unprejudiced
JF-Expert Member
- Jan 27, 2017
- 3,503
- 2,865
WHO is Lissu mpaka mumpe mileage hivyo na kumwona Rais wa nchi ndo mwenye Shida naye. Mnajikuza sana na ndipo mnafeli kabisa.
Je, Tundu Lissu atakutana na Rais Samia Suluhu Ubelgiji?
Je, Tundu Lissu atakutana na Rais Samia Suluhu Ubelgiji?
- Thread starter Erythrocyte
- Start date
WHO is Lissu mpaka mumpe mileage hivyo na kumwona Rais wa nchi ndo mwenye Shida naye. Mnajikuza sana na ndipo mnafeli kabisa.
Okay
macho_mdiliko
Platinum Member
- Mar 10, 2008
- 25,191
- 48,765
Nyie ndiye wapumbavu wenye mawazo kama Zitto. Mbowe alifanya kosa gani? Kufanya makongamano ya katiba mpya ni kosa? Ujinga ulio tukuka umeandika.
macho_mdiliko
Platinum Member
- Mar 10, 2008
- 25,191
- 48,765
bagamoyo ni kweli kabisa. Hata kwa wenye kusikiliza na kuelewa, rais Samia aliposhika madaraka alikuwa na nia kubwa kuwashirikisha wapinzani wote kwenye Tanzania mpya. Hao ''gang'' ni wengi kuliko inavyodhaniwa. Hawa ni ni watu wali CCM na wanahofu kuwa akishirikisha wapinzani na kuleta mabadiliko kwenye mfumo wa utawala, malengo yao ya ulaji na vyeo waliyonayo yatavurugika. Wengine walishiriki kwenye madhambi wakati wa Magufuli hivyo wanaogopa watajulikana. All in all rais Samia inabidi avae miwani ya mbao na asiwachekee. Akifanya hili basi atakumbukwa mazuri.
Nchi hii. Ni ya kuhurumia yaami Samia na roho mbaya na roho ya kishetani she will pay heavily issue ya mbowe
UmkhontoweSizwe
Platinum Member
- Dec 19, 2008
- 9,454
- 8,894
Akikutana naye basi nisikilizie majigambo yake kule kwenye Maria Sarungi online siku akipata nafasi ya kuongea. Mr #dishlimetilt yani ni bure kabisa
Dan Zwangendaba
JF-Expert Member
- Apr 25, 2014
- 5,814
- 8,118
Ni vigumu kuelewa haya mambo labda kutokana na umri ulionao
Yoda
JF-Expert Member
- Jul 22, 2018
- 48,475
- 70,102
Vipi kuhusu Mbowe?
Yoda
JF-Expert Member
- Jul 22, 2018
- 48,475
- 70,102
Taasisi ni nini?
nditolo
JF-Expert Member
- Jul 2, 2011
- 3,731
- 4,271
Kwa utendaji kazi wa police ni sahihi kabisa kuwa wao ndio walikuwa genge lililomshambulia Lissu.
Pili tambua kuwa wengi wao hawana shabaha sababu hata rengi hawapigi mara kwa mara. Pia wamezoea kutumia vi pistol/silaha ndogo ndogo sasa SMG walishindwa kulenga.
Pia hofu ya kutambulika wakati wanashambulia iliwafanya washindwe kupiga risasi.
Pia tukio la Hamza lilitufumbua macho kuwa police hawajui kutumia silaha.
14 February 2022
Brussels, Belgium
Supporting innovation for democracy and the rule of law is not a strategic objective of the European Union in Africa. However, fierce competition between different political models is underway on a global scale. It no longer opposes communist or socialist regimes to capitalist regimes, the free market to the managed economy. Now it is about democracy. This is threatened as much by neoliberalism as by the new authoritarianism, whether in its populist or nationalist version. Casually, Africa is one of the privileged theaters of this confrontation.
