Nimemsikiliza Tundu Lissu kwa makini sana!
Nina sympathize naye kwa masaibu aliyopata lakini kwenye hili jambo kakurupuka sana!
Huwezi shinda vita yoyote ya maana bila mkakati wa maana!
(The Art of War by Sun Zu)!
Tundu Lissu angejipa muda kwanza na angefuatilia hiyo case ya Uingereza huku akikusanya ushahidi taratibu.
Angesubiri aone pia kama Judgement ingekuwa in favor ya huyo Whistle Blower wake Michael Clifford then angekuwa kwenye position nzuri ya kufanya well informed decision!
Kaonyesha weakness kubwa sana, sema tu watu wengi ni mediocres wanamsifia tu bila reasoning ya maana!
Sana sana nimemsikia akibeza Mahakama zetu za Profesa Juma.
Soma Pia:
Ameonyesha tamaa ya kulipwa mapesa mengi na Tigo!! Amedhihirisha pia siyo mzalendo na kumbe ni kweli Hayati Magufuli alikuwa sahihi kwamba anashirikuana na maadui zetu kukamata Ndege zetu.
Tundu Lissu ni mkurupukaji sana! Utulivu zero kabisa.
Mkuu,
Huyu jamaa kaathirika sana kichwani.
Hajitambui kabisa maana hawezi kukusanya ushahidi kimya kimya ambao hauna shaka yoyote anapayuka kabla ya hitimisho lenye mwongozo sahihi.
Rejeo uliloliweka ni murua sana kuchakata fikra za mtu anayetaka kutekeleza jambo kwa ufanisi.
Ndio maana wana jeshi huwa hawakurupuki kutamka au kutenda chochote kabla hawajajiridhisha uwepo wa utisho.
Nalibandika hapa rejeo la "The Art of War by Sun Tzu) kwa ufupi
I-
Laying Plans
The art of war is of vital importance to
the State.
2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety
or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can
on no account be neglected.
3. The art of war, then, is governed by five
constant factors, to be considered in one’s deliberations,
when seeking to determine the conditions
obtaining in the field.
4. These are:
(1) The Moral Law.
(2) Heaven.
(3) Earth.
(4) The Commander.
(5) Method and discipline.
5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete
accord with their ruler, so that they will follow
him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.
7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times
and seasons.
8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger
and security; open ground and narrow passes; the
chances of life and death.
9. The Commander stands for the virtues of
wisdom, sincerely, benevolence, courage, and strictness.
10. By method and discipline are to be understood the
marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the
graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance
of roads by which supplies may reach the army,
and the control of military expenditure.
11. These five heads should be familiar to every general:
he who knows them will be victorious; he who
knows them not will fail.
12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to
determine the military conditions, let them be made the
basis of a comparison, in this wise:—
13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the
Moral law?
(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?
(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from
Heaven and Earth?
(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously
enforced?
(5) Which army is stronger?
(6) On which side are officers and men more highly
trained?
(7) In which army is there the greater
constancy both in reward and punishment?
14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast
victory or defeat.
15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and
acts upon it, will conquer let such a one be retained in
command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel
nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat:—let such a one
be dismissed!
16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself
also, of any helpful circumstances over and beyond
the ordinary rules.
17. According as circumstances are favorable, one
should modify one’s plans.
18. All warfare is based on deception.
19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem
unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive;
when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we
are far away; when far away, we must make him
believe we are near.
20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder,
and crush him.
21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If
he is in superior strength, evade him.
22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate
him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.
23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his
forces are united, separate them.
24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear
where you are not expected.
25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not
be divulged beforehand.
26. Now the general who wins a battle makes
many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought.
The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations
beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to
victory, and few calculations to defeat how much more
no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that
I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.
II-
Waging War
In the operations of war, where there
are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many
heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers,
with provisions enough to carry them a thousand
li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including
entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and
paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach
the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such
is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.
2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is
long in coming, then men’s weapons will grow dull and
their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town,
you will exhaust your strength.
3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of
the State will not be equal to the strain.
4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor
damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure
spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage
of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be
able to avert the consequences that must ensue.
5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war,
cleverness has never been seen associated with long
delays.
6. There is no instance of a country having benefited
from prolonged warfare.
7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the
evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable
way of carrying it on.
8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither
are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.
9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage
on the enemy. Thus, the army will have food enough for
its needs.
10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be
maintained by contributions from a distance.
Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes
the people to be impoverished.
11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes
prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s
substance to be drained away.
