Rais Samia kufanya ziara nchini Urusi kuanzia Juni 3 hadi Juni 5, 2026

TOKA MAKTABA

"Tunauwezo wa Kushasha kipigo na Kuigeuza Kifusi hadi Chini", Putin Atoa Onyo Kali kwa NATO na Mwitikio wa Kwanza Kuhusu drone Romania


30 June 2026

FULL PRESSER: "Level to the Ground", Putin Issues Stark Warning to NATO and 1st Reaction On Romania

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=S2qFk_UslKQRussian President Vladimir Putin holds a wide-ranging press conference following his state visit to Astana, Kazakhstan, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) summit.In this complete presser, Putin addresses pressing geopolitical issues, including the recent drone incident in Romania, the timeline for the conflict in Ukraine, and direct warnings to NATO regarding the defense of Kaliningrad and the Baltics.

He also outlines Russia's regional economic strategy, detailing the financing of a nuclear power plant in Kazakhstan, the development of "sovereign AI," and issuing a stark economic warning to Armenia regarding its potential pivot toward the European Union.
 
ChoiceVariable said:
Hana tabia ya kuzurula Bali hao beeru ndio walikuwa wanamtaka aende kwao na akawa anawachagua kama karanga.

Haendi Kwa Beberu na hawana Cha kumfanya sana sana atawatandika bakura za kuzidi nyie vibaraka wao.
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Lini TRUMP alimuita, Lini Kiongozi wa Ujerumani alimuita aende Ujerumani, lini Waziri Mkuu wa Uingereza alimuita aende Uingereza?
 
Tatizo Urusi hana economic influence kwa dunia hata ule muungano na India,China,SA, Brazil una sua sua wameshindwa kabisa kuiua dola ya Marekani.
 
Bagamoyo said:
Wageni waalikwa Jukwaa la 29 la Kimataifa la Uchumi la St. Petersburg (SPIEF 2026): waalikwa wa Kimataifa ni :

international participants of the forum are:
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02 June 2026

UJASUSI WA KIDOLA, GEOPOLITICS Jukwaa la Kimataifa la Uchumi la St. Petersburg (SPIEF)

AfD huko St. Petersburg: Jinsi Kremlin Inavyokuza Ushawishi wa Kisiasa Ndani ya Ujerumani
[COLOR=rgba(48, 55, 62, 0.73)]Juni 1, 2026


Besucher gehen durch die Hallen des Internationalen Wirtschaftsforums huko St. Petersburg (SPIEF). (zu dpa: "Deutsche nehmen an Putins Wirtschaftsforum teil")​

Wajumbe wanne wa chama cha siasa kali za mrengo wa kulia cha Alternative for Germany (AfD) wamethibitisha kushiriki kwao katika Jukwaa la Kimataifa la Uchumi la St. Petersburg (SPIEF), lililopangwa kufanyika kuanzia Juni 3–6, 2026.

Ujumbe huo utajumuisha msemaji wa sera za kiuchumi za AfD Bundestag Steffen Kotré , naibu kiongozi wa kundi la wabunge Markus Frohnmaier , mkuu wa tawi la chama cha Saxony Jörg Urban , na Mbunge wa AfD wa Bunge la Ulaya Petr Bystron . Ziara yao inafuatia mwaliko rasmi kutoka kwa mshauri wa rais wa Urusi Anton Kobyakov .

Wanasiasa wa Ujerumani wamehalalisha safari yao kwa kutaja hitaji la kurejesha uhusiano wa kiuchumi na Urusi na kuwezesha kurejeshwa kwa makampuni ya Ujerumani kwenye soko la Urusi.

Kotré na Urban wametetea haswa kuanza tena kwa kile wanachokielezea kama "usambazaji wa nishati wa bei nafuu na wa kuaminika wa Urusi," huku wakikosoa "maneno ya kijeshi" ya serikali ya Ujerumani. Bystron amesema kwamba anakusudia kuwasilisha kibinafsi wito wa Rais wa Tume ya Ulaya Ursula von der Leyen kwa Urusi kukomesha vita kwa Vladimir Putin, huku wakati huo huo akitetea urekebishaji wa uhusiano wa kibiashara na Moscow.

