Tanganyika and Zanzibar: Articles of Union and implementing legislation, with other evidences

Tanganyika and Zanzibar: Articles of Union and implementing legislation, with other evidences

Kwaharaka haraka inaweza kuonekana hivyo, Ila kimsingi Muungano ulileta stability Zanzibar. Hebu angalia hii document niliyo attach sasa hivi (Sikutaka kuiweka kwasababu watu wanaouhusika na haya makundi wengine wako hai hadi leo) Hebu angalia hayo makundi yalivyokuwa mengi !!!!

Nimeisoma juu iyo doc uloiweka yenye majina. Nakubaliana na wewe ndugu kwamba zanzibar haikuwa stable. Lakini ni nini chanzo cha matatizo yote hayo?
Kulikua na party ya ki communist, with these docs inaonesha kuwa USA participated indirectly katika kuhakikisha hawa wakomunisti hawachukui nchi. Zanzibar ilikua ina hofiwa kuwa itakuwa ni CUBA ya afrika na kwamba watakuwa ndio watakaoeneza ukomunisti east africa hadi afrika nzima. Hakuna asiejua kwamba USA is against communism.

Instability was there because the door were opened after the revolution for it to occur. Najua hapa watajitokeza watu wengi wanaojifanya kuijua historia ya zanzibar utakapogusia usultan, coz kuna watu wanachuki na waarabu without any reason.

Kwanza lazima tutizame events and how they originated. Tutizame historia ya Karume, hakuwa mzanzibari huyu mtu, wala john okello hakuwa mzanzibari, kilichomtoa Okello from UGANDA mpaka visiwani ni nani? Na aliemtoa karume kwao malawi mpaka zanzibar ni nani? Mi kwa mtazamo wangu hawa watu wametumwa. Kwa kusema kwamba oooh manake tumeenda kuwasaidia, wangewasaidia waliopo karibu yao kwanza kama kenya, katika kesi ya okello.

Kilichofanyika kabla ya mapinduzi ni kuwa mtawala wa zanzibar ambae ni britain tayari aliwekuwa kashaweka factions katika society ya zanzibar, ujue kuwa positions za uongozi zanzibar zilikua hazipangwi na sultani bali na mkoloni mwingereza, sultani ni pambo tu. hizi factions zilikuwa created makusudi ili kuleta machafuko kama wanavopendelea hawa wazungu.kwa sababu ya wazanzibari walikua na sifa ya ustahmilivu na uelewa for sure hawa mabwana wakaona kuwa kuuondoa ufalme zanzibar itakua tabu ndio maana wakatumika watu wasiokuwa wazanzibari kabisa, nafikiri hata history inasema kuwa walitokea watu kutoka bara na mashua na kuingia zenjy usiku. Mi kwa mtazamo wangu naona kuwa hapakuwa na intrest ya kuweka stability katika visiwa hivi bali palikiwa na intrest nyengine. Na hasa ukizingatia kuwa kuna hawa wakomunisti, ambao ndio tishio kwa USA na marafiki zake. Unaweza kusema kuwa, muungano ulileta stability sawa, lakini sio kwa lengo la kusema eti tunawasaidia hawa waafrika wenzetu, si kweli. Bali lengo ni kuwazuia wakomunisti, na kulinda mapinduzi yaliowachukiza wengi. Palikua na agenda nyengine hasa, maana wanamapinduzi wametoka nje ya zanzibar kisha wao wenyewe kwa wenyewe wakawa hawaaminiani. Na hili nafikiri ndio jambo Nyerere akahofia kuwa yatatokea mapinduzi mengine ambayo lengo lake litapotea. Ndio akaamua kumlinda Karume na sio okello, ili waimalize nguvu ya wazanzibari.

Inshort ni hivi, muungano ulileta stability sawa, lakini sio kwa lengo la kuwasaidia wazanzibari bali ni kulinda maslahi ya tanganyika maana sipati picha zanzibar ingekuwa cuba, mataifa ya karibu yangekosa amani kutokana na mabalaa ya wakomunisti. Msaada wa muungano ni sawasawa na kusema msaada wa UK kwa tanzania, sio kwa lengo la kunufaisha TZ bali uko kwa maslahi ya UK but sisi tunaona tunasaidiwa
 
Hakuna ushahidi kama walichangia asimilia 11% na kama ushahidi upo, ninaunga mkono waanze kulipwa asilimia 11% yote, na walipwe arrears za nyuma.
"Mbene explained in the National Assembly yesterday that BoT was established by the Bank of Tanzania Act of 1965 and section 12 (2) reveals that the bank's capital was provided by the United Republic of Tanzania, who is the bank's sole owner.
"The start-up capital for the establishment of BoT was 20m/- issued by the Treasury….The Bank of Tanzania Act of 2006 section 17 (2) has inherited that section and it still reads the same. Therefore, it is not true that Zanzibar contributed 11 per cent of BoT's starting capital," she maintained.
Nevertheless, Mbene clarified: "As part of the United Republic of Tanzania, Zanzibar has got shares…although I am not sure how many, maybe the 11 per cent the MP is referring to might be the ones Zanzibar had in the East Africa Currency Board."
Kama tutakubaliana na Mbene kwa kauli na maelezo yake. Je ni sahihi pia kuchukulia kuwa Zanzibar ina share katika kila kitu kinachomilikiwa kwa jina Tanzania?

Kama ni hivyo kwa nini inasemwa hawachangii kitu? wakati wana share kila sehemu?

Huyu Mbene ndio amejibu suali au amezidi kutuongezea masuali? Kama yeye hajui hizo shares, nani anaezijua?
 
Yaani ukiisoma history ya revolution utajua kabisa kama it wasnt for zanzibaris but for their own intrests.
 
Nimeisoma juu iyo doc uloiweka yenye majina. Nakubaliana na wewe ndugu kwamba zanzibar haikuwa stable. Lakini ni nini chanzo cha matatizo yote hayo?
Kulikua na party ya ki communist, with these docs inaonesha kuwa USA participated indirectly katika kuhakikisha hawa wakomunisti hawachukui nchi. Zanzibar ilikua ina hofiwa kuwa itakuwa ni CUBA ya afrika na kwamba watakuwa ndio watakaoeneza ukomunisti east africa hadi afrika nzima. Hakuna asiejua kwamba USA is against communism.

Instability was there because the door were opened after the revolution for it to occur. Najua hapa watajitokeza watu wengi wanaojifanya kuijua historia ya zanzibar utakapogusia usultan, coz kuna watu wanachuki na waarabu without any reason.

Kwanza lazima tutizame events and how they originated. Tutizame historia ya Karume, hakuwa mzanzibari huyu mtu, wala john okello hakuwa mzanzibari, kilichomtoa Okello from UGANDA mpaka visiwani ni nani? Na aliemtoa karume kwao malawi mpaka zanzibar ni nani? Mi kwa mtazamo wangu hawa watu wametumwa. Kwa kusema kwamba oooh manake tumeenda kuwasaidia, wangewasaidia waliopo karibu yao kwanza kama kenya, katika kesi ya okello.

Kilichofanyika kabla ya mapinduzi ni kuwa mtawala wa zanzibar ambae ni britain tayari aliwekuwa kashaweka factions katika society ya zanzibar, ujue kuwa positions za uongozi zanzibar zilikua hazipangwi na sultani bali na mkoloni mwingereza, sultani ni pambo tu. hizi factions zilikuwa created makusudi ili kuleta machafuko kama wanavopendelea hawa wazungu.kwa sababu ya wazanzibari walikua na sifa ya ustahmilivu na uelewa for sure hawa mabwana wakaona kuwa kuuondoa ufalme zanzibar itakua tabu ndio maana wakatumika watu wasiokuwa wazanzibari kabisa, nafikiri hata history inasema kuwa walitokea watu kutoka bara na mashua na kuingia zenjy usiku. Mi kwa mtazamo wangu naona kuwa hapakuwa na intrest ya kuweka stability katika visiwa hivi bali palikiwa na intrest nyengine. Na hasa ukizingatia kuwa kuna hawa wakomunisti, ambao ndio tishio kwa USA na marafiki zake. Unaweza kusema kuwa, muungano ulileta stability sawa, lakini sio kwa lengo la kusema eti tunawasaidia hawa waafrika wenzetu, si kweli. Bali lengo ni kuwazuia wakomunisti, na kulinda mapinduzi yaliowachukiza wengi. Palikua na agenda nyengine hasa, maana wanamapinduzi wametoka nje ya zanzibar kisha wao wenyewe kwa wenyewe wakawa hawaaminiani. Na hili nafikiri ndio jambo Nyerere akahofia kuwa yatatokea mapinduzi mengine ambayo lengo lake litapotea. Ndio akaamua kumlinda Karume na sio okello, ili waimalize nguvu ya wazanzibari.

Inshort ni hivi, muungano ulileta stability sawa, lakini sio kwa lengo la kuwasaidia wazanzibari bali ni kulinda maslahi ya tanganyika maana sipati picha zanzibar ingekuwa cuba, mataifa ya karibu yangekosa amani kutokana na mabalaa ya wakomunisti.

