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qcha .kusambazq chukiAngalia hii afu unitofautishie kati ya Idd Amin na naniliu
View: https://m.youtube.com/shorts/I37o60xwIYE?si=tIJ8dUV13hfkSZ_h
29 mlisambaza vifo. Kwaiyo ni bora Kusambaza vifo.qcha .kusambazq chuki
Sasa mbona maelezo kidogo tu
Shirika la Intelwatch la Afrika Kusini limewasilisha mashtaka mahakama ya ICC
, kuitaka mahakama hiyo kuchunguza madai mazito ya mauaji, utekaji na utesaji wakati wa maandamano ya tarehe 29 Oktoba 2025.
Pia imeitaka Mahakama hiyo kutoa hati za kukamatwa kwa Rais.
SAMIA NA GENGE LAKE
Kutokana na kesi ya Abdalla Banda kuondolewa kutokana na mashtaka yake kucheleweshwa kwa miaka mingi kufikishwa korti ya ICC The Hague, sasa itaharakisha kesi zingine za watuhumiwa kufikishwa mahakamani mapema ili haki ipatikane
HISTORIA YA KESI YA BANDA KUSITISHWA KUSIKILIZWA:
21 Julai 2026
The Hague
Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka ya ICC yaomba kuondoa mashtaka dhidi ya Abdallah Banda katika Hali ya Darfur
Banda Case: Status Conference, 21 July 2026
IntlCriminalCourt
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=10GDrDrZtHAOfisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka wa Mahakama ya Kimataifa ya Jinai imeomba idhini ya Chumba cha Kesi cha Nne ya kuondoa mashtaka ya uhalifu wa kivita dhidi ya kamanda wa zamani wa waasi wa Sudan Bw. Abdallah Banda Abakaer Nourain kuhusiana na uhalifu wa awali katika Hali ya Darfur .
Katika majalada na mawasilisho yaliyowasilishwa mahakamani wiki hii, Mwendesha Mashtaka aliwafahamisha majaji kwamba kutokana na kuzorota kwa ushahidi kwa muda, na uchovu wa njia za uchunguzi zilizopo, hakuna tena sababu za msingi za kuamini kwamba Bw. Banda anahusika na uhalifu unaoshtakiwa.
Awali upande wa mashtaka uliomba kuondoa mashtaka dhidi ya Bw. Banda mnamo tarehe 5 Oktoba 2023. Ombi hilo na hati zinazohusiana ziliwasilishwa kwa siri kwa mujibu wa amri za Baraza. Kwa sababu hiyo, ombi la Ofisi halikuweza kuwekwa hadharani hapo awali.
Ofisi ilichukua uamuzi huu kulingana na tathmini yake ya ushahidi, na kuongozwa na maslahi ya haki na usawa, na wajibu wake wa kuchunguza hali zinazowatia hatiani na kuwaondolea hatia kwa usawa.
Kamanda wa zamani wa Harakati ya Haki na Usawa, Bw. Banda alishtakiwa kwa makosa matatu ya uhalifu wa kivita kwa jukumu lake katika shambulio la Septemba 29, 2007 dhidi ya walinda amani wa Umoja wa Afrika walioko katika Eneo la Kikosi cha Kijeshi cha Haskanita huko Darfur ambalo liliua wanajeshi 12 na kuwajeruhi vibaya wengine wanane. Chumba cha Kabla ya Kesi kilithibitisha mashtaka hayo mnamo Machi 7, 2011, na baadaye Chumba cha Kesi kilitoa hati ya kukamatwa kwa Bw. Banda mnamo Septemba 11, 2014 baada ya kutoroka kutoka kwa haki.
Hata hivyo, katika zaidi ya muongo mmoja ambao umepita tangu wakati huo, maendeleo yalisababisha Ofisi kuhitimisha kwamba ushahidi huo hautoi tena msingi mkubwa wa kuamini kwamba Bw. Banda anahusika kihalifu kwa makosa yaliyoshtakiwa.
Mashahidi kutopatikana au kutotoa ushirikiano, masuala makubwa ya uaminifu kuhusu baadhi ya mashahidi wengine muhimu, na ushahidi wa utetezi uliopatikana hivi karibuni umedhoofisha kesi dhidi ya Bw. Banda. Kwa kuzingatia hatua ya juu ya uchunguzi na muda kupita, kuna uwezekano mkubwa kwamba uchunguzi zaidi utatoa ushahidi ambao ungebadilisha tathmini ya Mashtaka.
