huyu jamaa huwa ananifurahishaga sana.
Je, serikali yatangaza hali ya dharura kuelekea tarehe 7/7 (Sabasaba)?
Je, serikali yatangaza hali ya dharura kuelekea tarehe 7/7 (Sabasaba)?
Mwalimu wa tuisheni
JF-Expert Member
- Oct 19, 2019
- 8,797
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Nani kiongozi wa hayo maandamano..?
- Thread starter
- #63
Patrobas Katambi akiongea na wazee wa Shinyanga mjini kufuatia kauli tata aliyotoa akiwa bungeni jana, leo akiongea na wazee amesema yupo tayari kupoteza cheo kwa amri aliyotoa bungeni kwa IGP, kwa kuwa alisema hayo bungeni ili kulinda amani ya nchi... sikiliza mubashara live akiongea na wazee...
27 June 2026
Shinyanga, Tanzania
#PATROBAS KATAMBI ASEMA HANA HOFU NA CHEZO MUHIMU NI USALAMA WA TAIFA
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=L607Owp1Ano
Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi Patrobas Pascal Katambi amesema hajavunja katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania kwa Kupiga Marufuku Mikutano ya siasa nchini huku akisema hayuko tayari kuona Taifa linaangamia kwa kuacha kundi la watu wachache wenye maslahi binafsi ambalo linakiuka haki za wananchi wengi.
Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani na Mbunge wa Shinyanga Mjini, Patrobas Katambi , jana akiongea na wazee ambapo kama kawaida yake hufanya mikutano ya mara kwa mara na vikao vya kusikiliza kero na kuwasilisha mikakati ya kimaendeleo kwa wananchi na wazee wa maeneo mbalimbali ya Shinyanga, ikiwemo Kata ya Kulandoto. Lengo kuu la mikutano hii ni kuimarisha maelewano na kuleta maendeleo ya wananchi...
Patrobas Katambi amesema marufuku aliyotangaza jana bungeni sikukosea na nimesoma chuo kikuu hivyo sikukosea katiba nimesoma miaka chuo kikuu SAUT na Law School of Tanzania nimepita mitihani hivyo wazee wangu Tanzania lazima ibaki salama potelea mbali nipiteze cheo changu hivi wazee na kinamama wa Kulandoto hapa Shinyanga mnaweza kukimbia ikitokea mabomu na risasi zinapigwa hapa..(sauti wazee wanashangilia)..
Patrobas Paschal Katambi wakili msomi mhitimu wa The Law School of Tanzania, na chuo kikuu cha St. Augustine University Of Tanzania SAUT
27 June 2026
Shinyanga, Tanzania
#PATROBAS KATAMBI ASEMA HANA HOFU NA CHEZO MUHIMU NI USALAMA WA TAIFA
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=L607Owp1Ano
Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi Patrobas Pascal Katambi amesema hajavunja katiba ya Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania kwa Kupiga Marufuku Mikutano ya siasa nchini huku akisema hayuko tayari kuona Taifa linaangamia kwa kuacha kundi la watu wachache wenye maslahi binafsi ambalo linakiuka haki za wananchi wengi.
Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani na Mbunge wa Shinyanga Mjini, Patrobas Katambi , jana akiongea na wazee ambapo kama kawaida yake hufanya mikutano ya mara kwa mara na vikao vya kusikiliza kero na kuwasilisha mikakati ya kimaendeleo kwa wananchi na wazee wa maeneo mbalimbali ya Shinyanga, ikiwemo Kata ya Kulandoto. Lengo kuu la mikutano hii ni kuimarisha maelewano na kuleta maendeleo ya wananchi...
Patrobas Katambi amesema marufuku aliyotangaza jana bungeni sikukosea na nimesoma chuo kikuu hivyo sikukosea katiba nimesoma miaka chuo kikuu SAUT na Law School of Tanzania nimepita mitihani hivyo wazee wangu Tanzania lazima ibaki salama potelea mbali nipiteze cheo changu hivi wazee na kinamama wa Kulandoto hapa Shinyanga mnaweza kukimbia ikitokea mabomu na risasi zinapigwa hapa..(sauti wazee wanashangilia)..
Patrobas Paschal Katambi wakili msomi mhitimu wa The Law School of Tanzania, na chuo kikuu cha St. Augustine University Of Tanzania SAUT
- Thread starter
- #64
29 June 2026
MADELEKA LIVE : NI RAIS PEKEE ANAYEWEZA KUAMURU MAJESHI, SIYO KATAMBI
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=1f7OasXg81M
Wakili Peter Madeleka amkumbusha waziri Katambi kuwa hana mamlaka ya kutoa amri kwa IGP Camillius Wambura....
Patrobas Pascal Katambi wakili msomi mhitimu wa The Law School of Tanzania, na chuo kikuu cha St. Augustine University Of Tanzania SAUT ameteleza katika hili wakili msomi Peter Madeleka amefafanua..
Patrobas Paschal Katambi aliteuliwa na Samia Suluhu Hassan kuwa Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi mapema mwaka huu. Uteuzi huo ulifanyika Januari 8, 2026 ambapo kabla ya uteuzi huu, Patrobas Katambi alikuwa Naibu Waziri wa Viwanda na Biashara na anachukua nafasi ya Boniface George Simbachawene ambaye uteuzi wake umetenguliwa.
MADELEKA LIVE : NI RAIS PEKEE ANAYEWEZA KUAMURU MAJESHI, SIYO KATAMBI
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=1f7OasXg81M
Wakili Peter Madeleka amkumbusha waziri Katambi kuwa hana mamlaka ya kutoa amri kwa IGP Camillius Wambura....
Patrobas Pascal Katambi wakili msomi mhitimu wa The Law School of Tanzania, na chuo kikuu cha St. Augustine University Of Tanzania SAUT ameteleza katika hili wakili msomi Peter Madeleka amefafanua..
Patrobas Paschal Katambi aliteuliwa na Samia Suluhu Hassan kuwa Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi mapema mwaka huu. Uteuzi huo ulifanyika Januari 8, 2026 ambapo kabla ya uteuzi huu, Patrobas Katambi alikuwa Naibu Waziri wa Viwanda na Biashara na anachukua nafasi ya Boniface George Simbachawene ambaye uteuzi wake umetenguliwa.
- Thread starter
- #65
29 June 2026
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
LHRC condemns the proclamation issued by Tanzania's Minister Patrobas Katambi : "The Ban on Political Meetings is Unconstitutional"
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=CjVcK5w2J_8
The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) in Tanzania has come out in public and strongly condemns the proclamation issued by the Minister of Home Affairs, Hon. Patrobasi Pascal Katambi, to ban public meetings of political parties in Tanzania.
In their official statement issued on June 29, 2026, the Executive Director of LHRC, Dr. Anna Henga, has stated that the proclamation has no legal or constitutional basis, but is an abuse of power that threatens democracy, equality before the law, and good governance
29 Juni 2026
LHRC Yamtolea Uvivu Waziri Katambi: "Katazo la Mikutano ya Siasa ni Kinyume Cha Katiba"
Kituo cha Sheria na Haki za Binadamu (LHRC) kimejitokeza hadharani na kulaani vikali tamko lililotolewa na Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi, Mhe. Patrobasi Katambi, la kupiga marufuku mikutano ya hadhara ya vyama vya siasa nchini Tanzania.Katika taarifa yao rasmi iliyotolewa tarehe Juni 29, 2026, Mkurugenzi Mtendaji wa LHRC, Dkt. Anna Henga, amebainisha kuwa agizo hilo halina msingi wowote wa kisheria au wa kikatiba, bali ni matumizi mabaya ya madaraka yanayotishia demokrasia, usawa mbele ya sheria, na utawala bora
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
LHRC condemns the proclamation issued by Tanzania's Minister Patrobas Katambi : "The Ban on Political Meetings is Unconstitutional"
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=CjVcK5w2J_8
The Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) in Tanzania has come out in public and strongly condemns the proclamation issued by the Minister of Home Affairs, Hon. Patrobasi Pascal Katambi, to ban public meetings of political parties in Tanzania.