Jukwaa la Kimataifa la Uchumi la St. Petersburg (SPIEF) ni tukio la kila mwaka la Urusi ambalo kwa kawaida hutumika na Kremlin kuonyesha ushawishi wa kimataifa na kuvutia uwekezaji wa kigeni. Hata hivyo, tangu Urusi ilipovamia Ukraine kikamilifu, serikali nyingi za Magharibi na mashirika makubwa yamesusia jukwaa hilo. Katika kukabiliana na hali hiyo, waandaaji wamezidi kuzingatia kuvutia wajumbe kutoka Asia, Afrika, na wahusika wa Ulaya wenye huruma kisiasa.

Waandaaji wanatarajia wawakilishi kutoka zaidi ya nchi 130 kuhudhuria tukio la mwaka huu.

Petr Bystron hapo awali amehusishwa katika utata kadhaa maarufu, ikiwa ni pamoja na madai kwamba alipokea usaidizi kutoka kwa jukwaa la vyombo vya habari vinavyounga mkono Urusi la Voice of Europe badala ya kukuza maslahi ya Kremlin. Markus Frohnmaier ametembelea mara kwa mara Crimea iliyokaliwa na maeneo yanayodhibitiwa na Urusi mashariki mwa Ukraine.

Steffen Kotré amekuwa akitetea ushirikiano mpya wa nishati na Urusi, huku Jörg Urban akipinga usaidizi wa kijeshi wa Ujerumani kwa Ukraine na kuhudhuria kongamano la "BRICS-Ulaya" huko Sochi mnamo Novemba 2025.
Tangu mwanzo wa vita kamili vya Urusi dhidi ya Ukraine, SPIEF imebadilika polepole kutoka jukwaa la kiuchumi hadi chombo cha kisiasa na propaganda cha Kremlin.

Kwa Moscow, thamani kuu ya jukwaa hilo haiko tena katika kutoa matokeo muhimu ya kiuchumi bali katika kupata uwepo wa mfano wa wanasiasa wa kigeni, hasa kutoka Ulaya, ili kuonyesha taswira ya uhalali wa kimataifa. Kwa hivyo, ushiriki wa wawakilishi wa AfD una umuhimu mkubwa wa habari na sifa kwa Kremlin.
Kwa kualika ujumbe wa AfD, Moscow inatafuta kuonyesha kwamba nguvu za kisiasa ndani ya Umoja wa Ulaya zinabaki tayari kushirikiana na Urusi licha ya vita vinavyoendelea dhidi ya Ukraine. Uwepo wa wanasiasa wa Ujerumani huenda ukatumiwa na Kremlin kudhoofisha mitazamo ya umoja wa Ulaya, kukuza njia za ziada za ushawishi wa kisiasa, na kuhalalisha masimulizi ya Urusi katika nafasi ya habari ya kimataifa.

Ziara ya watu wanne mashuhuri wa AfD pia itatumiwa vibaya na vyombo vya habari vya serikali ya Urusi kama ushahidi unaodaiwa kuwa sera ya vikwazo vya Magharibi imeshindwa. Magazeti ya Urusi yanaweza kuonyesha ushiriki wa ujumbe huo kama uthibitisho kwamba usaidizi wa kurejesha ushirikiano na Moscow unakua hata ndani ya nchi wanachama wanaoongoza wa EU. Ukweli tu kwamba wanasiasa wa Ujerumani wanahudhuria kongamano hilo unaruhusu Urusi kuendeleza simulizi nzuri ndani na nje ya nchi.

Wakati huo huo, safari hii ina umuhimu mkubwa wa kisiasa wa ndani kwa AfD yenyewe. Inakuja miezi michache tu kabla ya uchaguzi wa majimbo huko Saxony-Anhalt , Berlin , na Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania , maeneo ambayo chama hicho kinapata uungwaji mkono mkubwa. Ziara hii inaashiria mwitikio wa chama kwa makundi ya wapiga kura wa Ujerumani Mashariki, ambapo wito wa kurejesha uhusiano wa kiuchumi na Urusi ni wa kawaida zaidi kuliko magharibi mwa Ujerumani.

Kwa AfD, kushiriki katika SPIEF pia hutumika kama njia ya kusisitiza utofauti wake wa kisiasa kutoka kwa serikali ya shirikisho. Chama hicho kinatafuta kujionyesha kama mtetezi wa ushirikiano wa kiuchumi na Urusi na urejesho wa ushirikiano wa nishati. Wakati huo huo, hii inaimarisha zaidi mitazamo ya AfD kama nguvu ya kisiasa inayounga mkono Urusi iliyo tayari kudumisha mazungumzo na Kremlin licha ya vita vya Urusi dhidi ya Ukraine.

