PostGE2025 Wakili Revocatus Kuuli: Hakuna nchi yoyote Mwanachama wa ICC inaweza kukwepa kuchunguzwa

PostGE2025 Wakili Revocatus Kuuli: Hakuna nchi yoyote Mwanachama wa ICC inaweza kukwepa kuchunguzwa

Conversations and stories after Tanzania's 2025 General Elections
Naona wana harakati uchwara waki aminishana kuwa wanaweza mshitaki Raisi huko ICC na akahukumiwa ..

labda niwaambie hao ICC huo uwezo hawana wala hata kumgusa hawawezi .

ili ICC iweze kufanya kazi labda huyo raisi awe na uhasama na marekani au kuna rasilimali zipo wanazitaka

Najua maraisi wengi sana ambao washa washikisha adabu raia viherehere na hawaja guswa hadi leo ..

hao mnao ona wana hukumiwa fuatilienitqgu di kuna mahali walipishana na wamarekani

Punguzeni muhemke tufanye kazi tusonge mbele.
 
Sasa mbona maelezo kidogo tu
Shirika la Intelwatch la Afrika Kusini limewasilisha mashtaka mahakama ya ICC


, kuitaka mahakama hiyo kuchunguza madai mazito ya mauaji, utekaji na utesaji wakati wa maandamano ya tarehe 29 Oktoba 2025.

Pia imeitaka Mahakama hiyo kutoa hati za kukamatwa kwa Rais.

Shirika la Intelwatch la Afrika Kusini limewasilisha mashtaka mahakama ya ICC​

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Mamlaka ya ICC​

Madai mazito katika faili nene la Samia Hassan lililofikishwa katika dawati la ICC the Hague Uholanzi, linasema ICC ina mamlaka katika kesi hii kwa sababu Tanzania ni mwanachama. ICC inaweza tu kushtaki kesi ambapo mahakama za kitaifa zimethibitisha kutokuwa tayari au haziwezi kufanya hivyo.

Jalada hilo linasema mahakama za Tanzania zimethibitisha kuwa haziko tayari au haziwezi kushtaki makosa haya yanayodaiwa kwa sababu zimeanzisha "uchunguzi sifuri" wa uhalifu wowote mkubwa ulioandikwa kwenye jalada na zimewazawadia uhuru badala ya kuwaadhibu wahusika rasmi wa uhalifu huu.

Na mashtaka yanaongeza kuwa Mkataba wa Roma wa ICC unamruhusu Samia Hassan na maafisa wake wakuu - ikiwa ni pamoja na jeshi, polisi na wakuu wa kijasusi - kushtakiwa kwa uhalifu huu dhidi ya ubinadamu chini ya kanuni ya ICC ya "wajibu wa amri" ya maafisa wakuu kwa hatua za vikosi vilivyo chini ya udhibiti wao wa moja kwa moja.

Inasema mauaji katika kipindi cha baada ya uchaguzi wa Oktoba 30 hadi 6 Novemba 2025 "yalitekelezwa kwa mujibu wa amri kutoka ngazi za juu za serikali, ikiwa ni pamoja na idhini ya Rais Samia Hassan ya 'kuchukua hatua zote na kuhusisha vyombo vyote vya usalama'". Ripoti hiyo inaongeza kuwa kiwango kikubwa cha mauaji hayo pia kilijumuisha uhalifu wa kuangamiza ICC.

"Huu haukuwa udhibiti wa msongamano ambao ulisababisha vifo kwa bahati mbaya; ilikuwa mauaji ya kukusudia." Ushahidi wa picha unaonyesha kuwa vikosi vya usalama vilifyatua risasi bila tahadhari, zikilenga vifua na vichwa na kuendelea kufyatua risasi hata waandamanaji walipokimbia

Mauaji yaliyolengwa​

Ripoti hiyo pia inamtuhumu Samia Hassan na serikali yake kwa mauaji kadhaa ya viongozi wa upinzani kabla ya uchaguzi, akiwemo mwanamkakati mwandamizi wa Chadema, Ally Kibao, aliyetekwa nyara kwenye basi jijini Dar es Salaam tarehe 6 Septemba 2024 alipokuwa anaelekea kwao Tanga . Mwili wake uligunduliwa siku iliyofuata msituni karibu na Bahari ya Hindi, uso wake ukichomwa na tindikali.

Na ripoti hiyo inamtuhumu Samia Hassan na maafisa wake wakuu kwa uhalifu wa ICC wa "kutoweka kwa nguvu", ikibainisha kuwa wataalam huru wa Umoja wa Mataifa wameandika zaidi ya kesi 200 za kutoweka kwa nguvu kati ya 2019 na Juni 2025.

Tori-Tanzania-kiongozi-wa-upinzani-akamatwa
Vikosi vya usalama vya Tanzania wakipiga doria baada ya kuzuia mkutano wa upinzani uliopigwa marufuku kufanyika Dar es Salaam tarehe 23 Septemba 2024. (Picha: EPA-EFE / Anthony Siame)

Hawa ni pamoja na: Humphrey Herson Polepole, balozi wa zamani wa Tanzania nchini Cuba na baadaye mkosoaji mkubwa wa serikali, alitekwa nyara nyumbani kwake tarehe 6 Oktoba 2025, wiki tatu tu kabla ya uchaguzi, na hajaonekana tangu wakati huo; angalau wanachama 50 wa vuguvugu la Shehe wa Uamsho walitekwa nyara mwaka 2013 na kushikiliwa kwa kulazimishwa kutoweka kwa miaka minane kabla ya mashtaka kuondolewa Juni 2021.

Soma zaidi: Ikiwa Watanzania 10,000 kweli wamekufa, kutojali kimataifa si chaguo

Ripoti hiyo inaongeza kuwa watu wengi walikamatwa na vikosi vya usalama na kisha kutoweka katika kipindi cha uchaguzi wa 2025.

Na inasema "mateso yanatumiwa kwa utaratibu na vikosi vya usalama vya Tanzania" dhidi ya wapinzani wa kisiasa.

Inataja kesi za Boniface Mwangi , mwanaharakati mashuhuri wa haki za binadamu nchini Kenya, na Agather Atuhaire, wakili na mwandishi wa habari kutoka Uganda, waliosafiri hadi Tanzania tarehe 19 Mei 2025 kuangalia kesi ya uhaini inayomkabili kiongozi wa CHADEMA , Tundu Lissu. Walikamatwa pamoja siku hiyo hiyo.

Wote wawili walivuliwa nguo na kupigwa kikatili. Atuhaire pia alishambuliwa kingono. Ripoti hiyo inabainisha: “Ukatili wa kijinsia umetumiwa kwa utaratibu wa kawaida wa vyombo vya usalama kama silaha ya ukandamizaji nchini Tanzania.”

Shutuma dhidi ya Samia Hassan na maafisa wake pia ni pamoja na mateso yao kwa jamii za Wamasai kaskazini mwa Tanzania, "kwa misingi ya kikabila na kitamaduni". Inasema serikali "imekiuka kwa utaratibu haki za Wamasai kwa ardhi ya mababu zao, maisha ya kitamaduni, na mila za kitamaduni kupitia kufukuzwa kwa lazima, ghasia, na kunyimwa ushiriki wa kisiasa".

Inaongeza kuwa kufukuzwa kwa Juni 2022 huko Loliondo kulikuwa na "kinyama hasa".

Kuzimwa kwa mtandao​

Katika shtaka la ICC, ripoti hii pia inataja kuzima kwa mtandao - kuanzia tarehe 29 Oktoba 2025 hadi 4 Novemba 2025 - kama uhalifu dhidi ya ubinadamu, hasa kwa sababu inasema kukatika kwa umeme "kuliwezesha kutendeka kwa uhalifu mwingine dhidi ya ubinadamu ikiwa ni pamoja na mauaji, mateso, na kutoweka kwa nguvu".

Pia ilizuia raia kutafuta matibabu kwa wale waliojeruhiwa na vikosi vya usalama. Na ilikiuka kifungu cha 7(1)(k) cha Mkataba wa Roma wa ICC, ambacho kinakataza kwa makusudi “mateso makubwa, au majeraha makubwa kwa… afya ya akili…” kwa sababu kiliwazuia Watanzania wengi kujua iwapo wapendwa wao waliuawa au kujeruhiwa katika maandamano hayo.

Ripoti hiyo inabainisha kuwa kifungu cha 7(1) cha sheria hiyo kinafafanua uhalifu dhidi ya ubinadamu kama mojawapo ya vitendo 11 vilivyoorodheshwa - ikiwa ni pamoja na mauaji, ukatili, utesaji, ubakaji na utekaji nyara - "wakati unafanywa kama sehemu ya shambulio lililoenea au la kimfumo dhidi ya raia yeyote, na ujuzi wa shambulio hilo".

