Mtanzania Aliyetoa Taarifa zilizopelekea Kukamatwa Osama Bin Laden Atishia Kuishitaki USA, asema hajalipwa pesa zake Bilioni 68

Mtanzania Aliyetoa Taarifa zilizopelekea Kukamatwa Osama Bin Laden Atishia Kuishitaki USA, asema hajalipwa pesa zake Bilioni 68

econonist said:
Hiyo kesi ataifungulia wapi?. Umetoa taarifa mwaka 2005. Osama kauawa mwaka 2011, huu muda mwingine vipi.
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Mbona inawezskana mkuu. Taarifa zikitolewa lazima ufanyike uchunguzi kimya kimya na inaweza kuchukua miaka mingi isifikiri taarifa zilitolewa leo halafu kesho wakamtimbia bin laden. Hapo kati ulipita muda mrefu wa kijiridhisha
 
Ila wabongo waoga sana. Hao al qaida mbona nao ni binadamu tu unaweza kuoambana nao na ukawashinda.
 
Pascal Mayalla said:
Masikini Jabarldin Hamis Ijengo, asaidiwe tuu kwa kupatiwa ulinzi under witness protection arrangements wasije kummaliza, huku taarifa zake hazikusaidia kitu!. The informant aliyewezesha Osama kukamatwa ni muuza mbonga mboga wa Pakistan aliyekuwa anawapelekea mboga mboga na matunda. Kama CIA, Mossad, FBI, Scotland Yard, MI.15 na MI.16 walishindwa, what are the chances of huyu jamaa wa Bongo.

Apatiwe tuu ulinzi kwa u snitch lakini info zake hazikuwa na maana yoyote, unless ni wale wataalam wa kuonyesha kwa zile njia za kitaalam za asili, apewe pesa zake!.
P
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Naomba taarifa ya chanzo cha huyo muuza Mboga

Based on an investigative report by the New York Times, Pakistan's intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence, was aware of bin Laden's whereabouts and chose not to share this information with the United States

Executive Summary

On October 7, 2001, U.S. aircraft began bombing the
training bases and strongholds of Al Qaeda and the ruling
Taliban across Afghanistan. The leaders who sent murderers to
attack the World Trade Center and the Pentagon less than a
month earlier and the rogue government that provided them
sanctuary were running for their lives. President George W.
Bush's expression of America's desire to get Osama bin Laden
``dead or alive'' seemed about to come true.
Two months later, American civilian and military leaders
celebrated what they viewed as a lasting victory with the
selection of Hamid Karzai as the country's new hand-picked
leader. The war had been conceived as a swift campaign with a
single objective: defeat the Taliban and destroy Al Qaeda by
capturing or killing bin Laden and other key leaders. A unique
combination of airpower, Central Intelligence Agency and
special operations forces teams and indigenous allies had swept
the Taliban from power and ousted Al Qaeda from its safe haven
while keeping American deaths to a minimum. But even in the
initial glow, there were concerns: The mission had failed to
capture or kill bin Laden.


Removing the Al Qaeda leader from the battlefield eight
years ago would not have eliminated the worldwide extremist
threat. But the decisions that opened the door for his escape
to Pakistan allowed bin Laden to emerge as a potent symbolic
figure who continues to attract a steady flow of money and
inspire fanatics worldwide. The failure to finish the job
represents a lost opportunity that forever altered the course
of the conflict in Afghanistan and the future of international
terrorism, leaving the American people more vulnerable to
terrorism, laying the foundation for today's protracted Afghan
insurgency and inflaming the internal strife now endangering
Pakistan. Al Qaeda shifted its locus across the border into
Pakistan, where it has trained extremists linked to numerous
plots, including the July 2005 transit bombings in London and
two recent aborted attacks involving people living in the
United States.

The terrorist group's resurgence in Pakistan has
coincided with the rising violence orchestrated in Afghanistan
by the Taliban, whose leaders also escaped only to re-emerge to
direct today's increasingly lethal Afghan insurgency.
This failure and its enormous consequences were not
inevitable. By early December 2001, Bin Laden's world had
shrunk to a complex of caves and tunnels carved into a
mountainous section of eastern Afghanistan known as Tora Bora.
Cornered in some of the most forbidding terrain on earth, he
and several hundred of his men, the largest concentration of Al
Qaeda fighters of the war, endured relentless pounding by
American aircraft, as many as 100 air strikes a day. One
15,000-pound bomb, so huge it had to be rolled out the back of
a C-130 cargo plane, shook the mountains for miles. It seemed
only a matter of time before U.S. troops and their Afghan
allies overran the remnants of Al Qaeda hunkered down in the
thin, cold air at 14,000 feet.