Kauli zilizotolewa na wajumbe zinaendana kwa karibu na masimulizi muhimu ya habari ya Urusi. Ukosoaji wa "maneno ya kijeshi," unataka kurejeshwa kwa uagizaji wa nishati wa Urusi, na rufaa za kurejesha mawasiliano ya kibiashara huondoa umakini kutoka kwa jukumu la Urusi kwa vita na kuelekea gharama za kiuchumi za Ulaya. Ujumbe kama huo unachangia kudhoofisha usaidizi wa umma kwa usaidizi unaoendelea kwa Ukraine na hutumikia maslahi ya Kremlin katika mzozo wake mpana wa habari na Magharibi.

Madai ya Bystron kwamba anakusudia kuwasilisha rufaa ya Ursula von der Leyen kwa Putin yanaonekana kuwa yamekusudiwa kuinua umuhimu wa kisiasa wa safari yake na kuunda hisia ya jukumu la upatanishi kati ya Umoja wa Ulaya na Kremlin. Hata hivyo, hakuna dalili kwamba Rais wa Tume ya Ulaya alimruhusu mwakilishi yeyote wa AfD kutoa ujumbe rasmi kwa Moscow. Taarifa kama hizo huruhusu AfD kujionyesha kama njia mbadala ya mawasiliano na Urusi huku ikiendeleza urekebishaji wa mahusiano na Kremlin.

Ziara hiyo inafanyika dhidi ya ukosoaji unaoendelea nchini Ujerumani kuhusu uhusiano kati ya watu fulani wa AfD na Urusi. Mnamo 2025, Martin Huber , Katibu Mkuu wa Chama cha Kijamii cha Kikristo (CSU) , alimtaja Markus Frohnmaier kama "kibaraka wa Putin" na akaonya kuhusu hatari zinazoweza kutokea za kiusalama ambazo uhusiano kama huo unaleta kwa Ujerumani na Umoja wa Ulaya. Wasiwasi huu unaonyesha wasiwasi mpana kuhusu uwezekano wa matumizi ya watendaji wa kisiasa kama njia za shughuli za ushawishi wa Urusi.

Kwa upana zaidi, safari hiyo inaangazia tena suala la Urusi kutumia vyama vya siasa vya Ulaya kama vyombo vya ushawishi wa kigeni. Kremlin kwa muda mrefu imekuwa ikitafuta kukuza uhusiano na harakati za kisiasa zinazopinga vikwazo, usaidizi wa kijeshi kwa Ukraine, na ujumuishaji wa kina wa Ulaya. Kwa muda mrefu, shughuli kama hizo hutoa changamoto zaidi kwa uthabiti wa kisiasa na usalama wa Ujerumani na Umoja wa Ulaya.

Uamuzi wa Ofisi ya Shirikisho ya Ulinzi wa Katiba ya Ujerumani (BfV) mwaka wa 2025 wa kuainisha AfD kama shirika lenye msimamo mkali unaongeza umuhimu wa mawasiliano haya. Uteuzi huu unamaanisha kwamba chama hicho kinaonekana kama tishio linalowezekana kwa utaratibu wa kikatiba wa Ujerumani na usalama wa taifa, na kuwezesha huduma za ujasusi kutumia hatua zilizopanuliwa za ufuatiliaji na ufuatiliaji. Katika muktadha huu, mwingiliano kati ya wanachama wa AfD na Kremlin unachukua umuhimu mkubwa wakati wa kutathmini hatari za shughuli za ushawishi wa Urusi ndani ya Umoja wa Ulaya.

Ushiriki wa wawakilishi wakuu wa AfD katika SPIEF haupaswi kutazamwa kama ziara ya kisiasa pekee bali kama sehemu ya mkakati mpana wa Urusi unaolenga kukuza watendaji wa kisiasa wenye huruma ndani ya Ulaya wenye uwezo wa kupinga sera za makubaliano kuhusu vikwazo, usaidizi wa kijeshi kwa Ukraine, na ujumuishaji wa Ulaya. Katika muktadha huu, lengo la Kremlin linaenea zaidi ya mahusiano ya umma na linajumuisha maendeleo ya muda mrefu ya mitandao ya kisiasa ambayo yanaweza kushawishi michakato ya kufanya maamuzi ndani ya mataifa muhimu ya Ulaya.