Mkuu,

Ninakubaliana na assessment yako, ila pia inabidi kwenye assessment yako ujikumbushe kwamba Nyerere hakuwa mfuasi wa westerners at the time. Kwahiyo with confidence ninasema motive ya Nyerere ilikuwa haina uhusiano na wamareKani , Ila pia in part aliamini kustablise Zanzibar ingesaidia usalama wa upande wa Tanganyika, so it was an issue of national security kwa Tanganyika. Ila sasa as a consequences, ilibidi atumie constitution as a tool to stabilise Zanzibar, which sound very unpopular now.

Swali la Msingi la kujiuuliza ni kwamba, Je wazanzibari wako tayari kuja pamoja na kutumia vizuri nguvu watakazo rudishiwa na tanganyika baada ya katiba mpya??? . Au wanataka wapate kwanza uhuru ndio wapange jinsi ya kuutumia?? Hili ndio swali linaloumiza kichwa kuelekea kwenye mchakato wa katiba.

Kwanini linaniumiza kichwa? Zanzibar inamakundi mengi mno, na yote yana nguvu sawia na mengi hayako tayari ku compromise, Muungano umekuwa ni vehcle ya kuyang'anganiza haya makundi ya compromise. Je Zanzibar huru zaidi iko tayari kucompromise bila kuwa forced na Tanganyika????

Nikupe mfano, Kwasasa NEC ya CCM Tanzania inasaidia sana ku defuse migogoro ya maKundi Ndani ya CCM Zanzibar kwa Kuchagua Mgombea wa Uraisi Zanzibar, Je ukifika wakati NEC ya Zanzibar inachagua mgombea yenyewe, je makundi yatakayoshindwa, yatakuwa tayari kuridhia kushindwa???? au yatatafuta namna ya kumpindua mshindi?. Na kama makundi mbalimbali hayo yasipokubali kushindwa; which will be mostly the case, then zanzibar itasongaje mbele bila muafaka???
 
Pata dondoo nyingine hii kisha kakitafute kitabu hicho na rejea zake:

"As Shivji further notes in Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? the union parliament managed to bypass the scheme of distribution of powers between the Union and Zanzibar by appending the list of union matters to the Interim Constitution of 1965 as a schedule. Since then the practice developed that the Union parliament increased the list by amending the schedule without reference to the Articles of Union. Apart from skewing the distribution of power, this practice also skews the distribution of resources. It is not surprising then that Zanzibars Minister responsible Natural Resources asserts that any oil extracted in Zanzibar would not be shared with the mainland and claims that he doesnt understand anything concerning the distribution of natural gas that has been discovered and is accruing revenue in Tanzania mainland" - WHERE IS ZANZIBARS DEATH CERTIFICATE? < http://www.mzalendo.net/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/The-Articles-of-Union.pdf >

Hayo nimaandiko ambayo yameaminika kwenye Academia ya Tanzania reference zake sio reliable sana.Mojawapo ya kazi ninayofanya ni kwenda national archive kuona Intelligence za kimagharibi zilisema nini kuhusu hili swala,Je kuna mambo mengine ambayo yanaweza yakatupa mwanga zaidi????Jibu ni ndio.

Mfano ukisoma historia ya nyerere, tunayoijua ni nusu tu, Nusu kubwa bado iko National Archive as semi classified document, Mwuulize mwalimu wako Tom Malony , maana wakati wa event ya mwalimu nyerere , tuli apply permission ya kupata hizi semi classified history za nyerere, na kwa accesss ya siku moja tu tuliweza kujua mengi kuhusu nyerere na historia yake kuliko vitabu vyote vilivyopo sokoni vinavyotujuza.

Uzuri wa hizi de-classified information zimeandikwa kipindi cha tukio kwa hiyo ni original reporting. While vitabu vya SHIvJI vinategemea secondary sources.
 
Hayo nimaandiko ambayo yameaminika kwenye Academia ya Tanzania reference zake sio reliable sana.Mojawapo ya kazi ninayofanya ni kwenda national archive kuona Intelligence za kimagharibi zilisema nini kuhusu hili swala,Je kuna mambo mengine ambayo yanaweza yakatupa mwanga zaidi????Jibu ni ndio.

Mfano ukisoma historia ya nyerere, tunayoijua ni nusu tu, Nusu kubwa bado iko National Archive as semi classified document, Mwuulize mwalimu wako Tom Malony , maana wakati wa event ya mwalimu nyerere , tuli apply permission ya kupata hizi semi classified history za nyerere, na kwa accesss ya siku moja tu tuliweza kujua mengi kuhusu nyerere na historia yake kuliko vitabu vyote vilivyopo sokoni vinavyotujuza.

Uzuri wa hizi de-classified information zimeandikwa kipindi cha tukio kwa hiyo ni original reporting. While vitabu vya SHIvJI vinategemea secondary sources.

Hicho kitabu nimeakuambia ni cha utafiti, hata yeye alikuja huko Uingereza kutafiti primary sources na katumia de-classified pia pamoja na makabrasha ya Jaji Ramadhani ambayo yalikuwa hayajawahi kutumiwa kabla - soma uhakiki huu:

[TABLE="width: 605"]
[TR]
[TD]
Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism: Lessons of Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union by I.G. Shivji

Review by Jenerali Ulimwengu​


Title: Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? Lessons of Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union

Author: Issa G. Shivji

Publisher: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers in association with Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA)

OSSREA ISBN 978-9994-455-21-8
Mkuku na Nyota ISBN 978-9987-449-99-6



INTRODUCTION


Once again, Professor Shivji has come out with a compelling book that will force all of us to scratch our heads and think, a work so powerful and so insightful that from now it will be well nigh impossible for anyone who will have read it to engage in any discourse about political and constitutional developments in Zanzibar, or about the nature, history and problems of the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, without making reference to the book.

As historical record, it affords us a much clearer grasp of what came to pass at the various stages of the existence of Zanzibar as a nation and as part of the Swahili civilisation that installed itself on the East African Coast over centuries.

As legal/constitutional treatise it fine-combs the major issues relating to legality, legitimacy and constitutionalism and bares the flaws that have plagued the Union because the principal protagonists in the narrative did not pay them the requisite heed.

As political comment, the book brings to the fore the pitfalls inherent in, on the one hand, trying to craft unity between states outside democratic processes and, on the other, failing to fully comprehend the nature of the imperialist forces which affect our lives as Africans and which impel us to urgently unite.

As a wake-up call, the book tells us that all is not well with the Union and, calls for more open debate on the Union.

What is more, as is his wont, in this book Shivji is in no mood for taking prisoners, and along the way he does take quite a few sacred cows to the slaughter. It is this incisiveness and forthrightness in examining historical facts that lends this book its great value as a work of singular scholarship and an unbridled contribution to our understanding of the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in particular and the question of African Unity in general. In his wake he minces few words in dissecting the actions of all the protagonists involved in the story, from Julius Nyerere to Abeid Karume, to Aboud Jumbe, to Abdulrahman Babu and others.

The book is divided into six chapters, each dealing with a thematic issue, offering descriptive and analytical insights, backed by earlier works by other writers (and Shivjiâ&#8364;&#8482;s own earlier contributions) as well as personal testimonies of those still alive and able to recount the events as they lived them. It also has a rich Appendix which should be a source of invaluable information for researchers. The upshot is an invaluable reference document that has benefited from the contributions of a wide range of credible actors and worthy researchers.

Chapter One sets the scene by presenting a graphic description of Zanzibar as it was at the time when anti-colonial forces in Africa were agitating for independence, and the different ethnic, racial and class formations that vied with each other for political ascendancy. It is here that the book brings into relief the reality of Zanzibar as a sort of melting pot wherein varied groups with varied origins had already engendered a culture and civilisation and language that were distinctly Zanzibari in particular and Swahili in general, belonging to a large religio-cultural ensemble of coastal city-states that straddled the East African Coast from Mombassa to Sofala in present-day Mozambique.

The rich tapestry of Zanzibari society thus brought together people who had come from the African mainland as far away as Nyasaland (present day Malawi) and Belgian Congo, Oman, Yemen, the Comoros, India and Shiraz in Persia etc, and who, the author argues, interacted in commerce, agriculture and crafts and who, though the idyllic characterisation of social relations on the islands of Unguja and Pemba may have been exaggerated, could not strictly be pigeon-holed into the racial hierarchy obtaining on the mainland (Europeans at the top, Asians in the middle, and Africans at the bottom.) The main argument here, and which becomes significant later on in the book, is that Zanzibariness came to be a reality, whatever the origins of those who claimed it.

According to Shivji it was the politicians jostling for political space who ushered in the politicisation of race and ethnicity, especially as independence approached and the prospects of taking power beckoned. Thus were born the easy categorisations that sought, and managed to place the various ethnic and racial groups into neat, little boxes: Arabs, Indians, mainlanders, etc., which would come to colour the politics of the islands to this day. Shivji shows the absurdity of such characterisation by pointing out that the first nationalist calls for independence from the British actually came from young, educated Arabs, acting not in the name of Omani colonialism but of Zanzibari nationalism.

Still, the damage had been done, and, whereas Karume and the ASP accused the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, ZNP, of being Arab feudalists acting at the behest of their masters in Oman, the ZNP suspected Karume and the ASP of being Trojan horses for the mainland. The bad blood created in that epoch still poisons Zanzibari politics to this day.