To download
Many international players have in fact understood that both on the geopolitical level and in terms of access to rare resources and the conquest of markets, the importance of the continent in world politics will increase during the 21st century, and their future cooperation with African states and societies will have enormous implications for their own political, economic, cultural and even military position in the world. Most of the powers that matter are therefore building “new global strategies with Africa”. To this end, they have put in place programs designed not only to reposition them on the continent, but also to show that authoritarianism can be as valid and effective a development model as any other. It is, for example,
In order to sustain competition with China, other powers would like to refocus their interventions in Africa. In this regard, they give priority to stimulating investment (particularly in the private sector), green transition and digital transformation, the development of major infrastructure and, possibly, job creation. This is the case of the European Union1. But so are Russia, Turkey, India, some Gulf States and other emerging powers.
With regard specifically to the democratic emergency, three of its conclusions are worth recalling briefly.
First of all, the demand for democracy in Africa is endogenous. It does not date from today, but from the colonial period, when the demand for autonomy and the quest for self-determination went hand in hand with the aspiration for social equality within the framework of the rule of law. At the time, the idea prevailed that democracy should be based on rights, starting with the right of peoples to govern themselves. In the future, its resilience would depend, it was thought, on the quality and solidity of institutions, the only ones capable of stopping the rise of personal power once decolonization was completed.
From the 1990s, when most African states were subject to structural adjustment plans and forced to repay the debts they owed to international financial institutions, the emphasis was on rebalancing relations between state and society and on the principles of participation, representation and accountability .
At the end of the 2000s, we are witnessing a turning point. If the rise of civil societies is confirmed, the question of democracy arises more and more with reference to the issue of living organisms. Faced with the development of various pandemics, the effects of global warming and the loss of biodiversity, many people now recognize the existence of an essential continuity between natural environments, ecological environments and human worlds. In the context of the pressure that weighs on the living and in response to the aggravation of the factors of vulnerability, democracy is increasingly formulated in terms of the fairest possible redistribution of the means of existence, in the perspective of ecological and social sustainability of the continent.
Of course, national specificities and different contexts must be taken into account. In many countries, however, we have witnessed a sometimes significant erosion of civil and political freedoms. In Central Africa, in certain parts of North Africa or in Sudan, repression has intensified. Gatherings of opposition parties are banned or violently dispersed. Activists and activists are arrested and imprisoned, often without trial. Violence against the “social cadets” (the “unemployed”, women, sexual, religious or linguistic minorities) continues to intensify.
Having actively contributed to the consolidation of an ecology of brutality, many States face multifaceted crises and sometimes bloody conflicts. Far from enshrining the legitimacy of the regimes in power, the elections have become a trigger for serious disorder. Often rigged, they sometimes lead to significant loss of human life, and ended up opening, in many cases, the way to constitutional crises punctuated by coups d'etat.
© Maja Smiejkowska/REX/Shutterstock (El Anatsui, 'Focus')
In view of the vast societal transition underway on the continent, bridging the gap between the power of cultural creation of societies and communities and the low quality of public and institutional life is therefore urgent. The appearance, almost everywhere, of new forms of organization, expression and mobilization among the younger generations bears witness to the vitality of social movements and the vigor of current innovations in the field of general creation. Access to digital networks, for example, is helping to increase deliberative capacities. In this context, the future of democracy will depend on two conditions.
First, how the resources of the social imagination generated through these practices will be used to increase the forms of self-organization and pool the efforts necessary for the reconstruction of the continent. It will also depend on the quality of the support given by international forces to the democratic ideal on the continent.
Where these intentions have been translated into concrete interventions, these often lack clarity, coherence and impact, and above all lack of articulation with the most creative local dynamics.
Most of the major Western countries have nevertheless set up support systems in the field of human rights. These are of various sizes. The European Union, in particular, has instruments to support administrative reforms. Moreover, it is estimated that around 10% of official development assistance paid to African countries is devoted to it. Because these amounts are distributed between different "windows" including the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), tracing the funding actually allocated to democracy is not easy.