Ikiwa itaidhinishwa na majaji, kuondolewa kwa mashtaka kutasababisha kusitishwa kwa kesi dhidi ya Bw. Banda.
"Hatuchukui uamuzi huu kirahisi. Tunatambua athari itakayokuwa nayo kwa waathiriwa ambao wamekuwa wakisubiri haki kwa miaka mingi. Tunashukuru kwa ushirikiano wao na uchunguzi wetu, na kwa ujasiri wao wa kujitokeza. Tunatumai wengi wataelewa kwamba ingawa Mashtaka yana wajibu wa kuhakikisha kwamba haki inapatikana, pia tuna wajibu wa kuendelea na kesi kwa msingi wa ushahidi wa kutosha," alisema Naibu Mwendesha Mashtaka Nazhat Shameem Khan.
"Kuondolewa kwa mashtaka kunamhusu Bw. Banda pekee. Ofisi yetu itaendelea na juhudi katika kesi zinazosubiriwa Mahakamani kuhusu ukatili wa zamani pamoja na uchunguzi wetu unaoendelea kuhusu uhalifu wa sasa huko Darfur. Hali huko Darfur inasalia kuwa kipaumbele muhimu kwa Ofisi yetu," aliongeza Naibu Mwendesha Mashtaka Shameem Khan.
Naibu Mwendesha Mashtaka Shameem Khan anasimamia kesi ya Banda. Mwendesha Mashtaka Karim AA Khan KC, aliyekuwa Wakili wa Utetezi wa Bw. Banda, alijiondoa katika kesi hiyo alipochukua wadhifa tarehe 16 Juni 2021.
Ombi la Upande wa Mashtaka la kujiondoa halina madhara yoyote kwa kuleta mashtaka mapya kulingana na hali sawa au zinazofanana iwapo litapata ushahidi wa kutosha.
Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka wa ICC hufanya uchunguzi wa awali huru na usio na upendeleo, uchunguzi na mashtaka ya uhalifu wa mauaji ya kimbari, uhalifu dhidi ya ubinadamu, uhalifu wa kivita na uhalifu wa uchokozi. Kwa maelezo zaidi kuhusu "uchunguzi wa awali" na "hali na kesi" mbele ya Mahakama, bofya hapa , na hapa .
Taarifa zaidi:
Kesi ya Banda
Hali huko Darfur
Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka
Chanzo: Ofisi ya Mwendesha Mashtaka | Mawasiliano
SAMIA NA GENGE LAKE KESI YAO ICC THE HAGUE KUHARAKISHWA ILI HAKI ISIPOTEE ?
CASE YA MTUHUMIWA ABDALLAH BANDA YAFUTWA
Kutokana na kesi ya Abdalla Banda kuondolewa kutokana na mashtaka yake kucheleweshwa kwa miaka mingi kufikishwa korti ya ICC The Hague, sasa itaharakisha kesi zingine za watuhumiwa kufikishwa mahakamani mapema ili haki ipatikane
HISTORIA YA KESI YA BANDA KUSITISHWA KUSIKILIZWA:
Dk Paula Cristina Roque
View attachment 3630062
Dk Paula Cristina Roque ni mkurugenzi mtendaji wa Intelwatch, shirika linalofuatilia matumizi ya kisiasa na yasiyo ya kidemokrasia ya huduma za ujasusi na ulinzi katika nchi za Kusini mwa Dunia (Global South).
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Mwangwi wa hivi karibuni wa kufunika ukatili wa baada ya uchaguzi ni kampeni ya serikali ya kukanusha ghasia zilizosababisha vifo za mwaka 2025, ikirudisha lawama kwa wale waliokuwa waathirika.
Dola ya kimabavu inayotawala Tanzania kwa sasa inatengeneza kwa makusudi simulizi mbadala kuhusu mauaji ya baada ya uchaguzi ya mwaka jana. Serikali ya Samia Suluhu Hassan inatekeleza mkakati mpana wa kukanusha kwa kiwango cha dola, ikitumaini kukwepa haki ya kimataifa na kutengwa kidiplomasia. Kwa mara nyingine tena, tunashuhudia sio tu "ubinadamu wa kawaida wa uovu" (banality of evil), kama ulivyorejelewa na Hannah Arendt, bali usaliti wa maumivu ya manusura, familia za waathirika, waliopotea, waliofungwa, na walioteswa.