Shivji quotes a couple of writings by present-day CCM leaders hailing from Zanzibar and holding Union ministerial positions, characterising the leaders of the opposition Civic United Front, CUF, as agents of Arab colonialists bent on returning to re-colonise Zanzibar. It is of interest that at least two of those cited may have been, at the time of their writings, ministers responsible for Police, and thus charged with dealing with â&#8364;&#732;political agitatorsâ&#8364;&#8482; during troubled times on the Islands, such as during elections.

Chapter Two describes in detail what transpired during the January 12 1964 insurgency that came to be known as the â&#8364;&#732;revolutionâ&#8364;&#8482;, the role played by John Okello and Karume, the part played by Babu and his Umma Party cadres. There seems to be no doubt on the part of Shivji that Karume did not take an active part in the events of that Saturday night, and that he may have been kept at a distance for his own safety. It also seems that Okello must have played a more significant role than that ascribed to him by some ASP stalwarts (that he was chosen to make those bloodthirsty radio broadcasts because of his voice!) Shivji also discounts claims made by Babu as to the importance of his Umma cadres in directing the revolution, although he concedes some of their cadres who had `trained in Cuba might have instructed some insurgents in the use of firearms.

What is beyond dispute is the direct participation in the uprising of the so-called â&#8364;&#339;Committee of 14,â&#8364; including Seif Bakari, Saidi Natepe and Saidi Washoto, representing the lumpencharacter of the uprising, which was not necessarily informed by a well thought-out political agenda for a social revolution. The author even asserts that the revolution, while necessarily political, was not popular because a good half of the population did not support it. This part of the genesis of the uprising was, as is demonstrated by Shivji, to seriously affect the conduct of affairs of state once les sans- culottes found themselves holding the reins of state. It is hardly surprising that the state that they put in place proceeded haphazardly without a clear direction, while wreaking havoc on peopleâ&#8364;&#8482;s basic rights, instilling fear in the populace and dealing with real or perceived opponents in the most brutal fashion.


It is in Chapter Three that the author deals with the factors presiding over the birth of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. On the one hand there was the age-old desire, expressed over and over again by African nationalist freedom fighters of the region within the Pan- African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, PAFMECA, including Nyerere, who had wanted their countries to enter into some kind of unity/federation even before independence, which fact may give credence to the point of view that accepts the Union as a brainchild of that early resolve on the â&#8364;&#732;pullâ&#8364;&#8482; side of things.

But on the other hand, the realities of the tensions of Cold War, especially acute at that particular time in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, may point to another source of pressure, on the â&#8364;&#732;pushâ&#8364;&#8482; side of the equation, and in this respect Shivji affords us ample documentary evidence to show that the Imperial powers subjectively saw themselves as standing to gain from what they saw as the neutralisation of the perceived â&#8364;&#732;communistâ&#8364;&#8482; threat posed by Babu and the â&#8364;&#732;comradesâ&#8364;&#8482; from the erstwhile Umma party.

When one considers the oft repeated desire for unity in the region and the expressed anxieties by the representatives of the Imperial powers concerned about the implantation of a â&#8364;&#732;Cubaâ&#8364;&#8482; on the East African coast, reinforced by what Shivji, (and he is not alone in this) sees as Karumeâ&#8364;&#8482;s insecurity as to his tenuous hold onto power, it is perhaps not outlandish to conclude that â&#8364;&#732;pullâ&#8364;&#8482; met â&#8364;&#732;pushâ&#8364;&#8482; in the move towards Union. In this context, did Nyerere, ardent Pan-Africanist but also convinced anti-communist that he was, see a once in a lifetime opportunity to kill two birds with one stone, that is rid himself of a â&#8364;&#732;communistâ&#8364;&#8482; threat on his doorstep at the same time fulfilling a long standing yearning for unity, in which case the end justified the means? This seems to be the suggestion.

In this section Shivji also sets out the basic points agreed upon by Nyerere and Karume, illustrating the surprisingly lackadaisical and non-consultative manner in which the Union was entered to, which fact would come to haunt the Union to this day. The author shows how even the promulgation of the interim constitution was done by one man, the president of Tanganyika, who did not even consult the president of Zanzibar on the matter. Shivji muses that even if Karume had been consulted he probably would not have been able to make head or tail of it, given his feeble grasp of such legalistic niceties and his lack of competent legal personnel at a time when Nyerere was served by capable expatriate British lawyers.

For Shivji this was the ominous beginning of a long journey of non consultation and unilateralism exercised by Nyerere over and over again, which incrementally eroded the identity and autonomy of Zanzibar within the Union, making for dire consequences that he expounds upon later in the book.

Chapter Four takes on the state of the Union as it tried to find its feet within the general framework of the Cold war, with Western powers doing their best to limit the influence of Babu and his â&#8364;&#732;communistsâ&#8364;&#8482;, Karume asserting his power by marginalising the Babu group and Nyerere increasingly uneasy with the growing autocracy manifested by his partner in the Islands. In short order, Karume reneged on the promises made at the time of the Revolution, banned Babuâ&#8364;&#8482;s Umma party and dispersed its cadres, mainly to the mainland. Using the Revolutionary Council, he gradually became the source of all executive, legislative, and judicial power. As to the Union he did what he pleased, pretty much as if it had never existed. His party, ASP, was totally emasculated, all associations, including those affiliated to his own party, were banned, and up to his death in 1972 not a single party congress was called.

Nyerere watched in horror from Dar es Salaam as Karume became an embarrassing despot, clamping down on human rights, allowing people to go without basic essentials, including foodstuffs even as his foreign reserve coffers bulged. The forced marriages saga, in which he and his chief lieutenants apportioned themselves Arab and Persian girls, most of them underage, was an outrage that Nyerere apparently had to suffer in the name of the Union.

The disappearance of prominent politicians who had run foul of him, some of them reportedly killed in blood-chilling circumstances, was another grim matter. In addition, he refused to allow young Zanzibaris the opportunity to acquire higher education, even at the University of Dar es Salaam, which should have been their right. In sum, once Karume had taken out insurance with his entry into a Union he hardly respected, he became a dangerous tyrant even as he dished out largesse to the once dispossessed Blacks by building them modern houses and redistributing land.

At the same time more seeds of discords were being planted in such areas as the membership of Zanzibar in the East African Currency Board, EACB, and the jurisdiction of the newly formed Bank of Tanzania, BOT, both issues touching on the desire to maintain a measure of autonomy, an assertion of its identity. (The fact that these issues were â&#8364;&#732;resolvedâ&#8364;&#8482; in favour of the Union government, in effect Tanganyika, has not meant that they have gone away, and they have come later to rear their heads again in unrelated issues such as membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, OIC, and international sporting organisations.)

This was roughly the situation at the time of Karumeâ&#8364;&#8482;s death, when the Union was already stretched to breaking point, and Shivji suggests in this book (and he is not the first to do so) that had Karume lived even a little longer the Union would not have survived.

The contents of Chapter Five will no doubt be of great interest to constitutional lawyers, who may want to mull over the Unionâ&#8364;&#8482;s legal/constitutional foundations. This section sets out to show that there was very little thorough consultation between the two partners and that whereas Tanganyika was served by competent legal counsel, as already seen, Zanzibar was not. Even attempts by Salim Rashid to enlist the services of a Ugandan lawyer, Dan Nabudere, came to naught because, seemingly, according to evidence adduced by Shivji, Nabudere was confronted with a fait accompli. According to the author, Nyerere, with the help of a British lawyer, Roland Brown, had seen to it.

There is indeed considerable confusion as to whom among the Zanzibari leadership did and who did not know of the decision to proceed with the unification of the two countries before the fact. The account in the book gives the impression of revolving doors in a comedy of errors, with characters coming and going without necessarily interacting with each other.

The suggestion by Shivji is that the confusion was organised, because Karume did not want too many members of the Revolutionary Council to know what was afoot, as most of them would have opposed it. Even after reading this part at least twice, this reviewer cannot pronounce himself with certainty as to who was privy to the whole process of the signing of the Union.

Even after the signing, problems persisted. While the parliament of Tanganyika met to ratify the Articles of Union, the same cannot be said of the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar, and Shivji presents testimonies of people who should have known (eg. Jumbe and Salim Rashid) asserting that no such ratification came to pass.

The author marshals closely knit legal and constitutional arguments in this section with a view to demonstrating that the Union was seriously flawed at its very inception because the requisite legal and constitutional steps were not followed through because, suggests Shivji, one side to the bargain was bent on manipulation while the other just did not have the capacity to comprehend what was going on.

Chapter Six looks at the Jumbe phase, with Jumbe having taken over the leadership of Zanzibar after Karumeâ&#8364;&#8482;s assassination. Jumbe came to power almost as an antithesis to Karume. According to Shivji Jumbe had all along not been seen by Karume as a potential threat. He rarely made his opinion known, was content to do his chiefâ&#8364;&#8482;s bidding and acquiesced in all his excesses. But he was also a more â&#8364;&#732;educatedâ&#8364;&#8482; man, in touch with modern tenets of governance, and therefore more to Nyerereâ&#8364;&#8482;s liking. He wasted little time in consolidating his power by clipping the wings of the Revolutionary Council and investing more power in party structures and undertaking constitutional reforms.