In their official statement issued on June 29, 2026, the Executive Director of LHRC, Dr. Anna Henga, has stated that the proclamation has no legal or constitutional basis, but is an abuse of power that threatens democracy, equality before the law, and good governance
29 Juni 2026
LHRC Yamtolea Uvivu Waziri Katambi: "Katazo la Mikutano ya Siasa ni Kinyume Cha Katiba"
Kituo cha Sheria na Haki za Binadamu (LHRC) kimejitokeza hadharani na kulaani vikali tamko lililotolewa na Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi, Mhe. Patrobasi Katambi, la kupiga marufuku mikutano ya hadhara ya vyama vya siasa nchini Tanzania.Katika taarifa yao rasmi iliyotolewa tarehe Juni 29, 2026, Mkurugenzi Mtendaji wa LHRC, Dkt. Anna Henga, amebainisha kuwa agizo hilo halina msingi wowote wa kisheria au wa kikatiba, bali ni matumizi mabaya ya madaraka yanayotishia demokrasia, usawa mbele ya sheria, na utawala bora
- Thread starter
- #66
ASKARI POLISI WATANDA KATIKA NJIA KUU ZA JIJI LA DAR ES SALAAM
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=N32l5D-mmCU
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=N32l5D-mmCU
- Thread starter
- #67
baz kaiza
JF-Expert Member
- Jan 27, 2015
- 14,971
- 18,641
Chadema haiko chini ya beberu yoyote mkubwa Chadema kipewa nguvu na USA nakwambia CCM inaondoka kesho acheni mchezo na Beberu
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- #69
Mitaa ya San Salvador nchini El Salvador askari walipotapakaa mwaka 2022
Askari wa kike akimkangua raia wa kike mjini San Salvador
Je Askari waliotapakaa jijini Dar es Salaam wapo kwa ajili ya show off tu bila kukagua baadhi ya raia kujiridhisha siyo tishio kwa usalama. Je hii ina maana gani kuweka utitiri bila ukaguzi pia utambulisho wa baadhi ya askari hauna namba ktk uniform zao kutambulisha kama wale ambao wamevaa uniform za FFU kunaashiria nini askari wasiokuwa na utambulisho ktk uniform zao ni kina nani, wa vikosi gani, wakuu wa doria zao watawatambuaje askari wanaowaongoza n.k
Hii kimataifa askari wenye uniform wasiojulikana vikosi vyao inaleta maana gani na maswali gani kuhusu hawa baadhi ya askari wasio na utambulisho wowote mitaani Dar es Salaam
Askari wa kike akimkangua raia wa kike mjini San Salvador
Je Askari waliotapakaa jijini Dar es Salaam wapo kwa ajili ya show off tu bila kukagua baadhi ya raia kujiridhisha siyo tishio kwa usalama. Je hii ina maana gani kuweka utitiri bila ukaguzi pia utambulisho wa baadhi ya askari hauna namba ktk uniform zao kutambulisha kama wale ambao wamevaa uniform za FFU kunaashiria nini askari wasiokuwa na utambulisho ktk uniform zao ni kina nani, wa vikosi gani, wakuu wa doria zao watawatambuaje askari wanaowaongoza n.k
Hii kimataifa askari wenye uniform wasiojulikana vikosi vyao inaleta maana gani na maswali gani kuhusu hawa baadhi ya askari wasio na utambulisho wowote mitaani Dar es Salaam
- Thread starter
- #70
MAKALA KUTOKA MAKTABA :
Desemba 08, 2020 1:43 PM
Askari amesimama karibu na eneo la usafi lililowekwa na manispaa ya San Salvador ili kuzuia kuenea kwa COVID-19 mnamo Mei 6. Yuri Cortez/AFP kupitia Getty Images
Makala haya yalichapishwa awali na Taasisi ya Masuala ya Dunia ya Sasa huko DC
SAN SALVADOR, El Salvador— Vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe vya kikatili vya nchi hii vilimalizika karibu miaka 30 iliyopita, lakini kwa njia nyingi, bado vinahisi kama uwanja wa mapigano. Askari waliovaa mavazi ya kivita huzunguka mitaa pamoja na polisi wenye silaha nyingi; waya za wembe hupita juu ya majengo na nyumba nyingi. Wale ambao wanaweza kumudu kufanya hivyo wanaishi katika jamii zenye malango yenye ulinzi binafsi, huku walinzi wakisimama kwenye mlango wa biashara nyingi. Hata hivyo, siku hizi, wanaonekana kutumia muda wao mwingi kupima joto la wateja na kuwaelekeza kwenye sanitizer ya mikono.
Mnamo Februari, kwa maelekezo ya Rais Nayib Bukele, wanajeshi waliingia bungeni katika jaribio la kuwashinikiza wabunge kuidhinisha ongezeko la ufadhili wa kijeshi. Wiki kadhaa baadaye, Bukele aliamuru mojawapo ya amri ya kutotoka nje ya nchi kwa muda mrefu zaidi na yenye vikwazo zaidi kuhusu janga. Vizuizi vya kijeshi viliwekwa kote nchini, na wale walioonekana kukiuka karantini walikamatwa. Wakati bunge na mahakama zilipojaribu kuzuia hatua hizi, Bukele aliwashutumu kwa "kuwa upande wa ugonjwa" na akakataa kufuata maagizo ya mahakama.
Watetezi wa haki za binadamu waliopinga vitendo vya jeshi walitishiwa—kama vile waandishi wa habari waliochapisha ripoti za uchunguzi wakimkosoa rais na Baraza lake la Mawaziri.
Ingawa Bukele alichukua madaraka mnamo Juni 2019, mvutano huu ni wa miongo kadhaa. Wasomi kwa ujumla wanakubaliana kuhusu ukweli wa msingi wa vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe vya El Salvador, ambavyo vilidumu kuanzia 1980 hadi 1992: Wasomi wadogo lakini wenye nguvu kiuchumi, wakiungwa mkono na jeshi, walipinga madai ya mageuzi na wakawa wakandamizaji zaidi, na kusababisha upinzani wa mrengo wa kushoto kupanga na kuchukua silaha. Kama sehemu ya sera yake ya "kudhibiti" Vita Baridi, Marekani ilitoa ufadhili na usaidizi wa kijeshi kwa serikali ya mrengo wa kulia.
Uhalifu wa kivita ulifanywa na pande zote mbili, lakini Umoja wa Mataifa baadaye uligundua kuwa wanajeshi wa serikali ya Salvador wanaoungwa mkono na Marekani na washirika wao walikuwa nyuma ya wengi wao. Labda ukatili mbaya zaidi—mauaji ya wanakijiji wasio na hatia wapatao 1,000 katika kijiji cha El Mozote mnamo Desemba 11, 1981—unaathiri jamii ya El Salvador leo, ukiisukuma nchi hiyo katika mgogoro wa kikatiba na kuibua maswali muhimu kuhusu haki, kumbukumbu, na taasisi dhaifu za nchi hiyo.
Siku hiyo, kikosi cha wasomi cha Atlacatl Battalion kilivamia El Mozote na kuwaua karibu wakazi wake wote, wakiwabaka wanawake hao na kuchafua miili hiyo. Ingawa waandishi wa habari wa Marekani walitangaza tukio hilo wiki kadhaa baadaye, na ripoti ya Tume ya Ukweli ya Umoja wa Mataifa ya 1993 iliikosoa serikali kwa kushindwa kulichunguza, wahalifu walionekana kuadhibiwa. Muda mfupi baada ya ripoti ya tume kutolewa, bunge la El Salvador lilipitisha sheria ya msamaha inayolenga kuwaondoa makamanda wa kijeshi waliohusika na kuagiza shambulio hilo.
Ilichukua miongo miwili kwa serikali ya Salvador kuomba msamaha—ingawa bado hakukuwa na jaribio la maana la kuchunguza mauaji hayo. Kisha, mnamo 2016, Mahakama Kuu ya El Salvador iliona sheria ya msamaha kuwa kinyume cha katiba, na kusababisha wakati wa kihistoria mwaka huo huo, wakati jaji wa eneo hilo, Jorge Guzmán, alipofungua tena kesi dhidi ya maafisa wakuu wa kijeshi zaidi ya dazeni. Mwendesha mashtaka mkuu aliwaita mashahidi kutoa ushahidi kuhusu kilichotokea, lakini kumbukumbu za kijeshi zilibaki zimefungwa. Maombi kwa Marekani kutoa rekodi zake zinazohusiana na mauaji hayo hayajajibiwa.
