GE2025 TEC: Ewe Mungu, Tuma Roho wako, afanye upya uso wa Nchi kabla ya Uchaguzi Mkuu 2025

Matukio, Taarifa, Habari na Mijadala ya Wananchi WAKATI wa Mchakato wa Uchaguzi Mkuu 2025
Hiyo Novena kama watashupaza shingo! Kila jicho litaona ukuu wa Mungu, Bwana wa MAJESHI!
 


A PHILOSOPHICAL DEFENSE OF PETITIONARY PRAYERS: A RESPONSE TO KIRANGA ​



I. INTRODUCTION


Prayer seems to be a prominent feature of every religion. When people pray, they attempt to contact/communicate with special persons or entities, such as a God or gods, or dead relatives, or exemplary human beings who are believed to occupy some special status.

People pray for all kinds of reasons. Sometimes people pray in order to give thanks, sometimes to offer praise and adoration, sometimes to apologize and seek forgiveness, and sometimes to ask for things.

A petitionary prayer, at its core, is a form of prayer where individuals make specific requests of God, to mitigate perceived evils and bring about desired goods, either for themselves or others.

The logic behind it stems from a belief that God is both powerful and benevolent, and that approaching Him with sincere requests can lead to positive outcomes.

Historically, the philosophical puzzles concerning petitionary prayer that have received most attention have arisen in connection with the traditional monotheism shared by Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

According to traditional monotheism, God knows everything that can be known (omniscient), can do everything (omnipotent), is perfectly good (omnibenevolent), impassible (unable to be affected by an outside source), immutable (unchanging), and free.

On this view, if God actually answers prayers that petition him for something, then it seems he is willing to withhold some good(s) from the world unless and until someone prays for those goods. But how is this compatible with His benevolence?

On the other hand, if God is dedicated to providing every good to us that we may need, it would seem that He would provide these to us even if we did not pray for them. But if so, it would appear that petitionary prayer is pointless.

If so, many people ask, does it make sense to offer petitionary prayer to God with the expectation that such prayer might influence God to bring about some good he otherwise would not have brought about?

That is, why would God make us ask for some good He might supply, and why would it be right for God to withhold that good unless and until we asked for it?
Given a specific good that can be given by God, we have four scenarios to consider.

A world in which people pray and another in which people do not pray. The world in which people pray has two possibilities, answered prayers and unanswered prayers.
And a world in which people do not pray has two possibilities too, the availability of the said good and unavailability of the said good. The following diagram clarifies:



Against this background, at least in regard to the desired good, it would seem that a world in which God simply supplied all appropriate goods to the world – without requiring us to pray for them, would be preferable to one in which God answers prayers, but allows the world not to enjoy all of the goods appropriate to it unless and until someone prays for them.

Let us call the first, the World-Minus-Prayer (WMP) and the second, the World-Plus-Prayer (WPP).

On this view, for petitionary prayer to be efficacious as “causes of certain effects,” it really must be the case that at least some prayers induce God to some action that He would not take were it not for the prayer.

Otherwise, the world in question reduces to some version of WMP, where God would do everything, even people don’t pray for anything.

So, our problem is to determine what good, weightier than the good of getting what one asks for because one asked for it, might be instantiated in WPP that is not instantiated in WMP.

FORMAL PRAYER PARADOX STATEMENT

A paradox is a set of statements which cannot all be true simultaneously.

It is along this line that, many thinkers have questioned whether petitionary prayer is coherent with the basic tenets of Christian theism, particularly divine omniscience, omnipotence, and omnibenevolence.

They ask: “Can an Omniscient God, who Knows the future, find The Omnipotence to Change His future mind?”

They puzzle can be summarized by using the following five-point syllogism:

  1. God is omniscient (omniscience premise).
  2. God is omnibenevolent (omnibenevolence premise).
  3. God is omnipotent (omnipotence premise).
  4. God is immutable (immutability premise).
  5. Petitionary prayer might influence God to bring about some good he otherwise would not have brought about (the influence premise).
On this view, “the influence premise problem” (IPP) of petitionary prayer relates to the view of many thinkers that to consistently affirm (5) would require one to deny one or more of (1)–(4).

That is, it seems that affirming the influence premise of petitionary prayer requires either that God is somehow:

  1. informed by the prayer, contra omniscience premise,
  2. influenced to prefer some good he otherwise would not, contra omnibenevolence premise, or
  3. increased in power, contra omnipotence premise, or
  4. Changed one’s mind, contra immutability premise.
ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE PRAYER PARADOX

Denying Some Premises


One way to elude the influence premise is to deny divine omnibenevolence, omnipotence, omniscience, immutability, or the influence aim.

First, one might maintain that petitionary prayer may somehow inform God. This would elude the influence premise, but at the cost of denying divine omniscience.

Two, one might claim that God could be influenced to desire to bring about a good he otherwise would not have desired.

This would elude the influence premise, but at the cost of denying divine immutability.

Also, this would elude the influence premise, but at the cost of denying divine omnibenevolence, understood to mean that God wills a set of goods than which no other set of compossible goods is morally better.