He also opened debate within the party, calling for an end to the more egregious abuses that were associated with the Zanzibari leadership under his predecessor. He also opened the doors for young Zanzibaris to study outside Zanzibar, and tens of them joined the University of Dar es Salaam, where not only did they acquire a â&#8364;&#732;modern educationâ&#8364;&#8482; but were also able to mingle and exchange ideas with their counterparts from the mainland. Thus was born a new crop of Zanzibaris who would, in time, make their mark on the conduct of politics in Zanzibar and within the Union. Shivji notes the irony that it was these same â&#8364;&#732;Young Turksâ&#8364;&#8482; whom Jumbe had sent to university that would, in time, become the instruments of his own political demise.

Perhaps most important in this section is Shivjiâ&#8364;&#8482;s critical look at the way Nyerere, using the doctrine of Party supremacy, managed to further encroach on Zanzibarâ&#8364;&#8482;s autonomy. From the outset, Shivji endeavours to show how Nyerere had all along acted in a manner that was detrimental to Zanzibarâ&#8364;&#8482;s autonomy by gradually elongating the list of Union matters beyond the original eleven items, thus making laws and decisions made on the mainland applicable to Zanzibar even in non Union matters.

The merger of the two political parties, TANU and ASP in 1977, and the subordination of all political, legislative and economic decisions to the authority of the one supreme party, CCM, the stage was set for the further dilution of the powers of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council and the House of Representatives, which had come into being under the new constitutional dispensation ushered in by Jumbe.

Now, a coup de grace was to be admitted. In the wake of voices of discontent in Zanzibar (the economy was weak, shortages were a common feature, Jumbeâ&#8364;&#8482;s profligacy in spending on things like a presidential jet was unpopular). Many on the islands believed, rightly or wrongly, that Zanzibar was being exploited and fettered by the mainland, and that if Zanzibar had greater autonomy this would not be the case.

When Jumbe, in an attempt to respond to this challenge, and perhaps to further consolidate and secure his hold on power, started consulting legal minds with a view to effecting greater autonomy by instituting a separate government for Tanganyika, he was â&#8364;&#732;triedâ&#8364;&#8482; in a meeting of the national executive committee of CCM, and forced to resign all his official positions: vice president of the Union, vice chairman of the party; president of Zanzibar, and chairman of the Revolutionary Council.

The effect of this event has come to spawn new dissentions among Zanzibari politicians and commentators of varying political persuasions. Particularly resented is the practice of CCM imposing on Zanzibar leaders â&#8364;&#339;made in Dodoma.â&#8364; Matters were not helped by the repeat of the same when, in 2000, once again, the party chose a candidate for the Zanzibar presidential election who had failed to get the endorsement of the Zanzibar caucus of CCM. It is easy to speculate that if this practice is not tempered, these dissentions may one day come to a head with dire consequences for the Union. Already the removal of the president of Zanzibar as automatic vice president of the Union has created a lot of rancour among many Zanzibaris.

In his Conclusion Shivji returns to the origins of the Union and the role played by the Imperial powers to bring it about, at the same time as he brings into sharp contrast the contending views held by Nkrumah and Nyerere. On matters internal to the Union he recaps his presentation of the secrecy in which the negotiations for the Union were shrouded, and the weakness of the consultative process undertaken, which informed the disgruntlement expressed during the constitutional debate of the early 1980s, which indirectly brought about Jumbeâ&#8364;&#8482;s downfall. Shivji insists, with reason, that for a union to have legitimacy, and therefore sustainability, it must be anchored in the consent of the people affected and involve the equitable distribution of power. Nyerere, according to Shivji, did not allow this to happen, and he punished Jumbe when he tried to raise the issue.

Worse, Nyerereâ&#8364;&#8482;s successors did not take any steps to rectify the situation, and instead they reversed even those progressive gains he had registered in furthering the aims of the Pan-African agenda, leading to the current state where the country has slid back into narrow nationalisms based on race, ethnicity, indigenousness and culture, even as we are witnessing elsewhere a resurgence of African nationalism and Pan-Africanism. He concludes, with a quote from Nyerere:

Africa must unite. This was the title of one of Kwame Nkrumahâ&#8364;&#8482;s books. That call is more urgent today than ever before. Together, we the peoples of Africa will be incomparably stronger internationally than we are now with our multiplicity of unviable states. The needs of our separate countries can be, and are being, ignored by the rich and powerful. The result is that Africa is being marginalised

Issa Shivji has to be congratulated on this tremendous contribution to the debate on Pan-Africanism in general and the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in particular, a work that must surely qualify to be his magnum opus ( for now, that is, as there is no telling what he might come out with the day after tomorrow.) There can be little disagreement with what he posits as the overriding interest in the unity of African states if the continent is to survive in the hostile world of imperialism, now under the guise of globalisation.

The position he takes on the great debate between Nkrumah and Nyerere (African Union Government now, vs. gradualism and a step by step approach) has been with us for quite some time now and the jury seems to be still out. In Shivjiâ&#8364;&#8482;s new role as the first Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Professor in Pan-African Studies will undoubtedly afford him ample space to guide us in further deliberation on this matter, as there is much to be said for both sides of the argument.

On one hand, we suspect rather know that had our forebears acceded to the Union government arrangement at or around Independence we would have already covered a lot of ground by now, in terms of consolidating unity and bringing Africa closer together, yet on the other we have learnt from the experience of even the limited experiment that is the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar the pitfalls with which any hurried association is fraught.

It is possible to say today that the balkanisation of our continent has not only been maintained but in too many cases it has been exacerbated by fissures along ethnic, racial and religious lines. Indeed, the tenuous territorial glue applied by colonialists for the protection of their interests and bequeathed onto us at Independence, is steadily coming unstuck.

The calls for unity we hear from individuals like Muammar Gaddafy come across increasingly as quirky, quixotic and capricious, unable to inspire serious consideration. Yet the yearning for unity among our peoples, our common recognition across the African continent that we share a common history and a common destiny, the realisation that we must either unite or perish in this world of adversity, must impel us to make that unity a reality. Forms may be debated but the principle remains unassailable.

Concerning the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, politicians, researchers and those who want to know where we came from, where we are at and where we might be headed, will want to read this book. To be sure, this book will not be popular with our governors, and I suspect it was not intended to be, because it raises too many issues that will make them uncomfortable.

It is to be hoped that at least some of them will muster the courage to read it and draw the many lessons it offers free of charge. Of central importance here is to predicate all our actions and decisions on thorough knowledge and appreciation of our history and the mistakes we made in the past with a view to rectifying them.

Unless this is done, we are bound to keep on repeating the mistakes of the past, bumbling from hiccup to hiccup as we try to plug holes in an edifice so threadbare it cannot even stand the stresses of repair. Every time there is a political crisis, including the â&#8364;&#339;pollution of the political atmosphereâ&#8364; the casus belli has been the same: Zanzibaris demanding the autonomy to determine their own affairs, with the one exception of the G-55 when the call came from Tanganyika.

Now CCM seems to have settled into the practice of picking Zanzibarâ&#8364;&#8482;s leaders in Dodoma, without regard for the views of the Zanzibaris themselves. Need we say that this does not augur well for the future of the Union? Didnâ&#8364;&#8482;t someone say that doing the same thing, the same way, over and over again and expecting different outcomes, is a sign of insanity?

Will Shivjiâ&#8364;&#8482;s book stir a political hornetâ&#8364;&#8482;s nest? Maybe, but the sting of the hornets thus disturbed may prove the medicine we need to cure an otherwise more painful ailment. Some readers may find his treatment of some leading characters in the narrative objectionable, and these objections may come from different sources regarding different such characters, but maybe that is something we all should learn to live with.

Shivjiâ&#8364;&#8482;s handling of the role played by Mwalimu may be found by some to be a trifle iconoclastic as he shows him to be a scheming Machiavelli with few scruples when pursuing his political ends. Lese majeste? Let the reader be the adjudicator. We have the misfortune of never having had the opportunity to read Nyerere himself on a number of issues discussed in this book, or even to have had Nyerere interviewed seriously by an African writer of Shivji,s stature.
Also, those who lived through those heady days and have a first-hand story to tell are getting on and may not be with us for long. But Shivji has given anyone who thinks they can add something to what we already know (or even dispute what Shivji is saying) a solid starting bloc.

This book is a masterpiece, a must read.

Yahoo! Groups



[/TD]
[/TR]
[/TABLE]
 
Kama tutakubaliana na Mbene kwa kauli na maelezo yake. Je ni sahihi pia kuchukulia kuwa Zanzibar ina share katika kila kitu kinachomilikiwa kwa jina Tanzania?

Kama ni hivyo kwa nini inasemwa hawachangii kitu? wakati wana share kila sehemu?

Huyu Mbene ndio amejibu suali au amezidi kutuongezea masuali? Kama yeye hajui hizo shares, nani anaezijua?

Nimeongeza proof kutoka IMF, zinazoonyesha shareza Zanzibar katika EACB kwamba zilikuwa asilimi 3.5%(Tatu na nusu). Ila kwamakusudi nadhani au kwa kutoelewa Zanzibar wamekuwa wanajumulisha na share zaAden, ambayo nayo ilikuwa EACB members, na share zake zilikuwa asilimia 11% naukichanganya na zanzibar zilikuwa zinafika (15%). ( Adeni ilikuwa chini yasulutani na alipoondoka alichukua chake) . Na baada ya Uhuru Zanzibarilipowenda kuomba kujiunga na IMF 1964 iliuwa imebakiwa na share za 3.5%sulutani alishaondoka na chake.Pia hizi document za IMF zinafanya assessment yachumi zote za Tanganyika na Zanzibar wakati wa uhuru wao, hebu sasa tuamuewenyewe? kama kweli Zanzibar yenye Uchumi wa $ 2 , Ilikuwa inauwezo wa kuwekezaasilimia 11 kwenye uchumi wa Tanganyika wa $24 MILIONI.
 