Katika miezi michache iliyopita, nimesoma shuhuda nyingi, nimeangalia ukatili wa video zilizothibitishwa, na nimesoma orodha za waathirika waliothibitishwa, kama sehemu ya uwasilishaji wetu wa pili wa ushahidi kwenye Mahakama ya Kimataifa ya Jinai (ICC).
Kilichotokea kati ya Oktoba 29 na 6 Novemba, 2025 na baada ya hapo, kilikuwa operesheni ya usalama iliyopangwa mapema na kwa utaratibu ili kuzima maandamano, kuadhibu wenye maoni mbadala, na kuwaponda watetezi wa demokrasia. Kile ambacho ulimwengu ulishuhudia kilikuwa uhalifu dhidi ya ubinadamu.
Sasa Hassan anataka tuamini kinyume chake, akilinda umwagaji damu kwa kisingizio cha mamlaka ya dola. Katika simulizi ya uwongo ya serikali, watekelezaji wa ukatili wanakuwa waathirika, upinzani unakuwa watekelezaji wa ukatili, na serikali iliyozongwa ilifanya kila iwezalo kudumisha amani na utulivu. Huu ni uwongo.
Uchaguzi wa Tanzania wa Oktoba 29, 2025 ulikuwa kiini-macho tu, na si chaguo huru. Huku vyama vikuu vya upinzani vikiwa vimezuiwa kushiriki na viongozi wakuu wakifungwa kwa mashtaka ya uhaini na mashtaka yanayohusiana nayo, Hassan alitangazwa mshindi kwa kura zisizoaminika za asilimia 98.
Misheni za waangalizi na wataalamu wa sheria walikubaliana: huu haukuwa uchaguzi wa kweli na wa ushindani. Ulikuwa kilele cha kufungwa kwa utaratibu kwa nafasi ya kiraia na kuondolewa kwa makusudi kwa mbadala wowote wa maana wa utawala uliopo.
Kilichotokea siku ya uchaguzi kilikuwa janga la haki za binadamu ambalo mamlaka bado zinajaribu kulifukia. Wakati Watanzania kote nchini walipoingia barabarani kupinga kutengwa, wizi wa kura na serikali inayozidi kuwa ya kimabavu, hawakukabiliwa na mazungumzo, bali walikabiliwa na risasi.
Vikosi vya usalama vilifyatua risasi za moto kwenye makundi ya watu, vikaajiri kipigo kwa raia wasio na silaha, na kufanya ukamataji wa halaiki. Mashirika ya ndani na ya kimataifa yalirekodi mauaji, utesaji, upotezwaji wa lazima, unyanyasaji wa kijinsia, kuwekwa kizuizini kiholela, na kunyimwa matibabu.
Mtandao wa intaneti ulizimwa, miji ilifungwa, na waandishi wa habari na wanaharakati walisumbuliwa na kunyamazishwa, vyote hivi vikionyesha utawala wenye nia ya kuficha kiwango cha ukatili wake wenyewe. Miili ilitupwa kwenye makaburi ya halaiki na kisha kufukuliwa na kuhamishwa mara tu makaburi hayo yalipotambuliwa.
Kufunika huku kuliendelea katika miezi iliyofuata, mwangwi wa hivi karibuni wa jambo hili ukiwa kampeni ya sasa ya ukanushaji wa dola. Viongozi wa upinzani wamezungumzia mamia, au hata hadi watu 2,000 waliouawa. Vikundi vya asasi za kiraia tayari vimeandika zaidi ya mauaji 3,000 yanayohusiana na msako huo.
Ingawa idadi kamili bado inabishaniwa, kwa kiasi fulani kwa sababu ya juhudi za dola kuwatishia mashahidi, kuzuia habari na kuzuia uchunguzi huru, mfumo wa matumizi ya nguvu mbaya yenye uhusiano na dola hauwezi kupingika.
Ukanushaji wa dola mara nyingi huambatana na matukio ya ghasia za halaiki. Upotoshaji wa kihistoria (historical revisionism) kwa muda mrefu umekuwa chombo cha udhibiti wa kimabavu na udhalilishaji wa kisiasa wa waathirika. Ukatili unafutwa, matukio yanasajiliwa chini ya mtazamo wa upande mmoja, historia ya taifa inaandikwa upya kupitia mtazamo wa kisiasa, na kumbukumbu ya wananchi inapingwa. Lakini ukanushaji unafanya kazi dhidi ya amani, upatanisho, na haki.
