.
On an economic front, actual uptake of the railway by the industrial zones it was intended to serve remains low—even after a year, the vast majority of the railway’s freight cargo is made up of imports, not exports. Integration with export and industrial zones is low, as the main trunk line does not connect to individual industrial zones, creating significant last-mile shipping and logistics for firms, particularly at port connections. Most exporters continue to use road transport, despite the higher time and financial cost, due to its greater flexibility and reliability compared to the train’s twice-daily schedule.
REUTERS/STRINGER
The flashy Mombasa terminal of the SGR line constructed by the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) and financed by the Chinese government in Kenya
This is a major problem for the railway’s economic prospects. Few passenger-based rail systems in the world are profitable; in developing countries, most railways connect to mines: one of the few bulk goods that can generate returns for such capital-intensive transport.
China also bears these costs. State insurer Sinosure publicly commented on $1 billion in losses written off for the project, and Eximbank has halted previously-discussed funding for the country’s second line, the section from Weldiya to Mekele. Though contracted to another Chinese SOE, CCCC, Ethiopia faces little prospect of further loan finance from China, until the first railway can show demonstrable success.
Further financial challenges afflict the projects, along with Ethiopia’s growing debt burden. A long-term foreign exchange shortage, worsened by poor export performance, has challenged Ethiopia’s ability to repay many of the loans that financed these projects. Repayments on the principal for the Chinese railway loan began in 2017, before the line was even operational. As of the beginning of 2019, the ERC was not only behind in its loan repayments to China, but also unable to front the remainder of the management fees for the Chinese companies operating the railway.
In late 2018, Ethiopia negotiated with Beijing to restructure of the Eximbank loan terms, extending the repayment period from 15 to 30 years.
China’s railway loan concessions to the Ethiopian government also contrast to the other debt-financed railway project the government is constructing: under Turkish contractor Yapi Merkezi, Ethiopia’s second railway line from Awash to Weldiya is still under construction, financed by a consortium of mostly European lenders including Turkish Eximbank and led by Credit Suisse. Despite its delayed Chinese debt repayments, Ethiopia has reportedly never missed a payment to its European creditors, where the penalties to future access to credit are harder.
Despite delayed Chinese debt repayments, Ethiopia has never missed a payment to its European creditors, where penalties are harder.
In this, China’s deep and strategically-tied pocketbook has been a big advantage, allowing Ethiopia to juggle its external obligations and leverage Chinese flexibility where it can. Ethiopia’s renegotiation and rollover of debt indicates that this BRI project is unlikely to have a Hanbantota-esque Chinese takeover. In contrast, Kenya’s Mombasa-Nairobi railway—another Chinese-designed and built SGR which has seen similar concerns over debt-burdens—but curiously has not received similar concessions from China—and has struggled to gain further funding from China for its expansion. Longer-term challenges remain in the national railway’s development and success. Financial concessions buy Ethiopia more time, but the government still faces an ongoing challenge of capacity building for the eventual handover of railway operations to Ethiopian ownership. China has supported through training exchanges in the form of student exchanges and in the construction of a new railway academy dedicated to vocational staff training—and the case of the light rail transit shows some early success: after three years, daily operation has been entirely localized to Ethiopian staff.
However, the Addis-Djibouti SGR has seen more missed opportunities: the very fact that operations and maintenance were awarded to construction contractors with no actual railway operations experience is indicative of the failure of adequate capacity building during construction. The government too, has learned from this, pressuring Turkish contractors Yapi Merkezi in the Awash-Weldiya rail project much harder on capacity building for ERC engineers and construction staff.
Under Ethiopian premier Abiy, the Horn of Africa country is also learning and adapting in other ways in managing its external partners, increasingly looking to encourage private sector finance and public private partnerships to finance future railway developments.
Outside of railway, though, China remains a viable partner: the recent signing of a new power project still demonstrates the considerable sway that China holds as a financier where other international sources of credit remain scarce. But both sides have been burned: while the strategic discourse of the Belt and Road mean that the SGR will not be abandoned, both lender and borrower now show greater caution in the infrastructure they pour money into.
*The author acknowledges the generous support of SAIS China Africa Research Initiative in funding field research for this article.