Inasema kuwa uhalifu inaodai ulienea kwani mashambulizi ya vikosi vya usalama yaliathiri baadhi ya mikoa ya Tanzania na maelfu ya wahanga. Hali ya utaratibu wa mashambulizi hayo ilidhihirishwa na kupelekwa kwa vikosi vya usalama kwa wakati mmoja katika maeneo kadhaa, kuunganishwa kwa mtandao kwa uratibu, mauaji ya watu wengi yaliyoratibiwa katika miji kadhaa kwa wakati mmoja, utupaji wa miili na kukamatwa kwa watu wengi na uratibu wa vikosi maalum washirika kadhaa yaliyohusika katika shambulio hilo.

Na ripoti hiyo inasema Mkataba wa Roma pia unahitaji kwamba shambulio liwe "kulingana na au kuendeleza sera ya vyombo vya dola au idara za vikosi maalum " ili kufanya shambulio hilo. "Sera hiyo haihitaji kuandikwa rasmi lakini inaweza kuzingatiwa kutoka kwa jumla ya mazingira."

Inaweza kuzingatiwa kuwa mashambulio hayo yalikuwa uamuzi wa kisera kwa sababu Samia Hassan aliidhinisha shambulio hilo waziwazi na taarifa yake kwa umma mnamo tarehe 1 Novemba 2025, kama alivyoapishwa Dodoma ndani ya kambi ya jeshi , kwamba "tutachukua hatua zote na kuhusisha vyombo vyote vya usalama" ili kukandamiza maandamano

Sera hiyo pia inaweza kuzingatiwa kutokana na upandishaji vyeo wa maafisa wanaohusika na ukatili na ugawaji wa rasilimali nyingi za serikali kwa shambulio hilo, ikijumuisha kupelekwa kwa vitengo vya jeshi na magari ya kivita katika mikoa kadhaa, kuzima kwa mtandao kwa kudumu kunahitaji uratibu na kampuni za mawasiliano, uendeshaji wa vituo vya kizuizini vya siri, shughuli za utupaji wa miili.

Ripoti hiyo pia inawafungulia mashtaka mkurugenzi wa Usalama wa taifa TISS, kamanda wa polisi wa Dar es Salaam, mkuu wa jeshi la ulinzi CDF JWTZ na inspekta jenerali wa polisi IGP kwa kuhusika na mashambulizi dhidi ya waandamanaji.

Pia inamtaja mkuu wa Tume ya Uchaguzi INEC kwa "kuwezesha udanganyifu wa uchaguzi". Inamtaja jaji kwa "kuwezesha mashtaka ya kisiasa", ikiwa ni pamoja na kuwa mhusika katika mashtaka ya uhaini ya Lissu.

Inamfungulia mashtaka waziri wa habari kwa kuzima mtandao pamoja na makamanda kadhaa wa kikosi cha usalama cha kanda maalum.

Hati hiyo, iliyoonwa na Daily Maverick DM, inamtaja Samia Hassan tu kwa jina. Kwa sababu za kisheria, majina ya maafisa wake yanarekebishwa, ingawa yanaweza kuhesabiwa kutoka kwa ofisi zao.

Waandishi wa hati hiyo wanaomba ICC kufungua uchunguzi wa awali na kufuatilia uchunguzi na mashtaka kwa haraka, kwani kucheleweshwa kutaruhusu uhalifu kuendelea, ushahidi kuharibiwa na mashahidi kunyamazishwa.

DM
 
Hotuba ya Samia leo 02 December 2025 mbele ya wazee, umma wa waTanzania na jumuiya ya kimataifa, inaharakisha safari yake ya kwenda ICC the Hague Uholanzi
 
SAMIA NA GENGE LAKE KESI YAO ICC THE HAGUE KUHARAKISHWA ILI HAKI ISIPOTEE ?

CASE YA MTUHUMIWA ABDALLAH BANDA YAFUTWA
Kutokana na kesi ya Abdalla Banda kuondolewa kutokana na mashtaka yake kucheleweshwa kwa miaka mingi kufikishwa korti ya ICC The Hague, sasa itaharakisha kesi zingine za watuhumiwa kufikishwa mahakamani mapema ili haki ipatikane

HISTORIA YA KESI YA BANDA KUSITISHWA KUSIKILIZWA:

21 Julai 2026
The Hague

Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka ya ICC yaomba kuondoa mashtaka dhidi ya Abdallah Banda katika Hali ya Darfur​

Banda Case: Status Conference, 21 July 2026​


IntlCriminalCourt​


View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=10GDrDrZtHA
Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka wa Mahakama ya Kimataifa ya Jinai ICC imeomba idhini ya Chamber (chumba) cha Kesi namba Nne ya kuondoa mashtaka ya uhalifu wa kivita dhidi ya kamanda wa zamani wa waasi wa Sudan Bw. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain kuhusiana na uhalifu wa awali katika Hali ya Darfur .

Katika majalada na mawasilisho yaliyowasilishwa mahakamani wiki hii, Mwendesha Mashtaka aliwafahamisha majaji kwamba kutokana na kupotea kwa ushahidi kutokana na muda, na upetevu wa njia za uchunguzi zilizopo, hakuna tena sababu za msingi za kuamini kwamba Bw. Banda anahusika na uhalifu unaoshtakiwa.

Awali upande wa mashtaka uliomba kuondoa mashtaka dhidi ya Bw. Banda mnamo tarehe 5 Oktoba 2023. Ombi hilo na hati zinazohusiana ziliwasilishwa kwa siri kwa mujibu wa amri za Baraza. Kwa sababu hiyo, ombi la Ofisi halikuweza kuwekwa hadharani hapo awali.

Ofisi ilichukua uamuzi huu kulingana na tathmini yake ya ushahidi, na kuongozwa na maslahi ya haki na usawa, na wajibu wake wa kuchunguza hali zinazowatia hatiani na kuwaondolea hatia kwa usawa.

Kamanda wa zamani wa Harakati ya Haki na Usawa (Justice and Equality Movement -JEM) , Bw. Banda alishtakiwa kwa makosa matatu ya uhalifu wa kivita kwa jukumu lake katika shambulio la Septemba 29, 2007 dhidi ya walinda amani wa Umoja wa Afrika walioko katika Eneo la Kikosi cha Kijeshi cha Haskanita huko Darfur ambalo liliua wanajeshi 12 na kuwajeruhi vibaya wengine wanane. Chumba cha Kabla ya Kesi kilithibitisha mashtaka hayo mnamo Machi 7, 2011, na baadaye Chumba cha Kesi kilitoa hati ya kukamatwa kwa Bw. Banda mnamo Septemba 11, 2014 baada ya kutoroka kutoka kwa haki.

Hata hivyo, katika zaidi ya muongo mmoja ambao umepita tangu wakati huo, maendeleo yalisababisha Ofisi kuhitimisha kwamba ushahidi huo hautoi tena msingi mkubwa wa kuamini kwamba Bw. Banda anahusika kihalifu kwa makosa yaliyoshtakiwa.

Mashahidi kutopatikana au kutotoa ushirikiano, masuala makubwa ya uaminifu kuhusu baadhi ya mashahidi wengine muhimu, na ushahidi wa utetezi uliopatikana hivi karibuni umedhoofisha kesi dhidi ya Bw. Banda. Kwa kuzingatia hatua ya juu ya uchunguzi na muda kupita, kuna uwezekano mkubwa kwamba uchunguzi zaidi utatoa ushahidi ambao ungebadilisha tathmini ya Mashtaka.

Ikiwa itaidhinishwa na majaji, kuondolewa kwa mashtaka kutasababisha kusitishwa kwa kesi dhidi ya Bw. Banda.

"Hatuchukui uamuzi huu kirahisi. Tunatambua athari itakayokuwa nayo kwa waathiriwa ambao wamekuwa wakisubiri haki kwa miaka mingi. Tunashukuru kwa ushirikiano wao na uchunguzi wetu, na kwa ujasiri wao wa kujitokeza. Tunatumai wengi wataelewa kwamba ingawa Mashtaka yana wajibu wa kuhakikisha kwamba haki inapatikana, pia tuna wajibu wa kuendelea na kesi kwa msingi wa ushahidi wa kutosha," alisema Naibu Mwendesha Mashtaka Nazhat Shameem Khan.

"Kuondolewa kwa mashtaka kunamhusu Bw. Banda pekee. Ofisi yetu itaendelea na juhudi katika kesi zinazosubiriwa Mahakamani kuhusu ukatili wa zamani pamoja na uchunguzi wetu unaoendelea kuhusu uhalifu wa sasa huko Darfur. Hali huko Darfur inasalia kuwa kipaumbele muhimu kwa Ofisi yetu," aliongeza Naibu Mwendesha Mashtaka Shameem Khan.

Naibu Mwendesha Mashtaka Shameem Khan anasimamia kesi ya Banda. Mwendesha Mashtaka Karim AA Khan KC, aliyekuwa Wakili wa Utetezi wa Bw. Banda, alijiondoa katika kesi hiyo alipochukua wadhifa tarehe 16 Juni 2021.