Ukweli ni sharti la kwanza la kuponya majeraha makubwa na kuvuka maumivu ya pamoja. Kukanusha ukweli ni kuwadhulumu upya wale waliotendewa ukatili.
Miaka ishirini na miwili iliyopita, nilipata fursa ya kusoma chini ya profesa wa sosholojia Stanley Cohen katika Chuo cha Uchumi cha London (LSE), ambaye kazi yake ya upainia ilichambua kwa kina ugumu wa ukanushaji wa ukatili unaofanywa na dola.
Akiwa ameshuhudia unyama wa ubaguzi wa rangi (apartheid) nchini Afrika Kusini katika miaka ya 1950 akiwa mtoto, na akiwa amesoma mikakati ya kitaasisi ya Ujerumani ya Nazi, udikteta wa kijeshi wa Amerika Kusini na kwingineko, Cohen alieleza vizuri hatua za ukanushaji wa dola.
Ukatili unapofichuliwa kwa mara ya kwanza, dola itatumia ukanushaji wa moja kwa moja (literal denial) kama safu yake ya kwanza ya ulinzi. Hata hivyo, ushahidi unapokuwa mwingi kupita kiasi, huhamia kwenye ukanushaji wa tafsiri (interpretative denial) ili kuruhusu uwepo wa mashaka na kubadili maana ya kile kilichotokea.
Katika hatua ya baadaye, dola inategemea ukanushaji wa kimaslahi (implicatory denial) kwa kuhalalisha hitaji la kuchukua hatua ili kulinda maslahi makubwa zaidi kama vile amani na usalama kwa faida ya wengi.
Kauli zote za serikali ya Hassan katika miezi michache iliyopita zinathibitisha hatua hizi za ukanushaji zilizoainishwa na Cohen. Mtindo huo uliendelea kutoka:
* Ukanushaji kamili: ("hakuna matumizi ya nguvu ya kupita kiasi", 31 Oktoba)
* Kuhamishia lawama kwa wageni: (3 Novemba)
* Kukiri vifo bila kutaja idadi: (14 Novemba)
* Kuelezea matumizi ya nguvu kama "yenye uwiano": (2 Desemba)
* Kukataa makadirio ya juu bila kutoa makadirio ya chini: (18 Desemba)
* Ukanushaji wa kimsingi wa sera huku wakikiri matokeo: (Januari 2026)
Kauli ya Hassan ya tarehe 2 Desemba – "Je, matumizi madogo ya nguvu yangeonekanaje?" – ni ukiri kwamba nguvu ilitumiwa kwa kiwango kinachohitaji utetezi.
Mikakati mingine minne pia imetumiwa kukanusha mauaji hayo ya kile tunachoamini kuwa maelfu ya raia: matokeo yaliyopotoshwa ya tume ya uchunguzi yenye upendeleo, kuonekana kwa filamu ya ushuhuda (documentary) inayorudisha "ukweli", matumizi ya vikundi vya ushawishi (lobby groups) ili kushawishi serikali za kigeni, na matumizi ya mastaa wa soka ili kurahisisha kusafisha taswira kupitia michezo (sportswashing). Kichekesho ni kwamba, hatua hizi zinaleta tuhuma zaidi kuliko kusafisha jina lao.
Ushahidi ni mwingi mno. Uchunguzi mbalimbali uliofanywa na mashirika yanayoheshimika na ya kuaminika umethibitisha kuhusika na uwajibikaji wa dola katika ukatili huo uliofanywa.
Miongoni mwa haya ni: uchunguzi wa Kituo cha Ustahimilivu wa Habari (Centre for Information Resilience) uliochapishwa Desemba 4, 2025, ukiwa na vipande 185 vya ushahidi wa kidijitali vyenye picha/video 44 zilizothibitishwa maeneo zilipochukuliwa; uchunguzi wa kiuchunguzi wa CNN wa Novemba 21, 2025 ulitoa ushahidi wa kipekee wa nyaraka za mauaji ya kiholela, makaburi ya halaiki, na kuficha miili kwa utaratibu; uchunguzi wa Amnesty International wa Desemba 19, 2025; uchunguzi wa Reuters waJanuari 9, 2026 ukiandika mauaji ya mkahawa wa Mjimwema; na uchunguzi wa kipekee wa Deutsche Welle Januari 13, 2026, kulingana na shuhuda za macho, mafaili ya polisi yaliyovuja, na ripoti za daktari wa uchunguzi wa silaha (ballistics), ukithibitisha matumizi ya nguvu mbaya dhidi ya raia wasio na silaha huko Mwanza.