Ethiopia and Kenya are struggling to manage debt for their Chinese-built railways
CC: Zigi Rizla Kafrican Depay Teargass Tony254 pingli-nywee komora096
Geza Ulole
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- Oct 31, 2009
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Swelling public debt interfered with SGR extension to Kisumu, Yatani
February 28, 2020 (2 days ago)
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Yatani has told parliamentarians that the government was already feeling the heat over its public debt load, hence decision to instead reactivate the Metre Gauge Railway (MGR) line linking Naivasha to the lakeside city/FILE
By JULIE OWINO, NAIROBI, Kenya, Feb 28 – Kenya’s swelling public debt was the reason behind the government’s decision to stop plans of extending the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) to Kisumu.
Treasury Cabinet Secretary Ukur Yatani told parliamentarians Thursday that the government was already feeling the heat over its public debt load, hence the decision to instead reactivate the Metre Gauge Railway (MGR) line linking Naivasha to the lakeside city.
“Because of our uptake of loans, we felt the project was going to constrain our budget, therefore the decision to propone the project,” said Yatani.
The construction of the rail was halted last August after the government failed to secure an expensive Sh368 billion loan from China.
Borrowing Locally
Yatani said the government will continue borrowing domestically even as it works on reducing the amount of money borrowed.
“I do not want to raise your expectations too high as we cannot say that we will stop borrowing locally, but we have a plan which will assist in reducing the rate at which we borrow as a country,” Yatani said.
He was presenting his submissions on business laws amendment bill 2019 to the finance and planning committee Thursday.
As of October 2019, Kenya’s total domestic debt was Sh2.836 trillion, while the total external public liability was Sh3.066 trillion to total to Sh5.902 trillion.
In the same month, Parliament approved the increase in debt threshold to Sh9 trillion saying this would ensure that the National Treasury had enough funds to meet its annual budget henceforth.
Swelling public debt interfered with SGR extension to Kisumu, Yatani - Capital Business
February 28, 2020 (2 days ago)
19
SHARES
ShareTweet
By JULIE OWINO, NAIROBI, Kenya, Feb 28 – Kenya’s swelling public debt was the reason behind the government’s decision to stop plans of extending the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) to Kisumu.
Treasury Cabinet Secretary Ukur Yatani told parliamentarians Thursday that the government was already feeling the heat over its public debt load, hence the decision to instead reactivate the Metre Gauge Railway (MGR) line linking Naivasha to the lakeside city.
“Because of our uptake of loans, we felt the project was going to constrain our budget, therefore the decision to propone the project,” said Yatani.
The construction of the rail was halted last August after the government failed to secure an expensive Sh368 billion loan from China.
Borrowing Locally
Yatani said the government will continue borrowing domestically even as it works on reducing the amount of money borrowed.
“I do not want to raise your expectations too high as we cannot say that we will stop borrowing locally, but we have a plan which will assist in reducing the rate at which we borrow as a country,” Yatani said.
He was presenting his submissions on business laws amendment bill 2019 to the finance and planning committee Thursday.
As of October 2019, Kenya’s total domestic debt was Sh2.836 trillion, while the total external public liability was Sh3.066 trillion to total to Sh5.902 trillion.
In the same month, Parliament approved the increase in debt threshold to Sh9 trillion saying this would ensure that the National Treasury had enough funds to meet its annual budget henceforth.
Swelling public debt interfered with SGR extension to Kisumu, Yatani - Capital Business
what concessional??!!.. SYNDICATED loan arranged by standard chartered..
Geza Ulole
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fool onyesha evidence ya commercial loan!
Geza Ulole
JF-Expert Member
- Oct 31, 2009
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- Thread starter
- #6,126
South Africa financier steps in with initial $100m for Isaka-Kigali SGR project
WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER 6 2019
The SGR passenger and cargo train terminal will be constructed in Ndera and Masaka. PHOTO | FILE
In Summary
By MOSES K. GAHIGI
More by this Author
The 532KM Isaka-Kigali standard gauge railway has received a boost after the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) committed to financing the project seen to hold immense potential for Rwanda's trade.
In July, Rwanda gazetted a bilateral agreement with Tanzania where the railway connects to, detailing the mechanism for the construction.
The South African financial institution with a $9 billion kitty, recently expressed interest in investing in the project while in Kigali to launch a partnership with the Development Bank of Rwanda to jointly finance investments in the country.
“This project is led by President John Magufuli and it’s already in the market; Yapi Merkezi, a Turkish firm, is already at it; Standard Chartered Bank is the arranger, they have approached us and we are considering it. We are obviously looking to approve it,” said Hildabertha Kundu, the DBSA regional manager for Central and East Africa.