12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry
will be afflicted by heavy exactions.
13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of
strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare,
and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated;
while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out
horses, breastplates and helmets, bows, and arrows,
spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen
and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its
total revenue.
15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on
the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is
equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a single
picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from
one’s own store.
16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be
roused to anger; that there may be advantage from
defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.
17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more
chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded
who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted
for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and
used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers
should be kindly treated and kept.
18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment
one’s own strength.
19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not
lengthy campaigns.
20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is
the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it
depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.
III-
Attack by Stratagem
In the practical art of war, the best
thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and
intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too,
it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it,
to capture a regiment, a detachment, or a company
entire than to destroy them.
2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not
supreme excellence: supreme excellence consists in
breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.
3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the
enemy’s plans; the next best is to prevent the junction
of the enemy’s forces; the next in order is to attack the
enemy’s army in the field; and the worst policy of all is
to besiege walled cities.
4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly
be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable
shelters, and various implements of war, will take up
three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over
against the walls will take three months more.
5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will
launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with
the result that one-third of his men are slain while the
town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous
effects of a siege.
6. Therefore the skillful leader subdues the enemy’s
troops without any fighting; he captures their cities
without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom
without lengthy operations in the field.
7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of
the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph
will be complete. This is the method of attacking by
stratagem.
8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the
enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack
him; if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.
9. If equally matched, we can offer battle; if slightly
inferior in numbers, we can avoid the enemy; if quite
unequal in every way, we can flee from him.
10. Hence, though an obstinate fight may be made by a
small force, in the end it must be captured by the larger
force.
11. Now the general is the bulwark of the State; if the
bulwark is complete at all points; the State will be
strong; if the bulwark is defective, the State will be
weak.
12. There are three ways in which a ruler can bring
misfortune upon his army:—
13. (1) By commanding the army to advance or to
retreat, being ignorant of the fact that it cannot obey.
This is called hobbling the army.
14. (2) By attempting to govern an army in the same
way as he administers a kingdom, being ignorant of the
conditions which obtain in an army. This causes restlessness
in the soldier’s minds.
15. (3) By employing the officers of his army without
discrimination, through ignorance of the military principle
of adaptation to circumstances. This shakes the
confidence of the soldiers.
16. But when the army is restless and distrustful, trouble
is sure to come from the other feudal princes. This
is simply bringing anarchy into the army, and flinging
victory away.
17. Thus we may know that there are five essentials
for victory:
(1) He will win who knows when to fight and when
not to fight.
(2) He will win who knows how to manage both
superior and inferior forces.
(3) He will win whose army is animated by the
same spirit throughout all its ranks.
(4) He will win who, prepared himself, waits to take
the enemy unprepared.
(5) He will win who has military capacity and is not
interfered with by the sovereign.
18. Hence the saying: If you know the enemy and
know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred
battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy,
for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If
you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb
in every battle.
IV-
Tactical dispositions
The good fighters of old first put themselves
beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited
for an opportunity of defeating the enemy.
2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own
hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is
provided by the enemy himself.
3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself
against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the
enemy.
4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer
without being able to do it.
5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics;
ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive.
6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient
strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength.
7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the
most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in
attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven.
Thus, on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves;
on the other, a victory that is complete.
8. To see victory only when it is within the ken of the
common herd is not the acme of excellence.
9. Neither is it the acme of excellence if you fight and
conquer and the whole Empire says, “Well done!”
10. To lift an autumn hair is no sign of great strength;
to see the sun and moon is no sign of sharp sight; to
hear the noise of thunder is no sign of a quick ear.
11. What the ancients called a clever fighter is one who
not only wins, but excels in winning with ease.
12. Hence his victories bring him neither reputation for
wisdom nor credit for courage.
13. He wins his battles by making no mistakes. Making
no mistakes is what establishes the certainty of victory,
for it means conquering an enemy that is already
defeated.
14. Hence the skillful fighter puts himself into a position
which makes defeat impossible, and does not miss
the moment for defeating the enemy.
15. Thus it is that in war the victorious strategist only
seeks battle after the victory has been won, whereas he
who is destined to defeat first fights and afterwards
looks for victory.
16. The consummate leader cultivates the moral law,
and strictly adheres to method and discipline; thus it is
in his power to control success.
17. In respect of military method, we have, firstly,
Measurement; secondly, Estimation of quantity; thirdly,
Calculation; fourthly, Balancing of chances; fifthly,
Victory.