Kwa Moscow, uwepo wa wanasiasa wa AfD katika SPIEF unatimiza malengo kadhaa ya kimkakati kwa wakati mmoja. Kwanza, husaidia kudhoofisha simulizi ya kutengwa kwa Urusi kimataifa kwa kuonyesha kwamba wawakilishi wa moja ya vyama vikubwa vya upinzani nchini Ujerumani wanabaki tayari kushirikiana moja kwa moja na maafisa wa Urusi licha ya vita vinavyoendelea. Pili, inaipa Kremlin fursa ya kukuza simulizi zinazodokeza kwamba vitendo vya kiuchumi na wasiwasi wa usalama wa nishati vinapunguza hatua kwa hatua uungaji mkono wa Ulaya kwa vikwazo. Tatu, inawawezesha maafisa wa Urusi kudumisha njia za mawasiliano ya moja kwa moja na wanasiasa wenye ushawishi wa Ulaya nje ya mifumo rasmi ya kidiplomasia.

Jambo la kuzingatiwa zaidi ni muundo wa ujumbe wa AfD. Washiriki waliochaguliwa wanawakilisha viwango tofauti vya ushawishi wa kisiasa: Bundestag, Bunge la Ulaya, na miundo ya uongozi wa kikanda mashariki mwa Ujerumani. Hii inaonyesha kwamba Moscow haitafuta tu wageni wa mfano bali inawashirikisha watu binafsi wenye uwezo wa kuunda ujumbe wa vyama katika nyanja nyingi za kisiasa. Kujumuishwa kwa watu kama vile Markus Frohnmaier na Petr Bystron, ambao wote wamehusishwa na utata unaohusisha maslahi ya Urusi, kunaimarisha zaidi mtazamo kwamba Kremlin inathamini uhusiano wa kisiasa wa muda mrefu na watendaji walio tayari kupinga misimamo mikuu ya Ulaya kuhusu Urusi.

Kremlin huenda inaiona AfD kama mojawapo ya vyombo vya kisiasa vinavyoahidi zaidi vya kuendeleza malengo kadhaa ya muda mrefu ndani ya Ujerumani na kudhoofisha usaidizi wa Ujerumani kwa Ukraine; kukuza uchovu wa vikwazo miongoni mwa wapiga kura na wafanyabiashara; kuhimiza kurejeshwa kwa ushirikiano wa nishati kati ya Urusi na Ujerumani; kuongeza mgawanyiko wa kisiasa ndani ya Ujerumani; kupinga makubaliano ya sera za kigeni miongoni mwa vyama vikuu.

Muhimu zaidi, Moscow haihitaji AfD kuingia serikalini ili kufikia malengo haya. Hata kama nguvu ya upinzani, AfD yenye nguvu inaweza kushawishi mjadala wa umma, kubadilisha mazungumzo ya kisiasa, na kulazimisha vyama vikuu kujibu masuala yanayofaa maslahi ya Urusi.

Ujerumani inasalia kuwa shabaha muhimu zaidi ya kisiasa ya Urusi ndani ya Umoja wa Ulaya EU. Berlin ina jukumu kuu katika: sera ya vikwazo vya EU; usaidizi wa kijeshi kwa Ukraine; msimamo wa nguvu wa NATO katika Ulaya Mashariki; sera ya nishati ya Ulaya; ushirikiano wa viwanda na kiteknolojia.

Kwa hivyo, nguvu yoyote ya kisiasa inayotetea urekebishaji wa mahusiano na Moscow kwa kawaida hupata thamani ya kimkakati kutoka kwa mtazamo wa Kremlin .

Msisitizo wa wawakilishi wa AfD kuhusu kurejesha uagizaji wa nishati wa Urusi ni muhimu sana. Kabla ya 2022, gesi asilia ya Urusi ilikuwa msingi wa ushindani wa viwanda wa Ujerumani . Moscow inaendelea kutumia kumbukumbu za zamani kwa mfumo huu, haswa miongoni mwa sekta zilizoathiriwa na kupanda kwa gharama za nishati . Wito wa kurejeshwa kwa "nishati ya bei nafuu ya Urusi" unasikika huku sehemu ya wapiga kura ikipitia kutokuwa na uhakika wa kiuchumi, haswa mashariki mwa Ujerumani.

