Sasa serikali isisubiri kusukumwa kukazia hukumu hii kabla ya 2025
13 June 2023
Arusha, Tanzania
Application 011/2020 - Bob Chacha Wangwe and Legal and Human Rights Centre vs United Republic of Tanzania
II. SUBJECT OF THE APPLICATION
A. Facts of the Matter
3. The Applicants challenge the provisions of the National Elections Act and they
claim that the Respondent State, by enacting and implementing the impugned
provisions, violated numerous rights including the right to equality before the law ; the citizen’s right to participate freely in the government of his country,
either directly or through freely chosen representative, the right to vote and be
elected at genuine periodic election and the right to equal access to public.
B. Alleged violations
4. The Applicants allege that the Respondent State has violated fundamental rights
guaranteed in article(s) 1, 13 (1), 21 (1) and (3); 25 (2) & 26; 21 (1) & 21 (2). 74(14) of the Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 (hereinafterreferred to as “the
UDHR), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966 (hereinafter referred to as “the ICCPR) and the Constitution of the United
Republic of Tanzania, respectively.
JUDGEMENT:
The Applicants alleged that the Respondent State had violated their right to participate in the government of their country contrary to Article 13(1) of the Charter and also their right to equality before the law and to equal protection of the law contrary to Article 3 of the Charter.
The Applicants submitted that section 6(1) of the NEA violated the Charter because the
Director of Elections is appointed by the President who is the
Chairperson of the
ruling party and also among the contestants in elections. This manner of appointing the Director of Elections, the Applicants contended, raised questions of impartiality and independence of the
Electoral Commission.
The Applicants also submitted that section 6(1) “
lacks the criteria for
the appointment of the Director of Elections and thus, makes it wide, broad and vague, and
subject to abuse”.
The Court noted that at the core of the Applicants’ grievances, in respect of the appointment of the Director of Elections, was the question of the independence and impartiality of the office.
In line with its jurisprudence, the Court pointed out that States have latitude in terms of configuring their electoral management bodies while bearing in mind the overriding responsibility of establishing an institution that is independent and impartial.
Having considered the Parties’ arguments, and given the various methods for constituting electoral management bodies in use in Africa, the Court held that there is no violation of Article
13(1) of the Charter by the mere reason that the Director of Elections is appointed by the
President. It also held that Article 13(1) of the Charter is not violated simply on the basis that the President makes the appointment of the Director of Elections following recommendation (s) by the Electoral Commission.
In respect of the Applicants’ allegation that section 6(1) of the NEA “lacks the criteria for the appointment of the Director of Elections and thus, makes it wide, broad and vague, and subject
to abuse”, the Court observed that, indeed, section 6(1) did not set out any qualifications that
an appointee for the position must possess in order to qualify for appointment.
The Court thus found it anomalous that the Respondent State’s laws contain no provisions
stipulating the qualifications that one must possess to be appointed a Director of Elections.
The Court held, therefore, that in relation to the head of the Electoral Commission’s secretariat, it behoved the Respondent State to appoint
individuals of the highest calibre who can independently, impartially and transparently coordinate the management of the electoral process. However, without a clearly laid out qualifications scheme, the considerations that the
appointing authority may take into mind when appointing a Director of Elections were unclear.
The Court found that this exposed the process not only to uncertainty but also the possible consideration of irrelevant factors.
Given the violations of the Charter that the Court had established, it also found a violation of Article 1 of the Charter.
On reparations, the Court reiterated its established jurisprudence that for reparations to be granted, the Respondent State should, first, be internationally responsible for the wrongful act.
Second, causation should be established between the wrongful act and the alleged prejudice. Furthermore, and where it is granted, reparation should cover the full prejudice suffered.
Finally, the Applicant bears the onus to justify the claims made.
The Court having found that sections 6(1), 7(2) and 7(3) of the NEA, in part, violate Article 13(1) of the Charter, ordered the Respondent State to take all necessary constitutional and
legislative measures, within a reasonable time and without any undue delay, to ensure that these provisions are amended and aligned with the provisions of the Charter so as to eliminate
the violations of Article 13(1) of the Charter asestablished.
The Court also noted that the violations that it had established raised critical matters of public concern and specifically in relation to the management of electoral processes within the Respondent State. In the circumstances, the Court deemed it proper to make an order
suo motu for publication of this Judgment.