Bin Laden expected to die. His last will and testament,
written on December 14, reflected his fatalism. ``Allah
commended to us that when death approaches any of us that we
make a bequest to parents and next of kin and to Muslims as a
whole,'' he wrote, according to a copy of the will that
surfaced later and is regarded as authentic. ``Allah bears
witness that the love of jihad and death in the cause of Allah
has dominated my life and the verses of the sword permeated
every cell in my heart, `and fight the pagans all together as
they fight you all together.' How many times did I wake up to
find myself reciting this holy verse!'' He instructed his wives
not to remarry and apologized to his children for devoting
himself to jihad.
But the Al Qaeda leader would live to fight another day.
Fewer than 100 American commandos were on the scene with their
Afghan allies, and calls for reinforcements to launch an
assault were rejected. Requests were also turned down for U.S.
troops to block the mountain paths leading to sanctuary a few
miles away in Pakistan. The vast array of American military
power, from sniper teams to the most mobile divisions of the
Marine Corps and the Army, was kept on the sidelines. Instead,
the U.S. command chose to rely on airstrikes and untrained
Afghan militias to attack bin Laden and on Pakistan's loosely
organized Frontier Corps to seal his escape routes.



On or
around December 16, two days after writing his will, bin Laden
and an entourage of bodyguards walked unmolested out of Tora
Bora and disappeared into Pakistan's unregulated tribal area.
Most analysts say he is still there today.
The decision not to deploy American forces to go after bin
Laden or block his escape was made by Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld and his top commander, Gen. Tommy Franks, the
architects of the unconventional Afghan battle plan known as
Operation Enduring Freedom. Rumsfeld said at the time that he
was concerned that too many U.S. troops in Afghanistan would
create an anti-American backlash and fuel a widespread
insurgency.


Reversing the recent American military orthodoxy
known as the Powell doctrine, the Afghan model emphasized
minimizing the U.S. presence by relying on small, highly mobile
teams of special operations troops and CIA paramilitary
operatives working with the Afghan opposition. Even when his
own commanders and senior intelligence officials in Afghanistan
and Washington argued for dispatching more U.S. troops, Franks
refused to deviate from the plan.
There were enough U.S. troops in or near Afghanistan to
execute the classic sweep-and-block maneuver required to attack
bin Laden and try to prevent his escape. It would have been a
dangerous fight across treacherous terrain, and the injection
of more U.S. troops and the resulting casualties would have
contradicted the risk-averse,



``light footprint'' model
formulated by Rumsfeld and Franks. But commanders on the scene
and elsewhere in Afghanistan argued that the risks were worth
the reward.
After bin Laden's escape, some military and intelligence
analysts and the press criticized the Pentagon's failure to
mount a full-scale attack despite the tough rhetoric by
President Bush. Franks, Vice President Dick Cheney and others
defended the decision, arguing that the intelligence was
inconclusive about the Al Qaeda leader's location. But the
review of existing literature, unclassified government records
and interviews with central participants underlying this report
removes any lingering doubts and makes it clear that Osama bin
Laden was within our grasp at Tora Bora.
For example, the CIA and Delta Force commanders who spent
three weeks at Tora Bora as well as other intelligence and
military sources are certain he was there. Franks' second-in-
command during the war, retired Lt. Gen. Michael DeLong, wrote
in his autobiography that bin Laden was ``definitely there when
we hit the caves''--a statement he retracted when the failure
became a political issue. Most authoritatively, the official
history of the U.S. Special Operations Command determined that
bin Laden was at Tora Bora. ``All source reporting corroborated
his presence on several days from 9-14 December,'' said a
declassified version of the history, which was based on
accounts of commanders and intelligence officials and published
without fanfare two years ago.
The reasons behind the failure to capture or kill Osama bin
Laden and its lasting consequences are examined over three
sections in this report. The first section traces bin Laden's
path from southern Afghanistan to the mountains of Tora Bora
and lays out new and previous evidence that he was there. The
second explores new information behind the decision not to
launch an assault. The final section examines the military
options that might have led to his capture or death at Tora
Bora and the ongoing impact of the failure to bring him back
``dead or alive.''
 
ChoiceVariable said:
Mtanzania Jabarldin Hamis Ijengo ametishia kwenda Mahakamani Kuishitaki Ubalozi wa Marekani Nchini Kwa madai kwamba haijamlipa pesa zake kufuatia kutoa taarifa za Siri na uhakika zilizowezeshwa kuuwawa Kwa Gaidi Maarufu bwana Osama Bin Laden.
View attachment 3000085

My Take
USA acheni Utapeli lipeni pesa za watu.
======
Did information that led to the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011 originate from Dar es Salaam?

This is a question that has remained unanswered for years, and it has now resurfaced following claims that a man in Dar es Salaam who tipped off the US security agencies about the whereabouts of bin Laden is demanding his reward of $27 million from the US government.

The Tanzanian man, Jabaldin Hamis Ijengo, has come forward alleging he played a key role in locating Osama Bin Laden.