Muda wa ziara hiyo hauwezekani kuwa wa bahati mbaya. Kwa kuwa uchaguzi ujao wa majimbo unakaribia, AfD inaonekana kuimarisha mvuto wake miongoni mwa wapiga kura ambao bado wanatilia shaka vikwazo na uungwaji mkono wa kijeshi kwa Ukraine.

Ujerumani Mashariki inasalia kupokea ujumbe kama huo kutokana na mambo kadhaa: uhusiano wa kihistoria na uhusiano wa Ujerumani Mashariki ya zamani na Umoja wa Kisovieti; viwango vya chini vya kujitambulisha na NATO ikilinganishwa na Ujerumani Magharibi; kutoridhika zaidi kiuchumi; uungwaji mkono mkubwa kwa masimulizi ya kisiasa yanayopinga uanzishwaji.
Kwa hivyo ziara hii inatimiza malengo ya sera za kigeni na uchaguzi wa ndani. Inawaruhusu viongozi wa AfD kujionyesha kama watetezi wa maslahi ya kiuchumi ya Ujerumani huku wakijitofautisha na vyama vikuu vya siasa.

Kwa mtazamo wa kijasusi, moja ya mambo muhimu si lazima kuajiri au kupeleleza moja kwa moja, bali kushawishi kilimo.
Shughuli za ushawishi za Urusi zimejikita kihistoria katika kujenga mahusiano ya kibinafsi ya muda mrefu; kutoa fursa ya kupata maafisa wa Urusi kwa njia ya upendeleo; kutoa mwonekano wa vyombo vya habari; kuunda fursa za mitandao ya kisiasa; kuunda mitazamo kupitia ushirikishwaji unaorudiwa.

SPIEF hutumika kama jukwaa bora kwa shughuli kama hizo kwa sababu inachanganya ufikiaji wa kisiasa, ujumbe wa kiuchumi, na mwonekano wa kimataifa chini ya mfumo unaoonekana kuwa halali na usio wa kiserikali.
Kwa mifumo ya ujasusi na ushawishi ya Urusi, majukwaa kama vile SPIEF hutoa fursa za kutambua washirika wa siku zijazo, kuimarisha mawasiliano yaliyopo, na kutathmini njia za kisiasa za watendaji wa kigeni wenye huruma.

Kauli ya Petr Bystron kwamba anakusudia kuwasilisha rufaa ya Ursula von der Leyen kwa Vladimir Putin inastahili kuzingatiwa sana.

Umuhimu haupo katika kiini cha ujumbe wenyewe, bali katika jaribio la kuionyesha AfD kama mpatanishi wa kidiplomasia kati ya Ulaya na Urusi.
Simulizi hii ina madhumuni kadhaa: kuinua hadhi ya kimataifa ya AfD; kuonyesha taasisi kuu za Ulaya kama zisizofaa; kuiwasilisha AfD kama njia mbadala ya mawasiliano inayoweza kutumika; kuimarisha madai ya Urusi kwamba mazungumzo yenye maana yanawezekana tu kupitia wanasiasa walio tayari kupinga makubaliano ya sasa ya Ulaya.

Msimamo kama huo ni muhimu sana kwa propaganda za Kremlin kwa sababu husaidia kuhalalisha mawasiliano na wanasiasa wa Ulaya licha ya juhudi rasmi za kuitenga Urusi kidiplomasia.
Ziara hiyo inaangazia udhaifu mpana zaidi ndani ya mifumo ya kidemokrasia ambayo Urusi imekuwa ikijaribu kuitumia kwa miaka mingi.

Hatari kuu si kwamba wawakilishi wa AfD wataendeleza moja kwa moja malengo ya sera ya Urusi watakaporudi kutoka Urusi . Badala yake, wasiwasi ni kwamba ushirikishwaji unaorudiwa polepole hurekebisha masimulizi yanayoipendelea Moscow, ikiwa ni pamoja na: kuonyesha vikwazo kama visivyofaa; kuhoji msaada wa kijeshi kwa Ukraine; kusisitiza ushirikiano wa kiuchumi kuliko wasiwasi wa usalama; kuielezea Urusi kama mshirika muhimu badala ya mpinzani wa kimkakati.

Baada ya muda, masimulizi haya yanaweza kushawishi maoni ya umma, kuathiri matokeo ya uchaguzi, na kuzidisha juhudi za kudumisha mwitikio mmoja wa Ulaya kwa uchokozi wa Urusi.

Maafisa wa Urusi waliratibu ujumbe kwa kiwango gani na wawakilishi wa AfD kabla ya SPIEF?