Ombi la Upande wa Mashtaka la kujiondoa halina madhara yoyote kwa kuleta mashtaka mapya kulingana na hali sawa au zinazofanana iwapo litapata ushahidi wa kutosha.


Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka wa ICC hufanya uchunguzi wa awali huru na usio na upendeleo, uchunguzi na mashtaka ya uhalifu wa mauaji ya kimbari, uhalifu dhidi ya ubinadamu, uhalifu wa kivita na uhalifu wa uchokozi. Kwa maelezo zaidi kuhusu "uchunguzi wa awali" na "hali na kesi" mbele ya Mahakama, bofya hapa , na hapa .

Taarifa zaidi:

Kesi ya Banda

Hali huko Darfur

Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka

Chanzo: Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka | Mawasiliano


TOKA MAKTABA :
Darfur, Sudan
Abakaer Nourain, a.k.a Abdallah Banda, Commander-in-Chief of the Justice and Equality Movement JEM
1784765671376.jpeg

Abdallah Banda (kulia) akiwa ktk mavazi ya kijeshi. Picha maktaba toka mitandao ya kijamii
 
SAMIA NA GENGE LAKE

Kutokana na kesi ya Abdalla Banda kuondolewa kutokana na mashtaka yake kucheleweshwa kwa miaka mingi kufikishwa korti ya ICC The Hague, sasa itaharakisha kesi zingine za watuhumiwa kufikishwa mahakamani mapema ili haki ipatikane

HISTORIA YA KESI YA BANDA KUSITISHWA KUSIKILIZWA:

21 Julai 2026
The Hague

Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka ya ICC yaomba kuondoa mashtaka dhidi ya Abdallah Banda katika Hali ya Darfur​

Banda Case: Status Conference, 21 July 2026​


IntlCriminalCourt​


View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=10GDrDrZtHA
Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka wa Mahakama ya Kimataifa ya Jinai imeomba idhini ya Chumba cha Kesi cha Nne ya kuondoa mashtaka ya uhalifu wa kivita dhidi ya kamanda wa zamani wa waasi wa Sudan Bw. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain kuhusiana na uhalifu wa awali katika Hali ya Darfur .

Katika majalada na mawasilisho yaliyowasilishwa mahakamani wiki hii, Mwendesha Mashtaka aliwafahamisha majaji kwamba kutokana na kuzorota kwa ushahidi kwa muda, na uchovu wa njia za uchunguzi zilizopo, hakuna tena sababu za msingi za kuamini kwamba Bw. Banda anahusika na uhalifu unaoshtakiwa.

Awali upande wa mashtaka uliomba kuondoa mashtaka dhidi ya Bw. Banda mnamo tarehe 5 Oktoba 2023. Ombi hilo na hati zinazohusiana ziliwasilishwa kwa siri kwa mujibu wa amri za Baraza. Kwa sababu hiyo, ombi la Ofisi halikuweza kuwekwa hadharani hapo awali.

Ofisi ilichukua uamuzi huu kulingana na tathmini yake ya ushahidi, na kuongozwa na maslahi ya haki na usawa, na wajibu wake wa kuchunguza hali zinazowatia hatiani na kuwaondolea hatia kwa usawa.

Kamanda wa zamani wa Harakati ya Haki na Usawa, Bw. Banda alishtakiwa kwa makosa matatu ya uhalifu wa kivita kwa jukumu lake katika shambulio la Septemba 29, 2007 dhidi ya walinda amani wa Umoja wa Afrika walioko katika Eneo la Kikosi cha Kijeshi cha Haskanita huko Darfur ambalo liliua wanajeshi 12 na kuwajeruhi vibaya wengine wanane. Chumba cha Kabla ya Kesi kilithibitisha mashtaka hayo mnamo Machi 7, 2011, na baadaye Chumba cha Kesi kilitoa hati ya kukamatwa kwa Bw. Banda mnamo Septemba 11, 2014 baada ya kutoroka kutoka kwa haki.

Hata hivyo, katika zaidi ya muongo mmoja ambao umepita tangu wakati huo, maendeleo yalisababisha Ofisi kuhitimisha kwamba ushahidi huo hautoi tena msingi mkubwa wa kuamini kwamba Bw. Banda anahusika kihalifu kwa makosa yaliyoshtakiwa.

Mashahidi kutopatikana au kutotoa ushirikiano, masuala makubwa ya uaminifu kuhusu baadhi ya mashahidi wengine muhimu, na ushahidi wa utetezi uliopatikana hivi karibuni umedhoofisha kesi dhidi ya Bw. Banda. Kwa kuzingatia hatua ya juu ya uchunguzi na muda kupita, kuna uwezekano mkubwa kwamba uchunguzi zaidi utatoa ushahidi ambao ungebadilisha tathmini ya Mashtaka.

Ikiwa itaidhinishwa na majaji, kuondolewa kwa mashtaka kutasababisha kusitishwa kwa kesi dhidi ya Bw. Banda.

"Hatuchukui uamuzi huu kirahisi. Tunatambua athari itakayokuwa nayo kwa waathiriwa ambao wamekuwa wakisubiri haki kwa miaka mingi. Tunashukuru kwa ushirikiano wao na uchunguzi wetu, na kwa ujasiri wao wa kujitokeza. Tunatumai wengi wataelewa kwamba ingawa Mashtaka yana wajibu wa kuhakikisha kwamba haki inapatikana, pia tuna wajibu wa kuendelea na kesi kwa msingi wa ushahidi wa kutosha," alisema Naibu Mwendesha Mashtaka Nazhat Shameem Khan.

"Kuondolewa kwa mashtaka kunamhusu Bw. Banda pekee. Ofisi yetu itaendelea na juhudi katika kesi zinazosubiriwa Mahakamani kuhusu ukatili wa zamani pamoja na uchunguzi wetu unaoendelea kuhusu uhalifu wa sasa huko Darfur. Hali huko Darfur inasalia kuwa kipaumbele muhimu kwa Ofisi yetu," aliongeza Naibu Mwendesha Mashtaka Shameem Khan.

Naibu Mwendesha Mashtaka Shameem Khan anasimamia kesi ya Banda. Mwendesha Mashtaka Karim AA Khan KC, aliyekuwa Wakili wa Utetezi wa Bw. Banda, alijiondoa katika kesi hiyo alipochukua wadhifa tarehe 16 Juni 2021.

Ombi la Upande wa Mashtaka la kujiondoa halina madhara yoyote kwa kuleta mashtaka mapya kulingana na hali sawa au zinazofanana iwapo litapata ushahidi wa kutosha.


Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka wa ICC hufanya uchunguzi wa awali huru na usio na upendeleo, uchunguzi na mashtaka ya uhalifu wa mauaji ya kimbari, uhalifu dhidi ya ubinadamu, uhalifu wa kivita na uhalifu wa uchokozi. Kwa maelezo zaidi kuhusu "uchunguzi wa awali" na "hali na kesi" mbele ya Mahakama, bofya hapa , na hapa .

Taarifa zaidi:

Kesi ya Banda

Hali huko Darfur

Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka

Chanzo: Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka | Mawasiliano


ENGLISH

21 July 2026
The Hague

ICC Office of the Prosecutor requests to withdraw charges against Abdallah Banda in Darfur Situation​

1784764966101.jpeg


The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court has requested Trial Chamber IV’s authorisation to withdraw the charges of war crimes against former Sudanese rebel commander Mr Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain in relation to previous crimes in the Situation in Darfur.

In court filings and submissions made public this week, the Prosecution informed the judges that due to the significant deterioration of evidence over time, and the exhaustion of available investigative avenues, there are no longer substantial grounds to believe that Mr Banda is responsible for the charged crimes.

The Prosecution originally requested to withdraw the charges against Mr Banda on 5 October 2023. The request and related documents were filed confidentially in compliance with orders of the Chamber. For that reason, the Office’s request could not previously be made public.

The Office took this decision based on its objective assessment of the evidence, and guided by the interests of fairness and justice, and its duty to investigate incriminating and exonerating circumstances equally.

Former commander of the Justice and Equality Movement, Mr Banda was charged with three counts of war crimes for his role in the 29 September 2007 attack against African Union peacekeepers stationed at the Haskanita Military Group Site in Darfur that killed 12 soldiers and severely wounded eight others. The Pre-Trial Chamber confirmed the charges on 7 March 2011, and subsequently the Trial Chamber issued a warrant of arrest for Mr Banda on 11 September 2014 after he absconded from justice.

However, in the more than a decade that has since elapsed, developments led the Office to conclude that the evidence no longer establishes substantial grounds to believe that Mr Banda is criminally responsible for the charged crimes.

Witnesses becoming unavailable or uncooperative, serious credibility issues regarding some other key witnesses, and recently obtained exculpatory evidence have undermined the case against Mr Banda. Given the advanced stage of the investigations and the lapse of time, it is highly unlikely that further inquiries will yield evidence that would change the Prosecution’s assessment.

If approved by the judges, the withdrawal of the charges will result in the termination of the case against Mr Banda.