Mnamo 2019, Guzmán aliamuru jeshi kufungua kumbukumbu zake ili kuruhusu wakaguzi walioteuliwa na mahakama kutafuta ushahidi ambao ungeweza kutoa mwanga juu ya nani aliyehusika na mauaji huko El Mozote. Kisha akaja Bukele: Baada ya kugombea kwenye jukwaa la kuwa rais wa kwanza "baada ya vita", aliahidi kwamba utawala wake ungefungua kumbukumbu hizo "kuanzia A hadi Z," akidai, "njia pekee ya kuponya majeraha ya zamani ni ukweli kujulikana." Lakini mwezi Juni huu, ghafla alibadilisha mwelekeo, akitaja wasiwasi kuhusu usalama wa taifa—hoja ile ile iliyotolewa na kila utawala uliopita.
Guzmán alikataa dai hilo na kupanga ukaguzi katika maeneo manane kote nchini kati ya Septemba 21 na Novemba 13. Yeye na timu yake walipofika katika kituo cha kwanza, kambi ya kijeshi huko San Salvador, walizuiliwa na wanajeshi kabla ya kukabiliwa na afisa mkuu wa Wizara ya Ulinzi akiwa amevaa sare. Siku chache zilizopita, jeshi na polisi, pamoja na maafisa wa afya, walipelekwa katika miji kadhaa, huku mingine kadhaa—ikiwa ni pamoja na San Francisco Gotera, ambapo kesi hiyo ilikuwa ikisikilizwa—ikiwa imezuiliwa kwa "sababu za kiafya." Harakati zilizuiliwa wakati vipimo vya virusi vya korona vilipokuwa vikifanywa. Katika hotuba ya Septemba 23 kwa taifa, Bukele aliwakosoa maadui zake, ikiwa ni pamoja na mahakama, mchunguzi wa haki za binadamu, na wabunge wa Marekani ambao walikuwa wamemtumia barua wakielezea wasiwasi wao.
Pia alimshutumu Guzmán kwa kuchochewa na utiifu kwa wapiganaji wa mrengo wa kushoto na hamu ya kuchafua taswira ya serikali na jeshi.
Wizara ya afya ilikanusha kupelekwa huko kwa wanajeshi kulikuwa na sababu za kisiasa, ikidai kwamba wanajeshi walikuwa wakiwalinda wafanyakazi wa afya tu. Lakini wataalamu walisema kwamba takwimu za serikali kuhusu janga hazikuonyesha kwamba maambukizi katika miji hii yalikuwa juu kuliko katika sehemu zingine za nchi. Badala ya kuhakikisha afya ya umma, kupelekwa kwa wanajeshi katika ngome za zamani za waasi—na mji ambao mahakama yake Bukele inapinga—kulifanya tukio la kusumbua. Wasalvador wametazama kwa wasiwasi mkubwa wakati mapigano kati ya Guzmán na jeshi yakiendelea. Itifaki za usalama zimeimarishwa katika mashirika ya haki za binadamu, haswa yale yanayohusiana na kesi hiyo, kwani wengi bado wanakumbuka kutoweka na mauaji ya wanasheria na wanaharakati waliothubutu kusimama dhidi ya jeshi na wasomi. Siku hizi, mashambulizi yanayoonekana zaidi hufanyika kwenye Twitter; wafuasi wenye shauku wa Bukele wanamshutumu mtu yeyote wanayemwona kuwa adui zake.
Kilicho kigumu zaidi, Wasalvador wenyewe wanaendelea kutokubaliana kuhusu kilichotokea wakati wa vita, na pia kuhusu nani aliyepaswa kulaumiwa. Baadhi huwaona wapiganaji wa msituni kama wapigania uhuru, huku wengine wakiwaona kama magaidi waliochochea jeshi. Vyovyote vile, Wasalvador wengi wanaamini jeshi ni muhimu kwa utulivu dhaifu wa nchi: Wanajeshi huchukua jukumu kubwa katika utekelezaji wa sheria, ambalo linajumuisha kudhibiti magenge ya mitaani yanayolaumiwa kwa vurugu nyingi zinazoendelea nchini.
Lakini kama rafiki na wakili wa haki za binadamu wa eneo hilo, Marina Ortiz, alivyonikumbusha hivi majuzi: "Ujeshi si lazima katika demokrasia."
Wale niliozungumza nao wameelezea nadharia chache kuhusu mabadiliko dhahiri ya mawazo ya Bukele lakini nyingi zinahusu moja: "Yeye ni sawa na wengine." Wengi wanaamini kwamba wasomi wa kiuchumi na jeshi bado wako upande mmoja wakitawala nchi. Vyovyote vile, anasema Ortiz, "Kama rais angejitolea kwa haki, angetenda tofauti." Hata hivyo, anaongeza kwamba mpango wa Guzmán ni hatua kubwa mbele, kwani hapo awali, tawi la mahakama lingeshirikiana na kuficha ukweli huo.
Katika wiki zilizofuata mzozo huo, idadi ya wanajeshi mitaani ilionekana kuongezeka. Jumapili iliyopita usiku, mimi na mwenzangu tuliamua kuendesha gari kupita Paseo el Carmen, sehemu maarufu ya baa na migahawa katika kitongoji cha Santa Tecla, ili kuona jinsi ilivyokuwa baada ya kufungwa kwa virusi vya corona. Tuliwaona wanajeshi watatu wakiwa wamevalia sare wakitembea kwenye njia ya watembea kwa miguu—mwonekano wa kawaida—lakini kitu kilihisi tofauti na kawaida. Badala ya kutembea tu, walikuwa wakitembea kwa kusudi, wakishika silaha za kiotomatiki ambazo kwa kawaida huning'inia mabegani mwao. Baada ya kugeuka kona, tuliona kundi la vijana wakitawanyika. Tuliendesha gari haraka, lakini tukiwa na hisia ya wasiwasi.
Asubuhi iliyofuata, nilipokuwa nikimtembeza mbwa huyo vitalu vichache kutoka nyumbani katika mtaa wangu usio na walinzi, nilikaribiwa na maafisa wawili wa polisi wenye mbinu wakiwa wamevaa mavazi ya kuchezea. "Mbwa wako anaitwa nani?" mmoja wao aliuliza kwa sauti ya kirafiki. "Je, unamtembeza kila siku?" Nilishiriki jina la mbwa huyo lakini nikajibu kwa njia isiyoeleweka, nikihisi kisilika (ingawa labda bila mantiki) kwamba sikutaka kutoa taarifa kuhusu utaratibu wangu. Mia chache baadaye, niliwapita wawili wengine waliokuwa kwenye doria, wakati huu askari na afisa wa polisi wakiwa wamevaa mavazi ya kijani na bluu yanayolingana. Nilipoondoka, nilifikiria maneno ya Ortiz: "Ikiwa kesi ya El Mozote itafikishwa mahakamani kwa mafanikio, ni ujumbe kwa kizazi kijacho kwamba tunapona," aliniambia. "Kama sivyo, tunatuma ujumbe kwamba jeshi linaweza kufanya chochote linachotaka."
Jaribio muhimu la taasisi za kidemokrasia za El Salvador, na uwezo na nia ya serikali kuhakikisha kwamba ukatili kama huo haurudiwi tena, kesi hiyo imekuja kuwakilisha mapambano ya kuwawajibisha wanajeshi wa Salvador na kubadilisha utamaduni wa kutokujali wa El Salvador. Huku maadhimisho ya miaka 39 ya mauaji hayo yakikaribia, bado haijabainika kama yatafanikiwa.