Tathmini: Uwezekano wa Wastani hadi Juu wa Uratibu Usio rasmi (65–80%)
Kwa sasa hakuna ushahidi wa umma kwamba maafisa wa Urusi waliwaandikia moja kwa moja au kuwaagiza rasmi wawakilishi wa AfD kuhusu la kusema mbele ya Jukwaa la Kimataifa la Uchumi la St. Petersburg (SPIEF). Hata hivyo, viashiria kadhaa vinaonyesha uwezekano wa wastani hadi juu wa mpangilio wa ujumbe wa awali na mpangilio wa matarajio kati ya waandaaji wa Urusi na wanasiasa wa AfD wanaoshiriki.
Viashiria Vinavyounga Mkono Uratibu wa Awali

Uwiano wa Kushangaza na Simulizi za Kremlin
Kauli zilizotolewa na Steffen Kotré, Jörg Urban, Petr Bystron, na Markus Frohnmaier zinafanana kwa karibu na masimulizi ya kimkakati ya muda mrefu ya Urusi:



Mpangilio kama huo hauthibitishi kiotomatiki uratibu, lakini uthabiti unaonekana.
Mwaliko Rasmi kutoka Kremlin
Inaripotiwa kwamba ujumbe huo ulipokea mialiko kutoka kwa mshauri wa rais Anton Kobyakov , mmoja wa waandaaji wakuu wa SPIEF.

SPIEF si mkutano wa kiuchumi tu. Tangu 2022, imekuwa jukwaa la kisiasa linalosimamiwa na kusimamiwa na miundo ya Kremlin.

Waandaaji wa Urusi mara kwa mara: chagua washiriki wanaofaa; panga kuonekana kwa vyombo vya habari; ratibu mada za majadiliano; wezesha mikutano na maafisa wakuu.

Hii hutoa fursa za ulandanishi wa masimulizi kabla hata tukio halijaanza.
Uteuzi wa Washiriki Unaonyesha Kuvutiwa kwa Kimakusudi na Urusi
Kremlin haikuwaalika wanachama wa AfD bila mpangilio.

Hata kama madai maalum yanaendelea kupingwa kisheria, kesi hiyo inaonyesha jinsi mitandao ya ushawishi ya Urusi inavyoweza kufanya kazi kupitia vyombo vya habari badala ya njia za kijasusi za kitamaduni.

Shughuli zenye ushawishi mzuri zaidi mara nyingi ni zile ambazo watendaji wa kisiasa huendeleza malengo yanayolingana na maslahi ya Urusi kwa sababu ya imani zao za kiitikadi au motisha za kisiasa za ndani. Mfano unaowezekana zaidi si ule wa udhibiti wa moja kwa moja bali wa usimamizi wa uhusiano na ukuzaji wa ushawishi .

Huduma za ujasusi za Urusi labda hufanya kazi nyuma ya mfumo mpana wa vyombo vya habari, majukwaa ya kisiasa, mitandao ya biashara, na wapatanishi wanaosaidia kudumisha mawasiliano na wanasiasa wa Ulaya wenye huruma. Katika kesi ya AfD, mafanikio makubwa ya Moscow yanaweza yasiwe kuwashawishi watu mashuhuri wa chama kupitisha masimulizi ya Urusi, bali kuwapata wanasiasa ambao maoni yao ya awali tayari yanaingiliana na malengo ya Kremlin na kisha kuwapa majukwaa, ufikiaji, na mwonekano unaoimarisha misimamo hiyo.
Source : AfD in St. Petersburg: How the Kremlin Cultivates Political Influence Inside Germany - Robert Lansing Institute
 
The delegation includes individuals who: have previously visited Russia; publicly oppose sanctions; criticize military aid to Ukraine; advocate restoring energy cooperation.

This suggests Moscow selected participants already known to be politically compatible.

Rather than persuading them, Russian officials likely view them as reliable amplifiers of narratives that already align with Kremlin interests.

Russian political influence operations rarely rely on explicit instructions.
Historically, Russian outreach to European political actors follows a softer model: identify sympathetic politicians; invite them to conferences and forums; provide privileged access; reinforce shared viewpoints; amplify their statements through Russian media.

This approach creates what intelligence services often call “voluntary narrative convergence.”

Politicians retain formal independence while repeatedly advancing themes beneficial to Moscow.

AfD Already Holds These Positions. An important caveat is that AfD has advocated many of these policies for years.