“We do not take this decision lightly. We acknowledge the impact it will have on the victims who have been waiting for years for justice. We are grateful for their cooperation with our investigation, and for their courage to come forward. We hope many will understand that while the Prosecution has a duty to ensure that justice is achieved, we also have an obligation to proceed to trial only on the basis of sufficient evidence,” said Deputy Prosecutor Nazhat Shameem Khan.

“The withdrawal of charges concerns only Mr Banda. Our Office will continue efforts in cases pending before the Court over past atrocities as well as our ongoing investigation into current crimes in Darfur. The Situation in Darfur remains a key priority for our Office,” added Deputy Prosecutor Shameem Khan.

Deputy Prosecutor Shameem Khan oversees the Banda case. Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC, former Defence Counsel for Mr Banda, recused himself from the case upon assuming office on 16 June 2021.

The Prosecution’s withdrawal request is without prejudice to it bringing new charges based on the same or similar factual circumstances should it obtain sufficient evidence.


The Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC conducts independent and impartial preliminary examinations, investigations and prosecutions of the crime of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and the crime of aggression. For further details on "preliminary examinations" and "situations and cases" before the Court, click here, and here.

More information:

Banda case

Situation in Darfur

Office of the Prosecutor

Source: Office of the Prosecutor | Contact: [email protected]
 
SAMIA NA GENGE LAKE KESI YAO ICC THE HAGUE KUHARAKISHWA ILI HAKI ISIPOTEE ?

CASE YA MTUHUMIWA ABDALLAH BANDA YAFUTWA
Kutokana na kesi ya Abdalla Banda kuondolewa kutokana na mashtaka yake kucheleweshwa kwa miaka mingi kufikishwa korti ya ICC The Hague, sasa itaharakisha kesi zingine za watuhumiwa kufikishwa mahakamani mapema ili haki ipatikane

HISTORIA YA KESI YA BANDA KUSITISHWA KUSIKILIZWA:
Dk Paula Cristina Roque
View attachment 3630062
Dk Paula Cristina Roque ni mkurugenzi mtendaji wa Intelwatch, shirika linalofuatilia matumizi ya kisiasa na yasiyo ya kidemokrasia ya huduma za ujasusi na ulinzi katika nchi za Kusini mwa Dunia (Global South).

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Mwangwi wa hivi karibuni wa kufunika ukatili wa baada ya uchaguzi ni kampeni ya serikali ya kukanusha ghasia zilizosababisha vifo za mwaka 2025, ikirudisha lawama kwa wale waliokuwa waathirika.

Dola ya kimabavu inayotawala Tanzania kwa sasa inatengeneza kwa makusudi simulizi mbadala kuhusu mauaji ya baada ya uchaguzi ya mwaka jana. Serikali ya Samia Suluhu Hassan inatekeleza mkakati mpana wa kukanusha kwa kiwango cha dola, ikitumaini kukwepa haki ya kimataifa na kutengwa kidiplomasia. Kwa mara nyingine tena, tunashuhudia sio tu "ubinadamu wa kawaida wa uovu" (banality of evil), kama ulivyorejelewa na Hannah Arendt, bali usaliti wa maumivu ya manusura, familia za waathirika, waliopotea, waliofungwa, na walioteswa.

Katika miezi michache iliyopita, nimesoma shuhuda nyingi, nimeangalia ukatili wa video zilizothibitishwa, na nimesoma orodha za waathirika waliothibitishwa, kama sehemu ya uwasilishaji wetu wa pili wa ushahidi kwenye Mahakama ya Kimataifa ya Jinai (ICC).

Kilichotokea kati ya Oktoba 29 na 6 Novemba, 2025 na baada ya hapo, kilikuwa operesheni ya usalama iliyopangwa mapema na kwa utaratibu ili kuzima maandamano, kuadhibu wenye maoni mbadala, na kuwaponda watetezi wa demokrasia. Kile ambacho ulimwengu ulishuhudia kilikuwa uhalifu dhidi ya ubinadamu.

Sasa Hassan anataka tuamini kinyume chake, akilinda umwagaji damu kwa kisingizio cha mamlaka ya dola. Katika simulizi ya uwongo ya serikali, watekelezaji wa ukatili wanakuwa waathirika, upinzani unakuwa watekelezaji wa ukatili, na serikali iliyozongwa ilifanya kila iwezalo kudumisha amani na utulivu. Huu ni uwongo.

Uchaguzi wa Tanzania wa Oktoba 29, 2025 ulikuwa kiini-macho tu, na si chaguo huru. Huku vyama vikuu vya upinzani vikiwa vimezuiwa kushiriki na viongozi wakuu wakifungwa kwa mashtaka ya uhaini na mashtaka yanayohusiana nayo, Hassan alitangazwa mshindi kwa kura zisizoaminika za asilimia 98.

Misheni za waangalizi na wataalamu wa sheria walikubaliana: huu haukuwa uchaguzi wa kweli na wa ushindani. Ulikuwa kilele cha kufungwa kwa utaratibu kwa nafasi ya kiraia na kuondolewa kwa makusudi kwa mbadala wowote wa maana wa utawala uliopo.

Kilichotokea siku ya uchaguzi kilikuwa janga la haki za binadamu ambalo mamlaka bado zinajaribu kulifukia. Wakati Watanzania kote nchini walipoingia barabarani kupinga kutengwa, wizi wa kura na serikali inayozidi kuwa ya kimabavu, hawakukabiliwa na mazungumzo, bali walikabiliwa na risasi.

Vikosi vya usalama vilifyatua risasi za moto kwenye makundi ya watu, vikaajiri kipigo kwa raia wasio na silaha, na kufanya ukamataji wa halaiki. Mashirika ya ndani na ya kimataifa yalirekodi mauaji, utesaji, upotezwaji wa lazima, unyanyasaji wa kijinsia, kuwekwa kizuizini kiholela, na kunyimwa matibabu.

Mtandao wa intaneti ulizimwa, miji ilifungwa, na waandishi wa habari na wanaharakati walisumbuliwa na kunyamazishwa, vyote hivi vikionyesha utawala wenye nia ya kuficha kiwango cha ukatili wake wenyewe. Miili ilitupwa kwenye makaburi ya halaiki na kisha kufukuliwa na kuhamishwa mara tu makaburi hayo yalipotambuliwa.

Kufunika huku kuliendelea katika miezi iliyofuata, mwangwi wa hivi karibuni wa jambo hili ukiwa kampeni ya sasa ya ukanushaji wa dola. Viongozi wa upinzani wamezungumzia mamia, au hata hadi watu 2,000 waliouawa. Vikundi vya asasi za kiraia tayari vimeandika zaidi ya mauaji 3,000 yanayohusiana na msako huo.

Ingawa idadi kamili bado inabishaniwa, kwa kiasi fulani kwa sababu ya juhudi za dola kuwatishia mashahidi, kuzuia habari na kuzuia uchunguzi huru, mfumo wa matumizi ya nguvu mbaya yenye uhusiano na dola hauwezi kupingika.

Ukanushaji wa dola mara nyingi huambatana na matukio ya ghasia za halaiki. Upotoshaji wa kihistoria (historical revisionism) kwa muda mrefu umekuwa chombo cha udhibiti wa kimabavu na udhalilishaji wa kisiasa wa waathirika. Ukatili unafutwa, matukio yanasajiliwa chini ya mtazamo wa upande mmoja, historia ya taifa inaandikwa upya kupitia mtazamo wa kisiasa, na kumbukumbu ya wananchi inapingwa. Lakini ukanushaji unafanya kazi dhidi ya amani, upatanisho, na haki.

Ukweli ni sharti la kwanza la kuponya majeraha makubwa na kuvuka maumivu ya pamoja. Kukanusha ukweli ni kuwadhulumu upya wale waliotendewa ukatili.

Miaka ishirini na miwili iliyopita, nilipata fursa ya kusoma chini ya profesa wa sosholojia Stanley Cohen katika Chuo cha Uchumi cha London (LSE), ambaye kazi yake ya upainia ilichambua kwa kina ugumu wa ukanushaji wa ukatili unaofanywa na dola.

Akiwa ameshuhudia unyama wa ubaguzi wa rangi (apartheid) nchini Afrika Kusini katika miaka ya 1950 akiwa mtoto, na akiwa amesoma mikakati ya kitaasisi ya Ujerumani ya Nazi, udikteta wa kijeshi wa Amerika Kusini na kwingineko, Cohen alieleza vizuri hatua za ukanushaji wa dola.

Ukatili unapofichuliwa kwa mara ya kwanza, dola itatumia ukanushaji wa moja kwa moja (literal denial) kama safu yake ya kwanza ya ulinzi. Hata hivyo, ushahidi unapokuwa mwingi kupita kiasi, huhamia kwenye ukanushaji wa tafsiri (interpretative denial) ili kuruhusu uwepo wa mashaka na kubadili maana ya kile kilichotokea.