Initially, DBSA will commit $100 million but is open to raising the amount depending on how the project goes.
“For us it's about development and impact, we can already see that massive movement of freight and cargo on rail is going to be way cheaper than on road, and the biggest problem in East Africa is lack of seamless connectivity; we have road connectivity but it's not seamless and it's not efficient,” said Ms Kundu.
She said connecting these countries by rail will also reduce the number of cargo tracks on the roads which will eventually increase the life of the roads.
The rail project will cost up to $2.5 billion, with Tanzania paying $1.3 billion and Rwanda $1.2 billion. Rwanda will however incur an extra expense to cover the extended line to Rubavu, which connects to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
A joint technical monitoring committee of five technocrats from each of the governments is expected to supervise the project. Line ministers from both countries will meet twice to review progress on financing, policy and regulation.
For the past few years, more than 70 per cent of Rwanda’s cargo has been coming through the Dar es Salaam port, with only 30 per cent coming through Mombasa.
However, volumes have dropped in recent times after an impasse between Kampala and Kigali escalated into border closure.
SA financier steps in with initial $100m for Isaka-Kigali SGR
WEDNESDAY NOVEMBER 6 2019
The SGR passenger and cargo train terminal will be constructed in Ndera and Masaka. PHOTO | FILE
In Summary
- In July, Rwanda gazetted a bilateral agreement with Tanzania where the railway connects to, detailing the mechanism for the construction.
- The South African financial institution with a $9 billion kitty, recently expressed interest in investing in the project while in Kigali to launch a partnership with the Development Bank of Rwanda to jointly finance investments in the country.
By MOSES K. GAHIGI
More by this Author
The 532KM Isaka-Kigali standard gauge railway has received a boost after the Development Bank of Southern Africa (DBSA) committed to financing the project seen to hold immense potential for Rwanda's trade.
In July, Rwanda gazetted a bilateral agreement with Tanzania where the railway connects to, detailing the mechanism for the construction.
The South African financial institution with a $9 billion kitty, recently expressed interest in investing in the project while in Kigali to launch a partnership with the Development Bank of Rwanda to jointly finance investments in the country.
“This project is led by President John Magufuli and it’s already in the market; Yapi Merkezi, a Turkish firm, is already at it; Standard Chartered Bank is the arranger, they have approached us and we are considering it. We are obviously looking to approve it,” said Hildabertha Kundu, the DBSA regional manager for Central and East Africa.
Initially, DBSA will commit $100 million but is open to raising the amount depending on how the project goes.
“For us it's about development and impact, we can already see that massive movement of freight and cargo on rail is going to be way cheaper than on road, and the biggest problem in East Africa is lack of seamless connectivity; we have road connectivity but it's not seamless and it's not efficient,” said Ms Kundu.
She said connecting these countries by rail will also reduce the number of cargo tracks on the roads which will eventually increase the life of the roads.
The rail project will cost up to $2.5 billion, with Tanzania paying $1.3 billion and Rwanda $1.2 billion. Rwanda will however incur an extra expense to cover the extended line to Rubavu, which connects to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
A joint technical monitoring committee of five technocrats from each of the governments is expected to supervise the project. Line ministers from both countries will meet twice to review progress on financing, policy and regulation.
For the past few years, more than 70 per cent of Rwanda’s cargo has been coming through the Dar es Salaam port, with only 30 per cent coming through Mombasa.
However, volumes have dropped in recent times after an impasse between Kampala and Kigali escalated into border closure.
SA financier steps in with initial $100m for Isaka-Kigali SGR
Geza Ulole
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- Oct 31, 2009
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Geza Ulole
JF-Expert Member
- Oct 31, 2009
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Geza Ulole
JF-Expert Member
- Oct 31, 2009
- 65,136
- 91,917
- Thread starter
- #6,129
Geza Ulole
JF-Expert Member
- Oct 31, 2009
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- Thread starter
- #6,130
Geza Ulole
JF-Expert Member
- Oct 31, 2009
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Geza Ulole
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The best 007
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Heheheheheeee jamani jamani hatotoka mtu humu we ngoja tu[emoji3][emoji3]
Bottas
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Bottas
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Tupeeni picha za train mlisema zinaingia leo na laxima tuhame jamii forums
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The best 007
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Hamtohama ila mtakuwa wanyonge sn
Geza Ulole
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Geza Ulole
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Geza Ulole
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Geza Ulole
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