Ripoti nyingine ni pamoja na zile za Human Rights Watch na uchunguzi wa Human Rights Monitor, ambazo zilichanganya mahojiano ya moja kwa moja ya mashahidi, shuhuda za maelezo, ushahidi wa nyaraka, na maelezo yaliyothibitishwa kutoka kwa waathirika, wanafamilia, watendaji wa jamii, viongozi vya dini, wataalamu wa afya, na waandishi wa habari.
Sambamba na hayo, Ofisi ya Kamishna Mkuu wa Haki za Binadamu wa Umoja wa Mataifa ilithibitisha mauaji ya kiholela "angalau 700", huku wataalamu wakisema kuwa idadi halisi inaweza kuwa maelfu.
Kutokana na shinikizo linaloongezeka la ndani na nje ya nchi, Hassan alitangaza Tume ya Rais ya Uchunguzi iliyoongozwa na Jaji Mkuu mstaafu Mohamed Othman Chande. Kwenye karatasi, hii ilionekana kama hatua kuelekea uwajibikaji.
Kiutendaji, kazi yake inaleta wasiwasi mkubwa kuhusu jaribio rasmi la kudhibiti simulizi hiyo na kuzuia madhara ya kisiasa. Tume hiyo ilikusanya takriban taarifa 1,000 zilizoapishwa na kukutana na zaidi ya watu 6,000 kote nchini.
Mnamo Aprili 2026, hatimaye iliripoti kile ambacho manusura walikuwa tayari wanakijua: kulikuwa na ukiukwaji mkubwa na matumizi ya nguvu ya kupita kiasi, huku takriban raia 518 wakikadiriwa kuuawa. Ilitaka mageuzi kadhaa na uchunguzi zaidi kwa baadhi ya maafisa.
Hata hivyo, hata ilipokiri ukiukwaji mkubwa wa haki za binadamu, tume hiyo kwa uangalifu iliepuka kuwataja wasanifu halisi wa ukatili huo. Ilielezea sehemu kubwa ya machafuko hayo kama ghasia za kisiasa zilizopangwa na kufadhiliwa, ikirudisha lawama kwa waathirika na wawakilishi wao wa kisiasa.
Tume ilihitimisha kuwa ghasia ghasia hizo zilikuwa "zimepangiwa, zimeratibiwa, zimefadhiliwa, na kutekelezwa na watu waliofunzwa", tafsiri iliyoundwa ili kuondoa uwajibikaji kutoka kwa vyombo vya usalama na kuuhamishia kwa adui wa nje wa kufikirika.
Ripoti hiyo ilishindwa kuwatambua watekelezaji wa ghasia hizo au kuchunguza vyombo vyovyote vya serikali vilivyopewa jukumu la ulinzi na hatua za polisi. Badala yake, ililaumu mitandao ya kijamii na lugha ya uchochezi kama vichocheo vikuu na kuhitimisha kuwa ghasia hizo zilipangwa, kuratibiwa, kufadhiliwa na kutekelezwa na watu waliofunzwa ambao walisajili makundi yaliyo hatarini kushiriki katika mashambulizi ili kuzidi nguvu vikosi vya usalama.
Ilikataa madai maalum ya makaburi ya halaiki, ilipunguza umuhimu wa mifumo mipana ya mauaji, na iliepuka kuonyesha msururu wazi wa amri ambao ungehusisha ukatili wa uwandani na wale walioamuru, waliowezesha, au waliovumilia ukatili huo katika ngazi za juu kabisa za dola.
Kurasimisha toleo hili la matukio ilikuwa muhimu ili uongo huo ukubalike. Hapo ndipo ilipoingia filamu ya ushuhuda (documentary) ya "Nini Kilitokea Oktoba29?" iliyoandaliwa na mwanablogu wa Nigeria, David Hundeyin, ambaye aliielezea kama uchunguzi huru kuhusu kile ambacho vyombo vya habari vya kimataifa vilikosea kuhusu matukio ya baada ya uchaguzi.