Katika hatua ya baadaye, dola inategemea ukanushaji wa kimaslahi (implicatory denial) kwa kuhalalisha hitaji la kuchukua hatua ili kulinda maslahi makubwa zaidi kama vile amani na usalama kwa faida ya wengi.

Kauli zote za serikali ya Hassan katika miezi michache iliyopita zinathibitisha hatua hizi za ukanushaji zilizoainishwa na Cohen. Mtindo huo uliendelea kutoka:

* Ukanushaji kamili: ("hakuna matumizi ya nguvu ya kupita kiasi", 31 Oktoba)

* Kuhamishia lawama kwa wageni: (3 Novemba)

* Kukiri vifo bila kutaja idadi: (14 Novemba)

* Kuelezea matumizi ya nguvu kama "yenye uwiano": (2 Desemba)

* Kukataa makadirio ya juu bila kutoa makadirio ya chini: (18 Desemba)

* Ukanushaji wa kimsingi wa sera huku wakikiri matokeo: (Januari 2026)

Kauli ya Hassan ya tarehe 2 Desemba – "Je, matumizi madogo ya nguvu yangeonekanaje?" – ni ukiri kwamba nguvu ilitumiwa kwa kiwango kinachohitaji utetezi.

Mikakati mingine minne pia imetumiwa kukanusha mauaji hayo ya kile tunachoamini kuwa maelfu ya raia: matokeo yaliyopotoshwa ya tume ya uchunguzi yenye upendeleo, kuonekana kwa filamu ya ushuhuda (documentary) inayorudisha "ukweli", matumizi ya vikundi vya ushawishi (lobby groups) ili kushawishi serikali za kigeni, na matumizi ya mastaa wa soka ili kurahisisha kusafisha taswira kupitia michezo (sportswashing). Kichekesho ni kwamba, hatua hizi zinaleta tuhuma zaidi kuliko kusafisha jina lao.

Ushahidi ni mwingi mno. Uchunguzi mbalimbali uliofanywa na mashirika yanayoheshimika na ya kuaminika umethibitisha kuhusika na uwajibikaji wa dola katika ukatili huo uliofanywa.

Miongoni mwa haya ni: uchunguzi wa Kituo cha Ustahimilivu wa Habari (Centre for Information Resilience) uliochapishwa Desemba 4, 2025, ukiwa na vipande 185 vya ushahidi wa kidijitali vyenye picha/video 44 zilizothibitishwa maeneo zilipochukuliwa; uchunguzi wa kiuchunguzi wa CNN wa Novemba 21, 2025 ulitoa ushahidi wa kipekee wa nyaraka za mauaji ya kiholela, makaburi ya halaiki, na kuficha miili kwa utaratibu; uchunguzi wa Amnesty International wa Desemba 19, 2025; uchunguzi wa Reuters waJanuari 9, 2026 ukiandika mauaji ya mkahawa wa Mjimwema; na uchunguzi wa kipekee wa Deutsche Welle Januari 13, 2026, kulingana na shuhuda za macho, mafaili ya polisi yaliyovuja, na ripoti za daktari wa uchunguzi wa silaha (ballistics), ukithibitisha matumizi ya nguvu mbaya dhidi ya raia wasio na silaha huko Mwanza.

Ripoti nyingine ni pamoja na zile za Human Rights Watch na uchunguzi wa Human Rights Monitor, ambazo zilichanganya mahojiano ya moja kwa moja ya mashahidi, shuhuda za maelezo, ushahidi wa nyaraka, na maelezo yaliyothibitishwa kutoka kwa waathirika, wanafamilia, watendaji wa jamii, viongozi vya dini, wataalamu wa afya, na waandishi wa habari.

Sambamba na hayo, Ofisi ya Kamishna Mkuu wa Haki za Binadamu wa Umoja wa Mataifa ilithibitisha mauaji ya kiholela "angalau 700", huku wataalamu wakisema kuwa idadi halisi inaweza kuwa maelfu.

Kutokana na shinikizo linaloongezeka la ndani na nje ya nchi, Hassan alitangaza Tume ya Rais ya Uchunguzi iliyoongozwa na Jaji Mkuu mstaafu Mohamed Othman Chande. Kwenye karatasi, hii ilionekana kama hatua kuelekea uwajibikaji.

Kiutendaji, kazi yake inaleta wasiwasi mkubwa kuhusu jaribio rasmi la kudhibiti simulizi hiyo na kuzuia madhara ya kisiasa. Tume hiyo ilikusanya takriban taarifa 1,000 zilizoapishwa na kukutana na zaidi ya watu 6,000 kote nchini.

Mnamo Aprili 2026, hatimaye iliripoti kile ambacho manusura walikuwa tayari wanakijua: kulikuwa na ukiukwaji mkubwa na matumizi ya nguvu ya kupita kiasi, huku takriban raia 518 wakikadiriwa kuuawa. Ilitaka mageuzi kadhaa na uchunguzi zaidi kwa baadhi ya maafisa.

Hata hivyo, hata ilipokiri ukiukwaji mkubwa wa haki za binadamu, tume hiyo kwa uangalifu iliepuka kuwataja wasanifu halisi wa ukatili huo. Ilielezea sehemu kubwa ya machafuko hayo kama ghasia za kisiasa zilizopangwa na kufadhiliwa, ikirudisha lawama kwa waathirika na wawakilishi wao wa kisiasa.

Tume ilihitimisha kuwa ghasia ghasia hizo zilikuwa "zimepangiwa, zimeratibiwa, zimefadhiliwa, na kutekelezwa na watu waliofunzwa", tafsiri iliyoundwa ili kuondoa uwajibikaji kutoka kwa vyombo vya usalama na kuuhamishia kwa adui wa nje wa kufikirika.

Ripoti hiyo ilishindwa kuwatambua watekelezaji wa ghasia hizo au kuchunguza vyombo vyovyote vya serikali vilivyopewa jukumu la ulinzi na hatua za polisi. Badala yake, ililaumu mitandao ya kijamii na lugha ya uchochezi kama vichocheo vikuu na kuhitimisha kuwa ghasia hizo zilipangwa, kuratibiwa, kufadhiliwa na kutekelezwa na watu waliofunzwa ambao walisajili makundi yaliyo hatarini kushiriki katika mashambulizi ili kuzidi nguvu vikosi vya usalama.

Ilikataa madai maalum ya makaburi ya halaiki, ilipunguza umuhimu wa mifumo mipana ya mauaji, na iliepuka kuonyesha msururu wazi wa amri ambao ungehusisha ukatili wa uwandani na wale walioamuru, waliowezesha, au waliovumilia ukatili huo katika ngazi za juu kabisa za dola.

Kurasimisha toleo hili la matukio ilikuwa muhimu ili uongo huo ukubalike. Hapo ndipo ilipoingia filamu ya ushuhuda (documentary) ya "Nini Kilitokea Oktoba29?" iliyoandaliwa na mwanablogu wa Nigeria, David Hundeyin, ambaye aliielezea kama uchunguzi huru kuhusu kile ambacho vyombo vya habari vya kimataifa vilikosea kuhusu matukio ya baada ya uchaguzi.

Hoja kuu ya filamu hiyo ilikuwa kwamba ripoti za ghasia hizo zilitungwa na adui wa nje "mwenye nguvu zaidi kuliko serikali yoyote ya Afrika". Hundeyin alijitokeza haraka kama mtetezi wa utawala huo wakati mauaji hayo yakiendelea. Siku moja baada ya mauaji hayo kuanza, kupitia akaunti yake ya X iliyothibitishwa, alielezea ghasia hizo kama "operesheni nyingine ya kisaikolojia ya Magharibi ya kubadilisha utawala" ikimlenga Hassan kwa sababu tu serikali yake ilikuwa "inaunga mkono China na Urusi".

Jaribio la hivi karibuni la kurejesha sifa ya kimataifa ya Tanzania lilihusisha kuwavutia mastaa wawili wa soka – Rio Ferdinand na Didier Drogba – ambao walikutana na Hassan. Baadaye mmoja wao alialikwa kuwa balozi wa Kombe la Mataifa ya Afrika (AFCON) la mwaka 2027. Usafishaji huu wa taswira kupitia michezo (sportswashing), kama ilivyo kwa ile filamu, una sifa zote za propaganda ya dola.

Kwa manusura na watetezi wa haki za binadamu, hii si haki; ni kudhibiti tu uharibifu unaoweza kutokea (damage control). Sasa tuna rekodi rasmi, ingawa inapunguza idadi halisi, kwamba uhalifu mkubwa ulitokea, lakini karibu hakuna matokeo yoyote ya maana kwa waliohusika na hakuna njia ya kuaminika ya kufikia ukweli kamili, uwajibikaji na fidia.

Badala ya kufungua mlango wa hesabu ya kweli, utawala unaonekana kuwa na nia ya kudhibiti habari, kupunguza uwajibikaji kwa maafisa wachache wa ngazi za chini, na kufunga ukurasa wa mauaji ambayo ungependa ulimwengu uyasahaulike.