Mengi ni hatari: El Salvador ni nchi ya pili inayoongoza kwa uraia kati ya wale waliopewa hifadhi nchini Marekani (uhamiaji mkubwa ulisababishwa na vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe, na kupeleka mamia ya maelfu kaskazini). Leo, wale wanaotafuta ulinzi wanaamini serikali yao haitaki au haiwezi kuwalinda kutokana na vurugu. Jeshi la Salvador bado linakabiliwa na tuhuma za ukiukwaji wa haki za binadamu katika mapambano yao dhidi ya uhalifu, huku mfumo wa haki za jinai ukiwa umejaa kutokujali. Wengi hapo awali waliweka matumaini yao kwa Bukele kuleta enzi mpya, lakini wanaanza kuwa wapya haraka.kukata tamaa
Yaliyomo yote © 2026 The Slate Group LLC. Haki zote zimehifadhiwa.
Mauaji ya Miaka 39 Ambayo Bado Yanawasumbua taifa la El Salvador
Ukandamizaji wa kijeshi wa hivi karibuni unaonyesha kuwa nchi bado haijaepuka urithi wa vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe vya kikatili.
Na Elizabeth HawkinsDesemba 08, 2020 1:43 PM
Askari amesimama karibu na eneo la usafi lililowekwa na manispaa ya San Salvador ili kuzuia kuenea kwa COVID-19 mnamo Mei 6. Yuri Cortez/AFP kupitia Getty Images
Makala haya yalichapishwa awali na Taasisi ya Masuala ya Dunia ya Sasa huko DC
SAN SALVADOR, El Salvador— Vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe vya kikatili vya nchi hii vilimalizika karibu miaka 30 iliyopita, lakini kwa njia nyingi, bado vinahisi kama uwanja wa mapigano. Askari waliovaa mavazi ya kivita huzunguka mitaa pamoja na polisi wenye silaha nyingi; waya za wembe hupita juu ya majengo na nyumba nyingi. Wale ambao wanaweza kumudu kufanya hivyo wanaishi katika jamii zenye malango yenye ulinzi binafsi, huku walinzi wakisimama kwenye mlango wa biashara nyingi. Hata hivyo, siku hizi, wanaonekana kutumia muda wao mwingi kupima joto la wateja na kuwaelekeza kwenye sanitizer ya mikono.
Mnamo Februari, kwa maelekezo ya Rais Nayib Bukele, wanajeshi waliingia bungeni katika jaribio la kuwashinikiza wabunge kuidhinisha ongezeko la ufadhili wa kijeshi. Wiki kadhaa baadaye, Bukele aliamuru mojawapo ya amri ya kutotoka nje ya nchi kwa muda mrefu zaidi na yenye vikwazo zaidi kuhusu janga. Vizuizi vya kijeshi viliwekwa kote nchini, na wale walioonekana kukiuka karantini walikamatwa. Wakati bunge na mahakama zilipojaribu kuzuia hatua hizi, Bukele aliwashutumu kwa "kuwa upande wa ugonjwa" na akakataa kufuata maagizo ya mahakama.
Watetezi wa haki za binadamu waliopinga vitendo vya jeshi walitishiwa—kama vile waandishi wa habari waliochapisha ripoti za uchunguzi wakimkosoa rais na Baraza lake la Mawaziri.
Ingawa Bukele alichukua madaraka mnamo Juni 2019, mvutano huu ni wa miongo kadhaa. Wasomi kwa ujumla wanakubaliana kuhusu ukweli wa msingi wa vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe vya El Salvador, ambavyo vilidumu kuanzia 1980 hadi 1992: Wasomi wadogo lakini wenye nguvu kiuchumi, wakiungwa mkono na jeshi, walipinga madai ya mageuzi na wakawa wakandamizaji zaidi, na kusababisha upinzani wa mrengo wa kushoto kupanga na kuchukua silaha. Kama sehemu ya sera yake ya "kudhibiti" Vita Baridi, Marekani ilitoa ufadhili na usaidizi wa kijeshi kwa serikali ya mrengo wa kulia.
Uhalifu wa kivita ulifanywa na pande zote mbili, lakini Umoja wa Mataifa baadaye uligundua kuwa wanajeshi wa serikali ya Salvador wanaoungwa mkono na Marekani na washirika wao walikuwa nyuma ya wengi wao. Labda ukatili mbaya zaidi—mauaji ya wanakijiji wasio na hatia wapatao 1,000 katika kijiji cha El Mozote mnamo Desemba 11, 1981—unaathiri jamii ya El Salvador leo, ukiisukuma nchi hiyo katika mgogoro wa kikatiba na kuibua maswali muhimu kuhusu haki, kumbukumbu, na taasisi dhaifu za nchi hiyo.
Siku hiyo, kikosi cha wasomi cha Atlacatl Battalion kilivamia El Mozote na kuwaua karibu wakazi wake wote, wakiwabaka wanawake hao na kuchafua miili hiyo. Ingawa waandishi wa habari wa Marekani walitangaza tukio hilo wiki kadhaa baadaye, na ripoti ya Tume ya Ukweli ya Umoja wa Mataifa ya 1993 iliikosoa serikali kwa kushindwa kulichunguza, wahalifu walionekana kuadhibiwa. Muda mfupi baada ya ripoti ya tume kutolewa, bunge la El Salvador lilipitisha sheria ya msamaha inayolenga kuwaondoa makamanda wa kijeshi waliohusika na kuagiza shambulio hilo.
Ilichukua miongo miwili kwa serikali ya Salvador kuomba msamaha—ingawa bado hakukuwa na jaribio la maana la kuchunguza mauaji hayo. Kisha, mnamo 2016, Mahakama Kuu ya El Salvador iliona sheria ya msamaha kuwa kinyume cha katiba, na kusababisha wakati wa kihistoria mwaka huo huo, wakati jaji wa eneo hilo, Jorge Guzmán, alipofungua tena kesi dhidi ya maafisa wakuu wa kijeshi zaidi ya dazeni. Mwendesha mashtaka mkuu aliwaita mashahidi kutoa ushahidi kuhusu kilichotokea, lakini kumbukumbu za kijeshi zilibaki zimefungwa. Maombi kwa Marekani kutoa rekodi zake zinazohusiana na mauaji hayo hayajajibiwa.
Mnamo 2019, Guzmán aliamuru jeshi kufungua kumbukumbu zake ili kuruhusu wakaguzi walioteuliwa na mahakama kutafuta ushahidi ambao ungeweza kutoa mwanga juu ya nani aliyehusika na mauaji huko El Mozote. Kisha akaja Bukele: Baada ya kugombea kwenye jukwaa la kuwa rais wa kwanza "baada ya vita", aliahidi kwamba utawala wake ungefungua kumbukumbu hizo "kuanzia A hadi Z," akidai, "njia pekee ya kuponya majeraha ya zamani ni ukweli kujulikana." Lakini mwezi Juni huu, ghafla alibadilisha mwelekeo, akitaja wasiwasi kuhusu usalama wa taifa—hoja ile ile iliyotolewa na kila utawala uliopita.
Guzmán alikataa dai hilo na kupanga ukaguzi katika maeneo manane kote nchini kati ya Septemba 21 na Novemba 13. Yeye na timu yake walipofika katika kituo cha kwanza, kambi ya kijeshi huko San Salvador, walizuiliwa na wanajeshi kabla ya kukabiliwa na afisa mkuu wa Wizara ya Ulinzi akiwa amevaa sare. Siku chache zilizopita, jeshi na polisi, pamoja na maafisa wa afya, walipelekwa katika miji kadhaa, huku mingine kadhaa—ikiwa ni pamoja na San Francisco Gotera, ambapo kesi hiyo ilikuwa ikisikilizwa—ikiwa imezuiliwa kwa "sababu za kiafya." Harakati zilizuiliwa wakati vipimo vya virusi vya korona vilipokuwa vikifanywa. Katika hotuba ya Septemba 23 kwa taifa, Bukele aliwakosoa maadui zake, ikiwa ni pamoja na mahakama, mchunguzi wa haki za binadamu, na wabunge wa Marekani ambao walikuwa wamemtumia barua wakielezea wasiwasi wao.
Pia alimshutumu Guzmán kwa kuchochewa na utiifu kwa wapiganaji wa mrengo wa kushoto na hamu ya kuchafua taswira ya serikali na jeshi.