18. Measurement owes its existence to Earth;
Estimation of quantity to Measurement; Calculation to
Estimation of quantity; Balancing of chances to
Calculation; and Victory to Balancing of chances.
19. A victorious army opposed to a routed one, is a
pound’s weight placed in the scale against a single
grain.
20. The onrush of a conquering force is like the bursting
of pent-up waters into a chasm a thousand fathoms
deep.
V-
Energy
The control of a large force is the same
principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a
question of dividing up their numbers.
2. Fighting with a large army under your command is
nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is
merely a question of instituting signs and signals.
3. To ensure that your whole host may withstand the
brunt of the enemy’s attack and remain unshaken—this
is affected by maneuvers direct and indirect.
4. That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone
dashed against an egg—this is effected by the science
of weak points and strong.
5. In all fighting, the direct method may be used for
joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in
order to secure victory.
6. Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible
as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers
and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to
begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to
return once more.
7. There are not more than five musical notes, yet the
combinations of these five give rise to more melodies
than can ever be heard.
8. There are not more than five primary colors (blue,
yellow, red, white, and black), yet in combination they
produce more hues than can ever been seen.
9. There are not more than five cardinal tastes (sour,
acrid, salt, sweet, bitter), yet combinations of them
yield more flavors than can ever be tasted.
10. In battle, there are not more than two methods of
attack—the direct and the indirect; yet these two in
combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers.
11. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in
turn. It is like moving in a circle—you never come to
an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?
12. The onset of troops is like the rush of a torrent
which will even roll stones along in its course.
13. The quality of decision is like the well-timed swoop
of a falcon which enables it to strike and destroy its victim.
14. Therefore the good fighter will be terrible in his
onset, and prompt in his decision.
15. Energy may be likened to the bending of a crossbow;
decision, to the releasing of a trigger.
16. Amid the turmoil and tumult of battle, there may be
seeming disorder and yet no real disorder at all; amid
confusion and chaos, your array may be without head
or tail, yet it will be proof against defeat.
17. Simulated disorder postulates perfect discipline,
simulated fear postulates courage; simulated weakness
postulates strength.
18. Hiding order beneath the cloak of disorder is simply
a question of subdivision; concealing courage
under a show of timidity presupposes a fund of latent
energy: masking strength with weakness is to be effected
by tactical dispositions.
19. Thus one who is skillful at keeping the enemy on
the move maintains deceitful appearances, according to
which the enemy will act. He sacrifices something,
that the enemy may snatch at it.
20. By holding out baits, he keeps him on the march;
then with a body of picked men he lies in wait for him.
21. The clever combatant looks to the effect of combined
energy, and does not require too much from individuals.
Hence his ability to pick out the right men and
utilize combined energy.
22. When he utilizes combined energy, his fighting
men become as it were like unto rolling logs or stones.
For it is the nature of a log or stone to remain motionless
on level ground, and to move when on a slope; if
four-cornered, to come to a standstill, but if round shaped,
to go rolling down.
23. Thus the energy developed by good fighting men is
as the momentum of a round stone rolled down a
mountain thousands of feet in height. So much on the
subject of energy.
VI-
Weak Points and Strong
Whoever is first in the field and awaits
the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight;
whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle
will arrive exhausted.
2. Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on
the enemy, but does not allow the enemy’s will to be
imposed on him.
3. By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the
enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting
damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to
draw near.
4. If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if
well, supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly
encamped, he can force him to move.
5. Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to
defend; march swiftly to places where you are not
expected.
6. An army may march great distances without distress,
if it marches through a country where the enemy is not.
7. You can be sure of succeeding in your attacks if you
only attack places which are undefended. You can
ensure the safety of your defense if you only hold positions
that cannot be attacked.
8. Hence that general is skillful in attack whose opponent
does not know what to defend; and he is skillful in
defense whose opponent does not know what to attack.
9. O divine art of subtlety and secrecy! Through you
we learn to be invisible, through you inaudible; and
hence we can hold the enemy’s fate in our hands.
10. You may advance and be absolutely irresistible, if
you make for the enemy’s weak points; you may retire
and be safe from pursuit if your movements are more
rapid than those of the enemy.
11. If we wish to fight, the enemy can be forced to an
engagement even though he be sheltered behind a high
rampart and a deep ditch. All we need do is attack some
another place that he will be obliged to relieve.
12. If we do not wish to fight, we can prevent the
enemy from engaging us even though the lines of our
encampment be merely traced out on the ground. All
we need to throw something odd and unaccountable
in his way.