Mr Ijengo says he provided crucial information to the US Embassy in Dar es Salaam in 2005 about Bin Laden's whereabouts in Pakistan.

The informant is now threatening to sue the US Embassy for the alleged failure to reward him for his instrumental role in disclosing the whereabouts of Bin Laden, ultimately leading to his death in 2011.

“Failure to comply with this demand will regrettably leave me with no choice but to pursue legal recourse, which may involve initiating court proceedings at your own risk and expense, without further notice,” warns the alleged informant.

The US Embassy in Dar es Salaam, through its spokesperson, Kalisha Holmes, declined to comment on the matter.

“While we cannot comment on ongoing law enforcement cases, all information provided to the Rewards for Justice programme is reviewed and vetted by the relevant authorities in the US,” Ms Holmes wrote in an email.

The informant, who spoke to The Citizen for the first time, says he has decided to come out publicly to claim his reward because he felt he was being denied what is truly his.

In 2015, The Citizen broke the story (Swipe to see coverage) when the claims were initially made. The matter has now resurfaced, with the man pursuing his reward for over 10 years now.

“It is because of the lengthy delays that it has become inevitable for me to come out,” said Mr Ijengo.

He reminded officials of the public offer made by the embassy in response to the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, wherein a reward of $27 million was promised for information leading to Bin Laden's location.

Chanzo: The Citizen
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Duh! Wamlipe tu
 
Walitakiwa na lenyewe waliuwe vilevile kwa sababu jitu likiwa mbea na nafiki halina maana siku yoyote likioneshwa au kuahidiwa hela linakusaliti.
 
JUAN MANUEL said:
Kwa kuongezea, Baada ya ubalozi kulipuliwa,
Polisi ya bongo, iliendesha kampeni ya kamatakamata ya watu Dar, wakawarundika Oystebay polisi, siku ya pili, wakafika diplomatic security na FBI agents, pale Oystebay, wakaperekwa kuona watu waliokamatwa, ndani ya dk 10, baada ya assessment, wakawambia polisi ngumbalu wa bongo, achieni wote hawa, hakuna muhusika, tupelekeni Mbezi ya Kimara, kwenye gereji X, pale kuna taarifa za kutosha.
Yaliyobaki ni Historia, aliyetengeneza bomu, kutoa msaada wa pesa, alikmatwa, yupo anaozea jera, US, sio Zenj, ya kuvimbiwa
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Yupo Guantanamo na kufanya ni mtazania pekee aliefungwa Guantanamo
 
ChoiceVariable said:
Mtanzania Jabarldin Hamis Ijengo ametishia kwenda Mahakamani Kuishitaki Ubalozi wa Marekani Nchini Kwa madai kwamba haijamlipa pesa zake kufuatia kutoa taarifa za Siri na uhakika zilizowezeshwa kuuwawa Kwa Gaidi Maarufu bwana Osama Bin Laden.
View attachment 3000085

My Take
USA acheni Utapeli lipeni pesa za watu.
======
Did information that led to the killing of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan in May 2011 originate from Dar es Salaam?

This is a question that has remained unanswered for years, and it has now resurfaced following claims that a man in Dar es Salaam who tipped off the US security agencies about the whereabouts of bin Laden is demanding his reward of $27 million from the US government.

The Tanzanian man, Jabaldin Hamis Ijengo, has come forward alleging he played a key role in locating Osama Bin Laden.

Mr Ijengo says he provided crucial information to the US Embassy in Dar es Salaam in 2005 about Bin Laden's whereabouts in Pakistan.

The informant is now threatening to sue the US Embassy for the alleged failure to reward him for his instrumental role in disclosing the whereabouts of Bin Laden, ultimately leading to his death in 2011.

“Failure to comply with this demand will regrettably leave me with no choice but to pursue legal recourse, which may involve initiating court proceedings at your own risk and expense, without further notice,” warns the alleged informant.

The US Embassy in Dar es Salaam, through its spokesperson, Kalisha Holmes, declined to comment on the matter.

“While we cannot comment on ongoing law enforcement cases, all information provided to the Rewards for Justice programme is reviewed and vetted by the relevant authorities in the US,” Ms Holmes wrote in an email.

The informant, who spoke to The Citizen for the first time, says he has decided to come out publicly to claim his reward because he felt he was being denied what is truly his.

In 2015, The Citizen broke the story (Swipe to see coverage) when the claims were initially made. The matter has now resurfaced, with the man pursuing his reward for over 10 years now.

“It is because of the lengthy delays that it has become inevitable for me to come out,” said Mr Ijengo.

He reminded officials of the public offer made by the embassy in response to the 1998 attacks on US embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi, wherein a reward of $27 million was promised for information leading to Bin Laden's location.

Chanzo: The Citizen
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How did he know about the issue?
 
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