The Court, therefore, ordered the Respondent State to publish this Judgment within a period of three (3) months from the date of notification, on the
websites of the Judiciary and the Ministry for Constitutional and Legal Affairs, and to ensure that the text of the Judgment remains accessible for at least one (1) year after the date of
publication.
On implementation of decisions, the Court reiterated that this is required as a matter of judicial
practice. The Court, therefore, ordered the Respondent State to submit to it within twelve (12)
months from the date of notification of this Judgment, a report on the status of implementation
of the decision set forth herein and thereafter, every six (6) months until the Court considered
that there has been full implementation thereof.
Each Party was ordered to bear its own costs.
Justice Rafaâ BEN ACHOUR issued a Dissenting Opinion.
Further Information
Further information about this case, including the full text of the decision of the African Court,
may be found on the website at:
African Court Cases | Details of a case
For any other queries, please contact the Registry by email
registrar@african-court.or
READ MORE :
Source :
African Court Cases | Details of a case
The Respondent State argues that
“The right to participate in the conduct of business is not absolute, insofar
as it may be legitimately restricted by law”. Relying on Article 27(2) of the
Charter and the decision of the Court in Tanganyika Law Society and
Legal and Human Rights Centre, Reverend Christopher Mtikila v.
Tanzania, the Respondent State argues that “the restrictions on persons
eligible for appointment to the position of Director of Elections are
reasonable and justifiable. The appointment of a civil servant to the
position of Director of Elections is in the public interest, as it is easy to
verify his or her ethical, professional and academic background, since the
public service is governed by a well-established legal framework”.
5. The Respondent State’s reasoning found favour with the majority of the Court,
which found that
“Section 6(1) of the NEA is not in violation of the Charter insofar as it
restricts the appointment of the Director of Elections only to candidates
from the public service”.
2
6. It is this finding, and the reasoning behind it, that I disagree with. Indeed, I believe
that reserving the position of Director of Elections only to public servants openly
violates the principle of equality of all before the law.
3
It is exclusive and
discriminatory and cannot be justified on any objective basis.
2§ 93 of the Judgement.
3Principle proclaimed by Article 7 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 10 December
1948: “All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the
law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration and
against any incitement to such discrimination”, and reiterated in Article 26 of the International Covenant.
The Court composed of: Blaise TCHIKAYA, Vice-President; Ben KIOKO, Rafaâ BEN
ACHOUR, Suzanne MENGUE, Tujilane R. CHIZUMILA, Chafika BENSAOULA, Stella
I. ANUKAM, Dumisa B. NTSEBEZA, Modibo SACKO, Dennis D ADJEI – Judges; and
Robert ENO, Registrar.
In accordance with Article 22 of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples’ Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter referred to as “the Protocol”) and Rule 9(2) of the Rules of Court (hereinafter referred to as “the Rules”),1 Justice Imani D. ABOUD, President of the Court and a national of Tanzania, did not hear the Application.
In the Matter of:
Bob Chacha WANGWE and Legal and Human Rights Centre
Represented by:
i. Advocate Jebra KAMBOLE, Law Guards Advocates;
ii. Advocate Fulgence MASSAWE, Legal and Human Rights Centre; and
iii. Advocate Amani JOACHIM, Legal and Human Rights Centre.
Versus
UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA
Represented by:
i. Dr Boniface Nalija LUHENDE, Solicitor General, Office of the Solicitor General;
ii. Ms Sarah Duncan MWAIPOPO, Deputy Solicitor General, Office of the
Solicitor General;
iii. Mr Vincent E. A. TANGOH, Director, Civil Litigation, Office of the Solicitor
General;
iv. Ms Alesia A MBUYA, Assistant Director, Constitutional, Human Rights and
Election Petitions, Principal State Attorney, Office of the Solicitor General;
v. Daniel NYAKIHA, State Attorney, Office of the Solicitor General;
vi. Vivian METHOD, State Attorney, Office of the Solicitor General;
vii. Ms Caroline Kitana CHIPETA, Acting Director, Legal Affairs, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and East African Cooperation; and
viii. Ms Blandina KASAGAMA, Legal Officer, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and East
African Cooperation.