Hadi pale patakapokuwa na mchakato huru na wa wazi unaokabili ukubwa kamili wa mauaji hayo na uwajibikaji wa wale waliowaamuru, ujumbe kwa waathirika na familia zao uko wazi kabisa na ni wa kikatili: maisha yao yanaweza kuchukuliwa, haki zao kukanyagwa, na mateso yao kuandikwa upya, yote hayo yakifanywa kwa ajili ya kutumikia utawala ambao ungependelea kuficha mauaji ya kimbari badala ya kukabili uhalifu wake wenyewe.

In English / Kimataifa walivyomsoma Samia Hassan michezo yake michafu

14 July 2026

Et tu, Samia? Tanzania’s autocratic state and the denial of a massacre​

The latest reverberation of the cover-up of post-election brutality is a campaign of state denial of the deadly violence of 2025, shifting blame back onto those who were brutalised.
Paula Cristina Roque
By Paula Cristina Roque
13 Jul 2026

Dr Paula Cristina Roque is the executive director of Intelwatch, an organisation that monitors the political and undemocratic use of surveillance and intelligence services in the Global South.

The autocratic state that now reigns over Tanzania is actively constructing alternative narratives over last year’s post-election massacre. The government of Samia Suluhu Hassan is implementing a far-reaching strategy of state denial, hoping to evade international justice and diplomatic isolation. Twice we are witnessing not only the banality of evil, as referenced by Hannah Arendt, but the betrayal of the pain of survivors, of victims’ families, of the disappeared, the jailed and the tortured.

Over the past few months I have read through numerous accounts, looked at the brutality of verified footage, and studied the lists of confirmed victims, as part of our second submission of evidence to the International Criminal Court. What happened between 29 October and 6 November, and thereafter, was a premeditated and well-planned security operation to neutralise protests, punish dissent and bludgeon democracy advocates. What the world witnessed were crimes against humanity. Hassan now wants us to believe the opposite, shielding carnage with sovereign legitimacy. In the government’s false narrative the perpetrators become victims, the opposition become perpetrators, and a besieged government did its best to maintain peace and stability. This is a lie.

Tanzania’s 29 October 2025 elections were a façade, not a free choice. With major opposition parties effectively banned from competing and key leaders imprisoned on treason and related charges, Hassan was declared the winner with an unbelievable 98% of the vote. Observer missions and legal experts agreed: this was not a genuine, competitive election. It was the culmination of a systematic closure of civic space and the deliberate removal of any meaningful alternative to the ruling regime. What happened on election day was a human rights catastrophe that the authorities are still trying to bury. When Tanzanians across the country took to the streets to protest against exclusion, fraud and an increasingly authoritarian government, they were met not with dialogue, but with bullets. Security forces fired live ammunition into crowds, beat unarmed civilians and carried out mass arrests. Domestic and international organisations documented killings, torture, enforced disappearances, sexual assault, arbitrary detentions and denial of medical care. The internet was shut down, cities were locked down and journalists and activists were harassed and silenced, all pointing to a regime intent on hiding the scale of its own violence. Bodies were disposed of in mass graves and then dug up and moved when the mass graves were identified.

The cover-up would continue in the subsequent months, a latest reverberation of this being the current campaign of state denial. Opposition figures have spoken of hundreds, even up to 2,000 people killed. Civil society groups have already documented more than 3,000 killings linked to the crackdown. While exact figures remain contested, in part because of the state’s efforts to intimidate witnesses, restrict information and obstruct independent investigation, the pattern of systematic, state-linked lethal force is undeniable.


State denial often accompanies events of mass violence. Historical revisionism has long been a tool of authoritarian control and political humiliation of victims. Atrocities are erased, events registered under the perspective of one side, the history of a nation redefined by a political lens and the population’s memory contradicted. But denial works against peace, reconciliation and justice. Truth is a prerequisite to heal deep wounds and move beyond collective pain. Denial of the truth is revictimising those who were brutalised.

Twenty-two years ago, I had the privilege of studying under sociology professor Stanley Cohen at the London School of Economics, whose pioneering work unpacked the intricacies of state denial of atrocities. Having witnessed the barbarity of apartheid South Africa in the 1950s as a child and having studied the institutionalised strategies of Nazi Germany, the military dictatorships of Latin America and others, Cohen aptly explained the stages of state denial. When an atrocity is first exposed, the state will use literal denial as its primary line of defence. However, when evidence becomes overwhelming, it shifts to interpretative denial to allow for an element of ambiguity and the reframing or spinning of what happened. At a later stage the state relies on implicatory denial by justifying the need to act in defence of a superior cause like peace and security to the benefit of the majority.

The totality of Hassan’s government statements over the past few months confirm Cohen’s stages of denial. The pattern progressed from: outright denial (“no excessive force”, 31 October), to deflection of responsibility to foreigners (3 November), an acknowledgment of deaths without numbers (14 November), the characterisation of force as “proportional” (2 December), the rejection of higher estimates without providing lower ones (18 December) and a categorical denial of policy while acknowledging results (January 2026). Hassan’s 2 December statement – “What would less force have looked like?” – is an admission that force was used on a scale that requires justification. Four other strategies have also been used to deny the massacre of what we believe were thousands of civilians: the distorted findings of a partisan commission of inquiry, the emergence of a documentary restoring the “truth”, the deployment of lobby groups to influence governments and the use of football stars to facilitate sportswashing. Ironically, these actions are more incriminating than absolving.


The evidence is overwhelming. Several investigations by respected and credible organisations have proved the state’s involvement and responsibility in the atrocities committed. Among these are: the Centre for Information Resilience’s investigation published on 4 December 2025, comprising of 185 pieces of digital evidence with 44 verified geolocated images/videos, CNN’s forensic investigation of 21 November 2025 provided unprecedented documentary evidence of extrajudicial killings, mass graves and systematic body concealment, Amnesty International’s investigation of 19 December 2025, Reuters’ investigation of 9 January 2026 documenting the Mjimwema café killings, Deutsche Welle’s exclusive investigation on 13 January 2026, based on eyewitness accounts, leaked police files and ballistics reports, corroborating the use of lethal force against unarmed civilians in Mwanza. Other reports included those by Human Rights Watch and from the Human Rights Monitor investigation, which combined direct witness interviews, narrative testimonies, documentary evidence and cross-verified accounts from victims, family members, community actors, religious leaders, healthcare professionals and journalists. In parallel, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights confirmed “at least 700” extrajudicial killings, with experts stating the true figure may be in the thousands.

Under mounting domestic and international pressure, Hassan announced a Presidential Commission of Inquiry chaired by retired chief justice Mohamed Othman Chande. On paper, this looked like a step towards accountability. In practice, its work raises serious concerns about an official attempt to control the narrative and contain the political fallout. The commission collected nearly 1,000 sworn statements and met more than 6,000 people across the country. In April 2026, it finally reported what survivors already knew: there were serious abuses and excessive force, with an estimated 518 civilians killed. It called for some reforms and further investigations into certain officers. Yet, even as it acknowledged grave violations, the commission carefully stopped short of naming the true architects of the violence. It framed much of the unrest as planned, financed political violence, shifting blame back onto the victims and their political representatives. The commission concluded that the violence was “planned, coordinated, financed and executed by trained individuals”, an interpretation designed to shift responsibility away from the security services and onto an imaginary external adversary. The report failed to identify perpetrators of the violence or investigate any government entities charged with security and police action. Instead, it blamed social media and inflammatory rhetoric as primary catalysts and concluded that the violence was planned, coordinated, financed and executed by trained individuals who recruited vulnerable groups to participate in attacks to overwhelm the security forces. It rejected specific claims of mass graves, downplayed wider patterns of killings and avoided drawing a clear chain of command that would link field abuses to those who ordered, enabled or tolerated them at the highest levels of the state.

Solidifying this version of events was crucial for the lie to take hold. Enter here the documentary What Happened on October 29? By Nigerian blogger David Hundeyin who described it as an independent investigation into what the international media got wrong about the post-election events. The film’s main argument was that reporting of the violence was fabricated by a foreign adversary “more powerful than any African government”. Hundeyin rapidly emerged as a regime apologist as the killings were under way. A day after the massacre began, he framed the violence on his verified X account as “yet another western regime change psy-op” targeting Hassan for the sole reason that her government was “pro-China and pro-Russia”.

The latest attempt to rehabilitate Tanzania’s international image involved the courting of two football celebrities – Rio Ferdinand and Didier Drogba – who met Hassan. One was later invited to serve as ambassador for the 2027 Africa Cup of Nations. This sportswashing, like the documentary, carries the hallmarks of state propaganda.

For survivors and human rights defenders, this is not justice; it is damage control. We now have an official record, although it downplays the actual figure, that grave crimes occurred, but almost no meaningful consequences for those responsible and no credible path to full truth, accountability and reparation. Instead of opening the door to genuine reckoning, the regime appears intent on managing information, limiting liability to a few low-ranking officers, and closing the book on a massacre that it would prefer the world forget.

