Doctor Mama Amon
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- Mar 30, 2018
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Somatology (Tabia za magimba): What are the properties of physical bodies and how do they explain the relationships between bodies, time and space? The following are the known properties of matter: figure, divisibility, indestructability, porosity, compressibility, dilatability, mobility, inertia, attraction, repulsion, polarity, elasticity, extension, impenetrability and irreplicability. The latter three properties are more relevant to the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist. The Catholic doctrine on the Eucharist, asserts that, after consecration prayer, the body of Jesus Christ, who is in heaven, is truly, really, wholly and substantially present in every consecrated host wherever it may be located on earth. These claims contradict the somatological principles of impenetrability and irreplicability of bodies. Since the 16 century during the Reformation the Protestants opposed them and argued that the consecration process was a symbolical and not literal process. The Protestants avoided the risk of being labelled cannibalists, while the Catholic Church consistently embraces it until today. Which doctrine of the Eucharist is more rational and close to truth as seen by God?
The Former Pope Benedict XVI presiding over the consecration process
SOMATOLOGY, CONSECRATION OF BREAD AND WINE AND EUCHARISTIC CANNIBALISM IN CATHOLIC LITURGY: WHERE DO WE GO AFTER SYNOD 2023?
Somatology is the philosophical study of the general properties of matter in the universe as opposed to the peculiar properties of individual forms of matter.
We are surrounded by forests, mountains, rivers, seas, animals, birds, and insects, the sun, the moon, stars, planets, comets, cars, buildings, rocks and stones. They are collectively called physical bodies, in a word, matter. It surrounds us and exists outside our consciousness, does not depend on our consciousness, and is or may be reflected directly or indirectly in consciousness.
In general, the visible universe is made up of physical substances that occupy space, have mass, and are composed of atoms, which are found in three states, solid, liquid and gaseous states. Thus, matter is an objective reality which is given to humans by their sensations, and which is copied, photographed and reflected by their sensations, while existing independently of them.
A separate and determinate portion of matter in space is called a body. It has weight and volume, and is contained by space. All terrestrial bodies are divided into three classes, namely, animals, plants, and minerals.
The following are the known properties of matter: figure, divisibility, indestructability, porosity, compressibility, dilatability, mobility, inertia, attraction, repulsion, polarity, elasticity, extension, impenetrability and irreplicability.
The latter three properties are more relevant to the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist and the related process of consecration.
Extension is the occupation of a portion of space by a body. Since matter exists under the containment of space, bodies occupy definite portions of space and are therefore extended in three dimensions of breadth, height and thickness. On this view there are regions of space or spacetime and there are entities such as people, tables, social groups, electrons, and so on that are located at those regions.
This is to say that, an entity x is exactly located at region y as x has-at-y the same size and shape as y, and stands-at-y in all the same spatiotemporal relations to things as does y. Thus, spheres are exactly located only at spherical regions, cubes only at cubical regions, and so on.
Also, this means that, x is partially located at region r iff r is a sub-region of a region x is exactly located at; and x is multi-located iff there are two or more distinct regions that x is exactly located at.
Impenetrability is the property of matter by which a body excludes every other body from the part of space it itself occupies.
It is a property in consequence of which no two bodies can occupy the same space at the same time, or a property in consequence of which arises the impossibility of co-location of two or more bodies. Thus, two bodies are impenetrable if and only if they cannot be in the same place at the same time.
By definition, colocation or penetrability would be a property in consequence of which entities both share location and parts. That is: For any ordinary bodies X and Y, and for any time t, X is co-located with Y at t iff X and Y exactly occupy the same place at t.
According to the principle of impenetrability of bodies, the above statement is false. Then, the following anti-colocation principle applies: Necessarily, at any time t, for any ordinary bodies X and Y, if X and Y are collocated at t, then X is identical with Y.
And irreplicability is the property of matter in consequence of which a body cannot be multilocated, that is, it cannot exactly be located at more than one region. It asserts that, necessarily, no physical body has more than one exact location.
To say that an object is multi-located would be to say that it has more than one exact location at the same time. It is akin to data replication on computer storage.
On the other hand, by definition, multi-location or replicability would be a property in consequence of which an entity can be simultaneously located at two or more places at the same time. According to the principle of irreplicability of bodies, the above statement is false.
Then, the following anti-multilocation principle applies: Necessarily, at any time t, for any ordinary objects X and Y, if X and Y occupy distinct places at t, then X is distinct from Y.
Hence, ordinary objects in general, and hence persons, are nonrepeatable entities, confined to a single place at a time.
The Catholic doctrine on the Eucharist, asserts that, after the consecration prayer, which is administered by the Priest, the body of Jesus Christ, who is in heaven, is truly, really, wholly and substantially present in every consecrated host wherever it may be located on earth.