Wizara ya afya ilikanusha kupelekwa huko kwa wanajeshi kulikuwa na sababu za kisiasa, ikidai kwamba wanajeshi walikuwa wakiwalinda wafanyakazi wa afya tu. Lakini wataalamu walisema kwamba takwimu za serikali kuhusu janga hazikuonyesha kwamba maambukizi katika miji hii yalikuwa juu kuliko katika sehemu zingine za nchi. Badala ya kuhakikisha afya ya umma, kupelekwa kwa wanajeshi katika ngome za zamani za waasi—na mji ambao mahakama yake Bukele inapinga—kulifanya tukio la kusumbua. Wasalvador wametazama kwa wasiwasi mkubwa wakati mapigano kati ya Guzmán na jeshi yakiendelea. Itifaki za usalama zimeimarishwa katika mashirika ya haki za binadamu, haswa yale yanayohusiana na kesi hiyo, kwani wengi bado wanakumbuka kutoweka na mauaji ya wanasheria na wanaharakati waliothubutu kusimama dhidi ya jeshi na wasomi. Siku hizi, mashambulizi yanayoonekana zaidi hufanyika kwenye Twitter; wafuasi wenye shauku wa Bukele wanamshutumu mtu yeyote wanayemwona kuwa adui zake.
Kilicho kigumu zaidi, Wasalvador wenyewe wanaendelea kutokubaliana kuhusu kilichotokea wakati wa vita, na pia kuhusu nani aliyepaswa kulaumiwa. Baadhi huwaona wapiganaji wa msituni kama wapigania uhuru, huku wengine wakiwaona kama magaidi waliochochea jeshi. Vyovyote vile, Wasalvador wengi wanaamini jeshi ni muhimu kwa utulivu dhaifu wa nchi: Wanajeshi huchukua jukumu kubwa katika utekelezaji wa sheria, ambalo linajumuisha kudhibiti magenge ya mitaani yanayolaumiwa kwa vurugu nyingi zinazoendelea nchini.
Lakini kama rafiki na wakili wa haki za binadamu wa eneo hilo, Marina Ortiz, alivyonikumbusha hivi majuzi: "Ujeshi si lazima katika demokrasia."
Wale niliozungumza nao wameelezea nadharia chache kuhusu mabadiliko dhahiri ya mawazo ya Bukele lakini nyingi zinahusu moja: "Yeye ni sawa na wengine." Wengi wanaamini kwamba wasomi wa kiuchumi na jeshi bado wako upande mmoja wakitawala nchi. Vyovyote vile, anasema Ortiz, "Kama rais angejitolea kwa haki, angetenda tofauti." Hata hivyo, anaongeza kwamba mpango wa Guzmán ni hatua kubwa mbele, kwani hapo awali, tawi la mahakama lingeshirikiana na kuficha ukweli huo.
Katika wiki zilizofuata mzozo huo, idadi ya wanajeshi mitaani ilionekana kuongezeka. Jumapili iliyopita usiku, mimi na mwenzangu tuliamua kuendesha gari kupita Paseo el Carmen, sehemu maarufu ya baa na migahawa katika kitongoji cha Santa Tecla, ili kuona jinsi ilivyokuwa baada ya kufungwa kwa virusi vya corona. Tuliwaona wanajeshi watatu wakiwa wamevalia sare wakitembea kwenye njia ya watembea kwa miguu—mwonekano wa kawaida—lakini kitu kilihisi tofauti na kawaida. Badala ya kutembea tu, walikuwa wakitembea kwa kusudi, wakishika silaha za kiotomatiki ambazo kwa kawaida huning'inia mabegani mwao. Baada ya kugeuka kona, tuliona kundi la vijana wakitawanyika. Tuliendesha gari haraka, lakini tukiwa na hisia ya wasiwasi.
Asubuhi iliyofuata, nilipokuwa nikimtembeza mbwa huyo vitalu vichache kutoka nyumbani katika mtaa wangu usio na walinzi, nilikaribiwa na maafisa wawili wa polisi wenye mbinu wakiwa wamevaa mavazi ya kuchezea. "Mbwa wako anaitwa nani?" mmoja wao aliuliza kwa sauti ya kirafiki. "Je, unamtembeza kila siku?" Nilishiriki jina la mbwa huyo lakini nikajibu kwa njia isiyoeleweka, nikihisi kisilika (ingawa labda bila mantiki) kwamba sikutaka kutoa taarifa kuhusu utaratibu wangu. Mia chache baadaye, niliwapita wawili wengine waliokuwa kwenye doria, wakati huu askari na afisa wa polisi wakiwa wamevaa mavazi ya kijani na bluu yanayolingana. Nilipoondoka, nilifikiria maneno ya Ortiz: "Ikiwa kesi ya El Mozote itafikishwa mahakamani kwa mafanikio, ni ujumbe kwa kizazi kijacho kwamba tunapona," aliniambia. "Kama sivyo, tunatuma ujumbe kwamba jeshi linaweza kufanya chochote linachotaka."
Jaribio muhimu la taasisi za kidemokrasia za El Salvador, na uwezo na nia ya serikali kuhakikisha kwamba ukatili kama huo haurudiwi tena, kesi hiyo imekuja kuwakilisha mapambano ya kuwawajibisha wanajeshi wa Salvador na kubadilisha utamaduni wa kutokujali wa El Salvador. Huku maadhimisho ya miaka 39 ya mauaji hayo yakikaribia, bado haijabainika kama yatafanikiwa.
Mengi ni hatari: El Salvador ni nchi ya pili inayoongoza kwa uraia kati ya wale waliopewa hifadhi nchini Marekani (uhamiaji mkubwa ulisababishwa na vita vya wenyewe kwa wenyewe, na kupeleka mamia ya maelfu kaskazini). Leo, wale wanaotafuta ulinzi wanaamini serikali yao haitaki au haiwezi kuwalinda kutokana na vurugu. Jeshi la Salvador bado linakabiliwa na tuhuma za ukiukwaji wa haki za binadamu katika mapambano yao dhidi ya uhalifu, huku mfumo wa haki za jinai ukiwa umejaa kutokujali. Wengi hapo awali waliweka matumaini yao kwa Bukele kuleta enzi mpya, lakini wanaanza kuwa wapya haraka.kukata tamaa
Yaliyomo yote © 2026 The Slate Group LLC. Haki zote zimehifadhiwa.
- Thread starter
- #71
06 July 2026
Tanzania banned political rallies in June 2026 for the second time in a decade.
It has become clear that Samia Suluhu Hassan’s claim to a reform agenda was something that she wanted to signal, but not deliver. Legislative reforms proved to be hollow. More substantive reforms were kicked down the road.
Instead, everyday repression has increased. Activists have been arrested, attacked or abducted. The main opposition presidential candidate, Tundu Lissu, was arrested and charged with treason in April 2025. Fifteen months later, his trial has yet to be concluded.
In this context, mass protests unfolded on election day in October 2025. They were met by an unprecedentedly violent crackdown.
A government-sponsored commission of inquiry acknowledged that at least 518 people were killed, but it alleged this was largely done by professional foreign agitators. In reality, the death toll may have been far higher, and the violence was in all likelihood carried out almost entirely by state security forces.
This is especially true for Tanzania’s leading opposition party, Chadema.
Chadema has built a nationwide support base. By 2015, it had achieved a grassroots campaign network that matched the long-dominant ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (in power since independence in 1961).
Chadema built its party apparatus using rallies. Its leaders spent months and years touring Tanzania town by town. They addressed citizens in public squares. They communicated their people power ideology and asked for volunteers on the spot. These volunteers were made the new members of local party branches.
Aspiring Chadema leaders used the same methods to organise at the local level. Lissu was one of those aspiring Chadema lieutenants. Together, they created a national movement. The rally was the vehicle for that movement-building.
Magufuli banned rallies in this context. He was attempting to put the brakes on opposition organising.
In years past, this would not have caused the government concern.
While Tanzania had a culture of mass rallies, it had no culture of mass protest. There have been protests, but they were localised or non-partisan or small, or all three at once. See, for instance, the Maasai protests against forced relocation and protests in Mtwara against a natural gas pipeline.
Careful government repression and deterrence have kept a lid on the scale and intensity of these protests. The absence of intense protests became self-sustaining – as no one had ever witnessed protests on a major scale, few ever joined them.