Whether in bilateral relations or relations with the European Union, there is therefore no systemic cooperation with African governments on political reforms aimed at ensuring inclusive and democratic governance. Since the mid-2000s, efforts to fill this void have been attempted. The creation in 2009 of the External Action Service was intended to strengthen this dialogue.
A multitude of small, often incoherent initiatives have taken the place of a political dialogue worthy of the name. This is the case with support for electoral processes, the independence of the judiciary, media pluralism, gender equality and the defense of human rights. The same applies to interventions aimed at improving the management of public finances, support for decentralization, the development of legal services and the modernization of courts. In this case, as in many others, the work is mainly done with governments.
Other initiatives relate to election support and election observation missions. Their impact on democratic governance is uncertain. To become a key element in democratization processes, election monitoring must be part of systemic and long-term efforts to improve the quality of institutions. Such efforts require investments in intermediary organizations such as the media or trade unions, in civic education, and in strengthening transnational relations between African and European civil societies.
Sometimes the activities of these various organizations go hand in hand, or in parallel with, research. This is carried out in specialized centers within universities, or by think-tanks. The United States provides, by far, most of the world's knowledge in this field. The same is true of the publication networks and the networking between the different milieus.
The first is historical. Democratic demand is not imposed from outside. It emanates from African societies themselves. Moreover, it is enshrined in regional standards and codified as such in a number of key texts emanating from African institutions themselves.4. It should therefore be part of any political dialogue with African regimes, whether bilaterally or multilaterally.
The second is instrumental. Supporting democracy and the rule of law is a direct way to address the central challenges of the Anthropocene, to mitigate and adapt to climate change; protect biodiversity and ecosystems; to reduce inequalities both in terms of basic capacities and in terms of gender equality, in short to promote the objectives of sustainable development. Without it, it is difficult to expand the range of choices available to societies and communities, to increase the human capacities needed to deal with uncertainty and systemic risks. Moreover, the challenges of development and the challenge of human security in Africa require systemic solutions.
The third is geostrategic. In addition to being a question of values, support for democracy responds to Europe's long-term political and security interests in Africa. We cannot detach the rise in Islamist violence from democratic flaws. With extremist “alternatives” flourishing on the bed of democratic disappointment, democracy is one of the conditions for the continent's long-term stability.
Human security, political stability and regional peace are compromised wherever an ecology of brutality is allowed to take root and consolidate, the inevitable consequence of which is to engender crisis after crisis. The policy of frenzied containment of migration has become, for its part, a major factor in the destabilization of the continent. It is not only unsustainable. She is inhuman.
www.lepoint.fr
Brussels, Belgium
Is a New Deal between Europe and Africa possible?
Ahead of the summit between the African Union and the European Union, Achille Mbembe suggests moving away from an apolitical vision of development.
Supporting innovation for democracy and the rule of law is not a strategic objective of the European Union in Africa. However, fierce competition between different political models is underway on a global scale. It no longer opposes communist or socialist regimes to capitalist regimes, the free market to the managed economy. Now it is about democracy. This is threatened as much by neoliberalism as by the new authoritarianism, whether in its populist or nationalist version. Casually, Africa is one of the privileged theaters of this confrontation.
The future of democracy is the new geopolitical question
To downloadMany international players have in fact understood that both on the geopolitical level and in terms of access to rare resources and the conquest of markets, the importance of the continent in world politics will increase during the 21st century, and their future cooperation with African states and societies will have enormous implications for their own political, economic, cultural and even military position in the world. Most of the powers that matter are therefore building “new global strategies with Africa”. To this end, they have put in place programs designed not only to reposition them on the continent, but also to show that authoritarianism can be as valid and effective a development model as any other. It is, for example,
In order to sustain competition with China, other powers would like to refocus their interventions in Africa. In this regard, they give priority to stimulating investment (particularly in the private sector), green transition and digital transformation, the development of major infrastructure and, possibly, job creation. This is the case of the European Union1. But so are Russia, Turkey, India, some Gulf States and other emerging powers.