Three, one might claim that God lacks the sheer power to bring about the good(s) that he wills to bring about, but petitionary prayer somehow increases God’s power.

This would elude the influence premise, but at the cost of denying divine omnipotence.

Further, such a move would raise the puzzling question as to how prayer could increase God’s power.

Four, one may ignore to consider a denial or significant modification of any of premises (1)–(4) to be a live option.

Instead, to address the influence premise one may deny the influence premise.

At this point, some may deny the usefulness of petitionary prayer altogether, as Mr. Kiranga does.

Many others, however, deny the influence premise by adopting the view that petitionary prayer does not influence God but may positively affect the human who prays or hears such prayer, say, by bringing human desires more in line with God’s will and in other ways.

This follows the common adage that prayer does not change God, but it changes us.

Indeed, for some Christian theists, it is metaphysically impossible that prayer could affect God or have any real influence on what God brings about.

Five, one may remain committed to all five premises, including affirming the influence premise, as the view most consistent with Christian practice.

In fact, numerous instances in Scripture appear to support the view that prayer might make a difference regarding whether or not God brings about some good (e.g., 2 Chron 7:14; Mark 9:29; Luke 11:1–13).

On this view, instead of denying any premises of the influence premise, one might argue that the four premises are not inconsistent.

One might attempt to show this by positing that there is some other premise by which the influence aim can be consistently affirmed alongside divine omniscience, omnibenevolence, and omnipotence.

For example, in addition to premises (1)–(5), one could posit:


(6) God’s providence is ordered in such a way that there is some good that God perfectly knows about, prefers to bring about, and possesses the sheer power to bring about, yet God has some reason(s) compatible with his perfect goodness such that he will not bring about that good without the “influence” of petitionary prayer.​

One inclined in this direction might thus affirm (6) while also believing that humans should not expect to be in a position to know God’s reason(s) for refraining from bringing about such good(s) in the absence of petitionary prayer.

Furthermore, one might propose an additional premise that is compatible with some of the foregoing proposals. Specifically, one might posit that:


(7) There is some factor or set of factors that morally prevents God from bringing about what he already prefers to bring about, but petitionary prayer makes a difference relative to the preventing factor(s).​

In some scenario, God might otherwise prefer to bring about a particular good (or prevent a particular evil) but in some cases doing so might be against the rules of engagement unless God is petitioned to do so.

This might be put in the form of the following additional premise:


(8) It might be that God has committed himself to rules of engagement in a cosmic conflict context such that God is morally prevented from bringing about some good(s) that he is aware of, otherwise would like to bring about, and possesses the sheer power to bring about, unless he is petitioned to do so by an appropriate party or parties.​

On this understanding, the influence premise is consistent with divine omniscience, omnibenevolence, and omnipotence.

More specifically, it is consistent with omniscience, because it is consistent with the belief that God is always entirely aware of the object of petition.

It is consistent with omnibenevolence, because it is consistent with the belief that God already otherwise prefers to bring about the potential good that is the object of petition.

And it is consistent with omnipotence, because it is consistent with the belief that God essentially possesses the sheer power to bring about the potential good that is the object of petition.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The above discussion has shown that, it is not illogical to engage in petitionary prayers, simply because of the so-called prayer paradox, which is represented by the following five-point syllogism:

  • God is omniscient (omniscience premise).
  • God is omnibenevolent (omnibenevolence premise).
  • God is omnipotent (omnipotence premise).
  • God is immutable (immutability premise).
  • Petitionary prayer might influence God to bring about some good he otherwise would not have brought about (the influence premise).
Against this syllogism, we have seen that, a world Plus Prayers (WPP) is superior to a World Minus Prayers (WMP). Thus, TEC is on the right track. Their efforts are not in vain.

THE EVIDENTIAL OBJECTION FOR PETITIONARY PRAYER

This objection asks and negatively answers the question, "Does God answer petitionary prayers?"

But, the formulation of this question is ambiguous. Are we asking whether God "always" or "typically" or "sometimes" or "ever" answers prayers?

The phrasing will make a difference in how one would go about trying to answer the question under each of these scenarios.

The answer to the question "Does God ever answer petitionary prayers?" will be affirmative even if there was or will be only one prayer in all human history (including the future) that has been answered.

Moreover, in order to explore whether there are petitionary prayers that have, in fact, been answered by God we first need to characterize the phenomenon of "answered petitionary prayer".

So, what is an answer to petitionary prayer? A simple characterization such as the following will not suffice:


"A’s petitionary prayer for a result E is answered by God if and only if A prayed for E to happen and then E actually happened".​

If I pray that the sun will shine tomorrow, the fact of the sun shining tomorrow does not prove, or even indicate, that God has answered my prayer.

That is because the sun might have shone whether or not I prayed for it. It seems probable, or at least possible, that my prayer does not lead God to make the sunshine.

The fact that the sun shines is better explained by appealing to natural principles and causes than by appealing to my prayer and God taking it into account.