That all changed in the October 2025 election when anger at political repression and long-stalled living standards radicalised public opinion and fuelled mass protests.
Suddenly, the notion that protests could not happen in Tanzania evaporated. Tanzania’s democracy movement took on a new, popular form. A people power movement was born anew.
In this context, the potential role of the rally in Tanzania changes. Any rally can simultaneously be, or become, a protest.
This has changed the picture for Tanzania’s increasingly authoritarian regime.
It only managed to suppress protests in 2025 by resorting to bloody and brutal repression. It does not want to have to do so again – it learned how quickly protests can scale and become a threat to the regime itself.
But rallies hold great significance in Tanzania and are central to everyday political communication.
Survey data from 2015, the last time an election proceeded without significant repression, shows that 69% of people attended rallies. Not just one or two: they attended seven on average.
Indeed, in much of Africa, the rally takes on a wholly different role. It is one of the primary channels of communication. Survey data from Afrobarometer (2019-2021) across 33 countries on the continent shows that 35% of people attend campaign rallies. By contrast, rallies are attended by just 1% in the UK and between 5% and 7% in the United States.
Africa’s levels of rally attendance are sky high from global perspectives.
But gone are the days when an opposition rally might merely provide a foothold in a locality. Today, it may become the stone that starts an avalanche among the public.
It is this logic that lies behind Hassan’s decision to torch one of her few tangible reforms, and further deepen repression in Tanzania
Tanzania has banned political rallies again: what the government fears
Tanzania banned political rallies in June 2026 for the second time in a decade.
It has become clear that Samia Suluhu Hassan’s claim to a reform agenda was something that she wanted to signal, but not deliver. Legislative reforms proved to be hollow. More substantive reforms were kicked down the road.
Instead, everyday repression has increased. Activists have been arrested, attacked or abducted. The main opposition presidential candidate, Tundu Lissu, was arrested and charged with treason in April 2025. Fifteen months later, his trial has yet to be concluded.
In this context, mass protests unfolded on election day in October 2025. They were met by an unprecedentedly violent crackdown.
A government-sponsored commission of inquiry acknowledged that at least 518 people were killed, but it alleged this was largely done by professional foreign agitators. In reality, the death toll may have been far higher, and the violence was in all likelihood carried out almost entirely by state security forces.
Why are political rallies so important in Tanzania?
In Tanzania, rallies are not just for election campaigns. They are also the means by which political parties mobilise and organise between elections.This is especially true for Tanzania’s leading opposition party, Chadema.
Chadema has built a nationwide support base. By 2015, it had achieved a grassroots campaign network that matched the long-dominant ruling party, Chama Cha Mapinduzi (in power since independence in 1961).
Chadema built its party apparatus using rallies. Its leaders spent months and years touring Tanzania town by town. They addressed citizens in public squares. They communicated their people power ideology and asked for volunteers on the spot. These volunteers were made the new members of local party branches.
Aspiring Chadema leaders used the same methods to organise at the local level. Lissu was one of those aspiring Chadema lieutenants. Together, they created a national movement. The rally was the vehicle for that movement-building.
Magufuli banned rallies in this context. He was attempting to put the brakes on opposition organising.
What’s different about this ban compared with the one a decade earlier?
Chadema has been trying to organise and rebuild just as it did after rallies were unbanned in 2023. But another context looms larger in this latest rally ban: the prospect of protest.In years past, this would not have caused the government concern.
While Tanzania had a culture of mass rallies, it had no culture of mass protest. There have been protests, but they were localised or non-partisan or small, or all three at once. See, for instance, the Maasai protests against forced relocation and protests in Mtwara against a natural gas pipeline.
Careful government repression and deterrence have kept a lid on the scale and intensity of these protests. The absence of intense protests became self-sustaining – as no one had ever witnessed protests on a major scale, few ever joined them.
That all changed in the October 2025 election when anger at political repression and long-stalled living standards radicalised public opinion and fuelled mass protests.
Suddenly, the notion that protests could not happen in Tanzania evaporated. Tanzania’s democracy movement took on a new, popular form. A people power movement was born anew.
In this context, the potential role of the rally in Tanzania changes. Any rally can simultaneously be, or become, a protest.
This has changed the picture for Tanzania’s increasingly authoritarian regime.
It only managed to suppress protests in 2025 by resorting to bloody and brutal repression. It does not want to have to do so again – it learned how quickly protests can scale and become a threat to the regime itself.
What does this mean for Tanzania’s struggle for democracy?
In another context, the banning and unbanning of rallies might seem like small news: objectionable in principle, but politically inconsequential. Whether campaigners can hold rallies or not, they can get their message out on television and on social media. In such contexts, rallies are as politically significant as a bumper sticker.But rallies hold great significance in Tanzania and are central to everyday political communication.
Survey data from 2015, the last time an election proceeded without significant repression, shows that 69% of people attended rallies. Not just one or two: they attended seven on average.
Indeed, in much of Africa, the rally takes on a wholly different role. It is one of the primary channels of communication. Survey data from Afrobarometer (2019-2021) across 33 countries on the continent shows that 35% of people attend campaign rallies. By contrast, rallies are attended by just 1% in the UK and between 5% and 7% in the United States.
Africa’s levels of rally attendance are sky high from global perspectives.
But gone are the days when an opposition rally might merely provide a foothold in a locality. Today, it may become the stone that starts an avalanche among the public.
It is this logic that lies behind Hassan’s decision to torch one of her few tangible reforms, and further deepen repression in Tanzania
- Thread starter
- #72
06 July 2026
The crackdown follows calls by Gen-Z activists and protesters, circulated on social media, to use Saba Saba Day to demand constitutional reform and accountability for the massacre that followed last October’s fraudulent election. Security forces killed as many as 3,000 protesters after Hassan was declared the winner with an implausible 98 percent of the vote. The official underestimate is 518 dying from “unnatural causes”.
Police patrol the streets on election day in Zanzibar, Tanzania, October. 30, 2025 [AP Photo/Uncredited]
The movement has no visible leadership and no single organisation behind it. Since October it has organised through decentralised WhatsApp and Telegram networks whose users avoid public profiles, aware that identifying themselves invites arrest, as happened to several WhatsApp group administrators detained in November on charges of “organising and promoting crime.”
Justifying the crackdown before parliament, Home Affairs Minister Patrobas Katambi Katambi ranted, “We have arrested some people with weapons and others with petrol containers,” adding that the government did not want a repeat of “what happened” last October.
The official narrative is that the October protests were sparked by outside agitators, rather than the real driving forces: soaring living costs, austerity measures and police-state violence, pushing workers and youth into struggle.
The ban is being enforced by a massive mobilisation of soldiers, police units and water cannons across Dar es Salaam and other major cities, with checkpoints established at locations expected to draw crowds—concentrated on the working-class districts of Kimara, Ubungo, Magomeni, Kinondoni and Tandale that were the epicentre of last October’s unrest, alongside similar deployments in Arusha, Mwanza and Mbeya. Police have renewed warnings that organising online constitutes a criminal offence.
The ban reveals a regime terrified of its own population. After stealing an election and unleashing the bloodiest repression in Tanzania’s post-independence history, the CCM state cannot permit even the slightest sign of opposition from workers and the rural poor. Even anniversaries, public holidays and official celebrations—rituals it has staged for decades to sanctify its own rule—have become intolerable.
Opposition parties have denounced Tuesday’s ban. Chadema’s head of foreign affairs, John Kitoka, wrote on X that “the regime’s answer to growing public demand for freedom is fear, intimidation, and repression,” branding the directive unconstitutional. The party’s chief legal counsel, Rugemeleza Nshala, said the ban was intended to “muzzle political freedom,” and confirmed that Chadema was weighing legal challenges.
Chadema’s own chairperson, Tundu Lissu, remains in detention after more than fourteen months, facing fraudulent treason charges that carry the death penalty, while the party remains barred from electoral participation until 2030.