Attachments

Hicho kitabu nimeakuambia ni cha utafiti, hata yeye alikuja huko Uingereza kutafiti primary sources na katumia de-classified pia pamoja na makabrasha ya Jaji Ramadhani ambayo yalikuwa hayajawahi kutumiwa kabla - soma uhakiki huu:

[TABLE="width: 605"]
[TR]
[TD]
Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism: Lessons of Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union by I.G. Shivji

Review by Jenerali Ulimwengu​


Title: Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? Lessons of Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union

Author: Issa G. Shivji

Publisher: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers in association with Organisation for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA)

OSSREA ISBN 978-9994-455-21-8
Mkuku na Nyota ISBN 978-9987-449-99-6



INTRODUCTION


Once again, Professor Shivji has come out with a compelling book that will force all of us to scratch our heads and think, a work so powerful and so insightful that from now it will be well nigh impossible for anyone who will have read it to engage in any discourse about political and constitutional developments in Zanzibar, or about the nature, history and problems of the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, without making reference to the book.

As historical record, it affords us a much clearer grasp of what came to pass at the various stages of the existence of Zanzibar as a nation and as part of the Swahili civilisation that installed itself on the East African Coast over centuries.

As legal/constitutional treatise it fine-combs the major issues relating to legality, legitimacy and constitutionalism and bares the flaws that have plagued the Union because the principal protagonists in the narrative did not pay them the requisite heed.

As political comment, the book brings to the fore the pitfalls inherent in, on the one hand, trying to craft unity between states outside democratic processes and, on the other, failing to fully comprehend the nature of the imperialist forces which affect our lives as Africans and which impel us to urgently unite.

As a wake-up call, the book tells us that all is not well with the Union and, calls for more open debate on the Union.

What is more, as is his wont, in this book Shivji is in no mood for taking prisoners, and along the way he does take quite a few sacred cows to the slaughter. It is this incisiveness and forthrightness in examining historical facts that lends this book its great value as a work of singular scholarship and an unbridled contribution to our understanding of the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in particular and the question of African Unity in general. In his wake he minces few words in dissecting the actions of all the protagonists involved in the story, from Julius Nyerere to Abeid Karume, to Aboud Jumbe, to Abdulrahman Babu and others.

The book is divided into six chapters, each dealing with a thematic issue, offering descriptive and analytical insights, backed by earlier works by other writers (and Shivji’s own earlier contributions) as well as personal testimonies of those still alive and able to recount the events as they lived them. It also has a rich Appendix which should be a source of invaluable information for researchers. The upshot is an invaluable reference document that has benefited from the contributions of a wide range of credible actors and worthy researchers.

Chapter One sets the scene by presenting a graphic description of Zanzibar as it was at the time when anti-colonial forces in Africa were agitating for independence, and the different ethnic, racial and class formations that vied with each other for political ascendancy. It is here that the book brings into relief the reality of Zanzibar as a sort of melting pot wherein varied groups with varied origins had already engendered a culture and civilisation and language that were distinctly Zanzibari in particular and Swahili in general, belonging to a large religio-cultural ensemble of coastal city-states that straddled the East African Coast from Mombassa to Sofala in present-day Mozambique.

The rich tapestry of Zanzibari society thus brought together people who had come from the African mainland as far away as Nyasaland (present day Malawi) and Belgian Congo, Oman, Yemen, the Comoros, India and Shiraz in Persia etc, and who, the author argues, interacted in commerce, agriculture and crafts and who, though the idyllic characterisation of social relations on the islands of Unguja and Pemba may have been exaggerated, could not strictly be pigeon-holed into the racial hierarchy obtaining on the mainland (Europeans at the top, Asians in the middle, and Africans at the bottom.) The main argument here, and which becomes significant later on in the book, is that Zanzibariness came to be a reality, whatever the origins of those who claimed it.

According to Shivji it was the politicians jostling for political space who ushered in the politicisation of race and ethnicity, especially as independence approached and the prospects of taking power beckoned. Thus were born the easy categorisations that sought, and managed to place the various ethnic and racial groups into neat, little boxes: Arabs, Indians, mainlanders, etc., which would come to colour the politics of the islands to this day. Shivji shows the absurdity of such characterisation by pointing out that the first nationalist calls for independence from the British actually came from young, educated Arabs, acting not in the name of Omani colonialism but of Zanzibari nationalism.

Still, the damage had been done, and, whereas Karume and the ASP accused the Zanzibar Nationalist Party, ZNP, of being Arab feudalists acting at the behest of their masters in Oman, the ZNP suspected Karume and the ASP of being Trojan horses for the mainland. The bad blood created in that epoch still poisons Zanzibari politics to this day.

Shivji quotes a couple of writings by present-day CCM leaders hailing from Zanzibar and holding Union ministerial positions, characterising the leaders of the opposition Civic United Front, CUF, as agents of Arab colonialists bent on returning to re-colonise Zanzibar. It is of interest that at least two of those cited may have been, at the time of their writings, ministers responsible for Police, and thus charged with dealing with ‘political agitators’ during troubled times on the Islands, such as during elections.

Chapter Two describes in detail what transpired during the January 12 1964 insurgency that came to be known as the ‘revolution’, the role played by John Okello and Karume, the part played by Babu and his Umma Party cadres. There seems to be no doubt on the part of Shivji that Karume did not take an active part in the events of that Saturday night, and that he may have been kept at a distance for his own safety. It also seems that Okello must have played a more significant role than that ascribed to him by some ASP stalwarts (that he was chosen to make those bloodthirsty radio broadcasts because of his voice!) Shivji also discounts claims made by Babu as to the importance of his Umma cadres in directing the revolution, although he concedes some of their cadres who had `trained in Cuba might have instructed some insurgents in the use of firearms.

What is beyond dispute is the direct participation in the uprising of the so-called “Committee of 14,” including Seif Bakari, Saidi Natepe and Saidi Washoto, representing the lumpencharacter of the uprising, which was not necessarily informed by a well thought-out political agenda for a social revolution. The author even asserts that the revolution, while necessarily political, was not popular because a good half of the population did not support it. This part of the genesis of the uprising was, as is demonstrated by Shivji, to seriously affect the conduct of affairs of state once les sans- culottes found themselves holding the reins of state. It is hardly surprising that the state that they put in place proceeded haphazardly without a clear direction, while wreaking havoc on people’s basic rights, instilling fear in the populace and dealing with real or perceived opponents in the most brutal fashion.


It is in Chapter Three that the author deals with the factors presiding over the birth of the union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar. On the one hand there was the age-old desire, expressed over and over again by African nationalist freedom fighters of the region within the Pan- African Freedom Movement of East and Central Africa, PAFMECA, including Nyerere, who had wanted their countries to enter into some kind of unity/federation even before independence, which fact may give credence to the point of view that accepts the Union as a brainchild of that early resolve on the ‘pull’ side of things.

But on the other hand, the realities of the tensions of Cold War, especially acute at that particular time in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, may point to another source of pressure, on the ‘push’ side of the equation, and in this respect Shivji affords us ample documentary evidence to show that the Imperial powers subjectively saw themselves as standing to gain from what they saw as the neutralisation of the perceived ‘communist’ threat posed by Babu and the ‘comrades’ from the erstwhile Umma party.

When one considers the oft repeated desire for unity in the region and the expressed anxieties by the representatives of the Imperial powers concerned about the implantation of a ‘Cuba’ on the East African coast, reinforced by what Shivji, (and he is not alone in this) sees as Karume’s insecurity as to his tenuous hold onto power, it is perhaps not outlandish to conclude that ‘pull’ met ‘push’ in the move towards Union. In this context, did Nyerere, ardent Pan-Africanist but also convinced anti-communist that he was, see a once in a lifetime opportunity to kill two birds with one stone, that is rid himself of a ‘communist’ threat on his doorstep at the same time fulfilling a long standing yearning for unity, in which case the end justified the means? This seems to be the suggestion.

In this section Shivji also sets out the basic points agreed upon by Nyerere and Karume, illustrating the surprisingly lackadaisical and non-consultative manner in which the Union was entered to, which fact would come to haunt the Union to this day. The author shows how even the promulgation of the interim constitution was done by one man, the president of Tanganyika, who did not even consult the president of Zanzibar on the matter. Shivji muses that even if Karume had been consulted he probably would not have been able to make head or tail of it, given his feeble grasp of such legalistic niceties and his lack of competent legal personnel at a time when Nyerere was served by capable expatriate British lawyers.

For Shivji this was the ominous beginning of a long journey of non consultation and unilateralism exercised by Nyerere over and over again, which incrementally eroded the identity and autonomy of Zanzibar within the Union, making for dire consequences that he expounds upon later in the book.