Hoja kuu ya filamu hiyo ilikuwa kwamba ripoti za ghasia hizo zilitungwa na adui wa nje "mwenye nguvu zaidi kuliko serikali yoyote ya Afrika". Hundeyin alijitokeza haraka kama mtetezi wa utawala huo wakati mauaji hayo yakiendelea. Siku moja baada ya mauaji hayo kuanza, kupitia akaunti yake ya X iliyothibitishwa, alielezea ghasia hizo kama "operesheni nyingine ya kisaikolojia ya Magharibi ya kubadilisha utawala" ikimlenga Hassan kwa sababu tu serikali yake ilikuwa "inaunga mkono China na Urusi".
Jaribio la hivi karibuni la kurejesha sifa ya kimataifa ya Tanzania lilihusisha kuwavutia mastaa wawili wa soka – Rio Ferdinand na Didier Drogba – ambao walikutana na Hassan. Baadaye mmoja wao alialikwa kuwa balozi wa Kombe la Mataifa ya Afrika (AFCON) la mwaka 2027. Usafishaji huu wa taswira kupitia michezo (sportswashing), kama ilivyo kwa ile filamu, una sifa zote za propaganda ya dola.
Kwa manusura na watetezi wa haki za binadamu, hii si haki; ni kudhibiti tu uharibifu unaoweza kutokea (damage control). Sasa tuna rekodi rasmi, ingawa inapunguza idadi halisi, kwamba uhalifu mkubwa ulitokea, lakini karibu hakuna matokeo yoyote ya maana kwa waliohusika na hakuna njia ya kuaminika ya kufikia ukweli kamili, uwajibikaji na fidia.
Badala ya kufungua mlango wa hesabu ya kweli, utawala unaonekana kuwa na nia ya kudhibiti habari, kupunguza uwajibikaji kwa maafisa wachache wa ngazi za chini, na kufunga ukurasa wa mauaji ambayo ungependa ulimwengu uyasahaulike.
Hadi pale patakapokuwa na mchakato huru na wa wazi unaokabili ukubwa kamili wa mauaji hayo na uwajibikaji wa wale waliowaamuru, ujumbe kwa waathirika na familia zao uko wazi kabisa na ni wa kikatili: maisha yao yanaweza kuchukuliwa, haki zao kukanyagwa, na mateso yao kuandikwa upya, yote hayo yakifanywa kwa ajili ya kutumikia utawala ambao ungependelea kuficha mauaji ya kimbari badala ya kukabili uhalifu wake wenyewe.
12 August 2026
Mahakama Kuu
Kivukoni Front
Dar es Salaam, Tanzania
KAMATI ZA ULINZI ZA MIKOA, POLISI WA MIKOA, USALAMA WA TAIFA WA MIKOA AMBAPO MAUAJI YALITOKEA OKTOBA -NOV 2025 ZATAJWA LEO KTK KESI YA UHAINI
Episode 41 : Kesi ya uhaini namba 19605 / 2025 INAYOMKABILI TUNDU ANTIPAS LISSU
View: https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=BLutEH5VDWo
Episode 41: Baada ya Tundu Lissu kumaliza kumhoji maswali ya dodoso shahidi wa 16 wa upande wa jamhuri ACP Amin Mahamba upande kwa Jamhuri wakiongozwa na wakili Katuga wakamfanyia Re examination Shahidi na baada ya kumaliza wameomba ahirisho la kesi kwasababu hawakujiandaa na shahidi mwingine kitendo ambachi kimemkasirisha Tundu lissu na ameomba ile amri ya mahakama ya kuwa wanapaswa kuja na mashahidi wawili iendelee, tumechelewa sana na sio kwasababu zangu ni kwasababu zao.
The judicial interest grows in the role that judges and courts should play relative to elections, the president of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights has addressed a conference of the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ), Kenya on the issue. Among other questions, Justice Imani Aboud discussed the contribution that courts can make, through their work as arbiters of the law, that would help assure voters, and politicians, that elections are fair, and thus help reduce the likelihood of violence related to polls.
Read speech
The president of the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Imani Aboud, says that courts in Africa are asserting themselves, even ‘venturing into the political space’ in an effort to ensure that electoral disputes are settled quickly and fairly.
Speaking at the annual conference of the International Commission of Jurists, Kenya, Justice Aboud added that the public and politicians were gradually trusting the courts ‘as neutral arbiters in the process’ and that this public confidence was crucial in maintaining their role.