ACT-Wazalendo, Tanzania’s third-largest party that claims to be the true inheritor of Nyerere’s “African Socialism”, likewise announced it would challenge the ban in court. Its shadow minister for Defence, Internal Affairs and Security, Rashid Ali, said, “This directive is not only an attempt to continue pushing the country further into darkness and to prevent the lawful activities of political parties; it is also a continuation of the rulers’ violation of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania and Article 23(1)(a) and (b) of the Political Parties Act”. The party pledged to take legal action to challenge the directive.
Legal appeals to a constitution the regime tramples at will offer no way forward. Nor do Chadema’s and ACT-Wazalendo’s repeated appeals to the “international community”—by which they mean the imperialist powers and institutions such as the United Nations, South African Development Community and the African Union—to impose sanctions and install a transitional government.
This is the programme of a capitalist faction that fears mobilising workers and rural masses against the CCM regime and seeks to have imperialism install it in office. Chadema, no less than ACT-Wazalendo, represents sections of the Tanzanian business elite seeking a larger share of the spoils of foreign investment. Its programme of tax cuts and a “conducive environment for investors” in mining, oil and gas offers the youth no way out.
Hassan is desperately manoeuvring to secure her regime through deepening ties with China and Russia.
In June, Hassan made the first state visit by a Tanzanian president to Moscow since Julius Nyerere in 1969, meeting Vladimir Putin, receiving an honorary doctorate, and unveiling plans for over $2 billion in Russian investment, centred on Rosatom’s $1.2 billion Mkuju River uranium project. Direct flights between Dar es Salaam and Moscow began this month.
President of Tanzania Samia Suluhu Hassan [Photo by Scottish Government / CC BY 2.0]
This follows years of deepening economic ties with China, now Tanzania’s largest trading partner and principal financier of major infrastructure projects. Hassan presents this orientation as “non-alignment,” insisting that Tanzania works with all countries and takes no side. It reflects the calculations of a bourgeois regime that has turned to Beijing for more favourable loans, investment and commercial agreements after receiving little from increasingly hostile Western powers.
However, such a policy no more offers a path to genuine national liberation than Nyerere’s “African Socialism” did six decades ago.
Washington and Brussels have escalated pressure on Hassan. In May, the State Department designated Tanzania’s Senior Assistant Commissioner Faustine Jackson Mafwele, banning him from the US over his role in the abduction, torture and sexual assault of Kenyan activist Boniface Mwangi and Ugandan activist Agather Atuhaire, both seized in Dar es Salaam while observing Lissu’s treason trial.
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Days earlier, Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Ted Cruz introduced the Reassessing the US-Tanzania Bilateral Relationship Act, which passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 17 and now awaits a full Senate vote. The Senate’s press release makes explicit the geopolitical calculation underlying all the human rights rhetoric. The bill claims to respond to “democratic backsliding, political repression, human rights abuses and growing concerns about Chinese influence in Tanzania,” and it directs the State Department to “evaluate the extent of the People’s Republic of China’s military, economic and political engagement in Tanzania, including cooperation that could undermine democratic institutions and U.S. interests in the region.”
When the Senate advanced a substitute version to drop the original bill’s proposed cut to security and military cooperation, it broadened this mandate into a review of Tanzania’s “growing diplomatic and commercial ties with China and Russia.”
Brussels has moved on a parallel track. In November, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning the killings and demanding Lissu’s immediate and unconditional release. David McAllister, chair of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, said that the European Union (EU) should “use every tool at our disposal to hold those in power accountable,” and separately demanded that “all EU funds must be stopped immediately.” In June 2026, after Dodoma refused entry to a European Parliament human rights delegation, the Parliament voted to keep €156 million in EU funding frozen.
The very same imperialist powers now posturing over Tanzanian lives arm and finance the Israeli genocide of Palestinians in Gaza, wage a proxy war against Russia that has killed hundreds of thousands, and operate a Fortress Europe that has turned the Mediterranean into a mass grave for African migrants. Their sudden concern is a cover for their scramble for the country’s nickel, graphite, uranium and rare earths, and to deny China and Russia a firmer foothold in East Africa.
Moreover, even as the sanctions and aid freezes were being debated, Tanzanian and US officials continued negotiating three flagship American-linked projects: a $42 billion LNG export terminal led by Shell, Equinor and ExxonMobil; the $942 million Tembo Nickel project, developed with Kabanga Nickel to supply battery-grade material for the electric vehicle industry; and the $300 million Mahenge graphite project run by Australia’s Black Rock Mining. The EU flagged its own interest in the Epanko graphite project.
The imperialist powers are clearly cultivating Chadema, and Lissu personally, as their preferred vehicle inside Tanzania. Every EU resolution on Tanzania since May 2025 has named Lissu and demanded his release. Lissu lived for six years of exile in Brussels and enjoys personal ties to European officials. The American Shaheen-Cruz bill contains an equivalent mechanism, conditioning any restoration of US aid on a “national reconciliation process” with Chadema.
The Tanzanian working class and youth confront a corrupt bourgeois state defending itself through terror, an opposition tied to the same capitalist order, and imperialist powers competing against rising capitalist powers like China to loot the country’s resources under whatever political arrangement best serves them. None of these forces offers a way forward.
What is posed is the same task that confronted Tanganyika’s militant working class in the 1940s and 1950s and that TANU, Nyerere and every subsequent CCM government have worked to suppress: its independent political mobilisation in a struggle for socialism.
Courage in the face of tanks, curfews and internet blackouts must be coupled with a revolutionary socialist programme and leadership. One that links the fight against the CCM dictatorship to the struggle against imperialism across the continent, as part of the International Committee of the Fourth International. Only the building of such a party, rooted in the working class and committed to the fight for the United Socialist States of Africa, can politically arm Tanzania’s Gen-Z so that it can end, once and for all, sixty-four years of capitalist rule
Tanzanian regime bans Gen-Z Saba Saba protests, deploys army and policeSamia Suluhu Hassan’s Tanzanian government has banned all political rallies and demonstrations ahead of nationwide protests called for Tuesday July 7,2026 Saba Saba Day, the anniversary of the 1954 founding of the Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), predecessor of the ruling Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM).
The crackdown follows calls by Gen-Z activists and protesters, circulated on social media, to use Saba Saba Day to demand constitutional reform and accountability for the massacre that followed last October’s fraudulent election. Security forces killed as many as 3,000 protesters after Hassan was declared the winner with an implausible 98 percent of the vote. The official underestimate is 518 dying from “unnatural causes”.
Police patrol the streets on election day in Zanzibar, Tanzania, October. 30, 2025 [AP Photo/Uncredited]
The movement has no visible leadership and no single organisation behind it. Since October it has organised through decentralised WhatsApp and Telegram networks whose users avoid public profiles, aware that identifying themselves invites arrest, as happened to several WhatsApp group administrators detained in November on charges of “organising and promoting crime.”
Justifying the crackdown before parliament, Home Affairs Minister Patrobas Katambi Katambi ranted, “We have arrested some people with weapons and others with petrol containers,” adding that the government did not want a repeat of “what happened” last October.
The official narrative is that the October protests were sparked by outside agitators, rather than the real driving forces: soaring living costs, austerity measures and police-state violence, pushing workers and youth into struggle.
The ban is being enforced by a massive mobilisation of soldiers, police units and water cannons across Dar es Salaam and other major cities, with checkpoints established at locations expected to draw crowds—concentrated on the working-class districts of Kimara, Ubungo, Magomeni, Kinondoni and Tandale that were the epicentre of last October’s unrest, alongside similar deployments in Arusha, Mwanza and Mbeya. Police have renewed warnings that organising online constitutes a criminal offence.
The ban reveals a regime terrified of its own population. After stealing an election and unleashing the bloodiest repression in Tanzania’s post-independence history, the CCM state cannot permit even the slightest sign of opposition from workers and the rural poor. Even anniversaries, public holidays and official celebrations—rituals it has staged for decades to sanctify its own rule—have become intolerable.
Opposition parties have denounced Tuesday’s ban. Chadema’s head of foreign affairs, John Kitoka, wrote on X that “the regime’s answer to growing public demand for freedom is fear, intimidation, and repression,” branding the directive unconstitutional. The party’s chief legal counsel, Rugemeleza Nshala, said the ban was intended to “muzzle political freedom,” and confirmed that Chadema was weighing legal challenges.