The Report submitted to President Emmanuel Macron ahead of the New Africa-France Summit held in Montpellier in October 2020 presented a relatively detailed overview of the "situations of democracy" in Africa since 19902. It emphasized the changes of all kinds that the continent is experiencing – demographic changes, urbanization and digitization, the desire for mobility and circulation and the risks and challenges linked in particular to ecological sustainability – and encouraged France to project into the century and to imagine a new relationship with African countries based on a dynamic balance between well-understood interests and the quest for meaning that drives current generations.
With regard specifically to the democratic emergency, three of its conclusions are worth recalling briefly.
First of all, the demand for democracy in Africa is endogenous. It does not date from today, but from the colonial period, when the demand for autonomy and the quest for self-determination went hand in hand with the aspiration for social equality within the framework of the rule of law. At the time, the idea prevailed that democracy should be based on rights, starting with the right of peoples to govern themselves. In the future, its resilience would depend, it was thought, on the quality and solidity of institutions, the only ones capable of stopping the rise of personal power once decolonization was completed.
From the 1990s, when most African states were subject to structural adjustment plans and forced to repay the debts they owed to international financial institutions, the emphasis was on rebalancing relations between state and society and on the principles of participation, representation and accountability .
At the end of the 2000s, we are witnessing a turning point. If the rise of civil societies is confirmed, the question of democracy arises more and more with reference to the issue of living organisms. Faced with the development of various pandemics, the effects of global warming and the loss of biodiversity, many people now recognize the existence of an essential continuity between natural environments, ecological environments and human worlds. In the context of the pressure that weighs on the living and in response to the aggravation of the factors of vulnerability, democracy is increasingly formulated in terms of the fairest possible redistribution of the means of existence, in the perspective of ecological and social sustainability of the continent.
Casually, it is in Africa that the future of democracy is being played out
To tell the truth, the results of the democratization processes initiated since the 1990s are mediocre. The recent political evolution of African political regimes shows a clear setback in the progress made since the introduction of the multiparty system and a social polarization that is all the more accentuated in that in many countries the major political and constitutional reforms have simply been abandoned.3. Today, the continent is once again plagued by the resurgence of ethnic or religious struggles. Almost everywhere, dominant party regimes have taken over and tend to perpetuate policies that trap many local communities in an endless cycle of vulnerability.Of course, national specificities and different contexts must be taken into account. In many countries, however, we have witnessed a sometimes significant erosion of civil and political freedoms. In Central Africa, in certain parts of North Africa or in Sudan, repression has intensified. Gatherings of opposition parties are banned or violently dispersed. Activists and activists are arrested and imprisoned, often without trial. Violence against the “social cadets” (the “unemployed”, women, sexual, religious or linguistic minorities) continues to intensify.
Having actively contributed to the consolidation of an ecology of brutality, many States face multifaceted crises and sometimes bloody conflicts. Far from enshrining the legitimacy of the regimes in power, the elections have become a trigger for serious disorder. Often rigged, they sometimes lead to significant loss of human life, and ended up opening, in many cases, the way to constitutional crises punctuated by coups d'etat.
In the end, the majority of Africans still do not enjoy any guarantees in terms of social or civil rights (right of association, freedom of the media, freedom of expression) or fundamental freedoms. Moreover, if they had the opportunity, it cannot be ruled out that many would be willing to exchange minimum socio-economic rights for their political and civic rights. Moreover, many are those who constantly wonder whether, in the competition between democratic regimes and authoritarian regimes, the latter are not, like China, more effective in reducing poverty, building health care and education, guarantee security and promote inclusive economic growth than so-called democratic regimes.
In view of the vast societal transition underway on the continent, bridging the gap between the power of cultural creation of societies and communities and the low quality of public and institutional life is therefore urgent. The appearance, almost everywhere, of new forms of organization, expression and mobilization among the younger generations bears witness to the vitality of social movements and the vigor of current innovations in the field of general creation. Access to digital networks, for example, is helping to increase deliberative capacities. In this context, the future of democracy will depend on two conditions.