The party: opposed sanctions before SPIEF; criticized military aid to Ukraine before SPIEF; advocated Russian energy imports before SPIEF.

Therefore, Russian officials may not need to coordinate messaging because the party already promotes many positions favorable to Moscow.

The upcoming state elections in eastern Germany provide independent political incentives. Many AfD voters favor: lower energy prices; reduced support for Ukraine; normalization of relations with Russia.

Consequently, AfD leaders have strong domestic reasons to emphasize these themes regardless of Kremlin influence.

The Most Likely Scenario
The most probable assessment is that Russian officials did not need to dictate talking points to AfD representatives because both sides already share substantial ideological and policy overlap.

However, there is a high probability that SPIEF organizers and Russian officials engaged in informal narrative coordination, including: discussions about key themes; expectations regarding public statements; media planning; framing of economic and political issues.
In intelligence terms, this would not constitute command-and-control influence but rather message alignment between actors whose interests temporarily converge.
The critical question is not whether Moscow told AfD representatives what to say.

The more important question is: To what extent has the Kremlin successfully cultivated a political environment in which influential European politicians voluntarily promote narratives that advance Russian strategic objectives without requiring direct instruction?

The SPIEF delegation suggests that, at least in this case, Moscow may no longer need to persuade certain political actors—the narratives have already become self-sustaining within parts of the European political landscape.

Does the Kremlin View AfD as a Future Governing Partner or Primarily as a Disruptive Opposition Force?
At present, the Kremlin primarily views AfD as a disruptive opposition force rather than a realistic future governing partner.

However, Moscow would prefer a scenario in which AfD eventually participates in government or becomes indispensable to coalition-building at the federal or state level.

Probability Assessment: Primarily a disruptive opposition force: 70–80%; Potential future coalition partner at regional level: 50–60%;Potential participant in a federal government within 5–10 years: 20–30%; Strategic long-term governing partner comparable to Hungary’s Fidesz: 10–15%.

From Moscow’s perspective, AfD already delivers significant benefits without holding executive power.

AfD can: challenge sanctions policy; oppose military aid to Ukraine; undermine political consensus; increase polarization; weaken confidence in mainstream institutions; amplify narratives favorable to Russia.

Russia’s influence strategy in Europe has often focused on weakening political cohesion rather than installing friendly governments.

The Kremlin understands that a fragmented Germany is often more useful than a Germany governed by a stable pro-Russian administration that may never materialize.

Historically, Moscow has supported parties that: challenge NATO; oppose sanctions; criticize EU integration; promote national sovereignty over supranational institutions.

Examples include: Viktor Orbán and Fidesz; Marine Le Pen and National Rally; Matteo Salvini and Lega; Freedom Party of Austria.

In many cases these movements were more valuable while influencing public debate than while actually governing.
Why AfD Is Not Yet a Realistic Governing Partner

Several obstacles remain.
Germany’s major parties maintain a “firewall” against AfD.
Currently: CDU/CSU rejects coalition cooperation; SPD rejects coalition cooperation; Greens reject coalition cooperation; Left Party rejects coalition cooperation.This significantly limits AfD’s path to power.

The designation of AfD as an extremist organization by Germany’s domestic intelligence authorities has increased political risks associated with cooperation.

Many German elites increasingly view AfD not simply as a political competitor but as a potential security concern.
This reduces the likelihood of near-term federal coalition participation.
Unlike Hungary or Slovakia, Germany remains strongly anchored in NATO; the EU; transatlantic institutions.
A sudden geopolitical reorientation toward Russia remains unlikely.

How Moscow Probably Sees AfD’s Future
The Kremlin likely applies a long-term strategy.
In Short Term Moscow expects to maximize AfD electoral gains; increase pressure on mainstream parties; weaken support for Ukraine.
Russia does not necessarily expect AfD to enter government.

In Medium Term (3–7 years)The Kremlin sees to normalize cooperation with AfD; erode the political firewall;make coalition discussions unavoidable.
This is similar to the path followed by several European populist parties that were initially considered politically untouchable.

In Long Term (5–10 years) the ideal Kremlin scenario would be a Germany where: AfD participates in regional governments; coalition arrangements become normalized; sanctions policy becomes politically contested; military support for Ukraine faces stronger resistance.

Even partial success would represent a strategic gain for Moscow.
The Kremlin pays particular attention to eastern German states because: AfD performs strongest there; economic grievances are more pronounced; pro-dialogue attitudes toward Russia are more common; historical links to the Soviet era remain stronger.