Chadema’s own chairperson, Tundu Lissu, remains in detention after more than fourteen months, facing fraudulent treason charges that carry the death penalty, while the party remains barred from electoral participation until 2030.
ACT-Wazalendo, Tanzania’s third-largest party that claims to be the true inheritor of Nyerere’s “African Socialism”, likewise announced it would challenge the ban in court. Its shadow minister for Defence, Internal Affairs and Security, Rashid Ali, said, “This directive is not only an attempt to continue pushing the country further into darkness and to prevent the lawful activities of political parties; it is also a continuation of the rulers’ violation of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania and Article 23(1)(a) and (b) of the Political Parties Act”. The party pledged to take legal action to challenge the directive.
Legal appeals to a constitution the regime tramples at will offer no way forward. Nor do Chadema’s and ACT-Wazalendo’s repeated appeals to the “international community”—by which they mean the imperialist powers and institutions such as the United Nations, South African Development Community and the African Union—to impose sanctions and install a transitional government.
This is the programme of a capitalist faction that fears mobilising workers and rural masses against the CCM regime and seeks to have imperialism install it in office. Chadema, no less than ACT-Wazalendo, represents sections of the Tanzanian business elite seeking a larger share of the spoils of foreign investment. Its programme of tax cuts and a “conducive environment for investors” in mining, oil and gas offers the youth no way out.
Hassan is desperately manoeuvring to secure her regime through deepening ties with China and Russia.
In June, Hassan made the first state visit by a Tanzanian president to Moscow since Julius Nyerere in 1969, meeting Vladimir Putin, receiving an honorary doctorate, and unveiling plans for over $2 billion in Russian investment, centred on Rosatom’s $1.2 billion Mkuju River uranium project. Direct flights between Dar es Salaam and Moscow began this month.
President of Tanzania Samia Suluhu Hassan [Photo by Scottish Government / CC BY 2.0]
This follows years of deepening economic ties with China, now Tanzania’s largest trading partner and principal financier of major infrastructure projects. Hassan presents this orientation as “non-alignment,” insisting that Tanzania works with all countries and takes no side. It reflects the calculations of a bourgeois regime that has turned to Beijing for more favourable loans, investment and commercial agreements after receiving little from increasingly hostile Western powers.
However, such a policy no more offers a path to genuine national liberation than Nyerere’s “African Socialism” did six decades ago.
Washington and Brussels have escalated pressure on Hassan. In May, the State Department designated Tanzania’s Senior Assistant Commissioner Faustine Jackson Mafwele, banning him from the US over his role in the abduction, torture and sexual assault of Kenyan activist Boniface Mwangi and Ugandan activist Agather Atuhaire, both seized in Dar es Salaam while observing Lissu’s treason trial.
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Days earlier, Senators Jeanne Shaheen and Ted Cruz introduced the Reassessing the US-Tanzania Bilateral Relationship Act, which passed the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on June 17 and now awaits a full Senate vote. The Senate’s press release makes explicit the geopolitical calculation underlying all the human rights rhetoric. The bill claims to respond to “democratic backsliding, political repression, human rights abuses and growing concerns about Chinese influence in Tanzania,” and it directs the State Department to “evaluate the extent of the People’s Republic of China’s military, economic and political engagement in Tanzania, including cooperation that could undermine democratic institutions and U.S. interests in the region.”
When the Senate advanced a substitute version to drop the original bill’s proposed cut to security and military cooperation, it broadened this mandate into a review of Tanzania’s “growing diplomatic and commercial ties with China and Russia.”
Brussels has moved on a parallel track. In November, the European Parliament passed a resolution condemning the killings and demanding Lissu’s immediate and unconditional release. David McAllister, chair of the Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee, said that the European Union (EU) should “use every tool at our disposal to hold those in power accountable,” and separately demanded that “all EU funds must be stopped immediately.” In June 2026, after Dodoma refused entry to a European Parliament human rights delegation, the Parliament voted to keep €156 million in EU funding frozen.
The very same imperialist powers now posturing over Tanzanian lives arm and finance the Israeli genocide of Palestinians in Gaza, wage a proxy war against Russia that has killed hundreds of thousands, and operate a Fortress Europe that has turned the Mediterranean into a mass grave for African migrants. Their sudden concern is a cover for their scramble for the country’s nickel, graphite, uranium and rare earths, and to deny China and Russia a firmer foothold in East Africa.
Moreover, even as the sanctions and aid freezes were being debated, Tanzanian and US officials continued negotiating three flagship American-linked projects: a $42 billion LNG export terminal led by Shell, Equinor and ExxonMobil; the $942 million Tembo Nickel project, developed with Kabanga Nickel to supply battery-grade material for the electric vehicle industry; and the $300 million Mahenge graphite project run by Australia’s Black Rock Mining. The EU flagged its own interest in the Epanko graphite project.
The imperialist powers are clearly cultivating Chadema, and Lissu personally, as their preferred vehicle inside Tanzania. Every EU resolution on Tanzania since May 2025 has named Lissu and demanded his release. Lissu lived for six years of exile in Brussels and enjoys personal ties to European officials. The American Shaheen-Cruz bill contains an equivalent mechanism, conditioning any restoration of US aid on a “national reconciliation process” with Chadema.
The Tanzanian working class and youth confront a corrupt bourgeois state defending itself through terror, an opposition tied to the same capitalist order, and imperialist powers competing against rising capitalist powers like China to loot the country’s resources under whatever political arrangement best serves them. None of these forces offers a way forward.
What is posed is the same task that confronted Tanganyika’s militant working class in the 1940s and 1950s and that TANU, Nyerere and every subsequent CCM government have worked to suppress: its independent political mobilisation in a struggle for socialism.
Courage in the face of tanks, curfews and internet blackouts must be coupled with a revolutionary socialist programme and leadership. One that links the fight against the CCM dictatorship to the struggle against imperialism across the continent, as part of the International Committee of the Fourth International. Only the building of such a party, rooted in the working class and committed to the fight for the United Socialist States of Africa, can politically arm Tanzania’s Gen-Z so that it can end, once and for all, sixty-four years of capitalist rule
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- #73
16 July 2026
KESI YAFUNGULIWA KUPIGA TAMKO LA PATROBAS KATAMBI, TAMKO LAKE NI HARAMU NA LA KIBAGUZI
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=TquG0_BnTw0
Habari kwa kina :
LHRC, TLS NA DK. SLAA WAMSHTAKI WAZIRI PATROBAS KATAMBI MAHAKAMANI
Chama cha Wanasheria Tanganyika (TLS) kwa kushirikiana na Kituo cha Sheria na Haki za Binadamu (LHRC) na mwanasiasa maarufu, Dk Willbrod Slaa, wamefungua kesi ya kikatiba dhidi ya Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi, Patrobas Katambi na wenzake sita.
TLS na wadau wenzao wamefungua kesi hiyo Mahakama Kuu, Masjala Ndogo mjini Tabora, Tanzania chini ya hati ya dharura wakipinga kauli aliyoitoa Patrobas Katambi bungeni Dodoma hivi karibuni kuhusiana na zuio la mikutano ya hadhara ya vyama vya siasa.
Mbali na Patrobas Katambi, aliyeshtakiwa kwa jina lake, wadaiwa wengine katika kesi hiyo ni Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi, Mkuu wa Jeshi la Polisi (IGP) na Mwanasheria Mkuu wa Serikali (AG).
Pia, wamewaunganisha wadhamini waliosajiliwa wa Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) na wadhamini waliosajiliwa wa chama cha ACT- Wazalendo.
Juni 26, 2026, akiwa bungeni jijini Dodoma wakati vikao vya Bunge vikiendelea, waziri Patrobas Katambi alipiga marufuku mikutano ya vyama vya siasa nchini kote kwa kile alichoeleza ni sababu za kiusalama, akamuelekeza IGP kutekeleza agizo hilo.
Na kuanzia siku hiyo shughuli zote za kisiasa zimesitishwa kwa vyama vyote vya siasa, ingawa mawaziri wa serikali ya CCM ambao wote ni wanasiasa wanaendelea kukipugia chapuo la kisiasa chama dola kongwe CCM huku vyama vingine havipati fursa hiyo.