Chapter Four takes on the state of the Union as it tried to find its feet within the general framework of the Cold war, with Western powers doing their best to limit the influence of Babu and his ‘communists’, Karume asserting his power by marginalising the Babu group and Nyerere increasingly uneasy with the growing autocracy manifested by his partner in the Islands. In short order, Karume reneged on the promises made at the time of the Revolution, banned Babu’s Umma party and dispersed its cadres, mainly to the mainland. Using the Revolutionary Council, he gradually became the source of all executive, legislative, and judicial power. As to the Union he did what he pleased, pretty much as if it had never existed. His party, ASP, was totally emasculated, all associations, including those affiliated to his own party, were banned, and up to his death in 1972 not a single party congress was called.

Nyerere watched in horror from Dar es Salaam as Karume became an embarrassing despot, clamping down on human rights, allowing people to go without basic essentials, including foodstuffs even as his foreign reserve coffers bulged. The forced marriages saga, in which he and his chief lieutenants apportioned themselves Arab and Persian girls, most of them underage, was an outrage that Nyerere apparently had to suffer in the name of the Union.

The disappearance of prominent politicians who had run foul of him, some of them reportedly killed in blood-chilling circumstances, was another grim matter. In addition, he refused to allow young Zanzibaris the opportunity to acquire higher education, even at the University of Dar es Salaam, which should have been their right. In sum, once Karume had taken out insurance with his entry into a Union he hardly respected, he became a dangerous tyrant even as he dished out largesse to the once dispossessed Blacks by building them modern houses and redistributing land.

At the same time more seeds of discords were being planted in such areas as the membership of Zanzibar in the East African Currency Board, EACB, and the jurisdiction of the newly formed Bank of Tanzania, BOT, both issues touching on the desire to maintain a measure of autonomy, an assertion of its identity. (The fact that these issues were ‘resolved’ in favour of the Union government, in effect Tanganyika, has not meant that they have gone away, and they have come later to rear their heads again in unrelated issues such as membership of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, OIC, and international sporting organisations.)

This was roughly the situation at the time of Karume’s death, when the Union was already stretched to breaking point, and Shivji suggests in this book (and he is not the first to do so) that had Karume lived even a little longer the Union would not have survived.

The contents of Chapter Five will no doubt be of great interest to constitutional lawyers, who may want to mull over the Union’s legal/constitutional foundations. This section sets out to show that there was very little thorough consultation between the two partners and that whereas Tanganyika was served by competent legal counsel, as already seen, Zanzibar was not. Even attempts by Salim Rashid to enlist the services of a Ugandan lawyer, Dan Nabudere, came to naught because, seemingly, according to evidence adduced by Shivji, Nabudere was confronted with a fait accompli. According to the author, Nyerere, with the help of a British lawyer, Roland Brown, had seen to it.

There is indeed considerable confusion as to whom among the Zanzibari leadership did and who did not know of the decision to proceed with the unification of the two countries before the fact. The account in the book gives the impression of revolving doors in a comedy of errors, with characters coming and going without necessarily interacting with each other.

The suggestion by Shivji is that the confusion was organised, because Karume did not want too many members of the Revolutionary Council to know what was afoot, as most of them would have opposed it. Even after reading this part at least twice, this reviewer cannot pronounce himself with certainty as to who was privy to the whole process of the signing of the Union.

Even after the signing, problems persisted. While the parliament of Tanganyika met to ratify the Articles of Union, the same cannot be said of the Revolutionary Council of Zanzibar, and Shivji presents testimonies of people who should have known (eg. Jumbe and Salim Rashid) asserting that no such ratification came to pass.

The author marshals closely knit legal and constitutional arguments in this section with a view to demonstrating that the Union was seriously flawed at its very inception because the requisite legal and constitutional steps were not followed through because, suggests Shivji, one side to the bargain was bent on manipulation while the other just did not have the capacity to comprehend what was going on.

Chapter Six looks at the Jumbe phase, with Jumbe having taken over the leadership of Zanzibar after Karume’s assassination. Jumbe came to power almost as an antithesis to Karume. According to Shivji Jumbe had all along not been seen by Karume as a potential threat. He rarely made his opinion known, was content to do his chief’s bidding and acquiesced in all his excesses. But he was also a more ‘educated’ man, in touch with modern tenets of governance, and therefore more to Nyerere’s liking. He wasted little time in consolidating his power by clipping the wings of the Revolutionary Council and investing more power in party structures and undertaking constitutional reforms.

He also opened debate within the party, calling for an end to the more egregious abuses that were associated with the Zanzibari leadership under his predecessor. He also opened the doors for young Zanzibaris to study outside Zanzibar, and tens of them joined the University of Dar es Salaam, where not only did they acquire a ‘modern education’ but were also able to mingle and exchange ideas with their counterparts from the mainland. Thus was born a new crop of Zanzibaris who would, in time, make their mark on the conduct of politics in Zanzibar and within the Union. Shivji notes the irony that it was these same ‘Young Turks’ whom Jumbe had sent to university that would, in time, become the instruments of his own political demise.

Perhaps most important in this section is Shivji’s critical look at the way Nyerere, using the doctrine of Party supremacy, managed to further encroach on Zanzibar’s autonomy. From the outset, Shivji endeavours to show how Nyerere had all along acted in a manner that was detrimental to Zanzibar’s autonomy by gradually elongating the list of Union matters beyond the original eleven items, thus making laws and decisions made on the mainland applicable to Zanzibar even in non Union matters.

The merger of the two political parties, TANU and ASP in 1977, and the subordination of all political, legislative and economic decisions to the authority of the one supreme party, CCM, the stage was set for the further dilution of the powers of the Zanzibar Revolutionary Council and the House of Representatives, which had come into being under the new constitutional dispensation ushered in by Jumbe.

Now, a coup de grace was to be admitted. In the wake of voices of discontent in Zanzibar (the economy was weak, shortages were a common feature, Jumbe’s profligacy in spending on things like a presidential jet was unpopular). Many on the islands believed, rightly or wrongly, that Zanzibar was being exploited and fettered by the mainland, and that if Zanzibar had greater autonomy this would not be the case.

When Jumbe, in an attempt to respond to this challenge, and perhaps to further consolidate and secure his hold on power, started consulting legal minds with a view to effecting greater autonomy by instituting a separate government for Tanganyika, he was ‘tried’ in a meeting of the national executive committee of CCM, and forced to resign all his official positions: vice president of the Union, vice chairman of the party; president of Zanzibar, and chairman of the Revolutionary Council.

The effect of this event has come to spawn new dissentions among Zanzibari politicians and commentators of varying political persuasions. Particularly resented is the practice of CCM imposing on Zanzibar leaders “made in Dodoma.” Matters were not helped by the repeat of the same when, in 2000, once again, the party chose a candidate for the Zanzibar presidential election who had failed to get the endorsement of the Zanzibar caucus of CCM. It is easy to speculate that if this practice is not tempered, these dissentions may one day come to a head with dire consequences for the Union. Already the removal of the president of Zanzibar as automatic vice president of the Union has created a lot of rancour among many Zanzibaris.

In his Conclusion Shivji returns to the origins of the Union and the role played by the Imperial powers to bring it about, at the same time as he brings into sharp contrast the contending views held by Nkrumah and Nyerere. On matters internal to the Union he recaps his presentation of the secrecy in which the negotiations for the Union were shrouded, and the weakness of the consultative process undertaken, which informed the disgruntlement expressed during the constitutional debate of the early 1980s, which indirectly brought about Jumbe’s downfall. Shivji insists, with reason, that for a union to have legitimacy, and therefore sustainability, it must be anchored in the consent of the people affected and involve the equitable distribution of power. Nyerere, according to Shivji, did not allow this to happen, and he punished Jumbe when he tried to raise the issue.

Worse, Nyerere’s successors did not take any steps to rectify the situation, and instead they reversed even those progressive gains he had registered in furthering the aims of the Pan-African agenda, leading to the current state where the country has slid back into narrow nationalisms based on race, ethnicity, indigenousness and culture, even as we are witnessing elsewhere a resurgence of African nationalism and Pan-Africanism. He concludes, with a quote from Nyerere:

Africa must unite. This was the title of one of Kwame Nkrumah’s books. That call is more urgent today than ever before. Together, we the peoples of Africa will be incomparably stronger internationally than we are now with our multiplicity of unviable states. The needs of our separate countries can be, and are being, ignored by the rich and powerful. The result is that Africa is being marginalised

Issa Shivji has to be congratulated on this tremendous contribution to the debate on Pan-Africanism in general and the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar in particular, a work that must surely qualify to be his magnum opus ( for now, that is, as there is no telling what he might come out with the day after tomorrow.) There can be little disagreement with what he posits as the overriding interest in the unity of African states if the continent is to survive in the hostile world of imperialism, now under the guise of globalisation.

The position he takes on the great debate between Nkrumah and Nyerere (African Union Government now, vs. gradualism and a step by step approach) has been with us for quite some time now and the jury seems to be still out. In Shivji’s new role as the first Mwalimu Julius Nyerere Professor in Pan-African Studies will undoubtedly afford him ample space to guide us in further deliberation on this matter, as there is much to be said for both sides of the argument.

On one hand, we suspect rather know that had our forebears acceded to the Union government arrangement at or around Independence we would have already covered a lot of ground by now, in terms of consolidating unity and bringing Africa closer together, yet on the other we have learnt from the experience of even the limited experiment that is the Union of Tanganyika and Zanzibar the pitfalls with which any hurried association is fraught.