First, how the resources of the social imagination generated through these practices will be used to increase the forms of self-organization and pool the efforts necessary for the reconstruction of the continent. It will also depend on the quality of the support given by international forces to the democratic ideal on the continent.
Europe lagging behind
In theory, this support is part of the general objectives of the European Union's foreign policy (Article 21 of the Lisbon Treaty). For example, the French orientation and programming law relating to development and international solidarity policy of August 4, 2021 explicitly mentions the defense of fundamental freedoms, the promotion of the values of democracy and rule of law and support for good governance mechanisms. In either case, however, few tools exist that would support the effective implementation of these ideals.Where these intentions have been translated into concrete interventions, these often lack clarity, coherence and impact, and above all lack of articulation with the most creative local dynamics.
Most of the major Western countries have nevertheless set up support systems in the field of human rights. These are of various sizes. The European Union, in particular, has instruments to support administrative reforms. Moreover, it is estimated that around 10% of official development assistance paid to African countries is devoted to it. Because these amounts are distributed between different "windows" including the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR), the European Development Fund (EDF) and the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), tracing the funding actually allocated to democracy is not easy.
Moreover, if with the EIDHR, the Union can support the actors of democracy without the official agreement of African governments, the bulk of its interventions require the consent of the latter. This is the case of capacity building support. In addition, mechanisms such as the European Fund for Democracy (FEDEM) have substantial amounts available (nearly 100 million euros in 2021). But they exclude sub-Saharan Africa from their field of intervention and their subsidies are exclusively reserved for the immediate “neighbors” of Europe.
Whether in bilateral relations or relations with the European Union, there is therefore no systemic cooperation with African governments on political reforms aimed at ensuring inclusive and democratic governance. Since the mid-2000s, efforts to fill this void have been attempted. The creation in 2009 of the External Action Service was intended to strengthen this dialogue.
A multitude of small, often incoherent initiatives have taken the place of a political dialogue worthy of the name. This is the case with support for electoral processes, the independence of the judiciary, media pluralism, gender equality and the defense of human rights. The same applies to interventions aimed at improving the management of public finances, support for decentralization, the development of legal services and the modernization of courts. In this case, as in many others, the work is mainly done with governments.
Other initiatives relate to election support and election observation missions. Their impact on democratic governance is uncertain. To become a key element in democratization processes, election monitoring must be part of systemic and long-term efforts to improve the quality of institutions. Such efforts require investments in intermediary organizations such as the media or trade unions, in civic education, and in strengthening transnational relations between African and European civil societies.
Some Funds are global in nature. This is the case of the United Nations Democracy Fund. Others are regional funds. This is the case of the European Fund for Democracy whose actions are limited to neighboring countries of Europe. Still others are National Funds. This is the case of the National Endowment for Democracy, the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, the Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy. Of all the countries in the world, Germany is the one that spends the highest amounts on democracy support – around half a billion euros a year through foundations attached to political parties or trade unions .
Sometimes the activities of these various organizations go hand in hand, or in parallel with, research. This is carried out in specialized centers within universities, or by think-tanks. The United States provides, by far, most of the world's knowledge in this field. The same is true of the publication networks and the networking between the different milieus.
Get out of an apolitical vision of development
As the Summit of Heads of State of the European Union and the African Union prepares, perhaps it is useful to re-specify the reasons why Europe must get involved in supporting innovation and democracy in Africa.The first is historical. Democratic demand is not imposed from outside. It emanates from African societies themselves. Moreover, it is enshrined in regional standards and codified as such in a number of key texts emanating from African institutions themselves.4. It should therefore be part of any political dialogue with African regimes, whether bilaterally or multilaterally.