Until there is an independent, transparent process that confronts the full scale of the killings and the responsibility of those who ordered them, the message to victims and their families is brutally clear: their lives can be taken, their rights trampled and their suffering rewritten, all in service of a regime that would rather conceal a massacre than confront its own crimes. DM

NUKUU KADHAA ZA HIVI KARIBUN
I :

13 Julai 2026
Arusha
SAMIA - KALAMU YANGU INA HATARI SIJAWAHI KUSAINI MTU KUNYONGWA !

View: https://m.youtube.com/shorts/G6lqL66vKCI


13 Julai 2026
SAMIA ACHARUKA MBELE YA WANASHERIA AFICHUA MAZITO NA MIPANGO YA WACHOCHEZI DUNIANI
1784797008061.jpeg
 
Hakika utawala wa Samia na wateule wake hawawezi kukikwepa kikombe hiki cha mahakama ya ICC The Hague
 
DUA LA KUKU HALIMPATI MWEWE

Aug 1, 2026
Colonel (rtd) Haruni Ramadhani Kondo : Kuondolewa Kiongozi Mkuu Mahakama ya Kimataifa ICC Sababu Kuu ni nini

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=0-W2HDH421A

Colonel (rtd) Haruni Ramadhani Kondo has advantage of having first hand knowledge of both a journalist and a public relations officer in the Tanzania People's Defense Forces (TPDF) for more than twenty years.

Colonel (rtd) Haruni Ramadhani Kondo lead a group of civilian and military reporters, broadcasters and film-makers during the Tanzania / Uganda war in 1978.

Also, in 1979 Colonel (rtd) Haruni Ramadhani Kondo participated in the final stage of the Zimbabwe liberation struggle.
Source : Dr. Kondo Online TV
 
12 August 2026
Mahakama Kuu
Kivukoni Front
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

KAMATI ZA ULINZI ZA MIKOA, POLISI WA MIKOA, USALAMA WA TAIFA WA MIKOA AMBAPO MAUAJI YALITOKEA OKTOBA -NOV 2025 ZATAJWA LEO KTK KESI YA UHAINI

Episode 41 : Kesi ya uhaini namba 19605 / 2025 INAYOMKABILI TUNDU ANTIPAS LISSU

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=BLutEH5VDWo

Episode 41: Baada ya Tundu Lissu kumaliza kumhoji maswali ya dodoso shahidi wa 16 wa upande wa jamhuri ACP Amin Mahamba upande kwa Jamhuri wakiongozwa na wakili Katuga wakamfanyia Re examination Shahidi na baada ya kumaliza wameomba ahirisho la kesi kwasababu hawakujiandaa na shahidi mwingine kitendo ambachi kimemkasirisha Tundu lissu na ameomba ile amri ya mahakama ya kuwa wanapaswa kuja na mashahidi wawili iendelee, tumechelewa sana na sio kwasababu zangu ni kwasababu zao.
 
12 August 2026
Mahakama Kuu
Kivukoni Front
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

KAMATI ZA ULINZI ZA MIKOA, POLISI WA MIKOA, USALAMA WA TAIFA WA MIKOA AMBAPO MAUAJI YALITOKEA OKTOBA -NOV 2025 ZATAJWA LEO KTK KESI YA UHAINI

Episode 41 : Kesi ya uhaini namba 19605 / 2025 INAYOMKABILI TUNDU ANTIPAS LISSU

View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=BLutEH5VDWo

Episode 41: Baada ya Tundu Lissu kumaliza kumhoji maswali ya dodoso shahidi wa 16 wa upande wa jamhuri ACP Amin Mahamba upande kwa Jamhuri wakiongozwa na wakili Katuga wakamfanyia Re examination Shahidi na baada ya kumaliza wameomba ahirisho la kesi kwasababu hawakujiandaa na shahidi mwingine kitendo ambachi kimemkasirisha Tundu lissu na ameomba ile amri ya mahakama ya kuwa wanapaswa kuja na mashahidi wawili iendelee, tumechelewa sana na sio kwasababu zangu ni kwasababu zao.


N.B
MFANO, KAMATI ZA ULINZI NA USALAMA ZINAKUWA NA WAJUMBE WAPI NA KIONGOZI WA NI NANI

Wajumbe wa kamati ya ulinzi na usalama ni mkuu wa mkoa au wilaya na wajumbe wake ni viongozi wa majeshi yetu yaliyotajwa ktk katiba ya nchi .

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Picha maktaba
 
16 August 2026
Kangagani, Kaskazini Pemba
Pemba

WAZIRI KATAMBI -"HAKUKUA na MAANDAMANO HALALI - WANAPINGA WANAJUA WALIOYAFANYA, HATA SERIKALI HAITAPONA KAMA ILIFANYA AU NON STATE ACTORS AU MTU MMOJA MMOJA "


View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=MmArfkiO9Ck
Waziri wa Mambo ya Ndani ya Nchi nchini Tanzania, Patrobas Katambi msomi wa digrii ya sheria, amesisitiza kuwa hakukuwa na maandamano halali, akieleza kuwa wale wanaopinga au kulalamika wanajua vizuri waliosababisha na kufanya vitendo vya vurugu na uharibifu. Serikali imekuwa ikisisitiza kuwa mikusanyiko au maandamano yoyote lazima yafuate taratibu za kisheria na kupata vibali kutoka kwa mamlaka husika.

Patrobas Katambi wanaopinga wanahofu na jaji kutoka Uganda na Namibia .... vurugu za Kenya 2008 tume yake ilipata hata jaji Imani Aboud mtanzania, alikuwepo pia mwanasheria wa serikali Yohana Massara ambaye sasa ni jaji wa mahakama ya Tanzania ... kule Rwanda pia ....

Waziri Katambi ameyasema hayo Kijiji cha Kangagani, Kaskazini Pemba, wakati akimwakilisha Rais Dkt. Samia Suluhu Hassan katika uwekaji wa jiwe la msingi la skuli ya amali itakayogharimu takribani shilingi bilioni 4. ...

The judicial interest grows in the role that judges and courts should play relative to elections, the president of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has addressed a conference of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Kenya on the issue. Among other questions, Justice Imani Aboud discussed the contribution that courts can make, through their work as arbiters of the law, that would help assure voters, and politicians, that elections are fair, and thus help reduce the likelihood of violence related to polls.

Read speech

The president of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Imani Aboud, says that courts in Africa are asserting themselves, even ‘venturing into the political space’ in an effort to ensure that electoral disputes are settled quickly and fairly.

Speaking at the annual conference of the International Commission of Jurists, Kenya, Justice Aboud added that the public and politicians were gradually trusting the courts ‘as neutral arbiters in the process’ and that this public confidence was crucial in maintaining their role.

She said the conference offered an opportunity for a useful exchange on what Justice Aboud called ‘one of the most sensitive … important issues shaping the socio-economic and political landscape’ of Africa.

Defeat

Elections had prompted bitterly fought political battles across the globe and the drama of the 2020 presidential elections in the USA, where former President Donald Trump had still not conceded defeat to President Joe Biden, was still fresh in the minds of many.

Justice Aboud said that many African elections ended up in court, and ‘some of the hot spots and conflicts on the continent today stem from or are related to how elections were managed.’

Violence related to elections was a ‘widespread phenomenon’ on the African continent, but there were many causes for it. Left unaddressed, electoral violence could destabilise states, result in civil conflict and affect regional stability and security.’

Intolerant

The development of multi-party democracy led to periodic elections. But violence usually followed where there was a ‘strong possibility’ of a change to the existing power situation, with the incumbents unwilling to give up power.

Why was this? ‘Many African states still have an intolerant political culture, with different practices employed to manipulate the electoral outcome. Such practices include the use of security forces to harass opponents, bias on the part of electoral management bodies, restriction of movement of political opponents through … “no-go” areas during campaigns, expenditure of public resources to campaign for some parties, and manipulation of ethnic identities.’

It was inevitable that errors would creep into the complex process of elections and this in turn generated protests and objections by competing parties. Electoral processes should thus provide for mechanisms that aggrieved parties could use to redress real or perceived injustices.

Exclusion

Societies where there was a legacy of ‘unequal political representation and developmental disparities’ were particularly vulnerable to violence associated with elections. Where people saw themselves as victims of long periods of political exclusion and economic marginalisation, they could view elections not just as a way to choose the country’s leaders, but also as a ‘tool to overcome their predicament’. And this in turn explained tensions related to the raising of stakes, all of which could led to electoral violence, unless properly managed.

Justice Aboud said that while violence related to elections occurred at the domestic level it had regional implications for peace and security. ‘If left unaddressed, electoral violence has the potential to destabilise states, result in civil conflicts and affect regional stability and security’.

She also pointed to the ‘increasing prevalence of electoral violence’ that highlighted the need to develop ‘institutional mechanisms’ for resolving electoral conflicts at the national, regional and continental levels.

Jurisprudence

One result was the ‘increasing judicialisation of electoral contests’, something that could be seen in the ‘growing body of electoral jurisprudence developed by constitutional and supreme courts, as well as sub-regional and continental courts across Africa.’