It is possible to say today that the balkanisation of our continent has not only been maintained but in too many cases it has been exacerbated by fissures along ethnic, racial and religious lines. Indeed, the tenuous territorial glue applied by colonialists for the protection of their interests and bequeathed onto us at Independence, is steadily coming unstuck.

The calls for unity we hear from individuals like Muammar Gaddafy come across increasingly as quirky, quixotic and capricious, unable to inspire serious consideration. Yet the yearning for unity among our peoples, our common recognition across the African continent that we share a common history and a common destiny, the realisation that we must either unite or perish in this world of adversity, must impel us to make that unity a reality. Forms may be debated but the principle remains unassailable.

Concerning the Union between Tanganyika and Zanzibar, politicians, researchers and those who want to know where we came from, where we are at and where we might be headed, will want to read this book. To be sure, this book will not be popular with our governors, and I suspect it was not intended to be, because it raises too many issues that will make them uncomfortable.

It is to be hoped that at least some of them will muster the courage to read it and draw the many lessons it offers free of charge. Of central importance here is to predicate all our actions and decisions on thorough knowledge and appreciation of our history and the mistakes we made in the past with a view to rectifying them.

Unless this is done, we are bound to keep on repeating the mistakes of the past, bumbling from hiccup to hiccup as we try to plug holes in an edifice so threadbare it cannot even stand the stresses of repair. Every time there is a political crisis, including the “pollution of the political atmosphere” the casus belli has been the same: Zanzibaris demanding the autonomy to determine their own affairs, with the one exception of the G-55 when the call came from Tanganyika.

Now CCM seems to have settled into the practice of picking Zanzibar’s leaders in Dodoma, without regard for the views of the Zanzibaris themselves. Need we say that this does not augur well for the future of the Union? Didn’t someone say that doing the same thing, the same way, over and over again and expecting different outcomes, is a sign of insanity?

Will Shivji’s book stir a political hornet’s nest? Maybe, but the sting of the hornets thus disturbed may prove the medicine we need to cure an otherwise more painful ailment. Some readers may find his treatment of some leading characters in the narrative objectionable, and these objections may come from different sources regarding different such characters, but maybe that is something we all should learn to live with.

Shivji’s handling of the role played by Mwalimu may be found by some to be a trifle iconoclastic as he shows him to be a scheming Machiavelli with few scruples when pursuing his political ends. Lese majeste? Let the reader be the adjudicator. We have the misfortune of never having had the opportunity to read Nyerere himself on a number of issues discussed in this book, or even to have had Nyerere interviewed seriously by an African writer of Shivji,s stature.
Also, those who lived through those heady days and have a first-hand story to tell are getting on and may not be with us for long. But Shivji has given anyone who thinks they can add something to what we already know (or even dispute what Shivji is saying) a solid starting bloc.

This book is a masterpiece, a must read.

Yahoo! Groups
[/TD]
[/TR]
[/TABLE]
Nimeongeza proof kutoka IMF, zinazoonyesha shareza Zanzibar katika EACB kwamba zilikuwa asilimi 3.5%(Tatu na nusu). Ila kwamakusudi nadhani au kwa kutoelewa Zanzibar wamekuwa wanajumulisha na share zaAden, ambayo nayo ilikuwa EACB members, na share zake zilikuwa asilimia 11% naukichanganya na zanzibar zilikuwa zinafika (15%). ( Adeni ilikuwa chini yasulutani na alipoondoka alichukua chake) . Na baada ya Uhuru Zanzibarilipowenda kuomba kujiunga na IMF 1964 iliuwa imebakiwa na share za 3.5%sulutani alishaondoka na chake.Pia hizi document za IMF zinafanya assessment yachumi zote za Tanganyika na Zanzibar wakati wa uhuru wao, hebu sasa tuamuewenyewe? kama kweli Zanzibar yenye Uchumi wa $ 2 , Ilikuwa inauwezo wa kuwekezaasilimia 11 kwenye uchumi wa Tanganyika wa $24 MILIONI.

Hebu niambie tumewabaka vipi kiuchumi wazanzibari kama figures ndio hizo???? Ndio maana ninasema Shivji alikuwa na conclution yake kichwani na hakutaka ukweli, hakuna unyonyaji wowote tuliowafanyia wazanzibari zaidi ya kufanya nao kazi kama ndugu kwa mutual benefits na wao wakifaidi zaidi. Please check these documents harafu uje tujadiliane unipe msimao kama bado unaamini tuliwanyonya???
 
Hayo nimaandiko ambayo yameaminika kwenye Academia ya Tanzania reference zake sio reliable sana.Mojawapo ya kazi ninayofanya ni kwenda national archive kuona Intelligence za kimagharibi zilisema nini kuhusu hili swala,Je kuna mambo mengine ambayo yanaweza yakatupa mwanga zaidi????Jibu ni ndio.

Mfano ukisoma historia ya nyerere, tunayoijua ni nusu tu, Nusu kubwa bado iko National Archive as semi classified document, Mwuulize mwalimu wako Tom Malony , maana wakati wa event ya mwalimu nyerere , tuli apply permission ya kupata hizi semi classified history za nyerere, na kwa accesss ya siku moja tu tuliweza kujua mengi kuhusu nyerere na historia yake kuliko vitabu vyote vilivyopo sokoni vinavyotujuza.

Uzuri wa hizi de-classified information zimeandikwa kipindi cha tukio kwa hiyo ni original reporting. While vitabu vya SHIvJI vinategemea secondary sources.

1. Tom Molony sio mwalimu wangu, hajawahi kunifundisha - wakati nasoma alikuwa mwanafunzi kama mimi
2. De-classified materials, like any archival material, is open to interpretation and prone to errors and biases
 
Mkuu,

Ninakubaliana na assessment yako, ila pia inabidi kwenye assessment yako ujikumbushe kwamba Nyerere hakuwa mfuasi wa westerners at the time. Kwahiyo with confidence ninasema motive ya Nyerere ilikuwa haina uhusiano na wamareKani , Ila pia in part aliamini kustablise Zanzibar ingesaidia usalama wa upande wa Tanganyika, so it was an issue of national security kwa Tanganyika. Ila sasa as a consequences, ilibidi atumie constitution as a tool to stabilise Zanzibar, which sound very unpopular now.

Swali la Msingi la kujiuuliza ni kwamba, Je wazanzibari wako tayari kuja pamoja na kutumia vizuri nguvu watakazo rudishiwa na tanganyika baada ya katiba mpya??? . Au wanataka wapate kwanza uhuru ndio wapange jinsi ya kuutumia?? Hili ndio swali linaloumiza kichwa kuelekea kwenye mchakato wa katiba.

Kwanini linaniumiza kichwa? Zanzibar inamakundi mengi mno, na yote yana nguvu sawia na mengi hayako tayari ku compromise, Muungano umekuwa ni vehcle ya kuyang'anganiza haya makundi ya compromise. Je Zanzibar huru zaidi iko tayari kucompromise bila kuwa forced na Tanganyika????

Nikupe mfano, Kwasasa NEC ya CCM Tanzania inasaidia sana ku defuse migogoro ya maKundi Ndani ya CCM Zanzibar kwa Kuchagua Mgombea wa Uraisi Zanzibar, Je ukifika wakati NEC ya Zanzibar inachagua mgombea yenyewe, je makundi yatakayoshindwa, yatakuwa tayari kuridhia kushindwa???? au yatatafuta namna ya kumpindua mshindi?. Na kama makundi mbalimbali hayo yasipokubali kushindwa; which will be mostly the case, then zanzibar itasongaje mbele bila muafaka???

Yes ndugu, Nyerere amefanya for the safety of Tanganyika, na alihitajika atumie kila njia kuhakikisha mabalaa yalioki zanzibar yasijekuathiri taifa lake. Ndio maana akaona ni muhimu kueka muungano, because atawazidi nguvu hao maadui na atakuwa na right ya military operations katika visiwa kama ingebidi.

Foreign intervention:

This article examines the response of the British government to the revolution in Zanzibar in January 1964. It demonstrates
that, once the safety of British nationals had been assured, British concerns upon the possibility that the new regime in
Zanzibar might become susceptible to communist influence. These fears appeared to be realised as soon as British
influence in Zanzibar diminished and the new government welcomed communist aid and advisers. In the aftermath of
successful military interventions in support of moderate regimes in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, and under pressure
from Washington to take decisive action, the british prepared a series of plans for military action in Zanzibar. None of these were enacted and the final plan was scrapped in December. The paper examines the range of factors that undermined
British diplomacy and inhibited the government from taking military action in Zanzibar. In doing so it illustrates the
complexity of Britain's relationship with post-colonial regimes in East Africa and the difficulties that it faced when trying to
exert influence in a region recognised by both London and Washington as a British sphere of influence.

.........