She said the conference offered an opportunity for a useful exchange on what Justice Aboud called ‘one of the most sensitive … important issues shaping the socio-economic and political landscape’ of Africa.
Defeat
Elections had prompted bitterly fought political battles across the globe and the drama of the 2020 presidential elections in the USA, where former President Donald Trump had still not conceded defeat to President Joe Biden, was still fresh in the minds of many.
Justice Aboud said that many African elections ended up in court, and ‘some of the hot spots and conflicts on the continent today stem from or are related to how elections were managed.’
Violence related to elections was a ‘widespread phenomenon’ on the African continent, but there were many causes for it. Left unaddressed, electoral violence could destabilise states, result in civil conflict and affect regional stability and security.’
Intolerant
The development of multi-party democracy led to periodic elections. But violence usually followed where there was a ‘strong possibility’ of a change to the existing power situation, with the incumbents unwilling to give up power.
Why was this? ‘Many African states still have an intolerant political culture, with different practices employed to manipulate the electoral outcome. Such practices include the use of security forces to harass opponents, bias on the part of electoral management bodies, restriction of movement of political opponents through … “no-go” areas during campaigns, expenditure of public resources to campaign for some parties, and manipulation of ethnic identities.’
It was inevitable that errors would creep into the complex process of elections and this in turn generated protests and objections by competing parties. Electoral processes should thus provide for mechanisms that aggrieved parties could use to redress real or perceived injustices.
Exclusion
Societies where there was a legacy of ‘unequal political representation and developmental disparities’ were particularly vulnerable to violence associated with elections. Where people saw themselves as victims of long periods of political exclusion and economic marginalisation, they could view elections not just as a way to choose the country’s leaders, but also as a ‘tool to overcome their predicament’. And this in turn explained tensions related to the raising of stakes, all of which could led to electoral violence, unless properly managed.
Justice Aboud said that while violence related to elections occurred at the domestic level it had regional implications for peace and security. ‘If left unaddressed, electoral violence has the potential to destabilise states, result in civil conflicts and affect regional stability and security’.
She also pointed to the ‘increasing prevalence of electoral violence’ that highlighted the need to develop ‘institutional mechanisms’ for resolving electoral conflicts at the national, regional and continental levels.
Jurisprudence
One result was the ‘increasing judicialisation of electoral contests’, something that could be seen in the ‘growing body of electoral jurisprudence developed by constitutional and supreme courts, as well as sub-regional and continental courts across Africa.’
Much of Justice Aboud’s address focused on the growing jurisprudence related to elections that comes from national and regional courts. The increasing body of law on this issue had caused the judiciary to become a major player in the resolution of electoral disputes, she said.
Litigation over elections since 2018 has shown that domestic courts in Africa were ‘increasingly playing an assertive role as an independent and impartial arbiter in democratic politics and in electoral disputes.’
Bias
But there were problems. Electoral disputes weren’t always handled quickly enough, while the decisions of domestic courts were sometimes ‘overtaken by events’. Another problem was the perception of judicial bias, sometimes because of the role of corruption, other times due to a lack of judicial independence.
These misgivings about domestic courts and election tribunals had led politicians and voters to look for other ways to remedy what they thought of as electoral injustice. Sometimes dissatisfied litigants would then approach a regional court.
Justice Aboud then discussed some cases, related to election law, decided at the East African Court of Justice and at the Community Court of Justice of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
Violation
There had also been decisions, relevant to elections, that had come from the African Court, including a finding on independent candidates, for example. The court had decided that to require someone to belong to a political party in order to stand for election was a violation of the right to association. In that case, the court ordered Tanzania to amend its laws to allow independent candidates to contest elections at all levels.
All these examples of decisions related to elections, from national and regional level courts, showed that courts in Africa were ‘asserting themselves and venturing into the political space to ensure that electoral disputes are settled’, fairly and quickly.
The public and politicians were also coming to trust courts as neutral arbiters in the process, and this public confidence was crucial.
Empowered
Against this background, the courts had to be empowered through training, so that judges could identify and resolve human rights violations that may occur before, during and after elections.
‘If the current trend continues and with support from civil society organisations such as the ICJ, member states and the general public, they courts will become a force to reckon with in promoting effective electoral democracy at national, sub-regional and continental level, and play a meaningful role in the socio-economic and political development of our continent source : Crucial role for Africa's courts in preventing electoral violence – AfricanLII
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