13. By discovering the enemy’s dispositions and
remaining invisible ourselves, we can keep our forces
concentrated, while the enemy’s must be divided.
14. We can form a single united body, while the enemy
must split up into fractions. Hence there will be a
whole pitted against separate parts of a whole, which
means that we shall be many to the enemies few.
15. And if we are able thus to attack an inferior force
with a superior one, our opponents will be in dire
straits.
16. The spot where we intend to fight must not be made
known; for then the enemy will have to prepare against
an attack at several different points; and his
forces being thus distributed in many directions, the
numbers we shall have to face at any given point will
be proportionately few.
17. For should the enemy strengthen his van, he will
weaken his rear; should he strengthen his rear, he will
weaken his van; should he strengthen his left, he will
weaken his right; should he strengthen his right, he will
weaken his left. If he sends reinforcements everywhere,
he will everywhere be weak.
18. Numerical weakness comes from having to prepare
against attacks; numerical strength, from compelling
our adversary to make these preparations
against us.
19. Knowing the place and the time of the coming battle,
we may concentrate from the greatest distances in
order to fight.
20. But if neither time nor place be known, then the left
wing will be impotent to succor the right, the right
equally impotent to succor the left, the van unable to
relieve the rear, or the rear to support the van. How
much more so if the furthest portions of the army are
anything under a hundred LI apart, and even the nearest
are separated by several LI!
21. Though according to my estimate the soldiers of
Yueh exceed our own in number, that shall advantage
them nothing in the matter of victory. I say then that
victory can be achieved.
22. Though the enemy is stronger in numbers, we may
prevent him from fighting. Scheme to discover
his plans and the likelihood of their success.
23. Rouse him, and learn the principle of his activity or
inactivity. Force him to reveal himself, so as to find out
his vulnerable spots.
24. Carefully compare the opposing army with your
own, so that you may know where strength is superabundant
and where it is deficient.
25. In making tactical dispositions, the highest pitch
you can attain is to conceal them; conceal your dispositions,
and you will be safe from the prying of the subtlest
spies, from the machinations of the wisest brains.
26. How victory may be produced for them out of the
enemy’s tactics—that is what the multitude cannot
comprehend.
27. All men can see the tactics whereby I conquer, but
what none can see is the strategy out of which victory
is evolved.
28. Do not repeat the tactics which have gained you
one victory, but let your methods be regulated by the
infinite variety of circumstances.
29. Military tactics are like unto water; for water in its
the natural course runs away from high places and hastens
downwards.
30. So in war, the way is to avoid what is strong and to
strike at what is weak.
31. Water shapes its course according to the nature of
the ground over which it flows; the soldier works out
his victory concerning the foe whom he is facing.
32. Therefore, just as water retains no constant shape,
so, in warfare, there are no constant conditions.
33. He who can modify his tactics about his
opponent and thereby succeed in winning may be
called a heaven-born captain.
34. The five elements (water, fire, wood, metal, earth)
are not always equally predominant; the four seasons
make way for each other in turn. There are short days
and long; the moon has its periods of waning and waxing.
VII-
Maneuvering
In war, the general receives his commands
from the sovereign.
2. Having collected an army and concentrated his
forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements
thereof before pitching his camp.
3. After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which
there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical
maneuvering consists of turning the devious into the
direct, and misfortune into gain.
4. Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing
the enemy out of the way, and though starting after
him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows
knowledge of the deceit of DEVIATION.
5. Maneuvering with an army is advantageous; with an
undisciplined multitude, most dangerous.
6. If you set a fully equipped army in March in order to
snatch an advantage, the chances are that you will be.
too late. On the other hand, to detach a flying column.
for the purpose involves the sacrifice of its baggage
and stores.
7. Thus, if you order your men to roll up their buff coats,
and make forced marches without halting day or
night, covering double the usual distance at a stretch,
doing a hundred LI to wrest an advantage, the
leaders of all your three divisions will fall into the
hands of the enemy.
8. The stronger men will be in front, the jaded ones will
fall behind, and on this plan only one-tenth of your
the army will reach its destination.
9. If you march fifty LI in order to outmaneuver the
enemy, you will lose the leader of your first division,
and only half your force will reach the goal.
10. If you march thirty LI with the same object, two-thirds
of your army will arrive.
11. We may take it then that an army without its baggage-
train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without
bases of supply it is lost.
12. We cannot enter into alliances until we are
we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.