The second is instrumental. Supporting democracy and the rule of law is a direct way to address the central challenges of the Anthropocene, to mitigate and adapt to climate change; protect biodiversity and ecosystems; to reduce inequalities both in terms of basic capacities and in terms of gender equality, in short to promote the objectives of sustainable development. Without it, it is difficult to expand the range of choices available to societies and communities, to increase the human capacities needed to deal with uncertainty and systemic risks. Moreover, the challenges of development and the challenge of human security in Africa require systemic solutions.
The third is geostrategic. In addition to being a question of values, support for democracy responds to Europe's long-term political and security interests in Africa. We cannot detach the rise in Islamist violence from democratic flaws. With extremist “alternatives” flourishing on the bed of democratic disappointment, democracy is one of the conditions for the continent's long-term stability.
The European Union has not sufficiently understood this. By proceeding as if the problems of socio-economic development ultimately stemmed from a lack of financial, technical and administrative capacities and were not caused by structures of power and vulnerability, it deprived itself of the capacity to Africa a properly geopolitical look. It is therefore time to move away from a technical and apolitical approach to official development assistance.
Human security, political stability and regional peace are compromised wherever an ecology of brutality is allowed to take root and consolidate, the inevitable consequence of which is to engender crisis after crisis. The policy of frenzied containment of migration has become, for its part, a major factor in the destabilization of the continent. It is not only unsustainable. She is inhuman.
SOURCES
- European Commission & European External Action Service, Joint Communication to the European Parliament. Towards a comprehensive strategy with Africa , Brussels, 2020
- The new Africa-France relations: meeting the challenges of tomorrow together – Elysee.fr
- V-Dem, Varieties of Democracy. Global Standards, Local Knowledge , 2019. See https://www.v-dem.net/en/data/data-version-10/
- African Union, 2012, African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance . See African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance | African Union ; African Union, 2019, The Africa Governance Report: Promoting African Shared Values
Macron annonce un New Deal économique et financier avec l'Afrique
Un sommet entre l'Union africaine et l'Union européenne se tiendra les 17 et 18 février à Bruxelles sous la présidence française de l'Union europée...
www.lepoint.fr
14 February 2022
Brussels, Belgium
Source : Avis aux médias - sommet Union européenne - Union africaine des 17 et 18 février 2022
Brussels, Belgium
Media advisory - European Union - African Union summit of 17 and 18 February 2022
| The summit bringing together the leaders of the European Union and the African Union will take place on Thursday 17 and Friday 18 February 2022, in the Justus Lipsius and Europa buildings, in Brussels. |
Brussels, Belgium
The summit will be a unique opportunity to lay the foundations for a renewed and deepened partnership between the AU and the EU benefiting from political commitment at the highest level based on trust and a clear understanding of our mutual interests. Leaders are expected to discuss how the two continents can boost prosperity .The aim is to launch an ambitious Africa-Europe investment package taking into account global challenges such as climate change and the current health crisis. They are also expected to discuss tools and solutions to promote stability and security through a renewed architecture for peace and security.
Several thematic round tables will also be organised. The following topics will be discussed:
A joint declaration on a common vision for 2030 should be adopted by the participants.
Source : Sommet Union européenne‑Union africaine, 17-18 février 2022
European Union-African Union Summit, 17-18 February 2022
Main points of the agenda
The leaders of the EU and the AU, together with those of their respective Member States, will meet for the sixth European Union-African Union Summit , which will take place in Brussels on 17 and 18 February 2022.The summit will be a unique opportunity to lay the foundations for a renewed and deepened partnership between the AU and the EU benefiting from political commitment at the highest level based on trust and a clear understanding of our mutual interests. Leaders are expected to discuss how the two continents can boost prosperity .The aim is to launch an ambitious Africa-Europe investment package taking into account global challenges such as climate change and the current health crisis. They are also expected to discuss tools and solutions to promote stability and security through a renewed architecture for peace and security.