Moreover, another, and more acute, problem with such a proposal is that there are possible cases (whether probable or not) in which the right side of the account is satisfied and the left side is not.

Therefore, it cannot serve as an account at all. A more sophisticated characterization of ‘answered petitionary prayer’ is thus required, one that includes a counterfactual condition. Instead, a precisely characterization is proposed to be the following:


"A’s petitionary prayer for an object E is answered by God if and only if God’s desire to bring about E just because A requested it plays an essential role in a true contrastive explanation of God’s bringing about E rather than not."​

This characterization includes the counterfactual element but also much more.

In general, to say God answered prayer is to say that the full causal explanation of the occurrence of the state of affairs requested by the petitioner will include, among other things, God responding to the petition itself.

Thus framed, the evidential challenge for petitionary prayer becomes obvious. We have to investigate whether God has ever answered, or will answer, a petitionary prayer.

REBUTTAL TO THE EVIDENTIAL OBJECTION FOR PETITIONARY PRAYER

The burden of proof to justify a negative answer to such a question would thus be extremely heavy, so heavy that it could never be satisfied.
 

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Polepole sio mwana CCM ni Padre Kitima alishambulia serikalini Ilichukua hatua gani? Je watu kusali ni kosa?
 
Mimi na familia yangu ni wakatoliki.

Tutashiriki kufuata maelekezo haya.
 
Asitume yule Roho Rwanda maana wakatoliki wanajulikana
 

Ewe Mungu Wetu, Tuma Roho wako, Afanye Upya Uso wa Nchi Kabla ya Uchaguzi Mkuu 2025” (Zaburi 104:30)
 
Mfa maji. Kwanza nyie tunawachukia kama nini. Makafiri tunajua ni wapagani. Hakuna mkristo atakayeenda mbinguni never. Njoo uislam kabla kiama hakijawadia
Nani ajiunge na huo muungano mnaouita dini(ya juzijuzi)iliyojaa ghilba, hadithi za utapeli na chuki?
 
Mungu ni chaka la kitupia mambo ambayo watu wavivu hawataki kiyafanyia kazi, au watu wajinga hawajui wayatatue vipi.

Kiuhalisia Mungu hayupo. Ni hadithi tunajipigia wenyewe kujizuga tu.

Kama kuna kazi ya kufanya, ifanye mwenyewe, usimtegemee Mungu.

Bila kujali kama Mungu ni mhusika halisi au mhusika wa kitamthiliya kazi yake ni kama ile ya egemeo kwenye mtalimbo.

Anawaunganisha watu wanaosali pamoja na wale wanaosikia maneno ya Sala hizo huweza kumbukizwa fikra za wanaosali, japo sio mara zote.

Sala ni hatua ya kwanza ktk praxiological cycle. It is the planning phase. Kisha zinafuata hatua za utekekezaji na tathmini.

Wengine husema see, judge, act, review.

This is purely a sociological point.
 
Kwa nini Mungu mjuzi wa yote, mwenye uwezo wote na upendo wote asubiri kuombwa jambo la heri?

Why is prayer even necessary in a world where this God exists?

Kwa nini asiwape tu mnachoomba hata kabla hamjajua mnakihitaji?

Si cha heri?

Si ana uwezo wote?

Si ana ujuzi wote?

Si ana upendo wote?

Sasa kwa nini mhitaji kumuomba at all?

Umepiga danadana nyingi lakini hujajibu swali hili la msingi kabisa.
 
Ahaa, kwa hiyo hapa kimsingi unakubali (with a logical caveat ya bila kujali) kuwa Mungu hapa ni tamthiliya tu ya kuwaunganisha watu?

Hilo la kwamba Mungu ni tamthiliya tu ndiyo point yangu.

Sasa huoni kwamba kwa sababu Mungu ni tamthiliya tu mnaweza kumuomba halafu asijibu?

Dini na Mungu ni dhana zilizotumika na watawala kuwahadaa watu kuwa maisha haya si ya kufuatikia sana, wafuatilie maisha ya baadaye ya uzima.wa milele. Sasa kwa nini mtu ajishughulishe sana na maisha haya ya kupita wakati kuna maisha ya milele huko mbele? So this dumbing argument goes.

Huelewi point yangu kwamba kazi ya kuifanya nyie wenyewe ifanyeni wenyewe, huoni kuwa hayo mambo ya kumuomba Mungu wa tamthiliya kwa kazi mnayoweza kuifanya wenyewe kwa kusema atawaunganisha ndiyo hadithi za Kinjekitile Ngwale kusema risasi zitageuka maji? Hiyo nayo ilikuwa tamthiliya, hiyo nayo iliunganisha watu, lakini je, risasi ziligeuka maji? Wakina Kinjekitile walishinda vita?

Pambaneni na hali zenu, habari za kumtegea Mungu kazi zenu ni maneno ya mfamaji anayetapatapa.

Actually hao watawala wakisikia mnamuomba Mungu wanafurahi sana kwa sababu wanajua Mungu hayupo.

Angekuwapo, wao na matatizo yao yote wasingeweza kuwa watawala.
 
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