These claims directly contradict the somatological principles of impenetrability and irreplicability of bodies.
These contradictory claims have been examined by many theologians and philosophers, including Alexander Pruss (2009).
He has done so through an essay entitled, “The Eucharist: Real Presence and Real Absence,” appearing as chapter 23 in a book by Thomas P. Flint and Michael Rea (2009), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press), from page 512 and the following pages, constituting 13,646 words in length.
Despite his efforts as revealed in an essay that is 14,000 words long, he could not succeed in providing satisfactory answers to the questions he raises, as he problematizes the Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist. Part of how he frames the debate is in terms of the following critical questions:
Are the actions of the human agents given a supernatural power of producing such an effect or does God produce the effect entirely by himself on the occasion of these actions? Likewise, is the reception of the Eucharist a cause of the occurrence of grace in the recipient, or does God simply happen to choose to provide grace on the occasion of the receiving of the Eucharist? If the Eucharist causes the occurrence of grace in the recipient, then in what way does this causality actually work?
What does it mean to ‘eat’ and ‘drink’ in general and what significance is to be found in the idea of Christ giving himself to us to be eaten and drunk? How does the Eucharist cause both physical and spiritual nourishment? Do Christ’s body and blood become a part of the physical body of the believing recipient? Do Christ’s body and blood revert to ordinary bread and wine just prior to being digested in the recipient’s body? Do Christ’s body and blood cease to be present in the Eucharist just before digestion in the recipient’s body? During digestion, are Christ’s body and blood transubstantiated again, this time, into the flesh and blood of the recipient?
When Christ’s words are spoken in the Eucharistic liturgy, who counts as their speaker? To whom, if to anyone, does ‘my’ refer in ‘This is my body’? Is the word ‘my’ an indexical? How does the apparently demonstrative pronoun ‘this’ gain reference to the invisible divine reality here?
In the Catholic tradition, the Eucharist is seen as a sacrifice, fulfilling the prophecy of Malachi that in messianic times a sacrifice will be offered from the rising to the setting of the sun. Yet according to the Letter to the Hebrews, Christ’s sacrifice is the only sacrifice in messianic times. Catholic theology attempts to reconcile these two claims by saying that the sacrifice of the altar and the sacrifice of Calvary are one and the same sacrifice.
What, then, are the identity and individuation conditions for sacrifices? Is there on a deep level a single act of self-giving that Christ undertook, and if so, how is it related to the events of the altar and those of Calvary? Are they perhaps manifestations of that act? Are they parts of it?
Catholic devotion talks of being present at Mass as a way of being present at Calvary. Can this be literally true, space-time being bridged in a supernatural way? Or does the Eucharistic liturgy simply represent Calvary, and if so, what philosophical account can be given of the nature of this representing—is it conventional or in some way natural, for instance?
Next come the ontological issues surrounding the question: What actually happens that makes it true to say that ‘the body and blood of Christ’ comes to be present?
The ontologically simplest answers are ones that take this presence to be nonliteral. Thus, one might simply stay on a naturalistic level and say that Christ’s body and blood are ‘present’ in the congregation’s thoughts, and are represented by the bread and wine.
Or one might say that at communion, God gives the recipient of the Eucharist graces that ultimately flow from the sacrifice of Christ’s body and blood on the cross, and so the body and blood are ‘present’ through their effects.
There are, however, serious theological difficulties with these two solutions. The most obvious is that, as far back as we can trace it, Christians have generally taken it that the ‘presence’ is to be understood in a more substantive way, and have made the Eucharist a central part of their Christian worship, as is already seen in the New Testament (see e.g. Acts 2: 42 and 1 Cor. 10).
If one believes that the Christian church is guided by the Holy Spirit, at least in the central aspects of Christian life, this creates at least a strong presumption in favor of a more substantive interpretation, as opposed to the metaphorical interpretation.
Furthermore, the New Testament overall has a strong emphasis on the reality of Christ’s body and blood, in contrast to gnostics who saw the flesh as something unbecoming, and also contains Christ’s promise to abide with Christians. It would be fitting indeed for this abiding also to be bodily in some way.
Thus one should take seriously the idea of Christ’s body and blood being present in a non-metaphorical way, ‘really present’.
The doctrine of ‘real presence’ presents several questions. First, we may wonder about the sense of ‘present’ here. While we have taken ‘presence’ as not metaphorical, there may still be multiple senses of presence.
Is Christ’s body and blood ‘spatially present’ in the same sense in which the bricks of the church building are ‘spatially present’? Or is there some other nonmetaphorical way of being present that is applicable?