Several thematic round tables will also be organised. The following topics will be discussed:
- Growth financing
- Health systems and vaccine production
- Agriculture and sustainable development
- Education, culture and vocational training, migration and mobility
- Private sector support and economic integration
- Peace, security and governance
- Climate change and energy transition, digital [connectivity and infrastructure] and transport
A joint declaration on a common vision for 2030 should be adopted by the participants.
Source : Sommet Union européenne‑Union africaine, 17-18 février 2022
GOOD GOVERNANCE / UTAWALA BORA
WATUHUMIWA WALIOPO MAHABUSU MAGEREZA KUKOSA CHAKULA WAENDAPO MAHAKAMANI
www.jamiiforums.com
11 February 2022
Paris, France
HABARI ZA KUFUGULIWA MAGAZETI NA KESI YA MBOWE YAWA HABARI KUBWA MJINI PARIS, UFARANSA
Serikali ya awamu ya sita ya Tanzania leo alhamisi ya tarehe 10 February 2022 yadai kufungua ukurasa mpya kufuatia kuyafungulia magazeti manne ....
Paris, France
Un vendeur de journaux à Mwanza, en Tanzanie le 19 septembre 2015
afp.com - Daniel Hayduk
10 FÉV 2022
Mise à jour 10.02.2022 à 17:00
AFP
© 2022 AFP
Le gouvernement tanzanien a annoncé jeudi lever l'interdiction de quatre journaux, imposée sous le précédent président John Magufuli, et ouvrir "un nouveau chapitre" avec les médias, la présidente Samia Suluhu Hassan tentant de rompre avec certaines pratiques de son autoritaire prédécesseur.
Les quatre publications en swahili - parmi lesquels Daima, quotidien propriété du dirigeant de l'opposition emprisonné Freeman Mbowe - ont été interdites entre 2016 et 2020.
"L'intention du gouvernement actuel est de tisser de bonnes relations avec les médias et, pour commencer, je vais réaccorder des licences aux quatre journaux", a déclaré le ministre tanzanien de l'Information Nape Nnauye lors d'une réunion avec des rédacteurs en chef.
"Leur punition a assez duré", a-t-il ajouté.Le ministre a expliqué que la présidente Hassan désirait créer "un environnement propice aux médias". "Elle m'a demandé de rencontrer les journalistes, d'échanger nos points de vue et d'écouter vos inquiétudes".
Les autorités tanzaniennes avaient révoqué la licence de publication et de distribution de Daima juste avant les élections générales de 2020, l'accusant d'avoir enfreint la loi et la déontologie journalistique, sans préciser le contenu incriminé.
Mwanahalisi, un hebdomadaire, avait été interdit en 2017 après avoir publié la lettre d'un lecteur contenant des "insultes" à l'égard du président Magufuli et son gouvernement.
Mawio et Mseto, deux autres hebdomadaires, avaient vu leurs licences suspendues en 2016 après avoir tous deux abordés le sujet de la corruption au sommet de l'Etat.
Depuis qu'elle a succédé au président Magufuli, décédé soudainement en mars 2021 et dont elle était la vice-présidente, Mme Hassan tente de rompre avec certaines politiques de son prédécesseur, surnommé "Bulldozer" pour son style de gouvernement intransigeant.
Elle a tendu le bras à l'opposition et autorisé la réouverture de médias interdits sous Magafuli, faisant le voeu de défendre la démocratie et les libertés fondamentales.
Mais l'arrestation en juillet 2021 de M. Mbowe, dirigeant du principal parti d'opposition Chadema, sur des accusations de terrorisme, a douché les espoirs qu'elle tourne réellement la page de la présidence Magufuli.