Much of Justice Aboud’s address focused on the growing jurisprudence related to elections that comes from national and regional courts. The increasing body of law on this issue had caused the judiciary to become a major player in the resolution of electoral disputes, she said.

Litigation over elections since 2018 has shown that domestic courts in Africa were ‘increasingly playing an assertive role as an independent and impartial arbiter in democratic politics and in electoral disputes.’

Bias

But there were problems. Electoral disputes weren’t always handled quickly enough, while the decisions of domestic courts were sometimes ‘overtaken by events’. Another problem was the perception of judicial bias, sometimes because of the role of corruption, other times due to a lack of judicial independence.

These misgivings about domestic courts and election tribunals had led politicians and voters to look for other ways to remedy what they thought of as electoral injustice. Sometimes dissatisfied litigants would then approach a regional court.

Justice Aboud then discussed some cases, related to election law, decided at the East African Court of Justice and at the Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Violation

There had also been decisions, relevant to elections, that had come from the African Court, including a finding on independent candidates, for example. The court had decided that to require someone to belong to a political party in order to stand for election was a violation of the right to association. In that case, the court ordered Tanzania to amend its laws to allow independent candidates to contest elections at all levels.

All these examples of decisions related to elections, from national and regional level courts, showed that courts in Africa were ‘asserting themselves and venturing into the political space to ensure that electoral disputes are settled’, fairly and quickly.

The public and politicians were also coming to trust courts as neutral arbiters in the process, and this public confidence was crucial.

Empowered

Against this background, the courts had to be empowered through training, so that judges could identify and resolve human rights violations that may occur before, during and after elections.

‘If the current trend continues and with support from civil society organisations such as the ICJ, member states and the general public, they courts will become a force to reckon with in promoting effective electoral democracy at national, sub-regional and continental level, and play a meaningful role in the socio-economic and political development of our continent source : Crucial role for Africa's courts in preventing electoral violence – AfricanLII
 
23 September 2026
ICC The Hague

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Mahakama ya Kimataifa ya Jinai imemhukumu kiongozi wa zamani wa wanamgambo wa Seleka, Mahamat Said Abdel Kani, kwamba ana hatia ya makosa ya uhalifu dhidi ya ubinadamu yanayohusiana na vurugu katika Jamhuri ya Afrika ya Kati mwaka wa 2013.

Majaji walimkuta Said na hatia kwa makosa manne, ikiwa ni pamoja kuwafunga na kuwapa mateso. Waendesha mashtaka walisema Mahamat Said Abdel Kani alisimamia kituo cha kuwaweka kizuizini watu huko Bangui nchini Jamhuri ya Afrika ya Kati - CAR ambapo washukiwa wa wafuasi wa Rais wa wakati huo Francois Bozize walipigwa na kuteswa. Said alikana mashtaka yote.


ICC The Hague
Mahamat Said Abdel Kani Case: Judgement Hearing, 23 September 2026


View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=lbaaC57ikZc

Mahamat Said Abdel Kani apatikana na hatia ya uhalifu dhidi ya ubinadamu uliofanywa Jamhuri ya Afrika ya Kati​

Picha
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Mahamat Said Abdel Kani katika kikao kilichofanyika tarehe 23 Septemba 2026 kwa ajili ya kutoa uamuzi katika makao makuu ya ICC ©ICC-CPI

Leo, Septemba 23, 2026, Chumba cha Kesi namba VI cha Mahakama ya Kimataifa ya Jinai ("ICC" au "Mahakama") kilimpata Mahamat Said Abdel Kani na hatia ya uhalifu dhidi ya ubinadamu uliofanywa katika nchi ys Jamhuri ya Afrika ya Kati CAR mwaka wa 2013.

Baada ya kuchanganua ushahidi uliowasilishwa mahakamani, majaji walimkuta Bw. Said na hatia bila shaka yoyote kwa makosa dhidi ya ubinadamu ya kifungo au kunyimwa uhuru mwingine mkubwa wa kimwili, kunyanyasa, mateso na vitendo vingine vya kinyama. Uhalifu huu ulifanywa katika Ofisi Kuu ya Kupambanana kuzuia Ujambazi ('OCRB') huko Bangui (Jamhuri ya Afrika ya Kati) kati ya tarehe 12 Aprili na 30 Agosti 2013.

Jopo la Majaji wa Mahakama ya ICC iligundua kwamba, kwa kuzingatia jukumu na kazi zake kama kamanda wa Seleka anayesimamia kikosi maalum cha kupambana na ujambazi OCRB, Bw. Said alitenda kwa nia na maarifa yanayohitajika, na akamhukumu kama mtendaji mwenza wa moja kwa moja wa makosa haya.

Jopo la Mahakama ya ICC halikumkuta Bw. Said na hatia bila shaka yoyote kwa makosa ya kivita ya mateso, ukatili, na hasira dhidi ya utu wa mtu binafsi.

Akitoa hukumu, Jaji Kiongozi alikiri mateso na kiwewe cha waathiriwa wa matukio hayo ambao walitoa ushahidi kuhusu athari ya muda mrefu ya uhalifu huo kwao, familia zao na maisha yao. Watu waliozuiliwa katika kituo cha OCRB walitoa ushahidi kwamba wanaendelea kupata madhara ya kimwili na kisaikolojia kutokana na kuzuiliwa na kunyanyaswa kwao.

Hatua zinazofuata: Upande wa Utetezi na Mashtaka wanaweza kukata rufaa dhidi ya uamuzi huo ndani ya siku 30. Kufuatia uamuzi huo, Chumba kitaamua kuhusu hukumu ya Bw. Said. Katika uamuzi uliotolewa leo, majaji walitangaza ratiba ya kesi ya hukumu. Mchakato wa fidia pia utaanza, kwa waathiriwa wa makosa ambayo Bw. Said alihukumiwa.

Picha
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Chumba cha Kesi cha VI cha Mahakama ya Kimataifa ya Jinai wakati wa kusikilizwa kwa kesi hiyo mnamo tarehe 23 Septemba 2026 ©ICC-CPI


Undani wa kesi : Kesi hii ilianza tarehe 26 Septemba 2022. Mashtaka yalikamilisha uwasilishaji wake wa ushahidi tarehe 15 Novemba 2024. Mnamo tarehe 17 Machi 2025, Utetezi uliita shahidi wake wa kwanza na kukamilisha uwasilishaji wake wa ushahidi tarehe 2 Septemba 2025.

Mashtaka, Mwakilishi wa Kisheria wa Waathiriwa na Utetezi waliwasilisha Mihtasari yao ya Kufunga . Taarifa za [final submission] Kufunga kesi zilifanyika kuanzia tarehe 25-27 Novemba 2025. Katika kipindi cha vikao 130 vya kesi, Chumba kilisikiliza mashahidi 58 walioitwa na Mashtaka na mashahidi 3 walioitwa na Utetezi.

Jumla ya vipengee 3,863 vya ushahidi vilitambuliwa kama vilivyowasilishwa rasmi kuwa ushahidi.

Waathiriwa 32 waliowakilishwa na wakili wao Sarah Pellet, wamepewa haki ya kushiriki katika kesi hiyo. Katika kipindi chote cha kesi, Majaji walihakikisha kwamba haki zilizohakikishwa na Mkataba wa Roma kwa kila mmoja wa wahusika zinaheshimiwa.

Chumba cha Sita cha Kesi kilijumuisha jopo la Jaji Miatta Maria Samba (Jaji Kiongozi), Jaji María del Socorro Flores Liera, Jaji Sergio Gerardo Ugalde Godínez na Jaji Keebong Paek (Jaji Mbadala).

Source : https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/mahama...es-against-humanity-committed-central-african
 
Jopo la Majaji wa Mahakama ya ICC iligundua kwamba, kwa kuzingatia jukumu na kazi zake kama kamanda wa Seleka anayesimamia kikosi maalum cha kupambana na ujambazi OCRB, Bw. Said alitenda kwa nia na maarifa yanayohitajika, na akamhukumu kama mtendaji mwenza wa moja kwa moja wa makosa haya.
23 September 2026
ICC The Hague

BREAKING: ICC Yamhukumu Kiongozi wa Wanamgambo wa Afrika ya Kati Mahamat Said Abdel Kani Kwa Uhalifu wa Kivita


View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=WOe6wKahTFo
 
TOKA MAKTABA

Daniel Nsereko - "Evolution of the Status of the Individual in International Law”


View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=6Mi7wsq9-vo

International Law”Judge Daniel Nsereko (Judge, Special Tribunal for Lebanon)The Hague Summit on International Law & Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary Analysis of the Role of International Law in Promoting Human Rights.(International Court of Justice, The Hague; February 4th-5th, 2015)The Center for Cultural Diplomacy Studies - PublicationsInstitute for Cultural Diplomacywww.ccds-berlin.dewww.culturaldiplomacy.orgThe Institute for Cultural Diplomacy
 
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