The participation of Jörg Urban and other eastern German figures in SPIEF is therefore likely not accidental.
Moscow may view eastern Germany as the most promising entry point for expanding political influence.
The Kremlin’s immediate objective is not to place AfD in power. Rather, Moscow seeks to use AfD to weaken Germany’s political consensus on Russia, Ukraine, sanctions, and European security.
At present, AfD’s greatest value to the Kremlin lies in its ability to act as a force multiplier for narratives that divide German society and complicate policymaking.

However, Moscow is almost certainly investing in a long-term relationship. If AfD continues to expand its electoral base and gradually breaks political isolation, the Kremlin would readily welcome its evolution from a disruptive opposition movement into a coalition-capable political force.

In intelligence terms, AfD is currently more useful to Moscow as a destabilizing actor than as a governing actor—but the Kremlin would prefer to have both.

What Role Do Russian Intelligence and Influence Networks Play in Facilitating Contacts Between Russian Officials and AfD Representatives?
There is no publicly available evidence that Russian intelligence services directly manage or control AfD representatives. However, there is substantial evidence that Russia has developed a broader ecosystem of influence networks that facilitate contacts between Russian officials and sympathetic European politicians, including some members of AfD.

The most likely assessment is that Russian intelligence services play an enabling, coordinating, and protective role, while overt engagement is conducted through seemingly legitimate intermediaries such as political forums, business associations, media platforms, think tanks, cultural organizations, and parliamentary diplomacy.

Historically, Russia rarely relies on classic espionage when dealing with foreign politicians.

Instead, Moscow employs a layered influence architecture:

Outer Layer – Public Influence Structures
These include: international conferences; business forums; media organizations; academic institutions; cultural foundations; parliamentary friendship groups.Examples include: SPIEF; the former Voice of Europe network; various Russia-Europe dialogue forums; BRICS-related conferences; Russian cultural diplomacy initiatives.These organizations create legitimate reasons for contact.

Middle Layer – Political and Business Intermediaries
This layer often includes: former politicians; lobbyists; businessmen; consultants; pro-Russian activists; unofficial intermediaries.

Their function is to build personal relationships and establish trust.
In many cases, politicians never interact directly with intelligence officers but instead with individuals who have links to Kremlin institutions.

Inner Layer – Intelligence Oversight
Russian intelligence services such as: Federal Security Service (FSB); Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); Main Directorate of the General Staf are unlikely to run every political contact directly.
Their role is more likely to include: identifying promising political figures; assessing vulnerabilities; collecting political intelligence; evaluating influence opportunities; protecting Russian strategic interests.

SPIEF provides an ideal environment for influence operations because it combines: political access; economic discussions; media visibility; networking opportunities.
Unlike formal diplomatic meetings, participants often perceive the forum as a business event rather than a geopolitical engagement.

This reduces political sensitivity.
From an intelligence perspective, SPIEF functions as a: networking platform; assessment platform; recruitment environment; influence marketplace.
Russian officials can identify which foreign politicians: are receptive to Russian narratives; may become future leaders; possess influence within their political systems.

One of the most significant recent examples involves the now-sanctioned platform Voice of Europe.

Voice of Europe
European investigations alleged that the platform was used to: disseminate pro-Kremlin narratives; build relationships with European politicians; potentially channel influence and support.
The allegations involving Petr Bystron make this issue particularly relevant.
Source : AfD in St. Petersburg: How the Kremlin Cultivates Political Influence Inside Germany - Robert Lansing Institute
 
Nimeota ndege atakayopanda ikizimika mawinguni.
 
Punguzeni kuwaogopa hao magharibi, ni binadamu wanaozaliwa wakakua kisha wakafa kama sisi.
 
02 June 2026
Moscow
LIVE NOW | Tanzania – Russia Relations Enter a New Chapter


View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=HCS0FQiy864🇹🇿 Tanzanian President Samia Suluhu Hassan arrives in Moscow for a historic state visit, where she is set to hold talks with Russian President Vladimir Putin.

President Hassan is also expected to participate in the upcoming St. Petersburg International Economic Forum, one of the world's leading economic forums, bringing together government leaders, business executives, and investors from across the globe.

As Africa strengthens partnerships with emerging economies, this visit highlights the growing importance of Tanzania-Russia cooperation within the evolving multipolar world.
 
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