Son gouvernement a également infligé en 2021 une suspension de deux semaines au journal Uhuru, organe de son propre parti le Chama Cha Mapinduzi, après un article de une affirmant qu'elle envisageait de ne pas se représenter en 2025
Source : La Tanzanie lève l'interdiction de quatre journaux
WATUHUMIWA WALIOPO MAHABUSU MAGEREZA KUKOSA CHAKULA WAENDAPO MAHAKAMANI
Mbowe: Tunanyimwa haki ya kupata mlo wa mchana na maji kwa miezi mitano sasa
Mhe. Mbowe amenyoosha MKONO na kumwaleza Mhe. Jaji kwamba Wana miezi mitano bila kula chakula cha Mchana kwa maana nyingine kauli Hii inaonyesha watuhumiwa hawa wamekuwa wakishinda na kulala bila kula Kwa siku zote wanazoletwa mahakani huku mahakama ikishindwa japo kupitisha mchana bila kula "...
11 February 2022
Paris, France
HABARI ZA KUFUGULIWA MAGAZETI NA KESI YA MBOWE YAWA HABARI KUBWA MJINI PARIS, UFARANSA
Serikali ya awamu ya sita ya Tanzania leo alhamisi ya tarehe 10 February 2022 yadai kufungua ukurasa mpya kufuatia kuyafungulia magazeti manne ....
Paris, France
La Tanzanie lève l'interdiction de quatre journaux
Un vendeur de journaux à Mwanza, en Tanzanie le 19 septembre 2015
afp.com - Daniel Hayduk
10 FÉV 2022
Mise à jour 10.02.2022 à 17:00
AFP
© 2022 AFP
Le gouvernement tanzanien a annoncé jeudi lever l'interdiction de quatre journaux, imposée sous le précédent président John Magufuli, et ouvrir "un nouveau chapitre" avec les médias, la présidente Samia Suluhu Hassan tentant de rompre avec certaines pratiques de son autoritaire prédécesseur.
Les quatre publications en swahili - parmi lesquels Daima, quotidien propriété du dirigeant de l'opposition emprisonné Freeman Mbowe - ont été interdites entre 2016 et 2020.
"L'intention du gouvernement actuel est de tisser de bonnes relations avec les médias et, pour commencer, je vais réaccorder des licences aux quatre journaux", a déclaré le ministre tanzanien de l'Information Nape Nnauye lors d'une réunion avec des rédacteurs en chef.
"Leur punition a assez duré", a-t-il ajouté.Le ministre a expliqué que la présidente Hassan désirait créer "un environnement propice aux médias". "Elle m'a demandé de rencontrer les journalistes, d'échanger nos points de vue et d'écouter vos inquiétudes".
Les autorités tanzaniennes avaient révoqué la licence de publication et de distribution de Daima juste avant les élections générales de 2020, l'accusant d'avoir enfreint la loi et la déontologie journalistique, sans préciser le contenu incriminé.
Mwanahalisi, un hebdomadaire, avait été interdit en 2017 après avoir publié la lettre d'un lecteur contenant des "insultes" à l'égard du président Magufuli et son gouvernement.
Mawio et Mseto, deux autres hebdomadaires, avaient vu leurs licences suspendues en 2016 après avoir tous deux abordés le sujet de la corruption au sommet de l'Etat.
Depuis qu'elle a succédé au président Magufuli, décédé soudainement en mars 2021 et dont elle était la vice-présidente, Mme Hassan tente de rompre avec certaines politiques de son prédécesseur, surnommé "Bulldozer" pour son style de gouvernement intransigeant.
Elle a tendu le bras à l'opposition et autorisé la réouverture de médias interdits sous Magafuli, faisant le voeu de défendre la démocratie et les libertés fondamentales.
Mais l'arrestation en juillet 2021 de M. Mbowe, dirigeant du principal parti d'opposition Chadema, sur des accusations de terrorisme, a douché les espoirs qu'elle tourne réellement la page de la présidence Magufuli.
Son gouvernement a également infligé en 2021 une suspension de deux semaines au journal Uhuru, organe de son propre parti le Chama Cha Mapinduzi, après un article de une affirmant qu'elle envisageait de ne pas se représenter en 2025
Source : La Tanzanie lève l'interdiction de quatre journaux
Hamna
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