Kwa sasa situation zanzibar imebadilika sana, muna makundi mengi yes, but they are not the way the used to. During that colonial time, Britain tayari alikua ameshaweka matabaka na kuwafanya watu wa aina fulani ni wanyonge na flani ni mabwana for the purpose ya kutengeza chuki katika society ya zanzibar. But that thing is not to occur now katika kipindi hichi, people are civilized now, na ukitizama, wanaodai zanzibar huru sio waarabu tu, na waswahili pia ngozi nyeusi unayoijua wewe inadai zanzibar huru, tizama video zote za uamsho utaona.
Kuwepo kwa makundi mengi zanzibar sio sababu ya kusema kwamba ndio kutakua na machafuko, hakuna kundi linalodhulumiwa wala hakukutengenezwa matabaka ya watu tangu mapinduzi, ukitizama historia inakwambia kabisa kama karume madaraka aliwapa na waarabu, wa persia na waswahili pia. Tangu hapo hapakuwa na tabaka la watumwa wenye kuteswa ndio maana naamini ivi sasa zanzibar ikiwa huru hakutakuwa na civil wars, kinachoogopewa zanzibar ni kuwa CCM atapoteza uongozi ikiwa sanzibar itakua huru. Possibility ya kutokea machafuko zanzibar ni ndogo kuliko bara kama zanzibar itapata uhuru. Kuna makabila zaidi ya 120 na kwa kupitia JF tu naona kama gita vya makabuli ama chuki dhidi ya kabila flani inaweza toka anytime.then tanganyika mikoa yake imejigawa kikabila hasa, kwa mfano utakuta mkoa flani ni watu flani, tofauti na zanzibar, zanzibar jamii yote iko mixed hutopata sehemu ukasema kwamba mkoa flani ni waarabu na mkoa flani ni waswahili, unakuta jamii imemix na wanashirikiana. Hii nchi ya tanzania imeshindikana na wala simlaumu JK, watu walianza zamani kuharibu huu mungano, iachiwe zanzibar iwe huru na uwepo huo mkataba, then kila mtu ashughulikie mambo yake, kusingizia kwamba zanzibar kuna matabaka mengi si hoja ya kuilazimisha znz uwe katika muuungano wa nchi 1.

Na kuongezea kidogo, japo watakereka wengi, ni kuwa UISLAM umesaidia sana katika kuwaleta pamoja watu na kuwafanya watu wamuogopa mungu, hii ndio silaha kubwa sana. Leo hii CUF, CCM, na UAMSHO waeke mkutano ninakuhakikishia UAMSHO watapata wengi sana kuliko wote, sio kwa sababu wao wanadai zanzibar huru tu bali ni dini ndio iliouwaunganisha, maana ata cuf pia inadai zanzibar huru. Ustaarabu na hekima iliyoko zanzibar imeletwa na uislam na ndio maana ninaamini hakutatokea machafuko ya civil wars, labda CCM waanze uchokozi maana wao ndio walioleta chuki ya upmba na uunguja na kuwaaminisha watu kuwa pba na znz hawana undugu! Tembelea maskani ya kisonge ya ccm, wanaume wazima hawana kazi wala bazi, wamekaa kama makhani.thi wanakaa maskani na kupeana umbea na kueneza chuki, yuke Borafya nae kama shoga, hana la kufanya. Karume aliwaweza wale, walizoea kila siku maskani ile ipelekewe pesa karume akazina source coz hawana mchango katika taifa zaidi ya kubomoa tu
 
1. Tom Molony sio mwalimu wangu, hajawahi kunifundisha - wakati nasoma alikuwa mwanafunzi kama mimi
2. De-classified materials, like any archival material, is open to interpretation and prone to errors and biases

What is your take after looking at the IMF documents?. Unajua yule rafiki yako wa Queen Magret anakaa sio mbali sana na wewe hapo, yupo Connecticut.
 
Yes ndugu, Nyerere amefanya for the safety of Tanganyika, na alihitajika atumie kila njia kuhakikisha mabalaa yalioki zanzibar yasijekuathiri taifa lake. Ndio maana akaona ni muhimu kueka muungano, because atawazidi nguvu hao maadui na atakuwa na right ya military operations katika visiwa kama ingebidi.

Foreign intervention:

This article examines the response of the British government to the revolution in Zanzibar in January 1964. It demonstrates
that, once the safety of British nationals had been assured, British concerns upon the possibility that the new regime in
Zanzibar might become susceptible to communist influence. These fears appeared to be realised as soon as British
influence in Zanzibar diminished and the new government welcomed communist aid and advisers. In the aftermath of
successful military interventions in support of moderate regimes in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika, and under pressure
from Washington to take decisive action, the british prepared a series of plans for military action in Zanzibar. None of these were enacted and the final plan was scrapped in December. The paper examines the range of factors that undermined
British diplomacy and inhibited the government from taking military action in Zanzibar. In doing so it illustrates the
complexity of Britain's relationship with post-colonial regimes in East Africa and the difficulties that it faced when trying to
exert influence in a region recognised by both London and Washington as a British sphere of influence.

.........

Kwa sasa situation zanzibar imebadilika sana, muna makundi mengi yes, but they are not the way the used to. During that colonial time, Britain tayari alikua ameshaweka matabaka na kuwafanya watu wa aina fulani ni wanyonge na flani ni mabwana for the purpose ya kutengeza chuki katika society ya zanzibar. But that thing is not to occur now katika kipindi hichi, people are civilized now, na ukitizama, wanaodai zanzibar huru sio waarabu tu, na waswahili pia ngozi nyeusi unayoijua wewe inadai zanzibar huru, tizama video zote za uamsho utaona.
Kuwepo kwa makundi mengi zanzibar sio sababu ya kusema kwamba ndio kutakua na machafuko, hakuna kundi linalodhulumiwa wala hakukutengenezwa matabaka ya watu tangu mapinduzi, ukitizama historia inakwambia kabisa kama karume madaraka aliwapa na waarabu, wa persia na waswahili pia. Tangu hapo hapakuwa na tabaka la watumwa wenye kuteswa ndio maana naamini ivi sasa zanzibar ikiwa huru hakutakuwa na civil wars, kinachoogopewa zanzibar ni kuwa CCM atapoteza uongozi ikiwa sanzibar itakua huru. Possibility ya kutokea machafuko zanzibar ni ndogo kuliko bara kama zanzibar itapata uhuru. Kuna makabila zaidi ya 120 na kwa kupitia JF tu naona kama gita vya makabuli ama chuki dhidi ya kabila flani inaweza toka anytime.then tanganyika mikoa yake imejigawa kikabila hasa, kwa mfano utakuta mkoa flani ni watu flani, tofauti na zanzibar, zanzibar jamii yote iko mixed hutopata sehemu ukasema kwamba mkoa flani ni waarabu na mkoa flani ni waswahili, unakuta jamii imemix na wanashirikiana. Hii nchi ya tanzania imeshindikana na wala simlaumu JK, watu walianza zamani kuharibu huu mungano, iachiwe zanzibar iwe huru na uwepo huo mkataba, then kila mtu ashughulikie mambo yake, kusingizia kwamba zanzibar kuna matabaka mengi si hoja ya kuilazimisha znz uwe katika muuungano wa nchi 1.

Na kuongezea kidogo, japo watakereka wengi, ni kuwa UISLAM umesaidia sana katika kuwaleta pamoja watu na kuwafanya watu wamuogopa mungu, hii ndio silaha kubwa sana. Leo hii CUF, CCM, na UAMSHO waeke mkutano ninakuhakikishia UAMSHO watapata wengi sana kuliko wote, sio kwa sababu wao wanadai zanzibar huru tu bali ni dini ndio iliouwaunganisha, maana ata cuf pia inadai zanzibar huru. Ustaarabu na hekima iliyoko zanzibar imeletwa na uislam na ndio maana ninaamini hakutatokea machafuko ya civil wars, labda CCM waanze uchokozi maana wao ndio walioleta chuki ya upmba na uunguja na kuwaaminisha watu kuwa pba na znz hawana undugu! Tembelea maskani ya kisonge ya ccm, wanaume wazima hawana kazi wala bazi, wamekaa kama makhani.thi wanakaa maskani na kupeana umbea na kueneza chuki, yuke Borafya nae kama shoga, hana la kufanya. Karume aliwaweza wale, walizoea kila siku maskani ile ipelekewe pesa karume akazina source coz hawana mchango katika taifa zaidi ya kubomoa tu

Kama Imani yako ni kwamba hakuna makundi then hii ni habari njema sana na sisi sote tunamwomba Mwenyezi Mungu iwe hivyo! Kwasababu hatuwezi kuicha zanzibar ipasuke na fujo maana ita turnish image ya Tanzania. Kuna watu wamekuwa na commitment kubwa sana na utunzaji wa immage ya Tanzania ndio maana hata sasa kuna fujo lakini vyombo vikubwa vya habari vinaipotezea.
 
What is your take after looking at the IMF documents?. Unajua yule rafiki yako wa Queen Magret anakaa sio mbali sana na wewe hapo, yupo Connecticut.

Yanahitaji utulivu hayo makabrasha, nikiyapitia nitarudi.

Rafiki yupi - Wa Kizimbabwe au wa Kiskochi-Kikenya?
 
What is your take after looking at the IMF documents?. Unajua yule rafiki yako wa Queen Magret anakaa sio mbali sana na wewe hapo, yupo Connecticut.

By the way, bado unatumia barua pepe ya Tzeca au tanzaniawealth? Leta hoja zako kwenye Wanazuoni, kuna watafiti wa Zanzibar. Nimekutumia mwaliko!
 
Back
Top Bottom