13. We are not fit to lead an army on the march unless
we are familiar with the face of the country—its mountains.
and forests, its pitfalls and precipices, its marshes
and swamps.
14. We shall be unable to turn natural advantage to
account unless we make use of local guides.
15. In war, practice dissimulation, and you will succeed.
16. Whether to concentrate or to divide your troops,
must be decided by circumstances.
17. Let your rapidity be that of the wind, your compactness
that of the forest.
18. In raiding and plundering be like fire, is immovability
like a mountain.
19. Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night,
and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.
20. When you plunder a countryside, let the spoil be
divided amongst your men; when you capture new territory,
cut it up into allotments for the benefit of the soldiery.
21. Ponder and deliberate before you make a move.
22. He will conquer who has learnt the artifice of deviation.
Such is the art of maneuvering.
23. The Book of Army Management says: On the field
of battle, the spoken word does not carry far enough:
hence the institution of gongs and drums. Nor can
ordinary objects be seen clearly enough: hence the
institution of banners and flags.
24. Gongs and drums, banners, and flags, are means
whereby the ears and eyes of the host may be focused.
on one particular point.
25. The host thus forming a single united body, is it
impossible either for the brave to advance alone, or for
the cowardly to retreat alone. This is the art of handling.
large masses of men.
26. In night-fighting, then, make much use of signal fires
and drums, and in fighting by day, of flags and
banners, as a means of influencing the ears and eyes of
your army.
27. A whole army may be robbed of its spirit; a commander-
in-chief may be robbed of his presence of
mind.
28. Now a soldier’s spirit is keenest in the morning; by
noonday it has begun to flag; and in the evening, his
mind is bent only on returning to camp.
29. A clever general, therefore, avoids an army when
its spirit is keen, but attacks it when it is sluggish and
inclined to return. This is the art of studying moods.
30. Disciplined and calm, to await the appearance of
disorder and hubbub amongst the enemy:—this is the
art of retaining self-possession.
31. To be near the goal while the enemy is still far from
it, to wait at ease while the enemy is toiling and struggling,
to be well-fed while the enemy is famished:—
this is the art of husbanding one’s strength.
32. To refrain from intercepting an enemy whose banners
are in perfect order, to refrain from attacking an
army drawn up in calm and confident array:—this is
the art of studying circumstances.
33. It is a military axiom not to advance uphill against
the enemy, nor to oppose him when he comes downhill.
34. Do not pursue an enemy who simulates flight; do
not attack soldiers whose temper is keen.
35. Do not swallow bait offered by the enemy. Do not
interfere with an army that is returning home.
36. When you surround an army, leave an outlet free.
Do not press a desperate foe too hard.
37. Such is the art of warfare.
VIII-
Variation in Tactics
In war, the general receives his commands
from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates
his forces.
2. When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country
where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies.
Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In
hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In
desperate position, you must fight.
3. There are roads which must not be followed, armies
which must be not attacked, towns which must be
besieged, positions which must not be contested, commands
of the sovereign which must not be obeyed.
4. The general who thoroughly understands the advantages
that accompany variation of tactics knows how to
manage his troops.
5. The general who does not understand these, may be
well, acquainted with the configuration of the country,
yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical
account.
6. So, the student of war who is unversed in the art of
war of varying his plans, even though he be acquainted
with the Five Advantages, will fail to make the best use
of his men.
7. Hence in the wise leader’s plans, considerations of
advantage and of disadvantage will be blended together.
8. If our expectation of advantage be tempered in this
way, we may succeed in accomplishing the essential
part of our schemes.
9. If, on the other hand, in the midst of difficulties we
are always ready to seize an advantage, we may extricate
ourselves from misfortune.
10. Reduce the hostile chiefs by inflicting damage on
them; and make trouble for them, and keep them constantly
engaged; hold out specious allurements, and
make them rush to any given point.
11. The art of war teaches us to rely not on the likelihood
of the enemy’s not coming, but on our own readiness
to receive him; not on the chance of his not attacking,
but on the fact that we have made our position
unassailable.
12. There are five dangerous faults which may affect a
general:
(i) Recklessness, which leads to destruction.
(ii) cowardice, which leads to capture.
(iii) a hasty temper, which can be provoked by
insults.
(iv) a delicacy of honor which is sensitive to shame.
(v) over-solicitude for his men, which exposes him
to worry and trouble.
13. These are the five besetting sins of a general,
ruinous to the conduct of war.
14. When an army is overthrown and its leader slain,
the cause will surely be found among these five dangerous.
faults. Let them be a subject of meditation.