How can Christ’s body and blood be simultaneously present in multiple, disconnected places, wherever the Eucharistic liturgy is celebrated? Is a part present here and a part present there, or is the whole present in each place?
A parallel question concerns what happens to the bread and wine. It certainly appears as if bread and wine are present after consecration. Some take this appearance at face value, and insist that not only is Christ’s body and blood present, but so are bread and wine. This is ‘consubstantiation’.
Others insist that the appearance alone is present, and bread and wine are really absent. This conjunction of the real presence of Christ’s body and blood and the non-existence of bread and wine is, according to Pope Paul VI’s 1968 ‘Credo of the People of God’, at the core of the doctrine of ‘transubstantiation’
If consubstantiation holds, we have two options. First, by analogy with the incarnation, we could have ‘impanation’. Just as one and the same person is both a human and God, one and the same entity is both bread and body, and likewise for wine and blood, or maybe one and the same entity is both Christ and bread, as well as both Christ and wine.
Or one might have co-presence, in which case bread and body are in the same place, and wine and blood are in the same place. The co-presence version is subject to the objection that ‘this’ in ‘This is my body’ would seem to more appropriately apply to the visible of the two substances, namely bread, if there were two substances there.
If, on the other hand, transubstantiation holds, we have several further questions. Is there a real connection between the bread and wine and the body and blood, with, say, the bread and wine literally becoming transformed, or do bread and wine simply cease to exist, being followed by the coming-present of the body and blood?
What makes it be the case that bread and wine are present? Is an illusion miraculously caused in the minds of the people present? Or is it that the causal powers of the bread and wine are somehow sustained, so that light bounces off just as it did before? If so, what are these causal powers grounded in? Are they now the causal powers of Christ’s body and blood? Are they the causal powers of God? Are they self-standing causal powers, present in the same place as the body and blood?
Or had bread and wine received a power of affecting future events at a time at which they no longer exist?
“To discuss even half these questions would take a book,” Pruss (2009) claims, and then he resorts to the discussion of a single question, whether the doctrine of the real presence of Christ’s body and blood, and likewise the doctrine of the real absence of bread and wine, can be defended philosophically.
His solution is highly qualified by using assumptions unpallatable to the third millenium mind.
The next Episcopal Synod 2023 is expected to intelligently respond to this challenge as a way of narrowing the gap between conservative and liberal Christianity.
Given the prevalence of somatological principles in science textbooks from kindergarten upwards, it is my hope that, the synod shall be able to make proper discernment, as and when required, in a way that narrows donw the gap between conservative and liberal Christianity.
Personally I prefer a non-cannibalistic doctrine of the Eucharist because there is a plausible non-cannibalistic interpretation of the "this is my body".
The verb to-be ("IS") in the phrase "this is my body" can be interpreted in the following possible ways:
(a) The is-of-identification: Under the “is” of identification, the “verb to be” is a shorthand of “is identical with”. For example, Julius is Nyerere, ice is water, vapor is water.
(b) The is-of-attribution: the “is” of attribution is used to ascribe an attribute or property to an object, eg, The cow is red. Here, the attribute is predicated of a subject. Then, the “is” of predication does not express an equivalence relation and, in general, “x has P” and “y has P” do not imply “x is identical to y.”
(c) The is-of-composition: The parts are said to compose the whole and the whole is composed of the parts. Composition is the relation between a whole and its parts. Saying that Nyerere’s body is (composed of) skin and bone is not to say that Socrates’ body is identical to skin and bone. There is skin and bone that do not compose Socrates. Generally, the statement of the form “A is B” translates into “A is composed of set B.” And, the statement “A is composed of set B” translates into: A compound object A is composed of a set whose members are parts known as B1, B2, …, and Bn, when these parts are taken collectively and not distributively.
(d) The is-of-signification: Under the “is” of signification, the “verb to be” is a shorthand of “is a sign of”. For example, this flag is (a sign of) Tanzania, this Cross (is a sign of) Christianity, this cow is (a sign of) God, this bread is (a sign of) my body, this wine is (a sign of) my blood.
In my opinion, we need to avoid every possibility of advocating cannibalism, even if Jesus appears to have advocated it. In fact, if Jesus said that cannibalism is okay, we would still deny him obedience in this regard, at least.
Cannibalism is not wrong simply because God said so. God said cannibalism is wrong because cannibalism is wrong, and not vice versa.
REFERENCES
1. Alexander Pruss (2009), “The Eucharist: Real Presence and Real Absence,” In: Thomas P. Flint and Michael Rea (2009), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology (New York: Oxford University Press), Chapter 23.
2. Thomas Sattig (2015), The Double Lives of Objects: An Essay in the Metaphysics of the Ordinary World (Oxford: OUP, p.75fff and p.104ff).